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DECISIONS
RELATING TO
Ti:E PUBIAC IANDS.
RAILROAD GRANT-PRE-EMPTION FILING-INDEMNITY SELECTION.
NORTHERN PACIFIC R. B. Co. ET AL. V. JOHN 0. MILLER.
A prima facie valid pre-emption filing of record at the date when a railroad grant
takes effect excludes the land covered thereby from the operation of the grant.
The right to select a particular tract as indemnity can not be recognized if the loss
for which indemnity is claimed is not specifically designated.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, July 1,
1890.
The SE. 4 of NE. 4 and the NE. 1 of SE. 1 of section 19, T. 131 N.,
R. 40 W., Fergus Falls, Minnesota, are within the granted limits of the
St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway company and also within
the indemnity limits of the Northern Pacific Railroad company.
The rights of the former company (as stated by your office) attached
December 19, 1871, and a withdrawal for the benefit of the latter was
ordered by your office letter of December 26, 1871, received at the local
office January 6, 1872.
On November 24,1871, Jens Anderson filed pre-emption declaratory
statement alleging settlement the same day upon the land described.
On January 30, 1884, the Northern Pacific Railroad applied to select
the said land. Its application was rejected at the local office and the
said company appealed.
On April 8, 1884, John 0. Miller, alleging that the filing of Ander-
son had excepted the land from the grant to St. Paul, Minneapolis and
Manitoba Ry., made homestead application for the same.
Thereupon a hearing, at which the applicant and the company last
named were represented by counsel, was had at the local office on May
15, 1884.
On the same day the local officers found from the testimony that An-
derson had made settlement, built a house, and resided upon the land
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and that his claim being " capable of being perfected at the time the
railroad grant took effect" excepted the land therefrom.
From this ruling an appeal was taken by the attorney for the com-
pany.
On September 16,1885, your office held that Anderson's filing ex-
cepted the land from the grant to the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Mani-
toba Co., and also that the same " is not subject to selection as indemnity
by the Northern Pacific Company because one company cannot go into
the granted limits of another for indemnity lands."
From the foregoing both of the said companies have appealed.
At the date when as stated, the rights of the St. Paul, Minneapolis
and Manitoba company attached, Anderson's filing was of record and
primafacie valid. It, therefore, operated to except the tract from the
grant to that company. Malone v. Union Pacific Railway Company (7
L. D., 13); Northern Pacific Railroad company v. Stovenour, decided
June 7, 1890, (10 L. D., 645).
The claim of the Northern Pacific Railroad company to a right to
select the tract involved is based upon the third section of its granting
act (July 2, 1864, 13 Stats., 365), which provides that whenever prior
to the definite location of its line of road
any of said (granted) sections or parts of sections shall have been granted, sold, re-
served, occupied by homestead settlers or pre-empted or otherwise disposed of, other
lands shall be selected in lieu thereof under the direction of the Secretary of the
Interior in alternate sections and designated by odd nmbers notmorethan ten miles
beyond the limits of said (granted) alternate sections.
The loss to its grant in the manner prescribed of a tract or tracts of
land orresponding to those which it claims as indemnity is, under the
stated provisions of its grant, an essential to the right of the company
to so select.
That such losses should first be shown to the satisfaction of the land
department, is obvious, for otherwise the indemnity claimed therefor
could not properly be selected under the " direction of the Secretary of
the Interior" or in other words, in accordance with the act of 1864,
supra.
By circular approved August 4, 1885, (4 L. D., 90), the various local
officers were instructed as follows:
Before admitting railroad indemnity selections in any ease you will require pre-
liminary lists to be filed specifying the particular deficiencies for which indemnity is
claimed and in cases where indemnity selections have heretofore been made without
specification of losses you will require the companies to designate the deficiencies
for which such indemnity is to be applied before further selections are allowed.
The particular loss in lieu of which the Northern Pacific Railroad
company seeks to select the land in question is not shown by the record
before me and I am advised by your office that it has failed to designate
the same.
The said application of the Northern Pacific Railroad is accordingly
denied.
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The homestead application of Miller, if in other respects regular, will
therefore be allowed.
The action of your office in rejecting the respective claims of the
said companies to the land described, is for the reasons stated hereby
affirmed.
FINAL PROOF PROCEEDINGS-TRANSFEREE.
JOHN HILDEN ET AL.
Where no cause is shown for failure to submit final proof on the day fixed therefor,
bnt such proof is accepted by the local office, the defect may be cured by refer-
ence to the board of equitable adjudication.
A transferee in good faith may be accorded an opportunity to show the qualification
of the pre-emptor.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, July 1, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Daniel F. Law, transferee, from your
office decision of October 9, 1888, holding the pre-emption entry of John
Hilden for cancellation.
The record shows that on the 5th day of August, 1881, John Hilden
filed his declaratory statement for the E. i SE. i, of Sec. 12, T. 8 S., R.
41 E., and lots 3 and 4, Sec. 7, T. 8 S., 42 E., B. M., in the local land
office at Oxford, Idaho, alleging settlement on the 26th day of July, 1881.
July 21, 1882, notice was given that claimant would make his final
proof before the deputy clerk of the United States court at Soda Springs,
on the 25th day of August, 1882. Said proof bears date August28,1882,
and shows the claimant to be a single man twenty-nine years of age and
naturalized; that settlement was made on the lan I July 26, 1881, and
that he built a house and corral thereon. Value of the improvements
$200. It also shows that actual residence was established on the land
in August, 1881, and was continuous thereafter to date of proof. No
description of the house is given.
As to the quantity of land broken and cultivated, he answered " seven-
ty-five acres," and says it was used for cutting hay. His witnesses sky
that the land was used for " pasturage and for cutting hay."i
His proof was approved by the local office and the usual certificate
of purchase given.
On the 8th of March, 1884, your office suspended the entry and re-
quired him to submit supplementary proof of " record evidence " show.
ing him to be a naturalized citizen, or to have declared his intention to
become such.
June 11, 1884, the local office reported to your office that he had been
notified that he was required to furnish the record evidence required
and notice returned *' Eilden left the country," that his attorney was
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also notified and stated in reply that Hilden had "left for parts un-
known."'
July 27, 1885, your office requested of the local office an immediate
report showing what action had been taken by the local office and claim-
ant.
August 3, 1885, the local office reported to your office that " neither
John Hilden nor the present claimant to the land by purchase-Daniel
F. Law-have taken any action in compliance with said requirement."
With said report the local office also transmitted two letters of David
D. Wright, written to the local office. In one of said letters, bearing date
July 13, 1884, he states that " Daniel F. Law, the present occupant and
owner (by purchase from Hilden) of said tract was by me duly notified
as per request in your letter." Said report of the local office further
shows that "said David D. Wright, as deputy clerk United States
court, was the officer before whom John Hilden had made filal proof
in the case."
March 31, 1887, your office suspended the entry for the reason that
the proof was not made in accordance with the published notice which
fixed the time for making final proof for August 25, and proof was made
August 28, 1882, and required claimant to make " new publication and
new proof," and to furnish the record evidence of naturalization or de-
claration of his intention to become a citizen of the United States.
He was allowed ninety days to comply with or appeal from your said
decision.
August 1, 1887, the local office reported to your office that notice of
the requirements of your letter of March 31, 1887, was mailed by regis-
tered letter to the claimant and his receipt therefor, bearing date April
21, 1887, was returned to your office, and reported " no action has been
taken, ninety-five days having expired from date of mailing."
By your office decision of October 9. 1888, you held the entry for can-
cellation giving sixty days for appeal.
November 21, 1888, the local office reported noticeaddressed to claim-
ant returned " unclaimed " and also that the local officers had been in-
formed that Hilden is, and has been confined, in the asylum for the
insane.
March 6, 1889, your office directed the local office to notify Daniel F.
Law, present owner, of your decision of October 9, 1888, holding said
entry for cancellation and allowing him sixty days for appeal to the
Hon. Secretary.
Daniel F. Law appeals from your office decision of October 9, 1888.
On January 20, 1890, you transmitted to this Department an applica-
tion of appellant for modification of your decision holding the entry for
cancellation, in so far as the requirement to furnish new proof is con-
cerned, but proposing to transmit a copy of the naturalization papers
of Hilden. The reason assigned for the non-compliance with the re-
quirements of your office is that Hilden had been confined in the Insane
Asylum of Idaho for some eighteen months prior to December 16, 1889,
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 5
when he was discharged as shown by the affidavit of the medical super-
intendent of the asylum.
One of the questions arising upon the record in this case is upon your
requirement of October 9, 1888, requiring new notice and new proof for
the reason the proof on file was taken three days subsequent to the
time designated in the published notice. Where the officers of the local
office have accepted the proof, and where no cause is shown for the
delay, as in this case, then the defect may be cured by reference to the
board of equitable adjudication, under section nine of final proof rules,
dated July 17, 1889 (9 L. D., 123).
See Elias Rosenthal (10 L. D., 596).
The other question in the case relates to the right of appellant to
furnish the necessary proof as to citizenship of the entryman and while
I am not willing to sanction the laches as shown on the part of the ap-
pellant, yet in view of the insanity of the pre-emptor as shown, and all
the facts and circumstances in the case, I am of the opinion that the
appellant should have an opportunity to furnish the proof required by
law as to citizenship of the pre-emptor; and under the circumstances,
the appellant should show by affidavit the facts and circumstances con-
nectedl with his purchase of the lands.
You will, therefore, direct that the transferee, or claimant be required
to fur.nish supplemental proof within sixty days from notice hereof,
showing compliance with the requirements ot the pre-emption law as
to the citizenship of the entryman, and also the facts and circumstances
connected with the purchase by, and transfer of the lands to appellant
Daniel F. Law.
You will readjudicate the case upon the receipt of such new evidence.
In case of a failure to comply herewith in the time named, the entry
will be canceled.
Your said office decision is accordingly modified.
CONTEST-COMPLIANCE WITH LAW PRIOR TO NOTICE.
ANDERSON V. BULLOCK.
f the entryman prior to service of notice in good faith cures his default, the contest
must be dismissed.
Actual knowledge of an impending contest will not prejudice the claimant if his
subsequent compliance with law is in pursuance of a previous bona fide-intent.
No preference right can be acquired under a contest begun and prosecuted for other
purposes than in good faith to acquire title to the land.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, July
1, 1890.
This Department, by decision of June 11, 1888, affirmed the decision
of your office in the case of Lee W. Anderson v. Percy Bullock, hold-
ing for cancellation the latter's timber culture entry No. 8268, for the
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NW. 1 of Sec. 15, T. 110,1 R. 65, Huron district, Dakota. After notice
of said decision. Bullock duly filed a motion for review and rehearing.
The entry was made April 1, 1882. and Anderson initiated a contest
April 2, 188:3, the day after the expiration of the first year of the entry.
The ground of the contest was, that Bullock had failed "to break or
cause to be broken five acres within a year from making said entry."
Notice was not issued on this contest until August 28, 1883, and
service thereof was made on Bullock October 18, of that year.
Leaving the question of the bona fides of the entryman out of the
consideration of this case, I think this motion for review must be sus-
tained, for the reason that it seems that the fact relative to the claimant
curing, his laches after the time of the contest, and before notice thereof
was S. rd upon him has been entirely overlooked in the former adju-
dications in this case. It is conceded that, while the contest was
initiated April 2, 1883, notice thereof was not served on Bullock until
October 18, 1883, long after the default set up in the contest had been
cured. In the case of Scott v. King (9 L. D., 299), it is held that-
The fact of compliance with law after affidavit of contest is filed and before 7egal
notice thereof, goes to the weight, and not to the admissibility, of the testimony,
and
actual knowledge of a impending contest~will not prejudice the claimant, if his
subsequent compliance with the law is in pursuance of a previous bona fide intent.
It does not appear that claimant had knowledge of the contest the
latter part of April, 1883, when Anderson completed the breaking. It
is the uniform ruling of the Department that where the entryman, prior
to service of notice of contest upon him in good faith cures his laches,
.that the contest must be dismissed. (Stayton v. Carroll, 7 L.D., 198;
Hunter v. Haynes, ib., 8; St. John v. Raff 8 L.D., 552.)
In consideraton, however, of the fact that Anderson, as successful
contestant, has been permitted, since the departmental decision, to make
timber culture entry of the land, you are instructed, in order that he
may have an opportunity to show cause why said entry should not
be canceled, to direct the local officers to order a hearing to be had
thirty days after notice thereof is served upon the parties. At this
bearing any further testimony that can be had relating to the validity
of 3ullock's entry and particularly to the charge set up in the affidavit
of contest -may be submitted, and, also, testimomy bearing upon the
charges contained in a corroborated affidavit filed by Bullock with his
motion for review, to the effect that Anderson offered on several occa.
sions to dismiss his contest for a pecuniary consideration, and also pro-
posed that, if Bullock would give up his claim, he (Anderson) would
sell the and and divide the proceeds with him. If these charges are
true, the contest of Anderson would appear to have been begun and
prosecuted for other purposes than in good faith to acquire title to this
tract. In either case, Anderson could acquire no preference right of
entry by his contest. (Dayton v. Dayton, 8 IL. D., 248.)
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PRE-EMPTION ENTRY-TIMBER LANDS.
GEORGE El. HEGEMAN.
The acquisition of title under the pre-emption law to lands chiofly valuable for tim-
ber, can only be permitted when the good faith of the claimant is clearly mani-
fest.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, July 2, 1890.
This is an appeal by George H. Hegeman from your office decision
of March 13, 1889. rejecting his proof for the SE. i Sec. 22, T. 16 N.,
R. 4 W., Vancouver, Washington, made in support of his pre-emption
declaratory statement filed June 11, 1888, alleging settlement the 8th -
upon the tract named.
His declaratory statement was filed simultaneously with the like fil-
ings of George Ellis, William L. Horner and Louis F. Toellner, who
also alleged settlement June 8, 1888, upon the NE. i, the SW. j and
the NW. i of said section 22, respectively.
Proofs under said filings were made by Toellner and Ellis, Decem-
ber 14, 1888, and by Horner and the claimant (LHegeman) on the fol-
lowing day before the clerk of the district court for Chehalis county,
and in each instance two of the parties named testified as witnesses to
the proof submitted.
These proofs were as shown by the register's endorsement rejected at
the local office September 20, 1888, for failure to show sufficient resi-
dence, cultivation and improvement.
The appeals of the several parties named were forwarded with a letter
dated February 5, 1889, wherein the local officers set out that the said
section was " densely timbered and more valuable now for its timber than
for any other purpose," that the said filings had been made " upon the
strength" of a telegram asking if said section was vacant, sent the
local office by " J. C. Ellis of Olympia, a wealthy logger," the day pre-
ceding the date of said settlements (June 8, 1888), that the same were
made under the supervision of Geo. C. Israel, a close friend and legal
adviser of J. C. Ellis, a person who had been " reported guilty of un-
professional conduct relating to public lands."
legeman's proof set out that he was a single man twenty-eight years
of age, that he made actual settlement on the land June 16, 1888, when
he built a house and cleared one and a half acres, that his residence,
established the same (lay, had been continuous, that his improvements
valued at $320 comprised a log house twelve by sixteen feet with shake
roof and board floor, woodshed, road, and one and a half acres prepared
for crop and that the tract contains about one million feet of fir timber.-
Along with his appeal, the appellant Eegeman files an affidavit made
by J. C. Ellis, April 4, 1890, setting out that he had as an at of friend-
ship sent said telegram at the request of his nephew George Ellis, then
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in his employ and that he " was not at that or at any other time inter-
ested directly or indirectly in above said land."
The record shows the tract involved to be chiefly valuable for timber.
This being so, the good faith of the claimant should be clearly shown
before he can be allowed to acquire the same under the pre-emption
law. Daniel R. McIntosh (8 L. D., 641); State of California v. Sevoy(9 L. D., 139).
That the claimant's good faith is not clearly shown is, I think, mani-
fest. His proof showing meager improvements was made within about
the briefest permissible period following the initiation of his claim, and
when considered with the surrounding circumstances, in the light of
which his good faith must be determined, fails to satisfactorily show
that he went on the land for the purpose of rendering a bona fide com-
pliance with the pre-emption law.
The decision appealed from is accordingly affirmed.
MINING CLAIM-STATUTORY EXPENDITURE-ADVERSE RIGHTS-
REVIEW.
NICHOLS ET AL. V. BECKER.
Failure to prosecute an adverse claim, or in other manner assert a right against a
known pending application is conclusive as against the existence of such right.
The individnal rights of an applicant are not waived by his executing, as president
of a mining company, an agreement wherein certain interests adverse to said
company are recognized.
The action of the Department, on an application for a mineral patent, can not be{a controlled byjudicial proceedings instituted outside of the authority of section
2326 of the Revised Statutes.
Where several claims are embraced within one application, the annual work required
by statute may be done on one of suchclaims for the common benefit of the claimsincluded within said application.
Specifications of error, oi motion for review, must be definite, and clearly set forth
the particular facts or issues on which a ruling is desired.
Secretary Noble to the Gommissioner of the General Land Office, July 2,
1890.
This is a motion by William H Nichols, Joseph M. Marshall and
John Truan for review of a decision of this Department, rendered Feb-
ruary 28, 1889, in the case of William Hi. Nichols et al. v. Theodore H.
Becker, involving the latter's application for patent under the mining
laws, for certain claims on what is known as the " Bates lode," situated
in Gregory mining district, Gilpiu county, Colorado.
The decision complained of is a formal affirnance by the Department
,of a decision rendered by your office December 7, 1887, adverse to
Nichols, et al. upon an appeal by them from a decision of the local offi-
cers, also adverse to them, in the matter of their protest against the
issue of patent to Becker for the premises in question.
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An intelligent consideration of the present motion, in view of the
numerous errors assigned, seems to require that a full history of the
case be given from the outset.
It appears that, on October 3, 1868, Theodore H. Becker filed i the
local office at Central City, Colorado, his application (No. 73) for patent
under the mining act of July 26, 18665 (14 Stat., 251), for three hundred
linear feet of the Bates lode, known and described as claims Nos. 3, 4
and 5 on said lode, accompanied by a diagram and notice of his claim,
and by his statement that he had " occupied and improved the said lode
according to the local customs and rules of miners" in that district, and
had "expended in actual labor and improvements thereon an amount
not less than one thousand dollars." The required notice of his claim
was posted and published for the full period of ninety days.
On October 28, 1868, one Lewis E. Johnson filed an adverse claim to
the property in question.
On January 6, 1869. one 0. J. Goldrick filed an adverse claim for the
same property, but withdrew it on May 29, following.
On June 3, 1869, the Rocky Mountain Gold Mining Company, by G.
E. Randolph, its attotuey, filed certain papers purporting to be an ad-
verse claim to said property; but because of insufficiency in the matter
of certain departmental requirements, no record was ever made of the
same.
On January 2, 1880, the adverse claim of Lewis E. Johnson was with-
drawn by his attorney, and on the same day Becker submitted proofs
in support of his application, whereupon the register issued his certifi-
cate to the surveyor-general to the effect that Becker was entitled to a
survey of his claim. The surveyor-general, on Jauary 8,1880, granted
the application, and designated the survey as No. 579.
On February 17, 1880, the local officers received from the surveyor-
general an approved plat of nineral survey No. 556, for two hundred
and twenty-three linear feet on the Bates lode, from which it appeared
that the applicants therefor were William I. Nichols, John Truan and
Joseph M. Marshall. The next day, Becker presented a protest against
the filing of any application by Nichols and others for the premises de-
scribed in such survey, setting forth the pendency of his own applica
tion, and alleging a con~fict between his claim and such survey, and that
no application by Nichols and others could be legally filed while his
previous application is pending and undetermined.
On February 20, 1880, Nichols and others presented an application for
patent for the claim covered by said survey No. 556, and asked that the
same be filed. The local officers rejected the application on the day of
its presentation because of the pendency of Becker's application cover-
ing the same premises.
Nichols and others, on February 24, 1880, filed an appeal. On the
same day they presented an(l filed certain affidavits in the nature of a
protest against the application of Becker, charging that no work had
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been done or improvements made on his claim by any of the former
owners thereof, or by anybody, for the period of " at least five years last
past", and that the same had been forfeited and wholly and totally
abandoned.
On March 19, 1880, your office having previously received from the
local officers the appeal and affidavits aforesaid, instructed them to sus-
pend further action on Becker's application, and to transmit all the
papers relating to the case in order that it might be determined whether
a hearing should be had on the question of abandonment as raised by
said affidavits. The surveyor-general was also instructed to withhold his
approval of the final survey of Becker's claim until further orders. The
papers thus called for were transmitted March 26, 1880.
On July 8, 1880, your predecessor, Commissioner Williamson, having
considered the case on appeal, affirmed the action of the local officers
in rejecting the application of Nichols and others, and held that, inas-
much as their claim was not asserted during the period of publication
of notice of Becker's application, it " was invalid and of no avail," could
not in any sense be considered an adverse claim, and could not there-
fore have the effect to suspend proceedings under Becker's claim. The
appeal was thereupon dismissed. Upon consideration of the affidavits
transmitted with the appeal, however, the Commissioner, by virtue of
the supervisory powers in him vested, ordered that a hearing be had to
determine the question of Becker's alleged abandonment. From this
decision, which passed upon and denied the validity of the claim of
Nichols and others, no appeal was taken.
The hearing thus ordered took place before the local officers. It was
commenced in August, 1880. Various continuances were had by stip-
ulation of the parties, and the hearing was not completed until January,
1886, after your office had, by letter of October 16, 1885, specially in-
structed the local officers that the same must be proceeded with to a
speedy conclusion. This long delay occurred apparently without objec-
tion from either party.
On January 28, 1886, the local officers made their finding in the case.
It is as follows:
Having carefnlly examined and considered all the testimony taken before this office,
and all the evidence submitted and filed in this case, it is our joint opinion, that,
said Nichols, et al. have failed to prove, as alleged by them, that the premises in con-
troversy ' have been long abandoned, and Po work done thereon by said applicant',
but on the contrary, said applicant has show n that he has never failed to perform his
annual assessment work on said claims embraced in his application for patent No. 73,
filed in this office October 3, 1868.
From this finding Nichols and others filed an appeal February 20,
1886, and on June 1, following, their attorney forwarded to the Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office a lengthy statement in writing, signed
by Nichols, Truan and Marshall, and sworn to by Marshall, which is in
the nature of a protest against the application of Becker, accompanied
by a motion that the same be dismissed. On June 17, 1886, the Com-
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missioner acknowledged receipt of said protest, stating that it would
be taken up and considered when the case was reached in its regular
order, for action on the appeal from the finding of the local officers.
The matters alleged in said protest need not be here stated. While the
appeal was pending, additional documentary evidence was filed by both
parties, presumably under rule 72 of Practice.
On December 7, 1887, your office, after an elaborate discussion of the
evidence in the case, affirmed the finding of the local officers, and rel
ative to the motion to dismiss, based upon the protest aforesaid, it
was stated that inasmuch as said motion "involves the same points
raised by the appeal considered herein, it is therefore denied."
This is the decision, which on further appeal by Nichols and others,
was formally affirmed by the decision now complained of.
Numerous errors (seventeen in all) are alleged in the motion for
review, which upon examination are found to involve considerable repe-
tition of substantially the same subject matter of complaint. Stripped
of such repetition, and of unnecessary verbiage, the allegations are, in
effect, that the Department erred in sustaining the decision of your
office in the following particulars, viz:
I. In finding that Becker's title is traceable by a regular chain of
conveyances from the original locators, who located claim No. three in
1859, and claims four and five in February, 1860.
II. In finding that Becker, at any time, had title to the premises in
dispute, either by location, conveyance, possession, or otherwise.
III. In failing to consider the conveyance made in 1864 by Leighton
and Starbuck to the Rocky Mountain Gold Mining Company, and
other evidence showing that company's ownership, exclusive posses-
sion and occupation of the property i dispute, and of its extensive im-
provements thereon.
IV. In finding that the annual work required by statute was done on
the property for the year 1878.
V. In failing to find that the property in dispute had been, by all
former claimants of the same, or of any portion thereof, wholly aban-
doned prior to the year 1878, and that work had not been resumed
thereon prior to the relocation by Nichols and others in 1879.
VI. In failing to consider as evidence in the case a judgment rendered
in 1885 by a court of competent jurisdiction, to the effect that the pos-
sessory title to the property ili dispute was not in Becker, and in refus-
ingto recognize that judgment as binding against Becker.
VII. In not holding that upon the admitted facts Becker's claim does
not fall " within the statute under which it was wrongfully asserted."
VIII. In failing to recognize the agreement in writing, made in 1871,
between the Rocky Mountain Gold Mining Company and the Union
Gold Mining Company, to which Becker was a party, as conclusive
against him; and-in considering testimony taken after the execution of
said agreement, for the purpose of contradicting its terms.
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IX. " In failing to consider material facts established by the evidence,
and to decide material issues involved in the record, fairly presented by
the evidence and the record."
In view of the fact that the hearing ordered in this case was for the
sole purpose of determining the single question of abandonment, raised
by the affidavits theretofore filed by Nichols and others, it must be ap-
parent that the alleged errors as above set forth relate i great measure
to matters not involved in said hearing, and which are wholly irrelevant
to the issue therein presented. And in view of the further fact that no
appeal was ever taken by Nichols and others from your office decision
of July 8, 1880, which rejected their claim as invalid, and expressly rec-
ognized the validity and regularity of Becker's claim in all respects,
except only as to the charge of abandonment, it is not seen how, upon
any reasonable claim of right or justice, matters which are not pertinent
to the issue joined upon that charge, an now be urged upon the atten-
tion of the Department, with avail to the present protestants against
Becker's claim.
Inasmuch, however, as all the various complaints set forth in the
motion for review, herein substantially stated as aforesaid, have been
insisted upon with the greatest persistency by counsel for Nichols and
others, accompanied by the charge, made with apparent freeness, that
the case has never been heretofore properly considered, it has been de-
termined, for these reasons alone, and not because of any recognized
right in the parties complaining to demand it, to review the case upon
all such matters, whether deemed pertinent to the issue tried at the
hearing or not.
The abstract of title and title papers filed by Becker, show that by
deed from Richard Sopris and William M. Slaughter, partners as Sopris
and Slaughter, successors to Allen, Slaughter and Company, dated De-
cember 21, 1860, there was conveyed to Becker "Two claims (one hun-
dred feet each) and a fraction of sixty feet on the Bates lode, being the
whole of number one () and two (2) and a fraction of number three south-
west of the discovery;" that by two several deeds dated, respectively,
July 11, and July 12, 1867, said William M. Slaughter and Richard Sopris
conveyed to Becker their respective interests in the remaining forty feet
of said claim No. 3; that on February 25,1860, Blenney and Clay placed
of record, under the local rules and regulations then existing in said
mining district, their preemption, covering one hundred and eighty feet
of said Bates lode, being part of claims 4 and 5, and on Novemnber 3,
1861, conveyed the same to one C. R. Bissell; that said Bissell had a
miner's l)re-emption covering claimNo. 5 of said Bates lode, which ap-
pears to have been placed on record November 26, 1862; that by deed
dated July 26, 1862, Bissell conveyed to Wesley Bowling two hundred
feet of said Bates lode (being claims 4 and 5); that by deed dated March
13, 1863, Bowling conveyed the same to Joseph Kenyon; and that by
deed dated October 1, 1868, Kenyon conveyed the same to Theodore H.
Becker.
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It is thus seen that Becker's title papers cover the whole of claims
three, four and five; that a portion of claim three was conveyed to him
in 1860, and the remainder in 1867, and that claims four and five were
conveyed to him in October, 1868, just two days prior to filing his appli-
cation for patent.
It is stated in an affidavit of said Richard Sopris filed in the record
that the Bates lode was discovered in 1859; that afflant and his asso-
ciates, Slaughter and Allen, in May, 1859, located and staked off three
hundred feet of said lode, being claims Nos. one, two and three south
west of the discovery; that they commenced work thereon immediately
and held peaceable possession thereof until they sold and conveyed the
same to Becker in 1860 and 1867; that at the time of the discovery of
the Bates lode and the location of said claims Nos. one, two and three,
there were no local laws, rules or regulations in the Gregory mining
district requiring a record to be made of such discovery and location;
that in July, 1859, afflant presided at the first miners' meeting ever held
in said district, at which meeting a resolution was passed (transcript of
which is furnished) providing that " all claims may be recorded, if the
owners see fit; but no claim which is being worked shall be obliged to
be recorded;" that affiant knows William E. Blenney and H. M. Clay
claimed Nos. four and five of said Bates lode, lying just west of and ad-
joining the claims of affiant and his associates. The statements of this
affidavit stand uncontradicted. They show that No. three was worked
and possession thereof held by its locators, Sopris, Slaughter and Allen,
until they sold to Becker, whereby a record of their claim was made
unnecessary under the local rules then prevailing. It has been already
shown that Nos. four and five were covered by claims duly recorded.
The resolution referred to providing that claims which were being
worked need not be recorded, would seem to imply that, if recorded,
sufficient notice thereof would thereby be given, under the law at that
date, though not being worked.
But it is objected that the ownership of this property was in the Rocky
Mountain Gold Mining Company, and a deed to that company from John
Leighton and William M. Starbuck, dated March 19, 1864, purporting
to onvey two hundred and twenty-five feet of the Bates lode, "being
the property originally pre-empted by Clay and Blenney," is filed in the
record, and testimony is introduced tending to show possession and oc-
cupation of the property in dispute, by that company under said deed,
-and that the company erected extensive and valuable improvements
thereon during the time of such possession.
As to said alleged deed of conveyance, it is sufficient to say that it
was not made until after the property had been conveyed by Clay and
Blenney to Bissell, and by Bissell to Bowling, and by Bowling to Ken-
yon, who subsequently conveyed to Becker, and it could not, therefore,
operate to pass to the Rockv Mountain Company any title, so far as this
record shows, as against, or superior to, that purchased by Becker.
And all contention herein, based upon the alleged occupation and im-
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provement of the property by the Rocky Mountain Company must be
set at rest by the fact that said company, with full knowledge of Beck-
er's application, never attempted to prosecute an adverse claim, or in
any other manner to assert its right, if any it had or claimed, as against
Becker. Its attorney filed a notice of claim in 1869, but without any
proof, abandoned it and never afterwards moved in the premises. The
inference clearly is that said company acknowledged Becker's superior
claim, and was content not to assail it.
The first, second, and third specifications of error are thus disposed
of. Passing the fourth and fifth for the present, notice will be next taken
of the sixth. It is here complained that proper consideration has not
been given to a judgment of the circuit court of the United States for
the district of Colorado, rendered in 1885, in a certain ejectment suit then
pending therein in the name of the Bates-Hunter Consolidated Mining
Company against said Ni-hols and others, the object of which was to try
the right of possession to the property in question. Tejudgment was
based upon the verdict of a jury in favor of the defendants in said suit;
and the plaintiff, being the assignee of Becker, it is contended that such
judgment is binding upon him and conclusive against his claim to the
property.
This contention, in my judgment, cannot be sustained. In the first
\ place, the suit referred to was not a proceeding instituted in accordance
with the provisions of section 2326 of the Revised Statutes, and there-
fore no judgment rendered therein, whatever it might be, could in any
V way bind the Land Department or control its action in this case. This
case must be decided upon the record here presented. The verdict of
the jury in that suit was based upon the evidence produced at the trial
in court, a portion of which only is filed in this record.
But again, the judgment rendered upon the verdict was afterwards
set aside under a special statute of Colorado (Rev. Stats., Colo., 1868,
ch. 27, sec. 26), and a new trial ordered. Under this statute the de-
feated party was entitled to a new trial as a matter of right. (Vance
v. Schuyler, 1 Gilm. 160). Before the new trial was had, the plaintiff
appeared in court and dismissed its suit. There is now, therefore, no
judgment of the court to bind anybody.
The seventh alleged error (which is the twelfth in the original assign-
ment by counsel) is that upon the admitted facts Beckers claim is not
"within the statute under which it was wrongfully asserted. " This al-
legation is too general and indefinite to admit of intelligent consideration.
No conceded facts are pointed out in support of the assertion that
Becker's claim is not within the statute, nor is attention called to any-
thing in the record tending to show that such claim was " wrongfully
asserted " thereunder.
The same criticism applies with equal force to the ninth alleged error.
It is equally indefinite and can in no reasonable sense be termed a
4specification ' of error. It is wholly insufficient in a motion for review
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to simply allege failure "to consider material facts established by the
evidence," or failure " to decide material issues involved in the record,"
without specifying the particular facts or issues with reference to which
consideration is sought for a ruling desired. The grounds of error
should be clearly and specifically set forth. (Geo. W. Macey, et al. 6 L.
D., 781- Long v. Knotts, 5 I. D., 150; Albert H. Cornwell, 9 L. D., 340;
Bright et at v. Elkhorn Mining Co. id. 503).
Complaint is made in the eighth item of alleged error that effect has not
been given to the agreement in writing, made in 1871, between the
Rocky Mountain Gold Mining Company and the Union Gold Mining
Company, relating in part to the property now in dispute. A copy of
this agreement is on file in the record. It is signed by George E. Ran-
dolph as attorney in fact for the Rocky Mountain Company, and by
Theodore El. Becker as President of the Union Gold Mining Company.
Prior to its execution, certain controversies had arisen between said
companies relative to their mining operations on the Bates lode. By
the agreement it was provided, to the end that such controversies might
be amicably settled and a permanent boundary line established between
the contending parties, that the west line of claim No. three should be
established as such boundary line; and the respective agents of such
companies were authorized to make and did make quit-claim deeds from
each to the other, in conformity with such agreement. This agreement
gave to the Union Company whatever rights the Rocky Mountain-Com-
pany had, if any, to that part of the Bates lode lying east of the west
line of No. three, and to the Rocky Mountain Company'whatever rights
the Union Company had, if any, to that part of said lode lying west of
the west line of No. three. It is contended that, inasmuch as Becker
signed said agreement as President of the Union Company, he is for
that reason estopped from asserting in this case any individual right or
title to claims four and five, they being west of the boundary line thereby
established. Though this contention has been most strenuously per-
sisted in by counsel, I am wholly unable to conceive of any principle of
law or force of reasoning upon which it can be sustained. The agree-
ment was signed by Becker, not in his individual capacity, but as the
executive officer of the Union Company. While it is binding upon the
company, it can in no sense be considered as in any manner affecting
the individual rights of Becker, if any he had, to the property which
was the subject matter thereof. By it the Union Company surrendered
to the Rocky Mountain Company only such rights as it had, if any, to
claims Nos. four and five. If it in fact had any rights to surrender, and
they were then known, or afterwards proved to be inferior to the indi-
viddal rights of Becker, his signature to the agreement as President of
the Company was not an act which could operate to estop him from
afterwards asserting his individual rights as against any claim of the
Rocky Mountain Company based upon said agreement. The statements
in said agreement, apparently recognizing some sort of claim in the
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Rocky Mountain Company to Nos. four and five at the date of its execu-
tion, are not the statements or admissions of Becker, as claimed by coun-
sel, but of the Union Company, and it is perfectly plain that such ad-
missions, if such they be, cannot bind Becker in his individual capacity.
But in addition to this it clearly appears from the evidence in the
case that both said companies, at the time said agreement was made,
had full knowledge of Becker's claim of title to Nos. three, four and
five, and that it was not intended by said agreement to in any way
compromise his individual rights in the premises, but, on the contrary,
it was then and there understood by all parties that he should proceed
to perfect his title by obtaining patent under his application filed Octo-
ber 3, 1868. This was testified to by Becker at the hearing, and he
also testified that the Union Company never had or claimed to have
any title to any part of Nos. three, 'four and five, nor any interest
therein hostile to his.
Becker's testimony is fully corroborated by affidavits filed in the
record of George H. Potts and George B. Satterlee, the latter of whom
was trustee for the Rocky Mountain Company when said agreement
was made. It is shown by these affidavits that, prior to the execution
of the agreement, Becker, on several occasions, notified the Rocky
Mountain Company that he was the owner of the property described in
therein, and exhibited to its attorneys his title papers to claims three,
four and five; that said agreement was signed with the understanding
that it should in no wise affect Becker's individual claim to the property,
the sole object thereof being to settle the controversies then existing
between said companies; that Becker, at the time, gave notice of his
pending application for patent for claims three, four and five, and it
was further agreed between said companies that their said settlement
should in no manner affect the rights of Becker under his said applica-
tion..
It is objected that this evidence was introduced for the purpose of
contradicting the terms of said agreement, and for that reason is inad-
missible. There is, however, nothing in the testimony that tends in
the least to vary or contradict the agreement. It shows the circum-
stances attending its execution and was introduced as explanatory of
its provisions, and not for the purpose of contradicting its terms. It is
clearly admissible. ( Greenl. secs. 277-282-286-293;$; Thorington v.
Smith, 8 Wall., 1; M. & M. W'y Co. v. Jurey, 1M1 I. S., 584; United
States v. Peck, 102 U. S., 64; Reed v. Insurance Co. 95 U. S., 23; Canal
Co. v. Hill, 15 Wall. 94). In view thereof, there is no foundation
whatever, in my judgment, for the contention of counsel in respect to
said agreement.
This brings me to consider the fourth and fifth assignments of error,
as above stated. Herein is involved the real gist of the only present
legitimate controversy in this case. It is alleged that the Department
erred in finding that the annual work required by statute was done on
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the property in 1878; and in not finding that the property was wholly
abandoned by Becker prior to 1878, and that work was not resumed
thereon until after the relocation by Nichols and others in 1879.
Upon this question there is some conflict in the testimony, but the re.
spective decisions heretofore rendered by the local officers, by your
office, and by this Department have all been in favor of Becker. After
a careful review of the whole record in the case, I see no reason for re-
versing these uniform rulings. The conflict referred to is rather appar-
ent than real, and the evidence in my opinion fully justifies the finding
of the local officers, which has been affirmed throughout. The testi-
mony for protestants is uncertain in character, being positive only to the
extent that the witness knew of no work being done on claims three,
four and five during the year 1878 by Becker or by any one for him,
while a number of witnesses for Becker testify positively that work was
done on the claims for every year of the alleged abandonment, and that
the work was done for Becker, and at his expense. The claims were
worked underground and it is not at all singular that the required
amount of work should have been done without being observed by the
witnesses for protestants. True, the work was done principally on
claim No. three, one witness only testifying that he worked on No. four,
during the time (1878) of the alleged abandonment; but the work was
done for all the claims (Nos. three, four and five) included in Becker's
application. This was in every respect a compliance with the statute.
Smelting Company v. Kemp (104 U. S., 636-653); Chambers v. Harring-
ton (111 U. S., 350); Good Return Mining Company (4 I. D., 221); .
F. Mackie (5 L. D., 199-201). There is, therefore, nothing in the con-
tention that the annual assessment work should have been done on each
of the several claims applied for by Becker.
In view of the great pertinacity with which the present motion has
been urged by counsel for protestants, the whole record in the case has
been examined with great care, and every objection made by the motion
has been considered. From this examination I am satisfied that no suffi-
cient grounds for granting the motion exist, and the same is denied.
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HOMESTEAD SETTLEMENT-SECTION 2287 R. S.-RES JUDICATA.
HENRY W. LORD.
One who settles upon public land in good faith ;nnder the homestead law, and is
subsequently appointed register before the land is opened to entry, is entitled to
perfect his claim under section 2287 R. S., the same as though it had been
initiated by an application to enter. I
A settlement made with the intention to secure title through the provisions of section
2287, and without residence on the land, is not in good faith, and does not
authorize a purchase under said ection.
Section 2287 authorizes the perfection of a pending homestead claim through pay-
ment for the land, and not through a constructive residence thereon.
An expression of opinion by the Commissioner as to the validity of an entry pending
before the local office, will not preclude said Commissioner, or his successor,
from a full examination of the case when it is reached in regular order.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, July 7, 1890.
Henry W. Lord made homestead entry of the S. of the SE. 1 See. 29,
lot 4, ec. 33, and lots 1 and. 2, Sec. 33, and the SE. 4 of the SW. 1, Sec.
28, T. 154 N., E. 64 W., Creelsburg, afterwards Devil's Lake, land dis-
trict, Dakota, on September 29, 1883, the day on which the approved
plat of the township was filed in the local office. Subsequently, he re-
linquished the SW. 1 of the SE. I of See. 29, and on May 2, 1888, made
final proof of the remaining land embraced in his entry, upon which
final certificate issued.
Your office held that the issuance of said final certificate was illegal,
and that the entry should be canceled, for the reason that the record
shows that " Lord did not establish an actual bona-fide residence before
he made his homestead entry, and that he has failed to maintain (if estab-
lished) any residence since the date of his expiration of office." From
this decision the claimant appealed.
The facts in this case are substantially as follows:
In the spring of 1883, Henry W. Lord, then being in the city of Wash-
ington and an applicant for appointment to the office of register for the
local land office, which subsequently became the Devil's Lake land
office, went to Dakota for the purpose of entering government lands,
and on April 30, of that year settled upon the tract of land in contro-
versy, built a house, moved into it, and occupied it from April 30, to
May 5, following, when he returned to Washington. On May 22, the
President designated Creelsburg (afterwards known as Devil's Lake)
as the site for the office of one of the three additional land districts in
the Territory of Dakota, provided for by the act of March 3, 1883, and
on the same day Lord was appointed register of said district. On Sep-
tember 29, the township plat was filed in the local office, and on the
same day Lord made homestead entry.
The motive of claimant in going from Washington to Dakota in April,
DECISIONS RELATING T THE PUBLIC LANDS. 19
1883, was to select a tract fori a homestead and to make settlement
thereon prior to his appointment, as shown by a letter addressed by
claimant on October 7, 1883, to the principal clerk of public lands, from
which the following extract is taken:
I was largely indebted to you for the suggestion in March, when it was probable
that I would be appointed to this office, that I would have a right before such appt,
to enter a quarter section of land. I came out here in April, mainly for that purpose,
made a selection, built a house and occupied it until I left in May for Washington on
business connected with the location of the office. Late in May, after that I was
appointed register. Now, I see in looking at the law, paragraph or Sec. 2287, that it
is provided that 'any bona fide settler who has filed, etc., and subsequently appt.'
etc. Now, of course, I could not file as the lands were unsurveyed until recently.
Plats were rec'd a few days ago, and then I filed, which was the earliest possible to
do so, and my filing with a special affidavit has gone forward to Washington, with
the others. What I want to trouble you about is, whether I am i danger of a tech-
nical difficulty about the filing. I suppose, it not being possible to file, that my
squalter's right, with occupancy, would stand for filing until surveys were in, as in
the ease of any other settler.
This letter was accompanied by the affidavit of claimant, stating that
the settlement and improvements were made as above set forth, and to
this the Commissioner of the General Land Office, tnder date of April
22, 1884, replied:
Your homestead entry as an entry made under section 2287 appears regular, and
will be allowed to stand, subject to the usual conditions.
On March 15, 1888, Lord gave notice of his intention to make final
proof in support of his claim before the register and receiver at Devil's
Lake land office on May 2, 1888. Prior to the day on which the proof
was to be taken, to wit: April 18, 1888, Lord's term of office expired,
and E. G. Spillman, his successor, assumed the duties of register, and
Lord made his final proof before Spillman.
The proof appears regular in form. The improvements valued at
$583. The estimated value of the land $2000. The land was cropped
to wheat each season. In the year 1885, fifteen acres yielded three hun-
dred bushels; in 1886, twenty-five acres yielded six hundred bushels,
and in 1887, sixty-seven acres yielded fifteen hundred bushels. In 1888,
seventy-five acres were prepared and sown to wheat. Several thousand
young trees were planted on the land in 1885, and were growing.
The testimony of claimant in his final proof is fully corroborated by
his witnesses.
From the time Lord entered upon the duties of his office, August 1,
1883, until his time expired, he resided at Creelsburg with his family,
consisting of himself and wife; he was also necessarily detained at the
office until April 30, in closing official matters incident to his official
services.
From the foregoing statement of facts, it may be reasonably concluded
that Lord's settlement upon the tract in controversy was not made with
the bona fide intention and expectation of residing upon it as required
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by law, but for the sole purpose of acquiring the land under section
2287. This is apparent from the admission i his letter above referred
to, that when it was probable he would be appointed to office he went
to Dakota mainly for the purpose of making a selection of the tract,
acting upon the suggestion of a clerk in the general land, office that he
would have the right to enter a quarter section of public lands, if made
before his appointment to office, and, as the law (Sec. 2235, Revised
Statutes) requires that " Every register and receiver shall reside at the
place where the land office for which he is appointed is directed by law
to be kept," it is evident that he knew, at the time of his settlement
and entry, that he could not maintain a residence on the tract and at
the same time perform the duties of the office of register of the Devil's
Lake land office.
Section 2287 of the Revised Statutes, under which Lord contemplated
acquiring title to the land in controversy when he selected it and made
settlement, is as follows:
Any bona-fide settler, under the homestead or pre-emption laws of the United
States, who has filed the proper application to enter not to exceed one quarter section
of the public lands in any district land office, and who has been subsequently ap-
pointed a register or receiver, may perfect the title to the land under the pre-emption
laws by furnishing the proofs and making the payments required by law to the satis-
faction of the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
* This section is taken from the act of April 20, 1871 (17 Stat., 10), and
at the date of the passage of said act and of the revision of the statutes,
title could only be initiated under the homestead law by actual entry
at the local office. But the third section of the act of May 14, 1880 (21
Stat., 140), provided-
* That any settler who has settled or who shall hereafter settle on any of the public
lands of the United States, whether surveyed or unsurveyed, with the intention of
claiming the same under the homestead laws, shall be allowed the same time to file
his homestead application and perfect his original entry in the United States land
office as is now allowed to settlers under the pre-6mption laws to put their claims on
record, and his right shall relate back to the date of settlement, the same as if he
settled under the pre-emption laws.
This act did not enlarge the right given under section 2287, except so
far as to allow the claim to be initiated by settlement instead of entry,
and I think there can be no question that the settlement of Lord, made
April 30, 1883, followed by entry made the day the township plat was
filed, conferred upon him as much right to perfect title under section
2287 as if the land had been surveyed, and entry was actually made on
that day. In either case, the initiation of the right must have been
bona fide, whether by entry as originally provided, or by settlement
as provided for by the act of May 14, 1880.
Section 2287 was evidently intended for the relief of settlers who
had been appointed to the office of register and receiver after they had
made entry of the land, with full expectation and intention of com-
plying with the law as to residence and improvements, by allowing them
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to perfect titlb under the pre-emption laws by making proof and pay-
ment to the satisfaction of the Commissioner. From the fact that the
law requires that title shall be perfected under the pre-emption law by
making payment, it is evident that it was not the intention of Con.
gress to allow a homestead entry to be perfected un(ler the homestead
law by persons who by being appointed to the office of register or
receiver were prevented from complying with the law as to residence for
the time required, or that such appointees, even after a bona fide resi-
dence had been established, could maintain a constructive residence on
the land while engaged in the discharge of his official duties as register
or receiver. If it had been intended that, such absence should be
considered a constructive residence for the period of their official term,
it would have provided that title could be perfected under either the
homestead or pre-emption law accordingly as the claim was initiated.
But I am also of the opinion that settlenent or entry made under such
circumstances as are shown by the record in this case, by a person who
was afterwards appointed to the office of register or receiver, confers no
right upon such person to purchase under section 2287. That sec-
tion, as before stated, was only intended for the relief of persons who
had expended time and money upon a tract of land settled upon or
entered under such circumstances from which it could not be reasonably
presumed that they did not intend or expect to comply with the law and
perform the full consideration required by law of other settlers, by
establishing and maintaining a bona fide residence. This isthe consid-
eration for allowing such persons, who were afterwards appointed to the
office of register or receiver, to purchase the land; a payment of money
being required because it was known that from the nature of the em-
ployment they could not maintain a residence on the land and at the
same time comply with the law, which requires the local officers to
reside at the place where the land office foi which they are appointed is
directed by law to be kept.
If the settlement is made. as in this case, merely for the purpose of
securing the land as a gratuity, without fulfilling the consideration of
residence required by the statute, and knowing at the time that the
duties of the office would prevent the maintenance of residence on the
land, such a settlement or entry is not bona fide within the meaning of
the statute or of the character contemplated by it.
Nor do I think that the opinion of the Commissioner, as expressed in
the letter of April 22, 1884, would authorize the Department to allow
the claimant to purchase under section 2287, although he may have
made the improvements upon the faith of said opinion.
The allowance of an original entry by the General Land Office will
not preclude the Department from determining whether the land was
legally subject to entry when the case comes up for disposition on final
proof. Charles W. Filkins, 5 L. D., 49. Nor will an expression of
opinion by the Commissioner of the General Land Office as to the valid-
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ity of an entry pending before the local office preclude said-Commis-
sioner or his successor from a full examination of the same when reached
in its regular order, and from ordering a hearing on the merits of the
claim. George A. Brock, .5 L. D., 610; Robert Hall et al, id., 174.
Besides, in this case the letter of the Commissioner appears to have
been in response to an unofficial communication addressed to the prin-
cipal clerk of public lands, asking his individual opinion as to the right
of the claimant to make entry under the circumstances detailed. The
Commissioner had no right to exempt claimant from fulfilling, any es-
sential requirement of the law, but it now being before the Department
in its regular order, it will be acted upon as if no such opinion had been
expressed, as stated in the case of' Brock, above cited.
Being satisfied that the final certificate in this case was improperly
issued, and that I have no authority to pass this claim to patent, or to
allow a purchase under section 2287, your decision holding said final
certificate and entry for cancellation is affirmed. If this claimant is en-
titled to relief by reason of acting upon erroneous advice given by the
land office, it must be by Congress, or by making entry under the se-
ond section of the act of March 2, '89 (25 Stat., 854), allowing persons,
who have not perfected title under the homestead laws, to make home-
stead entry of not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres of public land
subject to such entry, such previous entry to the contrary notwith-
standing.
Should he determine to make a second entry nder the act aforesaid,
he will be allowed thirty (lays in which to exercise this right.
HOMESTEAD CONTEST-MARRIED WAOMAN-RESIDENCE.
BULLARD V. SULLIVAN.
A husband and wife, while they live together as such, can have but one residence,
and the home of the wife is presumptively with her husband.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, July 9, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Mary Anne laywood, formerly Sulli-
van, from the decision of your office in the case of Robert L. Bullard v.
Mary Anne Sullivan, holding for cancellation the latter's homestead
entry for NW. of the SE. and E. of the E. of NW. of the SE.4,
and S. of the SE. , and E. of the SE. of SW. and SW. of the
SE. SW. 1, Sec. 20, T. 3 S., Pa. 14 E., Stockton laud district, California.
The record shows that Mary Anne Sullivan made homestead entry for
said tract October 30, 1880, and on September 7, 1886, Bllard initiated
a contest against the same, alleging that the said Mary An ne Sulli-
van has wholly abandoned said tract; that she has changed her resi-
dence therefrom for more than six months since making said entry; that
said tract is not settled upon and cultivated by said party as required
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by law; that she has never resided upon said land, and made it her
home."
Thereupon hearing was ordered and had at the local office and from
the evidence submitted thereat, it found in favor of contestant and
recommended the entry for cancellation.
From this jdgment Mrs. Sullivan appealed to your office and you
affirmed the findings of the register and receiver and held the entry for
cancellation. She again appealed. From an examination of the evi-
dence I find that both parties were personally present and testified at
the hearing and evidence shows that when the claimant made her entry
she was a widow and the head of a family consisting of two daughters
and a son, all under the age of nine years. During the latter part of
November, 1880,_she built a board house ten by twelve feet in size upon
the tract, furnished it with articles of household furniture suitable to
her means, and established residence thereon with her family.
Three months and eight days after she made her entry (Feb. 8,1881),
she married Seth B. Haywood, a resident of La Grange, Cal., and went
to reside with him at La Grange. In August, 1881, she removed with
her husband to a quarter section of land four or five miles from La
Grange, commonly called the h* Junction." He made his homestead
entry for said land December 14, 1881, and which is described as the
SE. i, Sec. 25, T. 3 S., R. 14 E., in the same land district.
Claimant testified that she never intended to abandon her'homestead;
that she made it for the benefit of her children: that she was never ab-
sent from her claim six months at any one time, from the date of entry
up to the initiation of this contest; that since her marriage to Haywood
and up to the time of the hearing, she lived a portion of each year on her
claim, with one or more of her children, and the balance of the time she
resided with her husband, and on his claim, and that during such periods
as she was personally present on her land, her oldest daughter kept
house for her step-father.
The testimony of both parties shows that the land in dispute is mostly
valuable for grazing purposes, and not more han from three to five
acres of the whole tract are susceptible of cultivation. Her improve-
ments consisted of her frame house, and a fence enclosing about half an
acre. She owned four or five head of cattle, which she pastured on the
tract each year; she testified that her house had been burglarized two
or three times during her absences, but that she replaced the articles
stolen and had been residing in her house on her claim with her son from
May, 1886, continuously up to the time of the hearing; that she visited
her husband's claim occasionally during said period but only remained
for a short time.
It sufficiently appears from the record in this case thatboth claimant
and her husband are endeavoring to maintain separate residences atthe
same time, so that each by virtue of said residence may perfect title to
land covered by their respective entries. This can not be done.
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In the case of Thomas E. Henderson (10 L. D., 266), it was held that
a Husband and wife while they live together as such, can have but one
and the same residence; " and as " the home of a married woman is pre-
sumptively with her husband," Angie IL. Williamson (ib., 30), I think
the decision appealed from is a proper determination of the rights of the
parties, and the same is accordingly affirmed.
OKiLAHOMA TOWN-SITE5-CIRCULAR.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
WASHINGTON, D. C., July 10, 1890.
To te Trustees of Toitn-sites
in the U. S. Land Districts,
Oklahoma Territory.
To remove any doubts that may exist under regulations dated June
18, 1890, as to how the costs of contests are to be paid, you are hereby
instructed that your first duty, as stated in section 10 and the last clause
of section 13, is to proceed on the day designated in the notice published,
to set apart, except in contest cases, the lots, blocks, and grounds, with
the improvements, respectively, to each person or company entitled
thereto. You will at this point, and before proceeding to contests, make
assessment on all the lots embraced in the town-site, so that each shall
bear its fair proportion of all the expenses mentioned in section 15, and
no further assessments shall be made on uncontested lots that may be
required to meet expenses resulting from contests as to other property.
You will then, and not before, proceed to dispose of the contested cases,
and you will require each claimant to deposit with the disbursing officer
of the board each morning, a sum sufficient to cover and pay all costs
and expenses on such proceedings for the day, including the items men-
tioned in regulation numbered 15, because by section 8 of the act of
Congress, under which you are to proceed, all disbursements from the
appropriation made must be refunded to the Treasury of the United
States. At the close of the contests, on appeal or otherwise, the sum
deposited by the successful party shall be restored to him subject to the
rules in such cases; but that deposited by the losing party shall be re-
tained and accounted for by the disbursing officer of the board.
Very respectfully,
JOHN W. NOBLE,
Secretary.
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ATTORNEY-E-MPLOYE OF LOCAL OFFICE-SECTION 190 R. S.
SHARITT V. WOOD.
A clerk in a local office is within the provisions of section 190 R. S., and is prohib-
ited thereby during the period specified, from appearing as attorueyin a case that
was pending in said office while he was a clerk therein.
Proceedings had at the instance of an attorney disqualified under section 190 R. S.,
will not be recognized hy the Department.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land 
Office, July 10, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Washington Wood, Jr., from the de-
cision of your office dated October 12, 1888, in the case of Benjamin T.
Sharitt v. said Wood, involving the latter's homestead entry for the
SE.j of SW.j, Sec. 22, T. 16 S., R. 2 W., Montgomery land district,
Alabama.
August 7, 1886, Woodl applied to make homestead entry for said land
which was refused and the following endorsed on his applicatilon,-
" Rejected August 7, 1886, because land is classed as coal." From that
action Wood appealed.
On August 10, 1886, Sharitt made application to enter the same tract
as an adjoining farm homestead, which application was also refused and
the following endorsed thereon-" Rejected August 10, 1886, land
classed coal."
Your office after considering Wood's appeal directed that his applica-
tion be allowed and certificate and receipt were issued bearing date of
January 4, 1887.
April 27, 1887, Sharitt filed an affidavit of contest alleging that the
said
Washington Wood, fraudulently made said entry of said tract, that he, the affiant
made application to enter said tract in person to the register of this land office at
Montgomery, Ala., and filed his application with said register and paid him six dol-
lars ($6) in the morning of the 4th day of August, 1886, and affiant claims prior right
to enter said land.
Hearing was set for November 9, 1887, and notice of contest was
served September 7, 1887. Hearing was continued to the second Tues-
day in March, 1888, and again to July 5, 1888, and depositions of cer-
tain witnesses for contestant ordered taken before a commissioner of
Montgomery, Alabama, June 27, 1888. On the day appointed for the
taking of said depositions contestant appeared in person and by his
attorneys, Samuel Thompson and W. E. Brown. Claimant also ap-
peared in person and by his attorney, aid several witnesses were sworn
and testified, and their testimony transmitted to the local office.
July 31, 1888, this case having been called for final hearing W. E.
Brown appeared as attorney for contestant.
Claimant appeared in person and by attorney and moved that the
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testimony taken before the commissioner at Birmingham, be excluded
from the record and not considered in this case for the reasons that one
of contestant's attorneys (Samuel Thompson) was at that time and is
now disbarred from practicing or appearing in any manner as an attor-
ney or agent for any one before the local land office; and that the as-
sociate attorney (W. E. Brown), who appeared for contestant before
said commissioner, "was, at the time that Wood and Sharitt made
their applications before the local land office, the chief clerk in charge
of the register's office, and as such had charge of the applications, and
particularly do the records show that he had'charge of and did the
letter writing in the matter of the application of said Sharitt," and
further asked that said Thompson and Brown be each excluded from
appearing as atorneys in this case in any future proceedings therein.
W. E. Brown in reply to said motion stated that he (Brown) was em-
ployed by contestant as his attorney March , 1888, that he was not
connected with Samuel Thompson in this case; that he had known
that Thompson had been disbarred by direction of the Secretary of the
Interior, July 14, 1888, that he (Brown) appeared before the comumis-
sioner as Sharitt's attorney and conducted the examination of witnesses.
The local office overruled claimant's motion and held that " We can
see no legal reason why W. E. Brown should not act as-attorney for
Sharitt.'
Claimant appealed and on October 12, 1888, your office. affirmed the
action of the local office, whereupon claimant appealed to this Depart-
nment.
The ruling of the local officers upon the motion to exclude the testi-
mony in this case was interlocutory and therefore was not properly
subject to appeal. Te proper course would have been for your office
to dismiss the appeal and return the case to the local office for a final
decision. Inasmuch, however, as this was not done, and as a dismis-
sal of the appeal now would tend to protract litigation, it would seem
to the interest of all concerned to have the question here presented
determined at this time, and I have for these reasons concluded to
consider and pass upon this appeal.
It appears that said W. E. Brown, whose right to appear as attorney
in the taking of the depositions in question, is in dispute, was in the
month of August, 1886, when the respective applications of Wood and
Sharitt were presented, chief clerk in the register's office and that he
continued in that position until October 18, 1886, when he resigned.
The decision of your office is upon the theory that the section referred
to and the decision of this Department in the case of Luther Harrison
(4 L. D., 179), do not apply in this case. I do not understand upon
what ground such conclusion is based. The decision referred to is
broad enough to cover all clerks or employes and was evidently in-
tended to do so. The letter of your office (3 B. L. P., 399), holding that
this section of We Revised Statutes does not apply to employ6s of the
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local land offices was not approved by this Department and did not
overrule the decision in the Harrison case. That letter refers to an opinion
of the Attorney-General (15 Op., 267), holding that under the act of
March 3, 1877, providing for the transmission through the mails free of
postage, letters, etc., relating exclusively to the business of the govern-
ment, the use of the official envelopes provided for was limited to the
Executive Departments and the bureaus or offices therein at the seat of
government and did not extend to subordinate officers throughout the
country. The language used in the section now under consideration
is, however, broader and at the same time more specific in its descrip-
tion of the persons falling within its provisions than was the act then
being construed by the Attorney-General. Section 452 of the Revised
Statutes which prohibits " the officers, clerks, and employ6s in the Gen-
eral Land Office from purchasing the public lands hap been and is held
to include clerks and employes in the local offices. The section now
under consideration relates to any person employed as an officer,
clerk, or employd in any of the Departments " and must be held to in-
elude persons employed in the local offices. The arguments employed
in the decision in the Harrison case are just as applicable to this class
of employ6s as to any other.) Brown was not at the time these deposi-
tions were taken, under the provisions of section 190 Revised Statutes,
entitled to appear as an attorney in said case and the proceedings had
at his instance as such attorney cannot be recognized by this Depart-
ment.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the objection to the
depositions so taken is sustained. The papers in the case are here-
with returned, and you will direct the local officers to proceed with the
hearing in this case with as little delay as possible.
DESERT LAND ENTlRY.-AL[ENATION .-COMPACTNESS.
THOM AS B UNTON.
An oral promise of the claimant to convey, after perfection of title, a portion of the I
land in payment of money advanced for the reclamation thereof, does not neces-
sarily call for cancellation of the entry where good faith is apparent.
The nature and location of land, its means and facilities for irrigation and the right
of adjacent entrymen are properly matters for consideration in determining whether
a desert entry is sufficiently compact to answer the requirements of the law.
A desert entry may be referred to the board of equitable adj ndication where the final
proof is not submitted within the statutory period, and the delay is satisfactorily
explained.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Ofce, July 10, 1890.
The record in the case of Thomas Hunton shows that on the 24th
day of March, 1880, he made desert land entry No. 178, for the NE.
4 and SE. 41, sec. 15, the NW. I of the SW. 4 and S. i of SW. 4, sec.
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14; the NW. 1 and NE. of SW. 4, sec. 23, T. 23 N., R. 67 W., Chey-
enne, Wyoming, and made final proof and payment on the 19th day
of August, 1881, and received final certificate No. 121, September 8,
1884.
By your office letter of Jly 27, 1887, this entry was held for cancel-
lation, on the ground-
(1) That in his final proof, Hunton admitted that he had agreed to let his brother
have one-half the land.
(2) That the entry is not sufficiently compact, the distance from the northernmost
to the southernmost boundary being one and three-feonrths miles.
(3) That proof was not made until subsequent to the expiration of the statutory
period.
On the 6th October, 1887, unton made application, accompanied
by affidavit, for a hearing, which was afterwards withdrawn, and on
March 21, 1889, a stipulation was signed by B. N. Bonfils, special agent
of the General Land Office, and Gibson Clark, attorney for Hunton,
with the approval of the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
"that the facts alleged in said affidavit (meaning the affidavit of Hunton
aforesaid) are true and that said affidavit sets forth all the facts material
to said matter, and that the said matter may be considered and deter-
mined upon the facts sets forth in said affidavit."
On consideration of said facts, your office on April 11, 1889, again held
said entry for cancellation, from which decision Hltnton now appeals to
this Department.
The affidavit referred to reads as follows:
Thomas Hunton being first duly sworn on his oath, says:
I am the same person who made the above described desert land entry. I made the
entry originally at the Cheyenne Land Office on the 24th day of March, A. D. 1880.
The number of my declaration being 178. I made said entry in good faith for my
own exclusive use and benefit, and paid the first payment of 25 ts. per acre therefor
out of my own personal monies. Thereafter 1 expended in the improvement and rec-
lamation of said lands at least six hundred dollars out of my own personal monies,
but the land costing me very much more to reclaim it than I had at first expected, I
from time to time borrowed money and procured assistance from my brother, John
nton, to the amount of four thousand dollars, the greater portion of which sum I
tcsed in buildingditches pon, fencing, irrigating and otherwise improving this land.
this money I received from my brother John Hunton in and during the years 1881,
1882, 1883, and 1884. He had no interest of any kind whatever in the land, and there
was no agreement of any kind between us that be ever honld have any interest of any
kind in it, until some time in the year 1884, abou tlietime I made final proof upon the
land and after I had fully reclaimed it, that he spoke to rne about the amount of money
he had advanced me as before stated, and I then told him that after I had proved p
on the land and acquired title to it, he might have a one-half interest in it in pay-
ment of the amount I owed him, if he desired it. There was no written agrepluent
between us, conveying or promising to convey any part of the land or any interest in
it to him, and no other agreement of any kind concerning said land between us, than
that above stated, which was wholly verbal. It was the facts above set forth and
none other, which led me to make the statement in my final proof in answer to ques-
tion 18, as set forth in my final proof deposition, and I made said statement simply in
order that I might fairly, fully and truthfnlly place the officials of the land office in
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full possess on of all the facts in the case. In regard to the alleged want of compact-
ness i the form of the entry, it will be impossible to make the entry in more compact
form, except by the relinquishment of certain portions, to do which would be a total.
loss, for the reason that there are no vacant, unoccupied public lands adjoining the
lands in this entry, as I am informed and believe. I know there are none which can
be irrigated and reclaimed.
In regard to the allegationthat the proof was made after the expiration of the stat-
utory period, I have this to say. Either late in the year 1883 or early in the year
1884, I was called upon by the Cheyenne land office to show cause why my said entry
should not be canceled for my failure to make proof and final payment within the
statutory period. Thereupon I filed in said land office my affidavit setting forth the
reasons which had prevented me from fully reclaiming said land within said period.
This affidavit, by letter dated February 25, 1884, was duly transmitted to the Hon.
Commissioner of the General Land Office at Washington, D. C., and proved to be a
satisfactoryexplanation ofmysaid failure. Thereupon on orabout August20, A. D., *
1884, I filed in said Cheyenne Land Office the final proof depositions of myself and my
two witnesses. These depositions were not at said time received or acted upon by the
register and receiver of said Land Office, but under date of August 20, 1884, and with
letter of that date, were transmitted by the register of said Land Office to the Hon.
Commissioner of the General Land Office at Washington, D. C., for his instructions.
Said final proof depositions were received by the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, and having been examined by him, were under date of August 30, 1884, by
letter ' ' Vol. i, Page 372, of L. Harrison, Assistant Commissioner, returned to reg-
ister and receiver at Cheyenne, Wyoming, with instructions to permit me to complete
my said entry, which I accordingly did, on the 8th day of September, 1884.
Four questions naturally arise in the determination of this case.
1st, Ought the entry be canceled because, as admitted in the affida-
vit, Elunton told his brother about the time he made his final proof that\
he would let him have a half interest in the land when he had perfected|
his title, in payment of the four thousand dollars loaned or advanced'
to him by his brother and expended in the reclamation of the land?
I think this question should be answered in the negative. The first
section of the act of March 3, 1877 (19 Stats., 377), provides: .
That it shall be lawful for any citizen of the United States, or any person of requi-
site age, ' who may be entitled to become a citizen, and who has filed his declaration
to become such' and upon payment of twenty-five cents per acre-to file a declara-
tion under oath with the register and the receiver of the land district in which any
desert land is situated, that he intends to reclaim a tract of desert land not exceeding
one section, by conducting water upon the same, within the period of three years
thereafter. Provided hoiwever that the right to the use of the water by the person so
conducting the same, on or to any tract of desert land of six hundred and forty acres
shall depend upon bona fide prior appropriation: and such right shall not exceed the
amount of water actually appropriated, and necessarially used for the purpose of
irrigation and reclamation: and all surplus water over and above such actual appro-
priation and use, together with the water of all, lakes, rivers and other sources of
water supply upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain and be held free
for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining and manufact-
uring purposes subject to existing rights. Said declaration shall describe particu-
larly said section of land if surveyed, and, if unsurveyed, shall describe the same as
nearly as possible without a survey. At any time within the pelod of three years
after filing said declaration, upon making satisfactory proof to the register and re-
ceiver of the reclamation of said tract of land in the manner aforesaid, and upon the
payment to the receiver of the additional sum of one dollar per acre for a tract of
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land not exceeding six hndred and forty acres to any one person, a patent for the
same shall be issued to him. Provided, that no person shall be permitted to enter
more than one tract of land and not to, exceed six hndred and forty acres which
shall be in compact form.
rw There is nothing in this act to preclude a sale of the land after the
consummation of an entry.
The regulations of the Secretary for the guidance of the Commis-
sioner in the observance of the statute (5 L. D., 708), among other
things provide:
Desert laud entries are not asaignable, and the transfer of such entries, whether
by deed, contract, or agreement, vitiates the entry. An entry made in the interest
or for the benefit of any other person, firm, or corporation, or with intent that the
title shall be conveyed to any other person, firm, or corporation, is illegal.
It will be observed that the first clause of the regulation has refer-
ence only to the transfer of the entry.
>- Accepting as a fact that a transfer of the entry is violative of the
statute, as well as the instructions, and will not be tolerated, yet the
affidavit which contains the admitted facts shows tha_ there was no
actual transfer, and I am impressed with the belief that the entrymen
intended no wrong, but desired only to repay his brother for advances
made him to aid him in the reclamation of this tract, so that I am loath
to impute bad faith to him, and presuming honest intentions, I think
that this clause needs no further consideration to show that there has
been no violation thereof.
2d. Was the " entry made in the interest or for the benefit of any
other person, etc., or with the intent that the title should be conveyed
to any other person, firm, or corporation." On this point the affidavit is
positive, and its truth being admitted, it is only necessary to refer to it.
He says: " I made the entry in good faith for my own exclusive use and
and benefit." Finding that its reclamation would cost a great deal
more than he had anticipated, after expending $600 of his own money,
he was compelled to borrow $4,000 from his brother.
The statement of the entryman impresses me as frank, honest, and
manly, and I think no one who reads that portion of the affidavit will
come to any other conclusion than that the entryman made this entry
for his own benefit, but from a desire to pay his brother the money
which he had borrowed of him, he was willing to deed him one-half of
the land. It may be that the undertaking was beyond his means and
that the law will not uphold the entry by a poor man of such large
tracts upon borrowed capital to work a reclamation, and when irriga-
tion of the tract is complete and the certificate issued, deed a portion
thereof in satisfaction of the debt, or to accomplish indirectly what is
directly prohibited, but in this case no such transfer has been consum-
mated and I can not believe if the entryman had intended to violate the
law in this respect that he would have been so frank and open about
it. Usually frauds are not perpetrated in that way.
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3d. Has the entryman complied with the law in the matter of com-
pactness of entry e
In your holding this entry for cancellation on the ground that the
entry was not sufficiently compact, you seem to have been guided by a
regulation formerly in force in your office, which provided that " in no
case where the full quantity of six hundred and forty acres is entered
will the side line on either side be permitted to exceed one mile and a
quarter." -
In the case of Francis M. Bishop (5 L. D., 429), Secretary Lamar
eliminated this provision of the regulation as being in conflict with the
spirit of the law providing for desert land entries; that it operated as,
an obstruction, rather than an aid to its execution.
It is impracticable to establish inflexible rules which shall govern
the shape or form of an entry. Each case must depend upon the cir-
cumstances surrounding it and whether an entry should' be regarded
as sufficiently compact to answer the requirements of the law must de-
pend largely upon the nature and location of the land, its means and
facilities for irrigation and the rights of adjacent and surrounding entry-
men.
In the case of William Thompson (8 L. D., 104), the question of com-
pactness is discussed at some length, and many cases cited where
entries have been allowed, although the land entered was quite as ob-
jectionable so far as compactness is concerned as in the case now under
* consideration.
James S. Love (5 L. D., 642) entered 173.44 acres, and his entry was S
a mile in length. It was held for cancellation by your office because
not compact Acting Secretary Muldrow reversed the decision on ap-
peal, and held that it appeared of record that the lands immediately
adjoining the entry
have all been entered under the desert land law by other parties so that there (is) no-
way of rendering said entry more compact than it is and still retain the same quantity
of laud. The case is precisely like that of Ann E. Miller, decided by this department
May 22, 1886. In that case the entry was a mile long and quarter of a mile wide,
and the adjoining lands were all appropriated by other persons, and her entry was
allowed to stand.
While the decisions of this Department have not been uniform upon
the question of what should be considered a compact entry. within the
meaning of the statute, yet they have invariably been liberal in the
construction of the law, where the entryman has acted in good faith in
making his entry and in reclaiming the land, and especially where, as
in this case, the surrounding land has all been entered and the rights
of other entrymen have not been invaded or molested. This entry is a
mile and three-quarters in length; its greatest width being one mile,
diminishing north and south from the center to one half mile at the
northern extremity and one-fourth at the southern. No suspicion of
the lack of good faith can be attached to the entryman; e bas fully
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reclaimed the land, at an expense of four thousand dollars, and has
made valuable improvements thereon, and as the entry can not be
reformed without loss to the entryman, it will be held to meet the
requirements of the statute in relation to compactness.
4th, Should the entry be canceled because the claimant did not sub-
mit his proof within the three years provided for in the statute? 
Lthink not. The admitted facts fully explhin the cause of the delay
and while it is the repeated holdings of the Department that it has no
power to extend the statutory time within which the proof shall be sub-
mitted to this class of cases, yet where good faith is shown in the mat-
ter of reclamation and no adverse interests have attached, entries made
out of time have been authorized and upheld in numerous cases. Mar-
tha W. Fisher, 9 L. D., 430; Edward 0. Simpson, 9 L. D., 617; George
W. Mapes, 9 L. D., 631; George F. Stear, 8 L3. D., 573.
It appearing to my satisfaction that the eutryman has acted in good
faith, that he was allowed to make final proof after the time prescribed
by the statute (the proof in other respects being satisfactory), and there
being no adverse claim, the entry will be submitted to the Board of
Equitable Adjudication for confirmation.
The decision of your office is accordingly modified.
COAL DECLARATORY STATEMENT-SUIT TO VACATE PATENT.
JAMES D. NEGUS ET AL.
One who bas had the benefit of a coal declaratory statement is disqualified thereby
to enter under a second filing.
A coal declaratory statement, offered during the endency of a previous application
to file made for the benefit of the same applicant, though in the name of another,
confers no right as against an intervening adverse claim.
An applicant for the preference right to purchase coal land under section 2348 R. S.,
must be in actual possession of the land when he applies for such right, and the
labor expended and improvements made must be such as to clearly indicate his
good faith.
Suit to set aside patent will not be advised by the Department in the absence of a
specific showing of facts sufficient to justify such action.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, July 12,
1890.
By letter dated September 21,1886, your office transmitted (with other
papers) for consideration by this Department the petition of James D.
Negus and Thomas C. Clark, by James D. Negus his attorney in fact,
filed March 2, 1883, asking that the patent issued to Jesse Bell for the
SE. of Sec. 7, and to John Bell for the SW. - of Sec. 8, T. 21 N., R.
116 W., Evanston, Wyoming, "be recalled or proceedings . . insti-
tuted to cancel them " and also the separate petitions of Thomas W. B.
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Hughes and Orlando W. Joslyn each, by James D. Negus attorney in
fact, filed November 24, 1884, for the institution of suit " in the name of
the United States to cancel " the patents issued respectively to William
F. Bechel for the SE. of said section 8, and to Edgar M. Morseman
for the NE. of Sec. 17 in the same town and' range.
The said petitions although addressed to the Department were filed
and have been altogether with the accompanying and additional papers
considered in your office where counsel for the petitioners and for the
patentees have been heard orally arid upon brief.
By the said letter of September 21, 1886, whereby the said patents
are sustained, your office sets out that "all papers bearing upon the
matter including the contest cases of Abner G. McDaniel v. William
Bell, James D. Negus v. Alfred G. Lee, and Thomas C. Clarke v. James
H. Johnson, which are referred to by counsel "for petitioners" have
been forwarded "informally and without scheduling" to the end that
the facts may be fully before the Department.
The record in the said case of McDaniel v. Bell was (in response to a
letter from counsel for the former) by letter dated November 17, 1887,
returned by the Department to your office for appropriate action.
Thereupon your office on January 21, 1888, sustained the cash coal
entry of McDaniel for the NE. 1 of section 18 in said township 21. This
action was affirmed by the Department on July 1, 1889 (9 L. D., 15),
when the accompanying record was returned for the files of your office.
Sundry papers relating to the said case of Clark v. Johnson involv.
ing the SE. I of NW. I of said section 8, and to the said case of Negus
v. Lee involving the SE. i of NE. 1 of said section 7, are with the pend-
ing petitions.
The plat showing the public survey of said township 21, was filed in
the local office on April 7, 1882.
On April 25, 1882, the said Morseman, Bechel, John and Jesse Bell
made respectively coal cash entries (upon which said patents are based)
at $20 per acre, (Sec. 2347 R. S., Act of March 3, 1873, 17 Stat., 607),
for the several quarter sections heretofore described.
Subsequently to the date of said entries the said petitioners respect-
ively applied to file certain coal declaratory statements in conflict there-
with.,
These filings were offered (apparently by Negus) at the local office in
manner following:
Joslyn, June 3, 1882, W. i NE. i and W. I SE. i of said Sec. 17,
Hughes, June 3, 1882, N. j SE. i and S. A NE. I of said Sec. 8, Clark,
June 3, 1882, S. I NW. i and N. S W. i of said Sec. 8, Negus, June 5,
1882, S. A NE. j and N. i SE. I of said See. 7.
All of said filings were rejected at the local office by reason of con-
flict with said cash entries.
Appeals from this action were respectively filed by the petitioners in
the local office on July 3, 1883, from whence they were transmitted to
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your office by letter dated July 8, 1882, where, as stated by your office,
they were received July 15, 1882.
It appears that the said caslh'entries were "posted " on the tract books
of your office on June 6, 1882, that they weie then " marked special'
and were examined and approved for patent on July 10 and 12, and
patents issued dated July 15, 1882," that the appeals just mentioned
were accordingly dismissed July 29, 1882, that appeals from such dis-
missal were forwarded from the local office on August 14, 1882, and that
the same "were retained in your office by informal request of appel-
lant's attorney."
The petitioners claim a preference right under section 2348 R. S., to
purchase the tracts embraced in their said declaratory statements.
It is set out in various affidavits (mostly made by said Negus) and
also in the pending petitions that the petitioners several claims were
surveyed, staked, posted with notice and recorded among the county
records during the spring of 1881, that work in developing said claims
was then done by men employed by Negus, that in such work there
was expended on Negus' claim $77, on Clark's $44, on Hughes' $250
and on Joslyn's over $500, that such work was begun upon the Negus
X and Clark claims on March 21, 1881, and upon the Hughes and Joslyn
claims on April 5, and May 25, 1881, that the men thus employed were
driven by Jesse Bell with threats and fire-arms from the claims of
Negus and Clark on April 2, 1881, and in like manner froim the claims
of Hughes and Joslyn by William Sutton and others on June 15,
1881, and that pethioners have since been prevented from working said
claims by reason of the " threats and interferences " of said Bell and
Sutton.
The material allegation made by the petitioners is to the effect that
they had each acquired a preference right to enter the tracts included
in their respective filings and that the said conflicting cash entries upon
which the patents in question are based were made subject to such
rights.
Section 2347, supra, provides that a duly qualified person shall
" upon application to the register of the proper land office have the
right to enter (in the manner prescribed) by legal subdivisions any
quantity of vacant coal lands of the United States " not otherwise ap-
propriated or reserved by competent authority not exceeding one hun-
dred and sixty acres to such individual person."
Section 2348, supra, provides that any qualified person who has
opened and improved or shall hereafter " open and improve any coal
mine or mines upon the public lands and shall be in actual possession 
of the same" shall be "entitied to a preference right of entry under
the preceding section of the mines so opened and improved."
If, therefore, the petitioners had acquired and were in possession
of such preference rights of entry at the date of the cash entries by the
patentees it would seem under the sections cited that said cash entries
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have been allowed in contravention of said rights and that the patents
based thereo n (in so far as they conflict with the petitioners claims)
should be set aside.
But proceedings to vacate a government patent will not be advised
by this Department in the absence of a sufficient showing. Thomas J.
iLaney (9 L. D., 83).
Your office in this connection found that the petitioners had failed to
"make out so strong a case of prior right as to warrant the government
in attacking the title" conveyed by the patents in question.
In this conclusion I fully concur.
In the case of McDaniel v. Bell, supra, involving land adjoining that
embraced in the said patent to Jesse Bell, the Department found in ef-
fect that one William Bell, who on May 11, 1882, applied to file a coal
declaratory statement for such land and who, by direction of your office,
was allowed to do so in July following, had made such application and
filing in the interest and for the benefit of the said James D. Negus.
Rule 9 of the Circular, approved July 31, 1882, (1 IL. D., 687), pro.
vides that "' One person can have the benefit of one entry or filing only.
He is disqualified by having made such entry or filing alone or as a
member of an association." This rule is in my opinion fully sustained
by sections 2348, 2349 and 2350, Revised Statutes.
The said application by William Bell for the benefit of Negus having
been subsequently allowed and having been made prior to June 5, 1882,
it follows that on the latter date when Negus applied to file as stated,
in conflict with the cash entry of Jesse Bell, he was not qualified to enter
land under the act of 1873 supra and could therefore acquire no rights
as against such entry.
* Consequently it is unnecessary to further consider the said petition
of Negus and Clark, except so far as it relates to the claim of the
latter.
It is set out in said petition that the men (employed by Negus) who
"had been working and representing the claim of Thomas C. Clark as
well as the claim of James D. Negus" from March 19, 1881, after being
driven from the latter's claim by Jesse Bell (" who entered the mouth
of the tunnel made and worked by them, and drew a revolver and
pointed it at them and notified them to leave the claim or take the con-
sequences) on April 2, following, resumed work the same day on the
Clark claim whence they were driven" in like manner and with like
threats and fire-arms by the said Jesse Bell. That the said James D
Negus and Thomas C. Clark have since said time been prevented from d
resuming work on their respective claims by'reason of the threats and
interferences of the said Jesse Bell and others acting in concert with
him, who made threats " to shoot any men who should commence work
ing thereon."
By the circular of July 31, 1882, supra, section 18, the Department
held that the "opening and improving of a coal mine in order to con-
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fer a preference right of purchase must not be considered as a mere
matter of form; the labor expended and improvements made must be
such as to clearly indicate the good faith of the claimant."
And the statute (section 2348, supra) further requires the applicant
,for such preference right to be in actual possession of the land at the
time when he seeks to exercise such right.
The affidavit of Clark contained in the coal declaratory statement
presented as stated for him by Negus, made in New York, May 25,
1882, sets out that he is personally unacquainted with the land, that he
has expended from March 19, to April 2, 1881, $44 in "' tunnelling and
cross cutting."
The petition of Clark and Negus sets out "that said declaratory
statement showed that the said Clarke had expended the sum of $44
in working and developing said claim."
For more than a year prior to his application to file as stated in June,
1882, the tract claimed for Clark was admittedly neither in his posses-
sion nor subject to his control.
His meagre and vaguely described improvement of the land could
not therefore be considered were it not for the general allegation in the
said petition to the effect that since the said eviction of his agents in
April, 1881, he has been kept out of possession of his claim by the
threats of Jesse Bell.
The petitioners (Negus and Clark) however, make no specific showing
in support of such charge. They fail to set out when, or to whom, or
how often the said threats were made, or to describe the attendant cir.
cumstances, nor do they allege or offer to prove that Jesse Bell or
hose with him had acted in the premises for the benefit of John Bell
whose patent conflicts with the claim of Clark. Neither does it ap-
pear that any effort has been made by or for Clark to regain possession
of the land.
Conceding therefore that Clark's agents were as alleged forcibly dis-
possessed in April, 1881, the showing made by him in behalf of the pres-
ent petition does not (under the circumstances) in my opinion, warrant
the belief that his preference right to which he alleged the cash entry
of John Bell (made in April, 1882) was subject, can be successfully
maintained.
The petitions of Joslyn and Hughes set out that at the times stated
in April and May, 1881, the men employed on their respective claims
were driven therefrom by William Sutton, and "four other armed men
acting in concert with him."
The affidavits of William Bell (apparently the same party who had
filed as aforesaid for Negus) filed with said petitions set out that Sutton
had then claimed the said tracts for the Union Pacific R. R. Co., and
that (Sutton) for some weeks thereafter had kept armed men on said
claims to drive off the petitioner's employees. The, petitioners, how-
ever, neither allege or offer to prove that the conflicting entries of
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Morseman and Bechel were made in the interest of said company or
that Sutton was in the employ or acting at the instance of said entry-
men.
The petitioners (Joslyn and Hughes) alleged generally that since the
said dispossession of their agents, they have been kept out of the pos-
session of their claim by the threats and interferences of Sutton and
others, but make no specific showing in support of such charge.
The matters presented by the petitions last mentioned being in all
material respects similar to those presented by that of Clarke, I'must find
for the reasons heretofore stated, in connection with the latter, that the
preference rights alleged by Joslyn and Hughes have not been suffi-
ciently shown.
The claims of the petitioners are based upon the rights they may have
acquired in preference to those of the patentees. They have failed to
make a satisfactory showing of such rights. Consequently the Depart--
ment in the absence of a sufficient showing would not be warranted in
recommending suits for the cancellation of the patents involved.
The pending petitions are accordingly denied.
This disposition of the case renders it unnecessary for me to discuss
the matters attending the issue by your office of the patents referred to
or such other matters as may be presented by the record.
CALIFORNIA SWAMP LEAND-ACT OF JULY 23, 1S6.
ALLEN ET AL. V. MCCABE.
The title to land segregated and sold by the State of California as swamp prior to the
act of July 23,1866, is confirmed to said State by the second clause of section 4 of
said act, if the segregation survey conforms to the system of surveys adopted. by
the United States.
The supervision of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, in the matter of
approving township plats constructed by the United States surveyor general
showing segregation surveys made by the State prior to said act, is limited to
ascertaining whether said surveys conform to the system of surveys adopted by
the United States, and if so found, he is not authorized to withhold his approval.
emble, if fraud is alleged the Commissioner may refuse his approval.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, July 12,
1890.
I have considered the appeal of the State of California, in the case of
said State ex rel. J. B. Allen, and J. R. Rice, v. The United States exr rel .
W. B. McCabe, from the decision of your office of January 25, 1887,
holding for rejection the claim of the State under the swamp land grant
to lots 2, 3 and 4, of section 28, and lot l and the NE. i of the NW.i
of section 33, T. 14 N., R. 9 W., M. D. M., California.
The State claims under the act of September 28, 1850 (9 Stat., 519-
section 2479, Revised Statutes) whereby it was granted " the whole of
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the swamp and overflowed lands, made unfit thereby for cultivation and
remaining unsold on or after the twenty-eighth day of September A. D.
eighteen hundred and fifty " and under the act of July 23, 186G (14 Stat.,
218) to quiet land titles in California.
February 27, 1884, the relator William B. McCabe made homestead
entry of lot 1, and the NE. i of the NW. , of section 33, and lots 2, 3
and 4 of section 28, in said township.
July 23, 1873, the receiver of the land office at San Francisco for-
warded the application of the State of California ex rel. Charles Good-
win, to have lots 4 and 5, section 28, and lot 1 and the NE. of the
NW. of section 33, T. 14 N., R. 9 W., listed as swamp and overflowed
land under the act of July 23, 1866. Accompanying said letter was the
following statement:
No adverse claim. It appearing that the State sold said land prior to July 23,
1866-to wit, in 1860-we recommend that the same be listed to the State.
H. E. ROLLINS, register,
CHAS. H. CHAMBERLAIN, receiver.
With the letter was transmitted a certified copy of survey No. 18, of
the N. - of the NW. 4 of section 33, and the south fraction of the SW.
4 of section 28, containing ninety-seven acres, made March 14, 1860, by
T. J. DeWoody, county surveyor of Napa county, in accordance, as he
states, with the act of the legislature approved April 18,1859, and the
instructions of the surveyor-general.
This is the land J. R. Rice bought from the State as H. A. Higley,
register of the State land office certifies, under date of August 1860.
The certificate states that upon payment of the amount agreed upon and
the confirmation of the State's claim, Rice will be entitled to a patent
for the tracts described. The amount paid by Mr. Rice in 1860, was
twenty-seven dollars and sixteen cents, being twenty per cent of the
purchase money and the first year's interest, for ninety-seven acres of
swamp and overflowed land. In each of the years 1861, 1862 and 1863,
he paid $7.76 annual interest; in 1867 $23.28 being interest to April 1,
1868 and on May 12, 1868, $77.60 being payment in full, was made.
September 15, 1862, Rice, for value received, sold all of his interest in
said lands to Charles Goodwin.
Survey No. 19, also transmitted, was of fractional southeast quarter of
section 28, T. 14 N., R. 9 W., containing eighty-five and a half acres
and was made March 13, 1860, by T. J. DeWoody, county surveyor of
Napa county. As in the previous case, the county surveyor certified
to the correctness of the survey. This is the land James E. Allen ap-
plied to purchase from the State, and for which he made the first pay-
ment in 1860, as Et. A. Higley, register of the State land office certified
uVder date of August 1, 1860. July 17, 1860, Allen paid $23.94 for
said land, being twenty per cent. of the purchase money with interest
for the first year. He paid the annual interest of $6.84 for each of the
years 1861 and 1862. April 26, 1862, he assigned, for a valuable cor-
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sideration, all his interest in said tract to James W. MoGaugh, who
paid interest of $6.84 for each of the years 1863, 1864, 1870, 1871,1872,
and on December 3, 1868, paid $25.27 for three years eight months and
nine days. April 30, 1869, for value received, MeGaugh assigned all
his interest in said land to Charles Goodwin.
August 23, 1884, the United States surveyor-general transmitted a
plat of said township 14, showing the amendments made to the map
thereof in accordance with the segregation surveys made by the State
of California, in sections 28 and 33, prior to July 23, 1866, together
with the list of lands so segregated. This list embraces lots 4 and 5
containing 28.41 acres, and lots 1, 2 and 3, containing 89.63 acres, in see
tion 28, as per survey 18, and the NE. I of the NW. { and lot 1, con-
taining 79.63 acres in section 33, as per survey 19, the whole amounting
to 197.90 acres.
Upon this list the register of the United States Land Office made the
following annotation:
.Returned by United States surveyor-general as upland on plat filed December 14
1869. Homestead entry for lot 4 by William B. McCabe, No. 5911, February 27,1884,
The above remarks apply also to these tracts (NE. i of NW. i and lot 1 section 33)
and also to lots 2 and 3 of these tracts.
October 22, 1884, there was transmitted the protest of William B.
McCabe, who had made homestead entry of lots 2, 3 and 4, section
28 and lot 1 and NE. i of NW. i of section 33, ''. 14 N., R.- 9 W.
against the application of the State of California to have said land cer-
tified to said State as swamp and overflowed land, and against the ap-
proval of any segregation or survey of said lands or any portion there-
of as swamp lands and overflowed land or otherwise. As grounds of
protest he alleged that no portion of said land is, or ever was, of the
character contemplated by the act granting swamp lands, that the State
had never selected or applied for any portion of said land prior to the
homestead entry of said McCabe; that whatever claim said State may
have had is barred by the lapse of time and its own laches, and that the
pretended survey of said lands under the authority of the State of Cal-
ifornia does not conform to the system of surveys adopted by the United
States.
By your office letter of May 12, 1885, you ordered a hearing under the
last paragraph of section 4, of said act of 1866, to ascertain the actual
character of said tracts September 28, 1850, and your said order of a
hearing seems to be based upon the statement of the register of the
local office, that said land is returned as "upland" by the United States
survey of 1869.
Upon the testimony taken at this hearing the surveyor general found
that said land was swamp or overflowed land at date of the grant and
as such passed to the State, but on appeal of McCabe for the United
States, your office by the decision complained of reversed said decision
and held the claim of grantees under the State for cancellation.
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The issues raised seem to be two; first, was a hearing properly or-
dered, and second, if so, is your decision sustained by the evidence?
It is claimed by the grantees of the State that by the second clause
of section 4, of the act of 1866, the title of the State was quieted in the
grantees under the facts shown in the record and that no hearing could
be legally had and no inquiry could be made as to the character of the
land.
The appeal of the State is based substantially upon the claim that
your said decision is not supported by the evidence and is contrary to
law, specifically alleging that said decision is contrary to the provisions
of the act of Congress of July 23, 1866, and particularly to the provis-
ions of the second clause of the fourth section of said act.
The act of July 23,1866 (14 Stats., 218), provides in said section four
as follows:-
That in all cases where township surveys have been, or shall hereafter be, made
under authority of the United States, and the plats thereof approved, it shall be the
duty of the Commissioner of the General Land Office to certify over to the State of
California, as swamp and overflowed, all the lands represented as such upon such
approved plats, within one year from the passage of this act, or within one year from
the return and approval of such township plats. The Commissioner shall direct the
United States surveyor general for the State of California, to examine the segrega-
tion maps and surveys of the swamp and overflowed lands made by said State; and
when he shall find them to conform to the system of surveys adopted by the United
States, he shall construct and approve township plats accordingly, and forward to the
general land office for approval; Provided, That in segregating large bodies of land,
notoriously and obviously swamp and overflowed, it shall not-be necessary to subdi-
vide the same, but to run the exterior lines of such body of land.
In case such surveys are found not to be in accordance with the system of United
States surveys, and in such other townships as no survey has been made by the United
States, the Commissioner shall direct the surveyor general to make segregation sur-
veys upon application to said surveyor general by the Governor of said State, within
one year of such application, of all the swamp and overflowed land in such townships,
and to report the same to the general land office representing and describing what
land was swamp and overflowed under the grant, according to the best evidence he
can obtain. If the authorities of said State shall claim as swamp and overflowed any
land not represented as such upon the map or in the returns of the surveyors, the
character of such land at the date of the grant, September twenty-eight, eighteen
hundred and fifty, and the right to the same, shall be determined by testimony, to be
taken before the surveyor general, who shall decide the same, subject to the approval
of the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
The legislature of the State of California enacted several laws, begin-
ning with the act of 1855, for the purpose of ascertaining and segrega-
ting the swamp and overflowed lands granted to the State by the act
of September 28, 1850 (9 Stats., 519), but which by reason of the failure
of the Secretary of the Interior to certify the same to the State under
the second section of said act had not yet become available for purposes
of sale or reclamation. The act of said legislature under which the
sales of the land in controversy were made by the State was an act ap-
proved April 21, 1858, (General Laws of Cal., 1850 to 1864, page 592),
which provided that any qualified citizen of the State might have a
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segregation survey of any alleged swamp land which he desired to pur-
chase, by filing the affidavit provided for by section two of said act, in
the office of the surveyor of the county in which the land, or the greater
part of it, might be situated.
No general segregation law was enacted until 1861.
With his letter of August 23, 1884, the United States surveyor gen-
eral transmitted a plat of said township 14, showing the amendments
made to the map thereof in accordance with the segregation surveys
made by the state of California in section 28 and 33 prior to July 23,
1866. The lots described are lots 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, section 28, and lot 1
and the NE. J of the NW. i of section 33 and the certificate is in the
words following:
U. S. SURVEYOR GENERAL2S OFFICE,
San Francisco, Cal., July 23, 1884.
I hereby certify that the above is a correct list of the lands in township 14 north,
range 9 west, Mount Diablo base and meridian, selected and segregated as swamp
and overflowed lands by the State of California prior to July 23, 1866, as appears by
certified copies of State segregation surveys now on file and of record in this office
and I further certify that the said surveys conform to the system of surveys adopted
'by the United States.
Attest.
(SEAL.) W. H. BROWN,
U. S. Surveyor General, Dist. of Cala.
By letter of November 14, 1887, you transmitted a diagram of the
whole of said township 14, upon which was the following endorsement:
The above diagram of township No.14, north, range No. 9, west, Mount Diable me-
ridian, showing amendments to sections 28 and 33, is strictly conformable to the field
notes of surveys of swamp 'and overflowed lands in said sections, by T. J. Dewoody,
-county surveyor for Napa county, made in April 1860, which are on file in this office-
Said surveys have been examined and found to be in accordance with the United
States system of surveys and are hereby approved. WW. H. BROWN,
U. S. Surv. Gen. Cal.
U. S. SURVEYOR GENERAL'S OFFICE,
San Francisco, California, August 23, 1884.
Upon the diagram lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of section 28 and lots 1 and
the NE. I of theNW. I- of section 53, are marked "swamp and over-
dlowed lands." In your said letter you say: " Said plat has not been
approved by the Commissioner of the General Land Office."
It is contended by the counsel for McCabe that the surveys made in
1860, were illegal and void and were not in conformity with the laws of
the State or with the system of surveys adopted by the United States,
They discuss the State law and cite decisions of the supreme court of
'California as to its requirements. Into this discussion I do not think
it necessary to enter, because it was decided by Secretary Delano, De-
cember 5, 1871 (IC. L. L., 462), adopting the opinion of Assistant Attor-
ney General Smith (id., 453), that the system of surveys adopted by the
United States meant those made on the rectangular system as contra-
distinguished from those made on the geodetic system.
The survey made by the State in 1860, being in conformity with the
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system of surveys adopted by the United States and the land having
been sold prior to the act of 1866, and when there was no adverse claim
to it, the State having made application for the same in due form and the
surveyor general of the United States having approved and constracted
a township accordingly and forwarded the same to the Commissioner
of the General Land Office, for approval, it is necessary to consider the
effect of the refusal of the Commissioner to approve the plat.
In the case of Wright and Roseberry, 121 U. S., where there was no
formal approval by the Commissioner of the township plat the court
treated its official use as approval and said, (p. 517):
, The representation of the lands as swamp and overflowed on the approved town-
ship plat would be conclusive as against the United States that they were such lands,
if they had not been patented before the return of such township plat to the Land
Office. The act of Congress intended that the segregation map prepared by Author-
ity of the State, and filed in the State surveyor general's office, if found upon exam-
in-ttion by the United States surveyor general to be made in accordance with the
public surveys of the general government, should be taken as evidence that the lands
designated thereon as swamp and overflowed were such in fact except where this
would interfere with the previously acquired interests.
This language does not determine what constitutes the " approved"
plats referred to, whether the approval must be by the surveyor gen-
eral alone or by both the surveyor general and the Commissioner.
After quoting the second clause of the fourth section of said act of
July 23, 1866, Secretary Schurz said in the case of the Central Pacific
Railroad v. State of California (4 C. L. O., 150):
The act of September 2, 1850, granted none but swampy or overflowed lands,
whereas the State had segregated both dry and swampy lands. The clause above
quoted was therefore enacted to make an end of controversy by confirming to the
State those lands which she had segregated in accordance with the system of surveys
adopted by the general government. I am of the opinion that this clause confirms
absolutely to the State all lands not in a state of reservation which had been segre-
gated by her prior to July 23, 1866, if the State surveys were made on the rectangular
system whether the lands had been surveyed by the United States or not, or whether
they were swampy or dry lands, provided no valid pre-emption or homestead claim
or other right had been acquired by any settler as provided in the first section of the
act.
The laud in conttoversy having been actually segregated in 1860, by
a survey made under the laws of the State of California, and having
been sold by said State at that time, I am of the opinion that it comes
within the second clause of section 4, of said act of July 23,1865, and
that if such segregation survey was made in accordance with the rect-
angular system the title to the land was absolutely quieted to the State
by said act.
In section 11, of the said act of April 21, 1858, of the legislature of
California, it was provided that,-
All surveys under the provisions of this act, shall be made according to the instruc-
tions of the surveyor-general, and shall be made to conform to the srveys of the pub-
lie land by the general government, except that the lauds held by actual settlers.
shall be surveyed after what is known as the geodetic method and such geodetic sur-
veys shall be made to conform to the lines and boundaries established by such settlers,
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I am of the opinion that the supervision of the Commissioner for the
purpose of approvingthetownshipplats constructedbythe United States
surveyor general of California showing such segregation surveys made
under the law of the State prior to July 23, 1866, extends only to ascer-
taining whether said segregation surveys were made in accordance with
the system of United States surveys, and if they are found to have been
so surveyed then the approval of the township plats follows as a matter
of course; but unless it appears that some other system was used, the
Commissioner can not refuse his approval, except perhaps in cases
where fraud may be alleged.
In the case at bar, counsel for homestead claimants alleged that said
surveys were not made in the method adopted by the general govern-
ment, but their specifications only allege. certain informalities in the
affidavits upon which the surveys were based.
I therefore find that the segregation surveys of 1860 under which
appellants claim, do conform to the system of surveys adopted by the
United States, as certified by the United States surveyor general for
California, and should be approved by your office, and that the hearing
before the said sarveyor general to determine the character of the land
was improperly allowed.
Your said decision is accordingly reversed and said land may be cer-
tified to the State.
TIMBER CULTURE ENTRY-BREAKING.
LAsoN v. BURTON.
The entryman may take advantage of breaking done on the land by a previous oc-
cupant.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General'
Land Office, July 12, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of George W. Burton from the decision
of your office dated December 28, 1886, in the case of Francis G. Lam-
son v. George W. Burton, holding for cancellation the latter's timber
culture entry for /the SE. - Sec. 3, T. 3 N., R. 19 W., Bloomington land
district, &ebraska.
August 14, 1884, Burton made entry for said tract and on September-
16, 1885, Lamson initiated a contest against the same alleging " that the
said George W. Burton has failed to plow or break five acres since date
of entry to present time."
Hearing was ordered and had. The register and receiver from the
evidence submitted them found in favor of claimant, and dismissed the
contest.
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Contestant appealed and you reversed the finding of the register and
receiver and held the entry for cancellation, whereupon claimant ap-
pealed to this office.
The testimony offered at the hearing shows that prior to the year
1879, at least eleven acres were broken on the north side of the tract in
dispute, and that said breaking was cultivated and cropped to wheat in
the season of 1879, and that each year thereafter the said eleven acres
were cultivated, and in May, 1884, the same were planted to trees, and
at the date of claimant's entry there were from thirty to forty additional
acres of breaking on said quarter section. While the testimony in this
ease clearly shows that the claimant failed to break or plow five acres
-during the first year after his entry, yet, it is sufficiently shown that
-during said period he had known that there was at least ten acres of
said land in a good state of cultivation, mellow and friable, and that
its condition for cropping or tree planting during the second and third
years, was far better than any prairie land which he might break or
backset during the first or second year.
In the case of McKenzie v. Killgore (10 L. D., 323), it was held that
an entryman may take advantage of breaking done upon the land at
date of his entry, but that the length of tirne between such former work
and work done by the entryman should be considered as important in
determining whether or not the entryman should have credit for such
former breaking or plowing.
In the case at bar the evidence of both parties shows that nearly all
-of the trees planted in 1884, wilted and died and that on September 0,
1885 (thirteen months and six days after entry) claimant replowed a
portion of said tree plat, and at the time of the hearing the whole
thereof had been replowed and five acres sowed to winter rye, and that
said eleven acres were then in a good state of cultivation.
Indeciding the case of Burgess v. Hogaboom (10 L. D., 470), it is
held that " The timber culture law is not run in a cast-iron mould, and
must be construed in the light of reason" and as its object is to en-
courage the growth of forest trees on prairie lands, and requires that
land selected for such purpose should be subdued and made mellow be-
fore the tree seeds, trees or cuttings are planted, and as I find that such
condition was attained in the case at bar, and as your office did not
find any evidence of bad faith on the part of claimant, and as I think
the former plowing was so utilized by-him that it inured to the benefit
of the land, he should have credit therefor.
The decision of your office is accordingly reversed.
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PRE-EMPTION-SECOND FILING..
HOJMER C. STEBBINS.
A second filing will not be allowed on the ground that the land included in the first
is not habitable, unless it is clearly shown that the settler, in the exercise of or-
dinary diligence, was unable to discover the true character of said land.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissionqr of the General
Land Office, July 12, 1890.
The appeal from your office decision in the above case is before me,
and the record shows the following facts:
The claimant, Homer C. Stebbins, on April 15, 1886, filed declaratory
statement No. 6660 for the SE. - of Sec. 20, T. 27 N., R. 48 W., Valen-
tine, Nebraska, alleging settlement April 13th, same year.
March 25, 1887, George Sutton filed declaratory statement for same
land, which was relinquished and canceled August 27, 1887, and on the
same day Gilbert J. Wilkerson made homestead entry therefor.
Stebbins, on April 24, 1886, filed his second declaratory statement
No. 6832 for the NW. - of Sec. 2, Tp. 25 N., R. 48 W., alleging settle-
ment April 20th of the same year. On October 13, 1888, he made ap-
plication to the local office to be allowed to amend his first filing, so as
to take the land described in his second filing in lieu of that embraced
in his first, alleging in his affidavit, which was partially corroborated,
that at the time of examining the land embraced in his first filing he
had " met with an accident by the bursting of a gun, which injured his
eyes, and going home made said filing at land office in Valentine.'
That after getting relief, fearing " he had deceived himself," he went
back to the tract, and found that the land consisted of canons and
gravel hills, and was unfit for a farm. Thereupon he made his second
declaratory statement, embracing the land last above described, moved
on to it in June, 1886, and has lived there ever since, improving it by
a house, out-houses, cellar and well, and by the cultivation of fruits
and vegetables, and now asks that he may be permitted to retain it,
and to that end prays that the amendment be allowed.
On this showing you refused the amendment, and now hold claim-.
ant's second filing for cancellation. From this decision he has appealed
to this Department.
The provisions in relation to change or correction of entries are em-
braced in sections 2369, 2370, 2371 and 2372 of the Revised Statutes.
Section 2369 provides for change of entry where mistake has been
made through the fault of the government officers, or error in the pub-
lic records.
Section 2370 extends this provision to cases where patents have is-
sued or may hereafter issue.
Section 2371 makes the same provision applicable to errors in the
location of land warrants, while section 2372 provides for the correction
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of mistakes made by the-entryman himself in the true numbers of the
tract intended to be entered.
These are all the statutory provisions in relation to change or cor-
rection of entries, and the statute nowhere provides for an amendment
of entry. The Commissioner, however, with the approval of this de-
partment, has from time to time, in the interest of justice and equity,
allowed changes and corrections to be made by amendment, where en-
try of a tract of land not intended to be entered has been made through
a mistake of the true numbers, where no intervening rights are dis-
turbed, and where the mistake was through no fault or negligence of
the entryman. Changes of entry or second entries have also been
allowed where after entry it has been discovered that the land is *' not
habitable and the reasons therefor were not discoverable by the exert
cise of ordinary diligence at the time of making the entry. (Edward
C. Davis, 8 L. D., 507.) In this case Davis entered and improved a
quarter section in Nebraska, had built a frame house, planted fruit and
shade trees, and had dug a well and discovered that the water obtained
from it was poisonous and could not be used by man or beast, and that
no other kind of water could be obtained on his claim. This Depart-
ment found that "by his expenditure upon the land embraced in his
original entry and by his efforts to establish a home there, the claim-
ant had sufficiently shown his good faith in making his first entry."
The entrymnan was allowed to make a second entry, on filing a formal
relinquishment of the former, accompanie d by an affidavit that he had
not received money or other consideration o promise of consideration
for abandoning his first entry.
Other cases could be cited where a second filing has been allowed on
disc overing that the land embraced in the first entry was not habitable,
but in all these cases the applicant was required to show to the satis-
faction of the Commissioner, not only that the land was unfit for the
purpose for which it was entered, but also that such defect was not
discoverable by the exercise of ordinary diligence.
Now, in the case under consideration there is no pretense that there
was any mistake in the numbers of the first entry, or, in other words,
that the applicantfiled on land different from that which he intended to
enter; therefore his application does not come within the letter or
spirit of the statute allowing a change of entry (Sec. 2372 R. S.).
Does it then come within the cases recognized by the practice of this
Department as entitling applicants to a change of entry or second
filing That is to say, does appellant's application disclose that the
land embraced in his first filing is not habitable or fit for farming. and
also that this fact was not discoverable by the use of ordinary dili-
gence?
As to the first inquiry, the record shows that the untillable charac-
ter of the land is shown by the affidavit of appellant alone, and while
his application is accompanied by the corroborative affidavit of one Her-
bert M. Anderson, said Anderson in no manner corroborates the affi-
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davit of appellant as to the bad quality of the land. In fact, it would
appear that said Anderson is entirely unacquainted with the character
of the land, or, being acquainted, is unwilling to make affidavit as to
its untillable character.
Further, it appears from the records that within a year from the date of
appellant's, first filing, George Sutton filed (and presumably with his
eyes open and unimpaired) on the same tract, and later, in August,
1887, Gilbert J. Wilkerson made a homestead entrv therefor, and for
aught that appears to the contrary is now converting the " canons and
gravel hills" into a home for his family.
But conceding that appellant's affidavit truthfully describes the land;
and that the same is not habitable, or, as his affidavits states, is " unfit
for a farm," did appellant before filing exercise ordinary diligence to
ascertain the quality of the land, or such diligence as, under the prac-
tice of this Department, would entitle him to a second entry ?
The evidence as to his diligence consists of his own affidavit alone,
and is as follows:-
Homer C. Stebbins, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he made a preemption
D. S. upon SE. i Sec. 20, Tp. '27, R. 48, Nebraska, and at the time met with an acci-
dent by the bursting of a gun, which injured his eyes, and going home made said
filing at land office in Valentine. His eyes were injured by poy d. After filing
said D. S. and getting relief to his eyes, he returned to the tract of land fearing that
in his excitement and injury he might have deceived himself in the same. After
arriving at said tract be found that the same embraced canons and gravel hills that
made it unfit for a farm and he selected the NW. A, etc.
From this affidavit it does not satisfactorily appear at what time in
the proceedings he received the injury which impaired his eyesight.
In the first part of his affidavit he says he met with the accident at the
time of filing his declaratory statement, farther on he intimates that on
receiving the injury he went home and filed on the tract. But grant.
ing that his injury was received while he was examining the land, or
before he began the examination, the fact still remains that he was so
far satisfied with his examination as to " go home and file his declata-
tory statement." If he did examine the land before filing, then he is
certainly not entitled to relief. If he did not examine it, whether by
reason of his injury or otherwise, then he must have filed haphazard,
and is now asking this Department to cure his own laches.
To sustain appellant's second entry, under the facts disclosed by the
record in this case, would be to establish a most dangerous precedent,
invite perjury and open the doors of this Department to applicants for
change of entry on the most frivolous pretexts.
As claimant has never received any benefit from his first filing, ind
as the evidence shows that he has expended a considerable sum of
money in improving the claim last pre-empted, he will be allowed to
make homestead entry for the same land, within a reasonable time after
notice of the cancellation of his pre-emption filing, No. 6832, if qualified
to make entry under said law.
The decision of your office is accordingly modified.
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PRACTICE-APPEAL-NOTICE.
HANNON V. NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. CO.
In all cases where an appeal is held defective by the General Land Otfice, the papers
in the case, together with the appeal, should be transmitted to the Department,
and the letter of transmittal should specifically designate wherein the appeal is
defective.
An appeal will be dismissed if there is no proof that a copy of the appeal and specifi-
cations of error was served on the opposite party.
S8ecretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, July 12,
1890.
By letter of April 7, 1890, you transmitted papers in the case of Will-
iam Hannon v. Northern Pacific R. R, Co., involving the NW. , Sece.
17, T. 20 N., IR. 3 E., Seattle, Washington, land district.
It seems that on February 1, 1886, Hannon applied to make home-
stead entry for said land which application was, by the local officers,
refused because of conflict with the grant to said railroad company.
From that decision Hannon appealed to your office saying, " and for
grounds of appeal and reversal relies upon the decision of the Honorable
Commissioner in the analogous case of Donald McRae v. The Northern
Pacific Railroad Company made on or about January 12,1886, and upon
the doctrines and principles therein stated." Your office, on December
23, 1887, affirmed the action of the local officers stating that the decis-
ion of your office in the McRae case had, on September 30, 1887, been
reversed by this Department. (For case of McRae v. Northern Pacific
R. R. Co., see 6 . D., 400.)
It seems that Hannon filed an appeal from that decision and that on
October 24, 1888, your office returned said appeal together with those
in the cases of Charles R. Corey, Jay A. Carson and John Arthur, to the
local office "in order that said parties might comply with the require-
ments of Rule 93, of the Rules of Practice". No further steps seem to
have been taken in this matter until January 29,1890, when you called
upon the local officers for a report. Those officers under date of March
21, 1890, reported that the parties were notified on February 13, 1890,
through personal service on their attorney, of your requirements and
that no action had been taken. You did not transmit to this Depart-
ment the appeal that had been filed and I am not advised of the
grounds relied upon in such appeal. In all cases where the appeal is
for any reason considered defective by your office, all the papers in the
case and especially the appeal itself, should be transmitted and the letter
of transmittal should specifically designate wherein such appeal is de-
fective.
It is clearly shown in this case, however, by the papers before me
that Hannon has not complied with the rules of practice in that he has
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failed to file any proof of, service of a copy of his appeal and specifica-
tions of error on the opposite party, and his said appeal is, for that rea-
son, hereby dismissed.
PRACTICE-APPEAI-AILROAD GRANT-SC1OOL SELECTION.
CALL V. SOUTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co.
An appeal will not be dismissed on the ground that a copy thereof was not served
upon the opposite party in time, if the record fails to show when notice of the
decision was served upon the appellant.
A prima facie valid school selection of record when the grant to this company became
effective excepts the land covered thereby from the operation of the grant; and
the subsequent cancellation of the selection will not affect the status of the land
under the grant.
The case of Childs v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co. cited and followed.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, July 167
1890.
On May 15, 1888, Joseph H. Call made application to make homestead
entry for the N. A, SE. i, and E. A, NE. i of section 9, T. 6 S., R. 2 W.,
Los Angeles land district, California.
The local officers rejected the application " as being in conflict with
primary grant to Southern Pacific R. R. Co." Call appealed to your
office. By your office decision of July 2, 1888, you affirmed the action
of the local officers regarding the N. A, of SE. 1, and allowed the entry
of the applicant as to the E. i, NE. 1.
From this decision both parties appealed. The attorney of the appli-
cant moved to dismiss the appeal of the railroad company, because not
taken within the time required by the rules of practice. The notice of
appeal is required to be filed within sixty days from the date of service
of the notice of the decision and a copy of the notice of appeal must be
served on the opposite party within the time allowed for filing the
same. See Rules 86 and 93 of the Rules of Practice. The appeal was
filed August 31, 1888; the same was therefore taken in time. Whether
notice of it was served upon the opposite party within the time required
can not be ascertained, since the records and files in the case fail to
disclose the time that notice of your office decision was served upon the
company. The motion is denied.
The records of vour office show that the whole of the said land lies
within the twenty mile or primary limits of the grant to said company
made March 3, 1871 (16 Stat., 579), to aid in the construction of its
branch line of road as shown by the map of designated route thereof
filed in your office July 24, 1876.
The records of your office further show that the E. i of the NE. i, of
said section 9 was selected by the State of California as indemnity school
land April 14, 1870, and that such selection was canceled January 31,
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1871. No other filing or entry appears to have been made for the land
in question and on May 25, 1883, the same was claimed by the company
under its grant.
On the part of Call it is claimed that the land applied for was ex-
cepted from the operation of the railroad grant by reason of having
been embraced within the exterior boundaries of the ranchos San Ja-
cinto Viejo and Nuevo at the date when said grant became effective.
This claim cannot be sustained. The question has been decided in
the recent case of Childs v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co. (9 L. D., 471),
see also same case on review (10 IL. D., 630) upon facts similar to those
in the case at bar, so far as the NW. SE. 4 is concerned and in ac-
cordance with the opinion specified in the case cited, the appeal of Gall
must be overruled.
Nor can the appeal of the railroad be sustained. The E. J of the NE.
4 section 9, was excepted from said grant, because of the indemnity
school selection by the State which was made prior to the date of the
railroad grant, and remained intact until long after said grant became
effective. A primafacie valid school selection existing when the grant
took effect, excepts the land embraced therein from the operation of
the grant, and the subsequent discovery of the invalidity of the selec-
tion will not inure to the benefit of the company's claim. Southern Pa-
cific R. R. Co. v. The State of California, 4 IL. D., 437. It cannot be
said that the said eighty acres were free from a claim or right in the
terms of the act granting the land, while the State laid claim to it un-
der an indemnity school selection, which was of record; and if it was
not free from a claim or right the grant did not attach. The validity
or lawfulness of the claim is not material. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v.
Bowman (7 L. D., 238); Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Wiley (idem., 354);
Laity v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. (8 L. D., 378).
Your said office decision is affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT-INDIAN OCCUPANT.
SPICER ET AL. V. NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co.
(On Review.)
The occupancy of an Indian, who has not abandoned the tribal relation, existing at
date of definite location, will not except the land covered thereby from the opera-
tion of the grant.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, July 17,
1890.
I have considered the motion for review of departmental decision
rendered April 12, 1890, in the case of R. E. Spicer, et al. v. Northern
Pacific Railroad Company (10 IL. D., 440), involving the NE I- of Sec
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19, T. 25 N., R. 43 E., Spokane Falls, Washington, filed by said com-
pany on April 25, same year, and also the application of James N.
Olover, etl. intervenors, who claim property within said quarter section
through title derived through said company. The record upon which
said departmental decision was rendered shows that on September 4,
1889, there was filed in the local land office a certain application, sworn
to by R. E. Spicer, J. M. Hooker, and J. S. Bean, and signed by numer-
ous other persons, claiming to be residents on said tract, in which it was
set forth that at the time of the withdrawal of said tract for the benefit
of said company, on February 21, 1872, and at the time of the definite
location of said road through said land, on the 4th of October, 1880,
and for many years prior thereto, from 1868 up to 1883, said land
was Indian land and during all said time was occupied, possessed, culti-
vated and improved by an Indian named Enoch; that because of said
Indian's possession and occupancy of the land as aforesaid, the same
did not pass to the company under its grant, and that said Indian aban-
doned said claim in the year 1883, whereupon said tract became a part of
the public domain and subject to entry under the townsite laws; that
said applicants are residents on said tract, and that since the year 1883 a
large number of persons have settled upon said tract, built business
houses and dwellings, and at the date of said petition had established
a town thereon of more than five hundred inhabitants; that since No-
vember 28, 1883, said tract had been within the corporate limits of the
city of Spokane Falls, but the municipal authorities have neglected to
have the same surveyed and platted or to cause it to be entered as a
townsite, and that said petitioners therefore ask the Secretary of the
Interior to cause said tract to be surveyed as a townsite under the laws
of the United States, and that if it be deemed necessary a hearing
should be ordered to ascertain whether the tract is public land or inured
to the railroad company by virtue of its grant.
A supplemental petition, signed and sworn to by said I. E. Spi cer,
J. M. Hooker, and William Nonamaker, acting for the original petition-
ers, was transmitted to this Department by one L. El. Prather, attorney
for the parties, on September 21, 1889, in which the matters contained
in the original petition were substantially repeated and it was stated
that said company was about to take steps to remove the settlers from
the tract and to take forcible possession thereof, and for this reason
immediate action by the Department was urged. In addition to the
foregoing, the record contained the affidavit of said Indian by the name
of "1Enoch Silliquowya" or Louis Enoch, filed in the local office in
July, 1888, which alleged in substance that about twenty-five years
prior thereto the affiant settled on the NE and SE of sec. 19, T. 25 N.,
B. 43 E., in Spokane county, Washington Territory; " that he improved
and cultivated the said land, and he constantly lived upon and occupied
the same as his home with the purpose and bona fide design of procuring
title for himself as a homestead thereto from the United States when title
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could be procured; that he was living upon the said land as his home
in 1872 and up until the year 1883; " that about the latter date said
Indian was induced by the fraudulent representations of one H. T.
Cowley, agent of said company, to sell and convey his claim to the said
company for the sum of $2,000; that said agent represented to him
that he could not hold the land or acquire title thereto, and that the
land was not worth more than $1,000; that said Indian resided upon
said tract solely for the purpose of acquiring title thereto from the
United States, and he asked that a hearing be ordered to allow him an
opportunity " to prove the truth of his said allegations, and, if true,
to enter said land." The affidavit of Enoch was corroborated by the
joint affidavit of J. M. Noble and Frank Martin. The record further
shows that there was no adverse claim either in the local or general land
office, except the claims of Enoch and his father, covering together the
east half of said section nineteen, as shown by a letter from the Indian
Office dated December 1, 1880, which stated in effect that said Indians
had occupied the lands claimed by them, respectively, for many years,
and many of them had made valuable and lasting improvements
thereon, and that with reference to those residing on the lands found to
be within the limits of railroad grants, " some action should be taken
ooking to the adjustment of these conflicting claims in favor of the
Indians."
Upon this record, said departmental decision held that the grant to
said company by act of Congress approved July 2, 1864 (13 Stats., 365),
authorizes the filing and acceptance of but one map of general route,
and that the withdrawal upon what is known as the amended general
route of February 21, 1872, was without authority of law, citing the
Guilford Miller case (7 L. D., 100); that the settlement, residence and
improvement of a tract in an odd-numbered section within the pri-
mary limits of said grant by an Indian, who has abandoned his tribal
relation, with the intention of acquiring title thereto as a homestead,
existing at the date of the definite location of the road on October 4,
1880, served to except the land covered thereby from the operation of
the grant, and ordered a hearing to determine the status of the land in
question at the date of the definite location of the company's road.
The Northern Pacific Railroad Company filed a motion for the review
and revocation of said decision upon the grounds (1) that it was error
to hold that it was unnecessary to consider the withdrawal on said
amended general route because of the ruling in the Miller case (supra),
for the reason that the ruling in that case was being again considered
by the Department upon the application of the company fr a review
thereof; and (2) it was error to hold that if the allegations relative to
the occupancy of the Indian Enoch be true, they constitute such a claim
as would serve to except the land from the operation of the grant.
On May 19,1890, counsel for Spicer et al. filed a motion to dismiss said
motion for review because the same did not submit any new facts and
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was not supported by affidavits as required b rule 78 of Practice.
The motion for review is accompanied by the affidavit required by said
rule, and hence, so far as this point is concerned, the motion to dismiss
must be denied.
On May 24, 1890, oral argument was heard by the Department, at
which the railroad company and said Spicer et al. were represented by
counsel. At the same time also appeared counsel for James M.
Glover, W. H. Taylor, E. B. Hide, and A. A. Newberry, representing
their own interests and also "other residents and property-owners in
Spokane Falls, Washington," and presented their petition duly veri-
fied and supported by affidavits, asking leave to intervene in support
of the motion to review and revoke said departmental decision. Their
motion to intervene was granted. The intervenors allege in said peti-
tion that the whole of said section 19 within the primary limits of said
grant to said company has been twice listed to the company, namely:
on May 18, 1884, and June 27, 1888; that there is no claim of record
for said land adverse to said company; that the city of Spokane Falls
was duly incorporated on or about November or December, 1881, and
includes within its corporate limits nearly all of said section 19; that
all of the NEI of said section has been 1 surveyed and platted for town
purposes; " that said petitioners or their grantors have purchased from
said company in good faith and for a valuable consideration lots and
squares in said quarter section according to the plat of survey of said
city and now hold title to the same; that the value of the property so
purchased, with the improvements thereon, "is reasonably worth at
least eight millions of dollars; " that the right of purchase from said
.company of a portion of the El of said NE, known as " the disputed
tract," has been the subject of litigation between said company and
one 1H. T. Cowley, pending which a number of persons have " squatted "
on a small portion of said tract and have built thereon rough board
dwellings; that many of those whose names are on said application for
a survey of said land are occupying said dwellings on said disputed
tract; that the statements made in said application for survey are false;
that the Indian Enoch never settled upon said NEI of said section 19
with the purpose or "intention of acquiring title thereto under the In-
dian homestead law of the United States, nor in any other way; " that
said Indian has never abandoned his tribal relations, but has continu-
ously asserted the same, and as late as March 3, 1887, signed his name,
as chief of the Middle Spokane tribe of Indians, to an agreement be-
tween said tribe and commissioners representing the United States,
wherein said Indians agreed to go to and remain upon the Joco or
Cceur d'Alene Indian reservation, and that said chief Enoch and two
other chiefs were to receive an annuity of $100 for ten years; that
prior to July, 1888, the right of said company to said NEI has
never been questioned, and that prior to that time said intervenors
and their grantors had placed upon the land improvements " aggre-
gating in value several millions of dollars, consisting of stores, ware-
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houses, churches, schools, hotels and fine dwelling-houses; " that on
or about August 4, 1889, the most valuable part of said quarter section
and the improvements thereon were destroyed by fire, and the owners
thereof were actively engaged at the time of said departmental decision
in rebuilding the same; that the effect of said decision has een to cast
a cloud upon the title of said property so that confidence has been
shaken and capitalists have declined to make any further advances to
complete the improvements already begun, and that the growth and
prosperity of said city have been greatly hindered. It is further al-
leged that should said order be continued, it will cause " great loss of
money and business prospects, unsettle values, cloud titles to property
which has been bought and sold for many years past under warranty
deeds, and which has been improved in good faith and at an enormous
outlay of money." The intervenors therefore ask that said depart-
mental decision be revoked; that said application for survey be dis-
missed, and that such other relief be granted " as in justice and equity
may be right."
The aforesaid allegations are corroborated by the affidavits of Arthur
A. Newberry, W. H. Taylor, E. B. Hide, and James M. Glover. New-
berry swears to the location of said tract, the value of the improve-
ments placed thereon, and the destruction of the same by fire on August
4, 1889, and the efforts to rebuild the same, and that " the improve-
ments now upon said quarter section amount to more than four millions
of dollars." He also swears that upon this tract are located the pub-
lic school, the city gas-works, many churches, a five-story brick hotel
costing $300,000, many handsome dwelling-houses, and that within two
hundred feet of the north line of said quarter section are-located seven
national banks." He further swears that the school district of Spokane
Falls has recently voted the issuance of $250,000 worth of bonds for
educational and other purposes;" that the sale of said bonds "has
been rendered extremely difficult, if not impossible, and the improve-
ment and advancement of the general welfare of the ity has been
greatly retarded " because of the rendition of said departmental decis-
ion; that prior to said decision many of the applicants for survey were
occupying by sufferance rough cabins built upon a portion of the El
of the NEI, and the NEI of the SEI of said sec. 19; but that since said
departmental decision and ruling they have occupied the balance of the
NEI and other portions of said section 19, breaking enclosures and
occupying ground which has been in the exclusive possession of said
Newberry and other owners for many years past; that said Newberry
is the owner and in possession of a large amount of property situated
on said tract, which, prior to said departmental decision. was worth in
the market about $100,000, and on account of said decision has become
of no market value. Newberry's affidavit is corroborated by W. H.
Taylor, E. B. ide, and James M. Glover.
The intervenors also submit the record of the proceedings of the In-
dian council held at Spokane Falls on August 16 and 17, 1877, by
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inspector Watkins, in which said Enoch objected to being pushed " to
become a citizen; " also the record in the Indian office showing the
action of said -Enoch, who was one of the Indians to sign the articles of
agreement made by the Commissioner of the United States with the
"chiefs, head men and other Indians of the Upper and Middle bands of
SpokaneIndians" onMarchl8,18 8 7 . The nintharticle of said agreement
provides that " in consideration of the ages of chiefs Louis Spokane
Garry, Paul Sculhault, Antarkan, and Enoch, the United States agrees,
in addition to the other benefits herein provided, to pay to each of them
for ten years the sum of one hundred dollars per annum." This agree-
ment is signed by " Chief Enoch." In addition, the affidavit of IXnoch
himself, dated May 19, 1890, in which he swears that prior to the year
1883, he settled, improved, and for twenty-four years continuously re-
sided upon the tract of land now within the limits of Spokane Falls,
Washington; that during the spring of 1883 he sold said tract to the
Northern Pacific Railroad Company for $2,000; that he was advised at
that time to select another tract outside the reservation, which he did,
but, by so doing, he did not consider his tribal relations severed. He
also swears " I have not, nor do I intend to abandon my tribal relations.
I was present at Spokane Falls during the spring of 1887, and signed
articles of agreement made out and concluded at that place between
the commissioners appointed for that purpose and the Upper and Mid-
dle bands of Spokane Indians, and am to receive benefits as per article
nine of said agreement, when ratified by Congress, at which time I ex-
pect to be removed to the Ccur d'Alene reservation."
There is also filed the affidavit of Sidney D. Waters, who was the
United States Indian agent at the Colville agency in Washington dur-
ing 1883-8[ and 85. Said Waters swears "that he is well acquainted
with Enoch Silliquowya; that said Indian was one of the Indians be-
longing to the Colville agency during all the time said affiant was In-
dian agent of said agency; that said Indian has never severed his tri-
bal relations and has never adopted the habits and customs of the
white race, except as to dress." Another affiant, S. F. Sherwood,
swears that he has been for many years a government interpreter with
the Indians; that he speaks the Spokane langauge, and has known
said Indian Enoch continuously since long prior to 1872. He states
" I know him to be a Spokane Indian belonging to the Spokane Indian
tribe, and that he never severed his tribal relations. . . . I have
talked with him and he told me he had never severed his tribal relations
and never did anything inconsistant with his tribal relations, but al-
ways maintained them." Another affiant, James Monaghan, swears
that he is a resident of Spokane Falls and has known Enoch since
1872; that he has no interest in this case except as a citizen of said city;
that
I know he attended the councils of the tribe and did everything that the other
Indians did indicating the maintenance of his tribal relations . . . He always
claimed to be a tribal Indian. . . . His settlement was like that of hundreds
of other Indians around Spokane Falls, and he never manifested any intention Of
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taking up the land under the public land laws, to the best of my knowledge.
I know for twenty-five years that Enoch is a well-known Indian, claimed to be such,
regarded as such by his tribe and by the community in Spokane Falls, and differing
in no respect from the balance of his tribe, but tribal in every feature of his con-
duct.
H. T. Cowley swears that he (Cowley) is a citizen of the United
States, a resident of Spokane Falls since 1874, and first became ac-
quainted with Indian Enoch in the summer of 1674; that " at the time
I first knew Enoch he belonged to the Spokane Indian tribe, and he
never in fact severed his tribal relations; " that there was an Indian
eouncil held by A. C. Watkins, Special Commissioner of the Indian
Office, in 1877; that " at that council Enoch attended and made a speech,
in which he declared that the Spokane Indian tribe had been promised
and were entitled to an Indian reservation; . . . that they did not
wish nor intend to take lands in severalty." Said Cowley further swears
4"I was present at the settlement between Enoch and the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company. It was accomplished chiefly through the
efforts of the Commissioner of Indians Affairs and his correspondence
with Mr. Villard, then the president of the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company, and nothing could have been fairer or better understood.
* . . After Enoch made this settlement he immediately went down
on the Spokane River somewhere and took up some other land." Still
another affiant, John A. Sims, swears that he is a resident of Spokane
Falls and that he has no interest in this case except that of a citizen of
said city; that in September, 1872, he was appointed Indian agent to
the Colville, Spokane and other tribes of Indians in the then Territory
of Washington, and that as such agent he visited Spokane Falls and
became acquainted with said Indian Enoch. The affiant says:
Indian Enoch was then a member of the Spokane Indian tribe, and he. called upon
me, as Indian agent of the tribe, to settle a dispute between himself and a white man
by the name of Swift. . . . I remained agent of these same Indians until Octo-
ber, 1883. During the time I was such agent I frequently saw Enoch, frequently
heard of him, knew that he attended the councils of the tribe; that he never to my
knowledge did anything toward severing his tribal relations, but exercised his tribal
rights. I know he received supplies from the government as a tribal Indian, and is
so registered.
The affiant further swears that when Enoch came to see him, relative
to his negotiations with said company, the only claim of Enoch's then
recognized was for improvements and possession; that affiant told Enoch
he would do the best he could for him and communicated with the In-
dian Office relative to said proposed sale, but the Commissioner of In-
dian Affairs advised affiant to see Enoch and recommend a relinquish-
ment by him upon the payment by the company to him of the sum of
$2,000; that the money was paid by the company and Enoch executed
the relinquishment with a full knowledge of what he was doing; that
when Enoch signed the quit-claim deed he was fully satisfied with the
amount paid; that said conveyance was approved by said affiant as re-
quired by the regulations of the Department.
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On June 26, 1890, counsel for Spicer et. al. filed in the Department
another affidavit of said Enoch, dated June 18, same year, and also a
brief in answer to a brief of said company filed at the oral argument,
which, together with all the briefs filed and arguments made, have been
carefully considered. In his last affidavit, made before the local attor-
ney of Spicer et al., Enoch substantially denies the allegations made in
his former affidavit relative to his tribal relations, and swears, among
other things, that while he was living on said tract he "had abandoned
his tribe and was living separate and apart from them for the purpose
of getting title to said land from the government." The said affidavits
of Enoch are so contradictory in themselves that they must be wholly
discarded in passing upon said motion.
No action was taken by your office upon the application of Spicer et
wl. asking for a survey of said tract or a hearing with reference to the
status thereof. Upon the allegations and affidavits presented by Spicer
et al. a prima facie case was made which clearly made it the duty of the
Department to order a hearing upon the same. But the affidavits and
record evidence submitted on the part of the intervenors, disregarding
the affidavits of Enoch, show conclusively that said Enoch has never
abandoned his tribal relations, and hence at no time has he been quali-
fied to make entry of said land under the homestead laws. Secretary
Cox to the Commissioner of the General Land Office (1 C. L. O., 283);
Circular of April 1, 1870 (idem); Indian homestead act of March 3,
1875 (Sup. R. S. U. S., 167; 18 Stat., 420), and circular of March 25,
1875 (2 C. L. O., 493).
Since it appears that said Enoch has not abandoned his tribal rela-
tions, it necessarily follows he was not qualified to make settlement,
and his said occupancy of the land in dispute at the date of the definite
location of the road on October 4, 1880, did not serve to except the land
from the operation of the grant. Ram age v. Central Pacific R. R. (5 L.
D., 274); Southern Pacific R. R. v. Saunders (6 L. D., 98); Northern
Pacific R. R. v. Kerry (10 L. D., 290); Northern Pacific R. R. v. Rob-
erts (id., 427).
Under the supervisory authority of the Department, said hearing
was ordered upon the showing presented by the ex parte affidavits of
the applicants who asked for a survey of said tract as a town-site, but
the record evidence and the affidavits submitted by the company and
the intervenors in support of said motion for review show without
doubt that said Enoch has never abandoned his tribal relations, and-
that if the new testimony had been before the Department when the
original and amended applications were considered, said hearing would
not have been ordered. It, therefore, now appears that there are- no
sufficient reasons for ordering a hearing before the local officers in this
case.
This conclusion renders it unnecessary to consider the validity of
the withdrawal of February 21, 1872, upon the filing of the alleged map
of general route.
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Said decision of April 12, 1890, directing that a hearing be had, is
accordingly revoked, and said applications for a survey of said tract
are hereby dismissed.
DESERT LAND ENTRY-FINAL PROOF-RECLAMATION.
LEE . ALDERSON.
The intervention of an adverse claim defeats the right to perfect an entry, where
proof of reclamation is not made within the statutory period.
Proof of reclamation should not only show that water has been brought upon the
land, but also what proportion of each legal sub-division has been irrigated.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, July 18, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of William W. Alderson from your
office decision of October 26, 1888, wherein you hold for cancellation his
desert land entry No.59, for Sec 20, T. 2 S., R. 6 E., Bozeman, Montana.
On May 13, 1881, he filed in the local office his declaration of in-
tention to reclaim said tract under the provisions of the acts of Con-
gress approved March 3, 1877 (19 Stat., 377), and on the same day paid
the twenty-five cents an acre therefor, amounting to $160, and obtained
the usual certificate from the local officers. At the expiration of the
three years allowed him within which to reclaim the land, namely, on
May 13, 1884, Daniel Lee filed his declaration to reclaim the same tract,
accompanied by the usual affidavits of the desert character of the land,
and at the same time tendered the first payment of twenty-five cents
per acre.
This applicatio, was rejected by the local officers, for the reason
that the tract was covered by Alderson's entry of May 12, 1881.
On May 16, 1884, Lee filed his affidavit of contest against Alderson's
entry, charging that he " has not complied with the desert land act in
any way since making said entry; and that said tract is not and has
not been irrigated or reclaimed or cultivated by said party as required
'by law."
In pursuance of instructions from your office, a hearing was duly had
on Lee's averments against said entry, and the local officers on August
12, 1886, recommended the cancellation of the entry, basing their opin-
ion on " the impossibility of claimant's obtaining water " to irrigate the
tract; and by your said office decision you affirm the same, because the
evidence sustains the charge that "said Alderson has not complied
with the desert land act and that said tract had not been irrigated or
reclaimed or cultivated as required by law." From this judgment
Alderson appeals, charging that you erred:
I. In holding that it was necessary for Alderson to cultivate the land in order to
reclaim the same by bringing water thereon.
II. In finding and holding that said land had not been irrigated.
III. In holding (impliedly) that it is necessary-to irrigate the whole tract in order
to reclaim it by carrying water thereon.
IV. The decision is contrary to the law and the eviden;ce.
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Alderson never submitted his final proof until June 23, 1884, forty
days after his three years had expired. In the meantime Lee had ap-
plied to enter the land and led his affidavit of contest. Alderson offers
his excuse by saying that he was prepared to offer proof on May 3, 1884,
but was restrained from so doing on the information obtained from the
register that " results of reclamation by the production of crops," had
to be shown, and that he could not show such results;- but that he
learned soon thereafter that such proof was not necessary when he sub-
mitted his proof.
Rule 30 of the rules established for the submission of cases to the
board of equitable adjudication (6 L. D., 800), provides as follows:
All desert land entries in which neither the reclamation nor the proof and payment
were made within three years from the date of entry, bat where the entryman was
duly qualified, the land properly subject to entry under the statute, the legal re-
quirements as to reclamation complied with, and the failure to do so in time was the
result of ignorance, accident orfmistake, or of obstacles which he could not control,
and where there is no adverse claim.
Alderson never began the construction of his ditch until November,
1883, about five months before the time for making his proof would ex-
pire; he says " unexpected financial reverses " prevented his construct-
ing his ditch sooner; but this could not excuse his laches in failing to
submit proof of reclamation in time, especially when there was an ad-
verse claimant.
The evidence of claimant shows that he constructed a ditch from Lime
Kiln Creek to a point about one half mile south of the south line of the
tract. This ditch was about three miles long and about twenty-six
inches at the bottom, near three feet at top and about twelve inches
deep. It intersected a " coulee " or dry creek, a few feet wide, which
led on to the land, thence through the section. He claims that this
" coulee " enters the land at the highest or near the highest place and
that water can be taken from it to all parts of the land; that water was
running through this ditch and into the " coulee " and on to the land
May 1, 1883.
It is contended that this result having been accomplished that the
land is reclaimed " by conducting water upon the same." He says from
this ditch water can be distributed over and through all of the soil; that
if necessary he will build a reservoir on the " coulee " to distribute the
water. That this ditch Will enable him to irrigate the land.
This may all be true, but the carrying of water to the land, and even
through the land without showing the presence of lateral ditches and
water therein through the several smallest legal subdivisions, is not
sufficient to show the reclamation of the land within the meaning of
the statute.
The question is not what may be done; but the proof must show what
has been done to reclaim the land. The evidence fails to show that
this tract was reclaimed, although it does show that water was brought
to it.
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The proof must show what proportion of each legal subdivision has
been irrigated. Adam Schindler (7 L. D., 253); Wm. Holland, 6 L. D., 38.
Your said office decision is affirmed.
RESERVATION-DEPARTMENTAL AUTHORITY.
GEORGE HERRING.
A reservation of public land for a proper purpose made by the local office, on the
request of the surveyor-general, if unrevoked, may be considered as having been
approved by the Department, hence made by competent authority and the land
included therein not subject to entry.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, July 19,
1890.
By letter dated January 7, 1880, the surveyor-general of California
requested the local officers at Visalia to suspend "from entry and sale'i
sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 in T. 14 S., R. 28 E., M. D. M., for the reason that
they " are covered by trees of the sequoia gigantia variety, some of which
are reported to be forty feet in diameter and from three hundred to four
hundred feet high, constituting a remarkable and rare curiosity which
should be preserved."
The said letter also set out " that the tracts named being exceptional
in character will be made the subject of a report to the Department with
a view of bringing the matter to the attention of Congress.
By letter dated June 1, 1880, the surveyor general, stating that his
information had been erroneous, directed the local office, for the reasons
stated, to so suspend in lieu of the sections described, section 31, of T.
13 S., and also (at the suggestion of the local office) sections 5 and 6 of
T. 14 S., and range aforesaid.
On June 17, 1887, George Herring filed an application to enter the
X.W. of SW. , N. of SE. and NE. of SW. 1 of said section 6,
under the provisions of the act of June 3, 1878 (20 Stats., 89).
This application with the proof submitted September 15, 1887, in sup-
port thereof was rejected, by reason of said suspension.
From this action Herring took no appeal.
On March 1, 1888, Herring again made application to enter in like
manner the said land and on May 31st following, presented proofs in
support thereof.
On the date last mentioned the local office rejected said proof for the
reason that Herring's said application " was not in the form required
by the act of June 3, 1878."
Herring appealed.
Thereupon on February 29, 1889, your office found that his rights
had not been affected by his previous application. By the same decis-
ion, however, your office held "that the presence upon the land of
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growing mammoth trees renders it exceptional in character " and there-
fore not subject to entry under the act referred to and affirmed the
action below.
Herring again appeals.
Along with his appeal from the local office Herring filed an affidavit
made June 21, 1888 (not corroborated) wherein he avers that on Sep-
tember 15, 1887, he offered proof at the local office in support of his ap-
plication made in June preceding, that upon the rejection of such proof
he employed a land lawyer in Visalia to take an appeal to your office
that some time after, the said lawyer " became ill and died," that there-
after he had no notice or information that said appeal had not been
taken " until the lapse of many weeks."
The reservation requested by the surveyor-general in 1880, has so far
as the record discloses not been revoked. The said reservation may,
for the purposes of this case be therefore considered as having been ap-
proved by this Department and consequently, in contemplation of law,
as having been made by the President who speaks and acts through
the heads of the several departments in relation to subjects which ap-
pertain to their respective duties." Wolsey v. Chapman (101 U. S.,
755). See also Graham v. Southern Pacific R. R. (o. (5 L. D., 332).
There is no statute giving a general authority to the President to-
reserve lands. But the right of the President to put public lands in
reservation so that all questions in reference to them might be properly
considered, has always been maintained by the courts.
In the case of Grisar v. McDowell (6 Wall.,-363, 381) the supreme
court said that " from an early period in the history of the government
it has been the practice of the President to order, from time to time, as
the exigencies of the public service required, parcels of land belonging
to the United States to be reserved from sale and set apart for public
uses."
The trees referred to have been, as stated, correctly described by the
surveyor-general as constituting a " remarkable and rare curiosity
which should be preserved." To that end, the lands containing them
were withdrawn from sale and entry so that all questions in regard to
them could be properly considered.
Being thus placed in reservation by competent authority and for a
sufficient reason it was "'not in the power of a party to acquire rights
by treating such reservation as of no effect." See opinion of attorney-
general Devens in the matter of the Southern Pacific Railroad grant
l(16 Op. 80) and cases cited.
The reservation referred to being in existence at the time of Her-
ring's application, I must find in accordance with the views herein
expressed that the same has been properly denied.
This disposition of the case renders it unnecessary for me to discus&
the other matters that are presented by this appeal.
The decision appealed from is affirmed..
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OSAGE I.AND-FILING-FINAL PROOF.
BOYD v. SMITI.
Where two claimants for Osage land are each in default as to filing within the pre-
scribed period the superior right must be accorded to the one who makes the first
filing, subject only to defeat in case of failure to submit final proof within sin
months after such filing.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, July 18. 1890.
August 18, 1886, F. W. Boyd made Osage declaratory statement No.
5252, alleging settlement in October, 1881, for lot 6, Se6. 26, T. 26 S.,
R. 25 W., Garden City, Kansas.
August 28, 1886, Kate Smith filed Osage declaratory statement No.
5293 for the same land, alleging settlement March 1, 1886.
Smith offered final proof January 22, 1887, and Boyd January 24,
1887. The local officers rejected Smith's offered proof, and accepted
that of Boyd, on the ground of prior settlement by Boyd.
Smith appealed to your office, and on January 17, 1889, your office
affirmed the action of the local officers, from which decision Smith now
appeals to this Department.
Both claimants have satisfactorily shown compliance with law as to
residence, improvements and cultivation.
The point relied upon by Smith for reversal is, that in the original act
of Congress providing for the sale of the Osage lands payment was re-
squired to be made within one year of settlement, and that Boyd not
having offered final proof and payment until several years after settle-
ment, had forfeited his rights thereunder, and Smith having made her
final proof and tendered payment within the year, should prevail over
the claim of Boyd.
In the case of Hessong v. Burgan (9 L. D., 353), it is held that under
the act of Congressof May 28, 1880(2[Stat., 143), and the departmental
regulations in reference to the same, filing must be made within three
months from settlement, and final proof and payment within six months
after the filing. Neither Smith nor Boyd filed within three months of
settlement, and the fact that Smith's settlement antedated her filing
but five months, while Boyd's was five years before filing, can give
Smith no preference over Boyd, as both were in default, and Boyd's
filing having been made prior to that of Smith he thereby acquired
priority over Smith, which could only be defeated by failure to make
final proof within six months thereafter, and as he made such proof
January 24, 1887, within the prescribed time, his claim must prevail,
and the fact that Smith's proof was offered within a year of settlement,
while Boyd's was not, can have no bearing in the case, as both were in
pcari delicto as to filing. Had Smith alleged and shown settlement
within three months of filing her declaratory statement, she would have
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had priority over Boyd, because she would thereby have complied
with the regulation as to filing, which has the force and effect of law
(see case above cited).
The act of May 28, 1880 (21 Stat., 143), in effect, modifies the provis-
ion of the law of May 9, 1872 (17 Stat., 90), requiring payment within
one year of date of settlement, which counsel for appellant seem to rely
upon.
The decision of your office is affirmed, and Smith's declaratory state-
ment 5293 is canceled.
t PRE-EMPTION ENTRY-SETTLEMENT.
OHIO CREEK ANTHRACITE COAL Co. v. HINDS.
One who enters upon land as the representative of another, and remains thereon in
such capacity, is not a settler within the meaning of the pre-emption law.
First Assistant Secretary Clhandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, July 18, 1890.
On May 27, 1887, William Hinds filed pre-emption declaratory state-
ment alleging settlement February 11, 1885, upon the E. J of the SW. 1,
Sec. 26, and E. A of the NW. 1, Sec. 35, T. 14 S., R. 87 W., Gunnison,
Colorado.
In pursuance of his published notice of intention he submitted proof
in support of his entry at the local office on November 9, 1887. W. L.
Yule, President of the Ohio Creek Anthracite Coal Company, filed affi-
davit of protest against the acceptance of said proof. Both parties ap-
peared by counsel.
Separate motions were made by claimant's attorney to dismiss the said
protest for failure to specifically set forth the charges and " for the rea-
son that there are no corroborating affidavits." These motions were
denied November 14, 1887.
Thereupon the hearing was proceeded with upon different days until
November 24, 1887, when the case closed.
Upon the evidence submitted, the local officers recommended the ac-
ceptance of the claimant's proof and the approval of his entry. The
company appealed from this judgment and your office, on March 29,
1889, reversed this decision and sustained the contest and rejected
Hind's proof. From this order he appeals.
From an examination of the record it appears that at some time prior
to October 1883, the land in question with some four thousand acres of
adjoining coal land, had been purchased from a party having color of
title by the Mt. Carbon Anthracite Coal company of which said Ohio
Creek Company is the successor. At the time of such purchase there
were three or four houses on the land, one of which had previously been
used as a hotel.
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In August, 1883, one W. L. Hinds, the claimant's son, occupied a
dwelling-house on the land as superintendent of the Mt. Carbon Com-
pany, where in October following he was joined by the claimant, a di-
rector in said company, who came from New York in its interest.
The property of the Mount Carbon Company was subsequently sold
and ultimately conveyed to its said successor.
In the course of such re-organization, the claimant having obtained
a judgment against the Mt. Carbon ompany, bought its certain
personal property at the resulting sheriff's sale in Gunnison County,
and afterwards transferred his interest therein to the said new company
for forty shares of its stock.
The claimant, who became a director in the Ohio Creek Company,
continued to occupy the said dwelling-house until the time of trial. His
son became the superintendent of the last-named company, and remained
on the land until June 1, 1887, when he resigned.
The claimant averred in his proof that he made "settlement" on the
land in October, 1883. He testified that he first thought of pre-empting
the same in February, 1885, " the day of the sheriff's sale." He further
states that from the latter date until June, 1887, his "board" and
that of his son, had been paid by the said Ohio Creek company.
The improvements on the land valued as high as $8000, were all made
or at least paid for by the said Ohio Creek company, with the exception
possibly, of about one-eighth of an acre cultivated and some fencing,
sage brush and hay cutting by the claimant.
Within a few days after his filing, the claimant submitted to the said
Ohio Creek Company a proposition in writing whereby he offered to
"execute a quit claim of all my (his) rights, title and interest in and
to any and all the improvements situate on the " tracts heretofore de-
scribed.
The attorney, who drew said writing testifies that the claimant had
given the description therein contained from memory and that the
said proposition referred solely to the adjoining coal land and not to
the tract involved.
The claimant, however, states in said writing that he hoped said
proposition would be accepted as he incurred great trouble and ex-
pense in moving from New York and that " to move again will entail
like trouble and expense. "
That the claimant went on the land and, during at least the greater
part of the time covered by his proof, remained thereon simply as the
representative of the companies named and not with the intention of
acquiring the same under the pre-emption laws, is, I think, clear.
Consequently he can not be said to have been a settler thereon with-
in the meaning of the pre-emption law. Griffin v. Pettigrew (10 L. D.,
> 510).
Moreover his said offer to sell out to the protestant company tends
strongly to impeach the integrity of his filing.
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The action of your office in rejecting the claimant's proof is, in view
of the foregoing, hereby affirmed.
* The claim of the said Ohio Creek company to the landinvolved is not
presented by this record, and no ruling ismade in regard thereto.
HOMESTEAD CONTEST-ATTORNEY-APPEAL-ELINQITISHIMENT.
PIKE v. ATKINSON.
An attorney who advances money for the prosecution of a contest does not secure
thereby such an interest in the case as will entitle him to an appeal in the event
the contest is dismissed.
The preference right of a contestant is not defeated by a relinquishment, accompanied
with an application to enter, filed after the initiation of the contest.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, July 18, 1890.
I have considered the case of John C. Pike v. William S. Atkinsoni
on appeal by the former from your decision of December 4, 1888, dis-
missing his contest against the homestead claim of Atkinson and allow-
ing the homestead entry of Daniel Sullivan to stand, for the S. A NE.'
and S. I NW. of Sec. 30, T. 12, R. 15 W., Grand Island, Nebraska,
land district.
The facts are as follows:
On March 9, 1885, Atkinson made homestead entry for this land, and
,on March 12, 1886, one James Hunter filed affidavit of contest against
the same. Hearing was set for May 3, 1886. On March 27th, same
year Atkinson executed a relinquishment and gave it to one Roe, attor-
ney for Hunter. The testimony in the contest case was taken on May
23rd, and the case was taken under advisement by the local officers.
On June 2, 1886, Pike filed affidavit of contest against the said entry,
alleging abandonment and that the Hunter contest was a collusion
between Atkinson and Hunter, and Hunter's attorney (Roe), and that
it was for speculation. The hearing of this contest was set for August
23, 1886. July 1, 1886, Hunter withdrew from his contest and the
same was dismissed. On November 10, 1886, the day to which Pike's
-contest had been continued, he appeared with counsel and Atkinson
being in default. Roe appeared and moved the local officers to postpone
the hearing until the final disposition of his, Roe's, appeal from their
refusal to re-instate the Hunter contest. This motion was overruled
and the testimony was heard and the case was passed for decision.
On February 21, 1887, Daniel Sullivan filed the relinquishment of
Atkinson and filed application for homestead entry for the land. This
was filed subject to the rights of contestant, John C. Pike. On March
2, 1887, the local officers decided the contest in favor of Pike and
allowed him thirty days " preference right of entry," Sullivan's entry to
'be canceled if Pike should make application to enter.
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From this decision Sullivan appealed and your office on December 4,
1888, held that there was no sufficient ground for awarding the pref-
erence right of entry to Pike, and dismissed his contest and allowed
Sullivan's entry to stand intact. From which decision Pike appealed.
Your decision states the testimony sufficiently full and complete.
Although Roe as attorney for Hunter, had expended some money for
his client, yet he has no such interest in the case as will entitle him
to an appeal, hence the local office did not err in overruling his motion to
postpone the hearing until his attempted appeal should be heard.
Roe was evidently holding the relinquishment of Atkinson for specu-
lation.
While it is true that the contest of Pike was not the cause of the relin -
quishment by Atkinson, yet it is apparent that the filing of said relin--
quishment in the local office was the result of the contest, as at the
hearing in November evidence had been submitted which must have
resulted in the cancellation of the entry, and the only opportunity
that Roe had of obtaining any money for said relinquishment was to sell
the same and file it and procure the cancellation of the entry before it
was canceled on the evidence submitted at the hearing. The ancella-
tion thus being the result of the contest by Pike, he must have a pref-
erence right of entry, and the entry of Sullivan must be canceled should.
Pike still assert his right.
Your decision is therefore reversed.
PRE-EMPTION FINAL PROOF-PAYMENT-PROOF OF NON-ALIENA,-
TION.
JoHN J. SCHNEIDER.
Delayin making payment for the land will not defeat a pre-emption entry allowed prior
to the regulations requiring proof and payment to be made at the same time.
Where the final proof is not made before the local office, and the delay in making pay-
ment is fairly explained, additional proof of non-alienation is not required, if it
appears that the eutryman had complied with the law up to the date of final
proof, and had not then sold or agreed to sell the land.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General'
Land Office, July 18, 1890.
On March 31, 1883, John J. Schneider made pre-emption cash entry
for the S. of the NE. - and S. of the NW. , See. 13, T. 135 N., .
58 W., Fargo, Dakota.
In his declaratory statement filed, April 15, 1881, the land was erro-
neously described as the S. of the NE. 4 and N. 4 of the SE. of the
section named. Attention having been called to such error by your
office, his application to amend said filing was allowed by your office-
letter of January 11, 1886.
He made proof before the deputy clerk of the district court for Ran--
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som county on January 13, 1883, showing that he is a married man and
that he had continuously resided upon the land from April 11, 1881, to
the date of his proof and that his improvements consist of a log house
twelve by fourteen feet, stable, well, five acres broken and cropped in
1882, valued at $300.
On January 15,1886, your office suspended the said entry "on account
of insufficient proof; the pre-emption affidavit on file with the case not
covering the date of entry " and required the claimant to furnish "said
affidavit without delay."
The local office on July 23, 1887, reported that the entryman had, De-
ceinber 31, 1886, been notified of the foregoing and that " no action had
been taken."
Thereupon your office, December 14, 1887, directed the local of fce to
"advise the party that in lieu of the pre-emption affidavit required by
said letter, he will be allowed to furnish an affidavit of continued resi-
dence on and non-alienation of, the land down to date of entry, March
31, 1883, proof having been made before the clerk of the court on Janu-
ary 13, 1883."
The notice of this requirement was sent the entryman January 7,
1888, by registered letter, which was returned uncalled for.
From the said decision of December 14, 1887, F. T. Day, who swears
that he is the owner of the lan I in question and that the whereabouts
of the entryman, who " neglects and refuses " to comply with the said
requirement, are unknown and cannot be ascertained, has appealed to
this Department.
The affidavit of the entryman's attorney, dated March 13, 1883, sets
out that the delay in forwarding the testimony of the entryman and
witnesses to the local office was caused by " impossibility of obtaining
the funds with which to make final payment for said tract at an earlier
date."
The entryman's proof was made prior to the circular of November 18,
1884, (3 L. D., 188), whereby pre-emption claimants were required to
make proof and payment at the.same time.
Consequently the delay in making payment for the land should not
be permitted to affect the entry involved. R. M. Barbour (9 L. D., 615).
The entryman's proof shows a substantial compliance with the law
and his pre-emption affidavit thereto attached sets out that he had
neither sold nor agreed to sell the land.
Consequently, the entryman's proof having been made before an offi-
cer other than the register or receiver, and the delay in payment hav-
ing been fairly explained, the case at bar is. clearly governed by the
rule laid down in the case of Charles Lehman (8 L. D., 486), wherein
the Department has held that if the pre-emptor has in fact complied
with the law up to the time of making proof and can at that time truth-
fully make the requisite affidavit, a sale thereafter without such affida-
vit having been made, and prior to the issuance of final certificate, will
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not of necessity defeat the right to a patent. See also Grigsby v. Smith
(9 L. D., 98) and cases cited.
The record does not show whether or not the entryman between the
date of his proof (January 13, 1883) and the issue of his final certificate
(March 31, 1883), had alienated the land.
But under the authority cited, I must find from the record before me,
that such alienation would have been immaterial. I can, therefore, see
no reason for disturbing the entry in question.
The decision appealed from is accordingly reversed.
OKLAHOMA TOWN SITES-COMMUTED HOMESTEAD.
CIRCULAR.
Regulations to e observed in the execution of the provisions of the second proviso of the
twenty-second section of the "act to provide a temporary government for the Territory of
Oklahoma," etc., approved May 2,1890.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
Washington, D. ., July 18, 1890.
To the Registers and Receivers of the U. S. Land Offices, Oklahoma Ter-
ritory.
GENTLEMEN: All applications to commute homestead entries, or
portions thereof, to cash entries, at the rate of ten dollars per acre, for
the purpose named in the twenty-second section of the act above cited,
will be made through your respective offices and addressed to the Hon.
Secretary of the Interior, in accordance with the following regulations:
1. Entries under said section must be made according to the legal
subdivisions of the land, and no application for a less quantity than is
embraced in a legal subdivision or for land involved in any contest, will
be received by you.
2. A party desiring to found a city or town upon land embraced in
his homestead should present his application (form 4001) at the local
land office of the district in which his land is situated, and, if his appli-
cation and the status of his homestead entry are found to be in accord
with the foregoing requirements, you will so advise him and allow him
two months within which to prepare and file with you triplicate plats
of the survey of the land applied for. duly verified by the oaths of him -
self and the surveyor.
3. Such plats must state the name of the city or town, describe the
exterior boundaries thereof according to the lines of public surveys, ex-
hibit the streets, squares, blocks, lots . and alleys, and must specifically
set forth the size of the same. with measurements and area of each mu-
nicipal subdivision; and, if the survey was made subsequent to May
2, 1890, the plats must also show that the provisions of the first proviso
of the section of the act under consideration have been complied with,
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viz: the setting apart of "reservations for parks (of substantially
equal area if more than one park) and for schools and other public pur-
poses, embracing in the aggregate not less than ten nor more than
twenty acres."
4. Upon receipt of the plats you will transmit the same to this office,
for examination and the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to-
gether with the application to make entry and your joint report as to the
status of the land applied for. Should the plats be approved, one of
them will be retained in this office and the other two returned to you
with directions to notify the applicant of their approval and that he
will be allowed three months within which to make the proof herein-
after prescribed and to perfect his entry of the legal subdivision, or
subdivisions, applied for, exclusive of the portions reserved for parks,
schools and other public purposes (which are to be patented, as a gift
to the town when organized as a municipality, for the specific purposes
for which they were reserved), by tendering the purchase price of that
portion of the land actually entered. One of the approved plats re-
turned to you will be retained in your office and the other delivered to
the applicant to be placed on record and file in the office of the recorder
of the county in which the town is situated.
5. Notice of intention to make cash entry as above contemplated,
shall be the same in all respects as is required of a claimant in making
final homestead proof, and the entry when made will be given the cur-
rent number of the series of commuted or cash entries provided for in
the twenty-first section of the above cited territorial act. Proof in ac-
cordance with the published notice, consisting of the testimony of the
claimant and two witnesses, must be furnished relating-
1st. To the strict observance of the warning contained in the Pre'si-
dent's proclamation of March 23, 1889, if the land applied for is within
that portion of the Territory of Oklahoma opened to settlement thereby.
Should the land be located in a portion of the Territory which may here-
after become open to settlement by operation of law or a proclamation
of the President, it will be necessary for the claimant to show that he
has strictly observed the spirit and ltter of the provisions under which
settlement in said portion became permissible.
2nd. The claimant's citizenship, and qualifications in all other re-
spects, as a homesteader, the same as in making final homestead or com-
muted proof under the act relating to the Seminole lands, approved
March 2, 1889, and the territorial act admendatory thereoft approved
May 2, 1890.
3rd. Due compliance with all the requirements of the homestead law,
by the claimant, up to the date of commuting to cash entry.
4th. The foregoing to be accompanied by the usual proof of notice by
publication, together with the certificate of the register and rceiver
showing that the duplicate homestead receipt has been, presented to
them and canceled in respect to the land purchased for townsite pur-
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poses, and the certificate of the county recorder to the effect that a plat
of the town, bearing the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, has
been made of record and placed on file in his office.
6. After notice has been given an applicant that thishomesteadis free
from contests, and is not in conflict with any other entry, and pending
the preparation and approval of the town plats, you will neither accept
any affidavit of contest nor order any hearing involving the land applied
for; and after the approval of the plats, no contest initiated as such and
looking to the defeat of the proposed cash entry, will be entertained by
this office.
7. Parties appearing at the time and place of making proof and pro-
testing against the allowance of the cash entry, simply as objectors or
-friends of the government, will be heard, permitted to cross-examine
the claimant and his witnesses without additional cost to the claimant,
and their complaints and the'facts developed will be duly considered by
you, and such action taken as you may deem proper, except that you
will order no hearing in any such case. Should a protestant desire to
carry his action into a contest, between which proceedings there exists
a clear distinction (see McCracken v. Porter, 3 L. D., 399, and Martin v.
Barker, 6 L. D., 763), he will be required to file with you a sworn and
corroborated statement of his grounds of action, and that the contest is
not initiated for the purpose of harassing the claimant and extorting
money from him under a compromise, but in good faith to prosecute
the same to a final determination, which statement you will transmit
with the claimant's proof, and if the allegations therein contained are
considered sufficient by this office to warrant the ordering of a hearing,
you will be so advised and a hearing will be ordered upon compliance
by the contestant with the condition that he shall deposit with you a
sufficient sum to cover the costs thereof.
8. Notice of your-actions or decisions in all matters affecting an entry,
or an application to enter, under the foregoing instructions, and the
proof thereof, shall be the same as in ordinary cases; and any person
feeling aggrieved by your judgment in such matters may, within ten
days from receipt of notice thereof, appeal to this office. Within the
time for filing an appeal, the appellant shall serve a copy of the same
on the appellee who will be allowed ten days from such service within
which to file his brief and argument. Appeals from the conclusions of
this office lie to the Secretary of the Interior, subject to the foregoing
restrictions as to time, the same as in other matters of like character.
Respectfully,
LEWIS A. GROFF,
Commissioner.
Approved,
JOHN W. NOBLE,
Secretary.
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HOMESTEAD CONTEST-CITIZENSHIP-EVIDENCE-ATTORKEYS.
KIRKPATRICK v. BRINKMAN.
A contest against a homestead'entry on the ground that the entryman is not a citi-
zen must fail if declaration of intention to become a citizen is filed prior to the
initiation of stit.
A stipulation as to matters of evidence to be considered on the trial is within the prov-
ince of attorneys of record, and such action is binding upon the parties, in the
absence of misconduct on the part of the prevailing party.
First assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, July 21, 1890.
Sophia Brinkman, November 28, 1882, made homestead entry No.
10,066 for the SE. 4 of Sec.27, T. 5 N., R. 24 W., 6th P. M., Blooming-
ton, Nebraska. On June 18, 1886, Elias T. Kirkpatrick filed affidavit -
of contest, alleging that said Sophia Brinkman was not a citizen of the
United States at the date of her entry, and also that she had not com-
plied with the law in relation to settlement and residence. Hearing
was set for August 6th, before the local office.
A. J. McPeak, a notary public, was appointed by the register and
Teceiver to take depositions of witnesses as to the allegations involved
in the affidavit of contest, at his office in Arapahoe, Nebraska, July 30,
1886.
On said last date the parties appeared at the office of MePeak, at-
tended by counsel, and a stipulation was signed by F. B. Taylor, at-
torney for contestant, and Sheppard and Black, attorneys for contestee,
by which contestant withdrew all objections as to the sufficiency of
residence, cultivation, etc., leaving only for the consideration of the
local officers the allegation of non-citizenship.
The stipulation covers five pages of foolscap, but for the purposes of
this case it is only necessary to note one clause thereof, namely:
That on the 7th day of June, 1886, contestee appeared before said district court, it
being the first day of the first term of said court after contestee had learned she was
mot a citizen of the United States, and made application to be naturalized. Con-
testee was at that time informed by the judge of said court that all she could do was
to declare her intention to become a citizen of the United States, which she then and
there did.
A copy of said declaration, duly authenticated, is also filed with the
papers in the case.
In view of this stipulation, the local officers recommended the
dismissal of the contest. Kirkpatrick appealed to your office, and on
December 5, 1888, your office affirmed the action of the register and
Teceiver, and the contestant now appeals from said decision to this'
Department.
It will be noticed that claimant's declaration of intention to become a
eitizen preceded by nearly two weeks the filing of the affidavit of con-
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test, and as it is clear from the stipulation that claimant at the time of
making her entry honestly believed that she was a citizen (she having
been informed by her husband in his life-time that he was a Union
soldier) and her declaration having been made prior to the initiation of
the contest by Kirkpatrick removed the disability of alienage that ex-
isted at the time of making her entry (6 L. D., 485; 4 L. D., 564; 3 L.D.,
452; 2 L.D., 627).
Since the decision of your office dismissing the contest, contestant
has employed another lawyer, Taylor having left the country, and now
for the first time the point is raised, that Taylor " sold out " his client
when he signed the stipulation. That con testant did not intend nor au-
thorize his attorney to waive the question of residence and cultivation,
and asks that he may show lack of residence, etc.
The argument of contestant's last counsel consists largely of uncalled
for villification and abuse of opposing counsel, and abounds in vituper-
ation to such an extent as to be in bad taste and certainly does not add
strength to an argument. If Mr. Kirkpatrick employed a dishonest at-
torney, that is not the fault of the entryman unless it can be shown
that she corrupted him or was a party thereto, and she should not be
made to smart for the conduct of opposing counsel. The client is ordi-
narily bound by the admissions of his attorney and a stipulation as to
matters of evidence to be considered in the trial of the case is pee-
liarly-within the province of attorneys of record, and their action therein
is binding upon their clients unless the prevailing party is guilty ot
misconduct. And inasmuch as the question of residence and cultiva-
tion will necessarily be considered when claimant offers her final proof,.
and the contestant will then have the opportunity to offer any rebutting
evidence he may have, I do not now deem it necessary to open the
case for that purpose.
The decision of your office in dismissing the contest is therefore af-
firmed.
\ HOMESTEAD AND PRE-EMPTION-CONPLICTING SETTLEMENT RIGHTS
CLARK V. MARTIS.
One who occupies land as the tenant of another may, on the termination of the ten-
ancy, make a legal settlement on said land, by remaining thereon with the in-
tention of making the same a home to the exclusion of one elsewhere.
The extent of the pre-emption right is limited to the land actually included within
the settlement of the pre-emptor.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, July 21, 1890.
I h ve considered the case of Samuel Clark v. George C. Martin on
appeal by the former from your office decision of January 31, 1889, can-
celling his pre-emption filing number 1334, and accepting the final
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proof of said Martin for.the SW. of NE. 1 ; SE. of NW. 4NE4 of
SW. and NW. of SE. of section 28, T. 22 S., R. 20 E., Gainesville,
Florida, land district. The facts are these:
On February 12, 1885, Martin made a homestead entry for said landl
and on March 10, same year, Clark filed a pre-emption declaratory
statement for same land, alleging settlement February 10, 1885.
On September 10, 1885, Martin submitted commutation proof; Clark
appeared and offered adverse testimony and on October 13, following,
Clark submitted pre-emption final proof and Martin appeared anc
offered adverse testimony.
The matter was referred to your office, and a hearing was ordered
which was had December 17, 1886, and the local officers held Clark's.
declaratory statement for cancellation and accepted the commutation;
proof of Martin.
From this decision Clark appealed and your office decision of January
3, 1889, affirmed said decision from which he again appealed.
The testimony shows: That Samuel Clark was a freedman over sixty
years of age at time of hearing; that in 1866 he settled upon the SE. - of
NW. I and SW. -1 of NE. 1 of said section 28, and built a house, cleared,
fenced and cultivated a small parcel of said land; subsequently be made-
additions thereto until he had some thirty acres cleared and fenced. He
built some out-buildings and planted orange, banana, grape-fruit, and.
other valuable trees thereon. In 1868 he attempted to make a home-
stead entry for this land but by mistake entered the NE. SW. and
NW. I of SE. 4 of said section. Hle had built his house upon the SE. &
of NW. 4 and his "6 clearing" extended onto the SW. I of NE. 4. He-
did not offer final proof within seven years, but went to the land office-
about one month after the time had expired and was informed that he
was too late. In March, 1878, one W. B. Center made homestead entry
for the SE. 4 of NW. I and SW. I of NE. I of said section (being the
land occupied by Clark). He made no settlement or residence on the-
land but went there and informed Clark that he entered the land and
owned it and gave Clark the first information he had that there was a
mistake in his (Clark's) entry.
In 1879 Center died; his sister was appointed administratrix of his
estate aid guardian of his children, and one Coogler (who was law
partner of Martin), as agent for this guardian in December, 1881, sold,
the rights of said heirs to one I. N. E. Shoemaker of Reading, Pa., who
went upon the land, claimed to own it, built a house upon the SW. i of
NE. j of the section, made some improvements on that tract and
cleared, fenced, and planted to orange trees about seven acres in the
NE. i of SW. j of the section.
The entry of Clark was canceled on April 10, 1881, and on the 23rd
of December following, Shoemaker made homestead entry for the N. W.
iof SE. I and NE. of SW. i of the section. On July 20, 1883, the
Center entry was canceled by relinquishment and on 23rd of same-
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month Shoemaker's homestead entry was canceled by relinquishment
-and on same day he filed pre-emption declaratory statement for the
.four tracts in controversy, alleging settlement December 17, 1882.
Shoemaker went upon the land occupied by Clark in December, 1881,
and all of the improvements made on it were made before he had any
title except an agreement with Coogler, as agent of the guardian of
Center's heirs. Coogler says in an affidavit, When Iput Shoemaker
in possession of the Center lands in 1881, Sam Clark was still residing
upon the place at the spring and I told Shoemaker that Clark was only
a tenant at will."
In July, 1883, immediately after filing his pre-emption declaratory
statement, Shoemaker moved with his family back to Reading, Pa.,
wholly abandoning the land. e never returned to reside upon it; but
in December, 1884, visited Florida and in January, 1885, offered final
proof on his declaratory statement, which was rqjected because of aban-
-donment and failure to maintain a residence on the land.
Clark continued to reside upon the tract during the time Shoemaker
was making his improvements and while he was absent from the State.
It is shown that Clark is very ignorant, and that he was timid about
asserting his rights; that he was disposed to admit the superiority of
white men; in fact he was afraid of Center and did not know what he
-could do with Shoemaker-so he in fact admitted the superior right to
the land, in Center first, ad afterward in Shoemaker, and in the winter
-of 1884-5 he made preparations to leave the place and go to the farm
of his step-son. He had a part of his crops grown in 1884, stored there
and was arranging to move during the winter. Shoemaker testifies
that he was at Clark's in February, 1885, and Clark and his wife told
him they were going away. Martin offered testimony showing that
-Clark said that he would not stay there and improve the place for
another man. Shoemaker was there February 9, 1885, to get oranges
to take north with him. He and Clark talked over the matter and he
informed Clark that he was going north to stay and Clark told him he
~had a house over on Landy's (his step-son's) place and that they were
getting ready to move.
Coogler, as agent for Shoemaker, had sold the improvements on the
,land to Martin after Shoemaker's failure to " prove up", and on Febru-
.ary 12, 1885, Shoemaker's relinquishment was placed on file and Mar-
Atin's homestead entry was immediately made.
The local officers treat Clark as the tenant first of Center and after-
-wards of Shoemaker, and Martin and they cite Conk v. Rechenbach (4
'L. D., 257), in which it is held that " one holding as a tenant of another
-acquires no settlement rights under the homestead law." The principal
part of Shoemaker's testimony is for the purpose of showing that Clark
admitted his (Shoemaker's) ownership, but as I have said it was a kind
-of admission growing out of ignorance and timidity, and it is immaterial
as to whether it was tenancy or not, for if the relation of landlord and
,tenant ever existed between them that relation terminated with Shoe-
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-maker's abandonment of the land; it certainly could not exist after the
local officers, on a hearing, had decided that he bad abandoned the tract.
From that time Clark could by act and intent become a settler. That
is, if he had in his mind given up the idea of retaining his home upon
this land and had made preparations to move away, and if Shoemaker
is correct in his statement, that was the condition of his occupancy, and
if from being advised of his right to remain, or upon the information
that Shoemaker had failed to make proof and was not going to return
to the land as it seems Clark learned, he changed his intention and de-
termined to remain and make his home there, the tenancy being ended,
he could by " a combination of act and intent on his part, the act of oc-
cupying and living upon the tract and the intention of making the same
his home to the exclusion of a home elsewhere," make a legal settle-
ment. See West v. Owen (4 L. D., 412). This the testimony shows he
did-he did remain on the land-and he swears that his intention in so
remaining was to make his home there to the exclusion of one else-
where, and in this he is corroborated by all the circumstances in the case.
This eliminates from the case the question which is made by counsel,
to wit, whether Clark filed in time under the statute. Shoemaker fixes
his visit February 9th, Clark says he made settlement on the 10th. He
is probably correct as to the day, as Shoemaker is an intelligent man
and probably gave the date correctly. This would seem to settle this
case, bat I am clearly of opinion that Clark never had in contemplation
the NW. i of SE. 1 or NE. - of SW. but only the two i' forty acre lots"
on which he had made his improvements and while his declaratory
statement covers the tracts mentioned, I do not think his settlement in
fact included them. Your decision is modified as follows: The home-
stead entry of Martin for the SE. I NW. i and SW. 4 of NE. i of said
section 28, will be canceled and the proof of Clark as to these tracts
accepted. The pre-emption declaratory statement of Clark for the
NE. .4 of SW. I and NW. - of SE. 1 of said section will be canceled and
the proof of Martin accepted for said tract.
HOMESTEAD CONTEST -SUFFICIENCY OF CHARGE-EVIDENCE.
MCKANN V. HATTEN.
The testimony in a case should be conlined to the charge as laid in the affidavit of
contest.
A contest must fail if the charge as laid therein is not established by a preponderance
of the evidence.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, July 21,1890.
I have considered the case of John K. McKann v. Susan Hatten on
appeal by the latter from your decision of June 30, 1888, affirming the-
decision of the local officers holding for cancellation her homestead
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entry for the NW. 4 of Sec. 35, T. 31 N., R. 4~6 W., Valentine land dis-
trict, Nebraska.
On June 6, 1884, she made homestead entry for said tract, and on,
December 7, 1885, McKann filed affidavit of contest against the same-
alleging, as the only ground thereof, "' that the said Susan Hatten has
not settled upon said tract as required by law."
Notice of the contest was given by personal service. The charge
contained in the notice was " For abandoning her homestead." The
hearing was set for February 19, 1886. The parties appeared and the
contestee by her counsel filed a motion to dismiss the cause " forthe rea-
son that contestant has not served notice of this contest upon claimant as
required by law. "
The local officers disregarded this motion, appointed a commissioner
to take testimony and continued the hearing until August 19, 1886.
Both parties appeared before the commissioner; and the contestant
offered testimony to show a failure to establish residence on the land.
This testimony was objected to by the attorney of contestee.
August 19, 1886, the day of hearing the attorney for Hatten filed
with the local officers a brief in which he insisted that-" the only alle-
gation in this case is that claimant has not settled upon said tract
so the question of continuous residence can not be called in
question in this case." He insisted that only such testimony as related
to settlement could be considered and "claimant asks the register
and receiver to dismiss this contest. "
I The local officers on considering the testimony found that "the alle-
gatibns made by the contestant are sustained and therefore recom-
mended that the entry be canceled. "
From this decision 13atten appealed to your office, and on Jne 30
1888, your office, decided that the testimony disproved the allegation
of contestant, and proceeding you say:-" Her plea of poverty although
made in good faith, will not excuse total failure to establish residence
after a lapse of more than twenty months from entry. Said entry is.
therefore held for cancellation on the ground of such failure. "
From this decision Hatten appealed to this Department.
The testimony shows that in July 1885, claimant had a foundation for-
a dug-out house commenced and partly excavated; that she had a log
house put upon the land during the same month, but at the initiation of
the contest it had not been roofed or completed. She had six acres of
breaking done, and during the summer of 1.885, raised crops thereon;
that while said house was in course of construction, and for some time
daring the summer of 1885, she lived in a tent on the claim; that she
had household furniture in the tent and after she returned to Hay
Springs to work, she occasionally came back and stayed in the tent;
she worked some on the claim during the summer raising vegetables,
beans, etc. She was poor and during the summer of 1885, was sick a
portion of the time confined to her bed; she worked at Hay Springs,,
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earned her living by washing, and spent her surplus earnings-which
were not much-in improving her claim, and when the parties went to
the house to put up notice of contest, the house was roofed but not
4 chinked" and a door was hung therein, but the house was not yet
made habitable.
The contestant resided in Sheridan County, Nebraska. Was an at-
torney-at-law, and appeared in his own behalf.
The affidavit in this case was defective and uncertain, and the un
certainty as to what the contestee would have to meet was increased
by the charge contained in the notice, and by the want of action by the
local officers on the motion to dismiss. While it is not the province of
this Department to take up and pass upon defects in pleadings not
noticed or waived by the party interested, it is quite apparent that this
attorney was objecting to a hearing upon the affidavit as it was pre-
sented. The motion to dismiss was sufficient to call the attention of
the local officers to this fact, and to notify them that counsel was not
intending to waive any of his client's rights, yet no amendment was
made to the affidavit, and the contestant launched his case upon the
charge therein contained, hence the testimony should have been con-
fined to that charge. "The admissibility of evidence is determined by
the charge under investigation." Prince v. Wadsworth (5 L. D., 299).
This entryman made settlement and established residence upon the
land, and had she completed her house and moved into it, there could
be no question but that her residence would have dated from- the day
she moved into her tent upon the land. In Franklin v. Murch (10 L.
D., 582), Franklin moved into a tent upon the land, and lived there un-
til his house was completed. It was held that-" Franklin became an
actual settler the instant he pitched his tent upon the land, with the
intention of making it his home."
It appears that Miss flatten, by reason of poverty and sickness, had
not finished her house at the time the contest affidavit was filed, but
she appears to have been trying to complete it, as she had it " roofed "
and a door hung when the parties visited it to put up notice of the con-
test. She had lived on the land a part of the summer of 1885 beginning
in July, and had raised vegetables in a garden on the land, but she had
been at Hav Springs some time, although not absent from the land six
months, when the contest was initiated.
Your decision is inconsistent with itself and in conflict with the uni-
form decisions of this Department. You say the testimony disproves
"the allegations of contestant," but you sustain the contest and hold
the entry for cancellation.
"The burden of proof is upon the contestant to establish his charges
by a preponderance of evidence, and bad faith can not be imputed to a
claimant upon mere circumstances of suspicion." Scott v. King (9 L.
D., 299). See also Neff v. Cowhick (6 L. D., 660), and Tibergheim v.
Spellner (6 L. D., 483).
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Having found the allegations disproved, there was nothing remaining,
to be done but dismiss the contest. The entryman has a right to have-
his case tried by settled rules of practice, and if the law and decisions
are disregarded, every entry is placed in jeopardy. Adherence to law
and the rules of practice is necessary to avoid confusion in the hearing
of causes and for the protection of the rights of parties.
Your decision is reversed, and without intimating any opinion con-
cerning the acts of good faith or rights of the entryinan, or as to how-
far sickness and poverty tend to excuse absence from the land, I find
that the contestant failed to establish his case by a preponderance of
the evidence and the contest is accordingly dismissed.
PRACTICE-CERTIORARI-APPLICATION.
A. B. COOK.
The writ of certiorari will be denied if, from the application therefor, it is apparent
that the applicant's appeal if before the Department would be dismissed.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, July 21,.
1890.
A. B. Cook has filed a petition asking that the papers in the matter-
of his application to enter the NE. 1 SE. L Sec. 17, T. 13 N., R. 19 W.,
Helena, Montana, be certified to the Department for consideration and
action.
It appears that on November 20, 1889, Cook applied to enter said tract
under the homestead law which application was rejected by the local
officers for the reason that the tract was within the granted limits of
the grant for the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, and had passed
to said company under its grant. On appeal your office on March 4,.
1890, found that the land was within said limits; that the map of gen-
eral route was filed on February 21, 1872, notice of which was received
at the local office on May 6, 1872; that one Amelia Esch on February
28,1872, filed declaratory statement for the tract alleging settlement on,
the 2nd of the same month; that the line of road was definitely located
or July 6, 1882, and concluded that the claim of Esch excepted the land
from the operation of the withdrawal on general route, but that as it did
not appear there was any adverse claim to the tract at definite location,.
nor was any alleged by Cook, the land passed to the company at that
time.
It further appears that on March 17, 1890, Cook filed in your office a
waiver of his right of appeal from said decision, whereupon the case was.
regularly closed upon the records; that on May 12th following he filed
notice of appeal from said decision, in which he set out that since he
filed the waiver of his right of appeal, one Patrick H. Mahoney had ap-
plied to file pre-emption declaratory statement for said land, alleging
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on oath that at the date of the withdrawal on general route and of the
definite location, the tract was occupied by certain described pre-emp-
tion claimants; that he, Cook, was ignorant of the facts so alleged by
Mahoney, " and is not now advised as to the truth " of the same, but
that if said allegations are true he is advised and believes that the land.
did not pass to said company. He therefore concludes that he is en,
titled to the tract, and withdraws said waiver.
It further appears that your office on May 26, 1890, refused to enter--
tain the appeal for thA reason that the case had been closed on the filing-
of said waiver. Thereupon this petition was filed.
It does not seem necessary to consider the question whether under all
circumstances said waiver would have terminated the right of appeal
even in the presence of another applicant for the land. The writ of-
certiorari will be denied however if on the showing made it is apparent
that the applicant's appeal, if before the Department, would be dis-
missed. Rudolph Wurlitzer (6 L. D., 315). It should be premised;
that the' case made here must stand upon its own merits, independent
of that made by Mahoney. Your office found that "it does not appear
that there was any claim for the land " at definite location, " neither is-
any alleged by applicant." This finding is in no manner questioned.
by Cook. He entirely fails to aver that there was any claim to the tract
adverse to that of the company, at date of definite location. In the ab-
sence of such claim the tract would pass to the company under its grant.
Cook refers to certain allegations as made by Mahoney, but does not
even adopt them as his own, on the contrary he distinctly says he is-
" not now advised of the truth of such allegations. Were the case-
here on appeal with no allegation to contradict the finding of fact
of your office upon which the decision rested, the appealwould be dis-
missed. Under the ruling above cited that disposition will be made of;
this application and it is so ordered.
OKLAHOMA LANDS-GENERAL CIRCULAR.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
Washington, D. C., July 21, 1890.
REGISTERS AND RECEIVERS,
U. S. Land Offices, Oklahoma erritory.
GENTLEMEN: The 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23d, 24th and 2th,
sections of an act of Congress, approved May 2, 1890, entitled A An acti
to provide a temporary government for the Territory of Oklahoma, to-
enlarge the jurisdiction of the United States court in the Indian Terri-
tory, and for other purposes," embrace provisions for the disposal of
certain land therein designated.
None of said lands are now open to settlement except what is known,
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as the " Public Land Strip," and the lands described in the President's
proclamation of March 23, 1889, but due notice will be given when the
-other tracts mentioned are open to settlement.
All of said lands have been surveyed except the " Public Land Strip",
and that is now being surveyed. You will be supplied with the town-
;ship plats, tract books, blank forms, official circulars, and other requi-
-sites for the proper transaction of your business in connection therewith.
The statute contains some provisions which are applicable to all of
the lands described therein as being within the Territory of Oklahoma,
while other provisions are applicable only to certain tracts. The gen-
eral provisions are as follows:
GENERAL PROVISIONS.
Sections sixteen and thirty-six in each township in the Territory are
reserved for school purposes, and all tracts of land in said Territory
which have been set apart for school purposes, to educational societies,
,or missionary boards at work among the Indians, are not open to settle-
ment, but are granted to the respective educational societies, or mis-
sionary boards for whose use the same has been set apart. It is your
duty, in reference to the latter reservation, to inform yourselves as to
what tracts are covered by said provision, and advise the proper parties
that for the better protection of their rights, they should at once take
steps to put their claims of record, so that your tract books and the
Trecords of this office will show said reservations. The remainder of the
lands are made subject to entry by actual settlers under the general
homestead laws with certain modifications.
Your attention is directed to the general circular issued by this office
January 1, 1889, pages 13 to 30 inclusive, 42 to 57 inclusive, and 86 to
90 inclusive, as containing the homestead laws and official regulations
thereunder. These laws and regulations will control your action, but
modified by the special provisions of the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat.,
854) (see circular of March 8, 1889, 8 L. D., 314), and the act of May 26,
1890, (see circular of June 25, 1890, 10 L. D., 687), and the special pro-
visions of this act as hereinafter specified.
The provision in section.20, that all homestead entries for lands within
said Territory shall be in square form as nearly as may be, has refer-
ence to the purpose and intent of the homestead laws generally, con-
templating entries by quarter sections which are in square form, when
this is practicable, bat not requiring it as an absolute rule, and permit-
ting entries to be made of different tracts to make up the full quantity
allowed and intended to be entered. When this is the case it is required
that the tracts shall be contiguous to each other, so as to form one body
of land, although not in strictly square form, and in such cases the
ruling to that effect should be applied as given on page 45 of circular
of January 1, 1889.
No person who shall at the time be seized in fee simple of a hundred
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and sixty acres of land in any State or Territory, will be entitled to
enter land i said Territory.
The statute. provides that sections 2304 and 2305 of the Revised
Statutes (see pages 24, 25 and 26 of said circular of January 1, 1889),
shall, except as to the modifications contained in the act, apply to all
homestead settlements in the Territory, but makes no mention of sections
2306 and 2307 thereof; under which soldiers and sailors, their widows and
orphan children, are permitted, with regard to the public lands gener-
ally, to make additional entries in certain cases, free from the require-
ment of actual settlement on the entered tract. (See pages 26 and 27
of said circular). It is, therefore, held that soldiers' or sailors' addi-
tional entries cannot be made on these lands under said sections 2306
and 2307, unless the party claiming will, in addition to the proof re-
quired on pages 26 and 27 of said circular, make affidavit that the
entry is made for actual settlement and cultivation, according to section
2291, as modified by sections 2304 and 2305 of the Revised Statutes,
and the prescribed proof of compliance therewith will be required to be
produced, and the additional payment in cases where the same is pre-
scribed by this act will be required to be made before the issue of the
final certificate.
The statute reserves public highways four rods wide " between each
section " of land in the Territory, but provides that no deduction shall
be made, where cash payments are provided for, in the purchase money
on account of such reservation.
Settlement in the interest of another or others, is prohibited and a
penalty provided for the violation of said provisions.
In allowing townsite entries you will be guided by the circulars of in-
structions issued by the Department-under dates of June 18, 1890 (10
L. D., 366), and July 18, 1890, 11 IL. D., 68, so far as applicable, and
,such further instructions as may be hereafter issued.
SPECIAIL PROVISIONS.
The special provisions which are applicable to certain of the lands
'but not to all are as follows:
It is provided in the statute that section 2301 of the Revised Statutes
shall not apply to any of the lands mentioned in sections 18 and 21 of
said act. (See pages 19 and 88 of said cireular of January 1, 1889.)
'Therefore, entries made thereon will not be subject to commutation
under that section.
PUBLIC LAND STRIP.
Actual settlers at the date of the act, upon the lands known as the
" Public Land Strip " will be allowed the preference right to enter the
lands upon which they have settled under the homestead laws, but they
are not permitted to receive credit for more than two years residence
prior to the date of the act.
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LANDS ACQUIRED FROM MUSCOGIEE AND SEMINOLE INDIANS.
The lands acquired by the cession of the MIuscogee (or Creek) Nation
of Indians, and from the Seminole Nation of Indians by release and con-
veyance, are made subject to entry under the provision of sections 12,
13 and 14, of the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 1004) (See circular of
April 1, 1889, 8 L. D., 336), and section 2 of the act of March 1, 1889,
(25 Stat., 759), which reads as follows:
That the lands acquired by the United States under said agreement shall be a part
of the public domain, but they shall only be disposed of in accordance with the laws.
regulating homestead entries, not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres to one
qualified claimant. And the provisions of section twenty-three hundred and one of
the Revised Statutes of the United States shall not apply to any lands acquired under
said agreement. Any person who may enter upon any part of said lands in said
agreement mentioned prior to the time that the same are opened to settlement by act
of Congress, shall not be permitted to occupy or to make entry of such lands or lay
any claim thereto.
Said lands are described as follows:
Beginning at the northwest corner of the Creek country, thence fol-
lowing the eastern boundary of the Territory to the Canadian river,,
thence following the Canadian river to the western boundary of the
Territory, thence north along said western boundary to the south line
of whatis known as the Cherokee lands lying west of the Arkansas River,
or as the " Cherokee Outlet," thence east along said line extended to
the place of beginning.
Each settler upon said lands will be required, when he tenders his.
final proof, to make payment, in addition to the fee and commissions.
ordinarily required in homestead entries, of the sum of one dollar and.
twenty-five cents per acre for the land so taken by him.
In addition to the instructions hereinbefore given as being applicable
to all of the lands within said Territory, you will be guided by the in-
structions contained in the circular of this office dated April 1, 1889'
(8 L. D., 336), in allowing entries for these lands, but in the affidavit
required by the second paragraph of the third section of said circular,
you will require to be inserted, the date pon which the lands entered
are open to settlement, in lieu of the date there given.
OTHER LANDS NOW OCCUPIED BY ANY INDIAN TRIBE.
Entry for other lands within said Territory, now occupied by any
Indian tribe, which shall, by operation of law or proclamation of the-
President of the United States, be opened to settlement, will be allowed
under the homestead laws, excepting section 2301 thereof, but each
settler will be required, when he tenders his final proof, to make pay-
ment, in addition to the fee and commissions ordinarily required to be
paid in homestead'entries, of a sum per aere equal to the amount per acre
which is paid for the relinquishment of the Indian title,. but in no case
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shall such payment be less than one dollar and twenty-five cents per
acre.
In allowing entries for such lands, you will be guided by the instruc-
tions hereinbefore given as applicable to all lands within said Territory.
LANDS DESCRIBED IN PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION OF MARCH 23, 1889.
Section 21 of said act allows parties who have settled upon the lands
described in the President's proclamation of March 23, 1889, to obtain
patent therefor, twelve months from date of locating upon said home-
stead, by showing a compliance with all the laws relating to such
homestead settlement and paying for the lands so entered at the rate
of one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre. Applicants to purchase
under this provision will be required to furnish evidence of naturaliza-
tion, the same as in five year proof.
Applications to purchase, under this section, will be made upon form
4-001. Such applications the register will retain in his office. See
section 2355, Revised Statutes.
A cash certificate and receipt-forms 4-189 and 4-131, respectively-
will be issued, if the proof is satisfactory, and the same-will be reported
upon the regular abstract of lands sold. The proof and final affidavit,
in such cases. will be made upon the regular homestead blanks, modi-
fied as the circumstances required.
GREER COUNTY.
The statute provides for the final adjudication of the controversy be-
tween the United States and the State of Texas, regarding the owner-
ship of what is known as Greer county. Appropriate instructions will
be issued in the event that said lands are decided to belong to the
United States.
CASH PAYMENTS.
In entries for lands, where a cash payment is required to be made, in
addition to the fee and commissions ordinarily required in homestead
entries, said amount should not be collected when the original entry is
made, but is required to be paid when final proof is tendered.
Very respectfully,
LEWIS A. GPROFF,
Commissioner.
Approved,
JOHN W. NOBLE,
Secretary.
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PRACTICEAPPEAL-INTERLOCUTORY ORDER.
BOWXANE V. SNIPES.
An appeal will not lie from an interlocutory order of the local office.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, July 22, 1890.
October 17, 1882, Jesse L. Snipes made timber-culture entry No. 63,
for the NW. i of Sec. 22, T. 121 N., . 78 W., Aberdeen, Dakota. Sep-
tember 27, 1887, Fred J. Bowman filed an affidavit of contest, charging
failure to comply with tLe law during the third and fourth years after
entry.
Notice was issued, and the hearing set for December 27, 1887. Oc-
tober 26th previous to the day set for trial contestant filed additional
affidavit, alleging failure to comply with the law during the fifth year
after entry, and the 26th of December was set for the hearing of this
last affidavit.
November 14, 1887, contestant filed an affidavit, setting forth the in-
convenience and expense of bringing witnesses to Aberdeen, and there-
upon the register directed depositions to be taken before J. M. Paul, a
notary public, at Bowdle, Dakota. The taking of these depositions was
continued several times by consent and stipulation of counsel, and on
May 15, 1888, the day last set for taking the depositions, defendant,
Snipes, did not appear before the notary, but instead filed an affidavit
before the register and receiver, stating that " on the 13th he had been
informed that contestant would not prosecute the case further, and so
he had advised his witnesses that they need not go to Bowdle." He
further stated in said affidavit that most of his witnesses were in Aber.
deen, and that it would be expensive for him to go to Bowdle, and he
asked that the case might be continued until May 22, 1888, and heard
at the land office in Aberdeen. This was granted by the register, and
a telegram sent to Paul, the notary, informing him of this action.
The reasons assigned by the register, in his letter forwarding the
record, for this order, are that " this case had already occasioned a great
deal of unnecessary trouble and annoyance to the local office, and the
further fact that cases sent away from the local office are invariably re-
turned in bad shape, unwarranted orders made and entered of record,
and the testimony taken in such manner as to be unintelligible."
From this order of the register, Bowman appealed, and your office
sustained his appeal and directed the hearing of testimony before the
notary at Bowdle.
From this decision Snipes appeals to this Department.
Rule 43 of Practice provides:-"Appeals from the final action or de-
cisions of registers and receivers lie in every case to the Commissioner
of the General Land Office," which would seem to imply that it is only
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in cases of final action or decision of those officers that appeals will lie.
And it stands to reason that such should be the case to avoid the petty
annoyances, of cumbering the record, clogging the progress of the
trial, and delaying the expeditious disposition of the case by the party
aggrieved appealing from every adverse ruling. No appeal will lie
from an interlocutory order of the local office. Horn v. Burnett, 9 L. D.,
252. The rule is the same i relation to appeals from interlocutory de-
cisions of the General Land Office. Jones v. Campbell, 7 L. D., 404.
The contest will proceed according to the direction of the register,
and if the decision should be adverse to the contestant, on appeal to
the General Land Office from the final judgment of the local'officers, all
matters in controversy including the order now complained of, will be
reviewed by your office, aid if it is found that any material rights of
contestant have been denied him thereby, he will be granted all proper
relief on his appeal.
Your decision is therefore reversed.
RAILROAD GRANT-ACT OF APRIL 21, 1876.
KNAPP V. NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co.
An entry made in good faith by an actual settler within the limits of a railroad grant
prior to the time when notice of withdrawal is received at the local office, and
under which due compliance with law is shown, is contirmed by section 1, of the
act of April 21, 1876, and the cancellation of such entry, prior to the passage of
the act will not defeat the confirmatory operation thereof.
Secretary Noble to the 0ommissioner of the General Land Office, July 23,
1890.
On August 27, 1870, Cornelius Knapp made homestead entry of the
S NE * and NE 4 SE t, See. 17. T. 9 N. R. 2 W, Vancouver, Wash-
ington, which is withiL the primary limits of the grant to the Northern
Pacific R. R. Co., as shown by map of general route filed August 13,
1870, and of map of definite location filed September 13, 1873.
The notice of withdrawal was received at the local office October 19,
1870.
The right of the road having attached prior to the allowance of
Knapp's entry, be was on July 12, 1873 notified that it would be can-
celed if it was found, upon the definite location of the road, to fall within
the limits of the grant.
After the definite location of the road the act of June 22, 1874, was
passed (18 Stat. 194) providing that where lands, granted to any rail-
road company, be found in the possession of actual settlers whose filing
or entry had been allowed subsequent to the time when by the decision
of the land department the right of the company was declared to be-
come attached, the company shall upon filing proper relinquishment of
its claim, be allowed to select other land in lieu thereof.
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Knapp was advised of the provisions of said act and was allowed thirty
days, within which to show his connection with the land, and to make
the necessary al plication to the company. Failing to comply with said
conditions his entry was canceled August 30,1875, and on December 3,
1884, the company listed the land but it'has not been certified.
On December 20, 1888, Knapp iled an application for the re-instate-
ment of his entry, supported by affidavits showing that he began to
improve the tract about the month of September 1870, built a comfort-
able dwelling house twenty-four by twenty-eight feet, and on or about
the first day of February 1871 occupied said dwelling with his family
"and that he has ever since resided thereon with his fmily, and made
the same his exclusive and continuous home and now resides thereon."
'The affidavits also show that he continued to improve and cultivate the
tract from the date of his settlement in 1870 to the time of the filing of
said application, to wit: December 18, 1888.
Your office held that a homestead claim existing prior to the receipt
of notice of withdrawal at the local office is confirmed by the act of
April 21, 1876 (19 Stat. 35). The entry of Knapp was therefore re-
instated and the selection bj the company held for cancellation. From
this decision the company appealed alleging the following grounds of
error:
1. Error to rule that the homestead claim of Knapp is confirmed under the act of
21, April 1876.
II. Error not to have ruled that Knapp having failed to avail himself of the priv-
ilege accorded him by letter of March 29, 1873, and by permitting his entry to be
canceled his case is ' res adjudicate and cannot be re-opened.
The first section of the act of April 21, 1876 provides
That all pre-emption and homestead entries, or entries in compliance with any law
of the United States, of the public lands, made in good faith, by actual s ttlers,
upon tracts of land of not more than one hundred and sixty acres each, within the
limits of any land-grant, prior to the time when notice of the withdrawal of the lands
embraced in such grant was received at the local land-office of the district in which
such lands are situated, or after their restoration to market by order of the General
Land Office, and where the pre-emption and homestead laws have been complied with,
and proper proofs thereof have been made by the parties holding such tracts br par-
eels, they shall be confirmed, and patents for the same shall issue to the parties en-
titled thereto.
It is evident that it was the purpose of this act to confirm all entries
of lands within the limits of any land grant, made in good faith by
actual settlers, prior to the time when notice of withdrawal was received
at the local land office, where the homestead or pre-emption laws have
been complied with, and such entries serve to except such tracts from
the operation of withdrawal-so far as the rights of the original entry-
man are effected thereby-as if the settlement or entry had been made
prior to the date of withdrawal. If excepted from withdrawal for the
benefit of such entrymen, they were also excepted from the grant upon
definite location, provided the entryman continued to comply with the
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spre-emption or homestead laws as to residence; cultivation and im-
provement. Therefore the material question in this case is whether the
cancellation of the entry of Knapp for the reason that he had failed to
secure the relinquishment of the company under the act of June 22,
1874, is res adjudicate and takes the case out of the operation of the act
of April 21, 1876.
While the act of June 22, 1874, is entitled "An act for the relief of
settlers on the public lands " the relief contemplated by the act can only
be obtained by the will and action of the company. It confers upon
the railroad company the right to relinquish their title to such lands as
were occupied by settlers at the date the rights of the company at-
tached, and to select others in lieu thereof. The settler has no right
under the act that he could enforce against the company, but if the
company failed or refused to relinquish, the entry would be subject to
cancellation whether the settler took action or not, and the cancella-
tion of the entry in this case upon the failure to act did not change the
status of the entry so far as it affected the rights of the parties.
Subsequently the act of 1876 was passed for the relief of such settlers
which confirmed these entries, and so far as it affected the rights of the
,original entryman who had complied with the pre-emption or homestead
laws, such entries were as effective to except the tract from the opera-
tion of the grant for all time-as if the entry had been made-prior to
the date of withdrawal.
A similar question was involved in the case of Southern Minnesota R.
B. Co. v. Bottomly (4 L. D.208). In that case the land office in a contest
between the company and the entryman held the entry for cancellation,
which was affirmed by the Department October 23, 1874, on appeal by
Bottomly. Execution of this decision was however suspended to ascer-
tain whether the company would relinquish under the act of June 22,
1874. The company on November 3, 1874 refused to relinquish, and no
other action was taken in the matter until June 5, 1877, when Bottomly
inquired about the tract and was informed that he would be allowed
thirty days to obtain the relinquishment of the company. No relin-
puishlment was obtained, but-the cancellation of his entry not having
been entered in the local office-he was permitted to make proof and
receive final certificate. Subsequently he applied for patent and it was
upon this application that the decision of your office was made from
,which the appeal was taken when it last came before the Department-
It was contended by the company that the Department had by its de-
cision of October 23, 1874, declared that it was not a competent entry
to defeat the grant, and that question was res adjudicata. But upon
this question the Secretary said:
But for one thing the rule invoked would be applicable and operative, and the judg-
Cment of 1874 would stand. That one thing was the passage of the remedial act ot
1876 (cited supra) pending the execution of the judgment. That act took hold of and
became operative upon all cases within its purview, which at the date of its passage
had not been finally and fully disposed of.
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It is true thatin the'case cited it is said that although the "judgment
had been rendered, it was, and still is unexecuted," and that "the entry
is still of record." But I cannot see that this would in anywise affect
the question. In both cases the judgment of cancellation had been
rendered, bat in neither case was the land certified to the company and
the failure to make the entry of cancellation on the records of the local
office did not diminish the right of the road in the one case, nor did the
entry of it affect the right of the settlement in the other. Nor does the
fact that Bottomly had made final proof and received final certificate
affect the question. The governing principle that controls in both cases,
is that as to such settlers who had complied with the pre-emption or home-
stead laws as to residence and cultivation the tract Was excepted from
the operation of the grant as effectually as if the entry had been made
prior to and was existing at date of withdrawal, and no action of the-
land office short of certification to the company, would be such an exe-
cution of the judgment of the Department as to withdraw the entry
from the operation of the act of 1876. 
So long as the Department has jurisdiction of the land it has the
right to re-instate the entry and to allow the settler to make compliance
with the land laws.
Your decision is affirmed.
HOMESTEAl-SOLDIERS' DECLARATORY STATEMENT.
LEVI WOOD.
A soldier's homestead declaratory statement cannot be filed for uns urveyed land.
Secretary Noble toi the Commissioner of the General Land Office, July
2a, 1890.
On July 30, 1888, Levi Wood applied to file a soldier's declaratory
statement for a tract of unsurveyed land in the Buffalo, Wyoming land
district. His application was rejected at the local office by reason of
conflict with the Fort McKinney military reservation.
On appeal by Wood your office, on March 30, 1889, without consider-
ing the question of such conflict, affirmed the action below for the reason
that the land was unsurveyed, and on May 24th following your office
denied a motion filed by Wood for a review of its said former decision,
Wood appeals.
It appears that the tract involved lies between the east boundary of
the said military reservation and the sectional survey, showing the west
lines of section 21i and 35, T. 51 N., R. 82 W.; that said tract at the time
" of original survey was supposed to be within the limits of said reser-
vation and so marked on the official plats," and that from a recent sur-
vey it was found to be excluded therefrom.
By section 2309 Revised Statutes the duly qualified soldier is per-
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mitted to file before settlement " a declaratory statement as in pre-
emption cases," and required within six months thereafter to begin his.
settlement and improvement.
An entry under the- pre-emption law must be made " by legal sub-
divisions." (Section 2259, R. S.) The declaratory statement upon
which said entry is based must describe in like manner the land so en-
tered. This is conclusively shown by section 2266 R. S., whereby the-
pre-emption settler on unsurveyed land is required to file such state-
ment within three months after the receipt of the township plat at the-
local office.
The soldiers declaratory statement under section 2309, supra being-
the same "as in pre-emption cases" must therefore describe in accord-
ance with the public surveys the land which he purposes to enter under-
section 2304 R. S., whereby his entry is also required to be made "ac-
cording to legal subdivisions."
The appellant has made no settlement on the land and (as I am ad-
vised by your office), although a contract for the survey of the strip,
between the said reservation and the public surveys has been awarded,
the land involved is still unsurveyed.
The application in question must therefore be denied.
The decision appealed from is affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT-SETTLEMENT-ALIEN.
CENTRAL PACIFIC E. R. CO. v. BOOTH ET AL.
The settlement and residence of an alien upon lands within the limits of a railroad'
grant does not except the lands covered thereby from the operation of the grant.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, July,
24, 1890.
I have considered the case of the Central Pacific Railroad company v.
Henry Booth and James P. Robson, as presented by the appeal of the
former from the decision of your office, dated April 5, 1886, rejecting its,
claim to the E. j of SE. ; of Sec. 33, T. 7 N., R. 2 W., Salt Lake City land
office Utah Territory, and allowing said Robson to make homestead
entry of said tracts.
The record shows that said tracts are within the limits of the grant to,
said company by acts of Congress approved July 1, 1862, and July 2,
1864 (12 Stat., 489, and 13 Stat., 356), the right of which is held to have-
attached to the granted lands on October 20, 1868 (5 L. D., 661).
On March 15, 1869, and October 5, 1877, the township plat of survey
was filed in the local land office. On May14, 1869, one Henry Booth filed
his pre-emption declaratory statement, No. 425, for said tract alleging
settlement thereon April 15, 1858. On May 14, 1869, Booth also filed&
his declaration to become a citizen of the United States.
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The company, on December 26, 1884, made application to have said
land patented under said grant, and said Booth was duly notified to ap-
.pear and show cause why said application should not be allowed.
On February 18, 1885, said Robson made application to enter said tract
,under the homestead law, and the same was rejected by the local office-
The hearing was duly had on February 19, 1885, both parties being
present. Upon the evidence submitted the local land officers awarded
said land to the company, for the reason that at the date when the right
-of said company attached to its granted lands, said Booth was an alien
and he could acquire no right under the settlement laws of the United
States.
On appeal, your office reversed the action of the local land officers,
holding that the settlement and residence of said Booth at the date when
the right of the company attached served to except the land covered
thereby from said grant; that the claim of the company must be re-jected, and Robson allowed to enter said land.
The evidence submitted shows, that Booth was residing on said land,
with his family, on October 20, 1868, and continued to reside thereon
until 1870, when he sold his improvements, consisting of a dwelling
house and other improvements, all valued at $700 or $800. It also
appears that Robson is the present occupant of the land and has re-
sided thereon since the spring of 1874, and that his improvements are
worth from $1000 to $1500.
The sole question presented in the record is, will the settlement and
Tesidence of an alien upon lands within the limits of said grant at the
-date of the definite location of its road except the same from the grant 
This question must be answered in the negative.
Section three of said act of July 1, 1862, grants to said company
il every alternate section of public land designated by odd numbers, to
,the amount of five alternate sections per mile on each side of said road,
,not sold, reserved, or otherwise disposed of by the United States, and
-to which a pre-emption or homestead claim may not have attached at
'the time the line of said road is definitely fixed."
Section four of said act of July 2, 1864, enlarged the grant, by strik-
-ing out the word " five " in section three of the act of July 1, 1862, and
'inserting in lieu thereof the word ten," and provided (inter alia), that
-" any lands granted by this act, or the act to which this is an amend-
ment, shall not defeat or impair any pre-emption, homestead, swamp
land, or other lawful claim."
It will be observed that the enlarging act expressly provides that
rthe claims which shall not be impaired are, " pre-emption, homestead,
-swamp land or other lawful claim." The occupancy of land by an alien
-can not be considered a "lawful claim," for he knows that an alien can
not acquire title to land from the United States under the settlement
Jaws.
It was expressly ruled by this Department, in the case of Southern
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Pacific R. I. Co. v. Saunders (6 L. D., 98), that an alien can acquire no
right to public land before filing declaration of his intention to become
a citizen. See also Titamore v. Southern Pacific B. R. (10 LD, 463).
It follows, therefore, that the decision of your office was erroneous,
and the same is therefore reversed.
RAILROAD GRANT-FINAL PROOF PROCEEDINGS.
FLORIDA BY. AND NAVIGATION CO. v. DODD.
The failure of a railroad company to appear in response to a published notice of in-
tention to subniit final proof precludes its denial of the correctness of the case as
made by the record, but forfeits no right to which it is entitled under the law
as shown by the record.
No rights can be acquired by entry or settlement upon lands that were free at date of
definite location, and passed thereby under the operation of the grant.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, July
24, 1890.
I have before me the appeal of the Florida Railway and Navigation
Company from your office decision of May 7, 1887, holding for confir-
mation William C. Dodd's pre-emption cash entry, made October 28,
1884, for the NE. i NE. i See. 23; S. i SW. A See. 13, and SE. 1 SE. A,
Sec. 14, T. 18 S., R. 22 E., Gainesville district, Florida.
The tracts in the odd-numbered sections are within the six mile pri-
mary limits of the grant claimed by the Florida Railway and Navigation
Company (successors to the Atlantic, Gulf and West India Transit
-Company), between Waldo and Tampa. I
The records show that one Daniel F. Perry made homestead entry
for the land in question May 24, 1877, which was canceled June 30, 1880,
also, that William C. Dodd (the appellant here) filed declaratory state-
ment on said land, November 24. alleging settlement November 19,
1883. No other entry or filing appears to have been made therefor,
except the entry now under consideration.
No appearance was made in behalf of the railroad company to con-
test the claim of Dodd, in response to the published and posted notice
of his intention to make final proof. Your office held that " by such
failure to appear, said company waived whatever claim it might other-
wise have asserted in the premises, and is barred from objecting to
subsequent action on the entry in this (your) office."
There is no doubt that by its "failure to appear," when it had its
"day in court," the company, like any other defaulting party, is barred
both from denying the correctness of the case made by the record, and
from objecting to the consequences which the law attaches to that case.
But, except in this sense, and to this extent, such a default waives no
A' claim " at all, and the absent party forfeits no right which even the
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case made in its absence by its adversary shows that it has in law. See
case of Randolph v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company (9 L. D., 416).
The case made by the record here, admitting the literal correctness
of every allegation made by Dodd and his witnesses, shows the legal-
title to the land in dispute to be in the company. It is the ruling of
this Department (5 L. D., 107), that the definite location of this portion
of the company's road occurred in December, 1860, and according to
the record the land in dispute was at that time vacant public land.
Neither Perry's homestead entry, of May, 1877, nor Dodd's pre-emption
settlement, of November, 1883, could in any way effect the company's
right, which had thus become vested some twenty years before. The
facts proved by Dodd go simply to his own residence and improvement
long after the tract had ceased to be public land; their being in proof,
accordingly, in no way justifies the awarding of the company's land to-
Dodd.
Said decision is accordingly reversed.
RAILROAD GRANT-WITHDRAWAL ON GENERAL ROUTE.
MCARTHUR V. NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co.
Land included within the limits of withdrawal on general route is held in reserva-
tion until definite location of the road, and the status of such land, under said
withdrawal, is not affected by the fact that said land also fell within the limits of-
a subsequent order which purported to withdraw it for indemnity purposes.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, July
24, 1890.
This is an appeal by J. Amos McArthur from your office decision of
January 13, 1888, affirming the local office and rejecting his application
of November 26, 1887, to make homestead entry for the N. NSW. 
and SE. 1 NW. and NW. of NE. Sec. 13, T. 5 N., R. 3 E., Van-
couver, Washington Territory.
On August 13, 1870,:the Northern Pacific Railroad Company filed in
your office a map showing the general route of its road from a point at
the mouth of the Walla Walla river, in said Territory, along the course
of the Columbia, to about the first range line west of the Willamette
principal meridian, and thence north to the point where the interna-
tional boundary first touches the tide waters of the Pacific Ocean.
Upon the filing of this map, the laud within the limits of the grant
to said company upon each side of the route, as so indicated, was with-
drawn from settlement by operation of law. Buttz v. Northern Pacific-
R. R. Co., 119 U. S., 55.
By joint resolution of Maya3l, 1870, (16 Stat. 378) the designations
of certain lines of the company's road were changed: that which by
the granting act was known as the branch line (via the valley of the
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Columbia river to a point at or near Portland in the State of Oregon)
was changed to " main road " or " main line ", and that which had been
,designated as main line (across the Cascade mountains to Puget Sound)
was changed to branch line. By the same resolution there was con-
ferred upon the company a grant of lands for the line of its road from
Portland to Puget Sound. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., v. McRae (6 L.
D. 400).
The land involved is within the limits of the said statutory with-
~drawal on the map showing that part of the general route of the North-
ern Pacific Railroad between Ainsworth and Portland, filed August 13,
1870. It also fell outside of the granted and within the indemnity
limits of the grant as designated by the map showing the definite lo-
cation of the company's road between Portland and Kalama, filed
September 22, 1882.
The appellant insists that said withdrawal of August 13, 1870, was
by virtue of the said joint resolution of May 31, 1870, and not by the
original grant of July 2, 1864; that the limits of the grant by said reso-
lution having been definitely fixed, the land not having been selected
as indemnity by the company, and the order which purported to with-
-draw it for indemnity purposes having been revoked by the Depart-
ment, on August 15, 1887 (6 L. D. 133), it was subject to the appellant's
application.
I cannot agree with this contention. The land being within the limits
of the withdrawal on the general route of the road between Ainsworth
and Portland, the said withdrawal is in full force and effect, until the
road is definitely located, and its grant thereby defined between the
points named and opposite the tract involved. This has not been done.
T he land was, therefore, at the date of appellant's application to enter
subject to such withdrawal.
The fact that the land had been within the limits of the order which
purported to withdraw it for indemnity purposes, could not affect its
prior withdrawal by operation of law.
Your decision is affirmed.
SURVEY-SPECIAL AGENT'S REPORT.
9DWARD 'G. MCCLELLAN ET AL.
A survey should not be approved if the corners are not marked as indicated therein,
and as required by the rules and regulations.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, July
25, 1890.
With your letter of April 4, 1890, you transmit the papers in the
matter of the appeal of Edward G. McClellan and Thomas K. Stewart
from your decision rejecting the surveys of the exterior boundaries of
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townships 24 and 25 north, range 31 east, M. D. M., Nevada, made
under their joint contract No. 169, executed March 14,1884.
This action was taken by your office upon the report of Special Agent
P. F. Bussey, who examined and inspected said surveys, and who re-
ported that said work had been performed with gross carelessness; that
very many corners on the township lines were not found by the exam-
iner, and that the field notes do not describe any of the corners as they
actually exist in the field, and that from his examination he did not find
a corner so marked that a person could determine in what township or
range the lands were situated. Oth6r facts are set forth in the report of-
the special agent, showing material discrepancies between the field
notes of the deputy surveyors and the actual findings of the special
agent, and that said survey was grossly imperfect. If the facts as
found by the special agent are true, it can scarcely be contended by
the appellants that the survey should be accepted.
The appeal from your decision is based solely upon the following
grounds:
The instrument used by the inspector on the examination of the work was such a
poor one that it would be impossible for the best surveyor living to run a line with
it which could be sworn to as the only true and correct line as the inspector has done
in his report, the said instrument being a very cheap open-sight compass, of a kind.
that has been condemned by the Commissioner of the Land Office for years, and not
allowed to be used upon any government surveys.
The inspector is totally incompetent to make examinations of surveys, never hav-
ing seen an instrument till after he had been appointed inspector and come to this
State a few weeks before entering upon this examination.
The said inspector while doing the work and making out his report was nuder the
influence of Chas. W. Irish, the present surveyor general for Nevada, who has used
every means in his power to cast odium upon all surveys made in this State prior to
his appointment, and, under this influence, formed an opinion against said survey
before making his examination, made out his report according to suggestions from
Chas. W. Irish, and after said report was sworn to and signed by his assistants who
certified to its correctness, made material alterations before sending it to Washing-
ton. In proof of these charges we enclose affidavits of the inspector's compassman,
and the draughtsman in the surveyor general's office.
We herefore protest against any and all examinations and reports made by-the
present inspector or by any other incompetent person, and believe that you will see
the injustice of accepting the reports of any person who knows no more about sur-
veying than a common farmer about army tactics.
The present surveyor general has made alterations in field notes of surveys sent
into his office by deputy surveyors, and we have no means of ascertaining that he
has not done so in the notes furnished the inspector by him of this survey.
This appeal is supported by the affidavit of W. T. Moran, the com-
passman who assisted the special agent in his examination, who states-
that the instrument used was inferior, and that he objected to under-
take the work with such an instrument, but he was informed by Bussey
and Irish that it was sufficiently accurate for the purpose of the exam-
ination, as the object was simply to run the lines close enough to find
the corners; that he expected with the aid of flagmen to be able to
retrace the lines sufficiently well to meet the requirements, but before
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 951
the examination was commenced the flagmen were discharged by Bus-
sey, and that he was required to run the lines without flagmen, depend:
ing entirely upon the needle for line, and being required to act as ehain-
man, carrying over a rough and mountainous country, in addition to tre
instrument and chain, two heavy pins, weighted with lead. He further,
states:
A true line could not be run under such conditions, and affiant had not been in-
structed to run true lines, but only to run closely enough to enable the corners to be.
found with reasonable searching; and affiant says that it was with this understand-
ing, gained from the unmistakable statements of C. W. Irish and P. F. Bussey as to.
the method and object of the examination, that he consented to work with such an
instrument and in such a manner; and it was with this understanding as to the.
requirement and instructions that he made affidavit to the report of the examina-
tion.
I have recited and quoted from the affidavit fully for the purpose of
showing that it does not necessarily impeach the report of the examiner
or the affidavit of the affiant to said report, but merely shows the diffi-
culties under which he made his examination. It does not show that
he did not find the corners that should have been marked as indicated
by the field notes of survey, but on the contrary it shows that he must-
have run the lines close enough to find the corners, because it appears,
that in many instances he found the corners marked although not in the-
manner nor in the exact spot as indicated by the survey. He states
that he did not find any of the corners described as they actually existed
in the field, and that in the eleven miles of line examined he found only-
two quarter section corners, although he made diligent search in the
locality where they ought to be found; that McClellan, one of the con-
tractors, told him before his examination that he would find a great
many of the corners had been obliterated by the ranch-men who did not
want their land surveyed because they wanted their cattle and sheep to
range upon it; but that he took particular pains to find out if this was-
true and from his examination found that there was no person living
near there, nor was there any grass or springs near the line to make it
an object for any person to obliterate the corners, nor was the character
of the country such that they would be likely to be obliterated by the
elements.
As an illustration of the failure of the deputy surveyor to properly:
mark the corners, I quote from the report of the examiner which is veri-
fied by the compassman, in which he says:
I desire your particular attention to the corner common to Twps. 24 and 25, ranges
31 and 32. In the field notes of the contractors, they say, they set a post 4 ft.
long, 4 inches square, 12 inches in the ground. This post is not there. This corner
is on a piece of ground the like of which I have never seen anywhere only in this
immediate vicinity. It is a patch of black glossy gravel and s almost as smooth as
a floor, and looks like it had been rolled with a heavy roller and it is with difficulty
that a person can remove one of these gravel stones from the ground This is the
point at which they dug pits 24 x 18 x 12 inches.
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Now what process could have been used to place this gravel back in its place so
that it cannot be seen that it has ever been removed ?
Further, they describe a mound of earth 2i ft. by 5 ft. at the base, while I find a
m1ond of stones and no signs of any earth. I can assure you that if the dirt had
,been piled here on this gravel plat I think some traces of it would be visible still.
Further, they say nothing about the mound of stones that I find here.
I have dwelt at length upon this last mentioned corner because it is a township
corner, and should be one that would attract their attention and be as they describe it.
Further, I know of no other corner any nearer to what they describe than this one.
This is one of the many corners indicated by the survey that the ex-
aminer with the aid of the compass-man actually found, notwithstand-
ing the difficulties he had to contend with in finding it, at which no pits
and mounds, monuments or post, as shown by the field notes could be
found, or else were not marked as indicated by the field notes.
Again the affidavit states that " he has been informed and believes that
the report of this examination was materially altered by P. F. Bussey
and C. W. Irish after it had been sworn to by this affiant, and without
his knowledge and consent," but he does not state in what respect it
was altered, nor have appellants attempted to show that it has been
altered in any respect whatever, although they have had full opportu-
nity to do so if such is the fact.
A further discussion of this question is unnecessary. From what has
been stated it is shown from the report of the examiner that the survey
was grossly defective in failing to mark the corners as indicated by the
;survey, and as required by the rules and regulations, and said report
in this respect at least has not been impeached, nor have the appellants
<even denied it.
Your decision is affirmed.
LAND DEPARTMENT-CLERK IN SURVEYOR GENERAL'S OFFICE.
,-Frne ,/ HERBERT MCMICKEN ET AL.
(On Review.)
rks in the office of the surveyor-general are clerks or employes in the office of the
Commissioner of the General Land Office, in contemplation of law, and therefore,
under the inhibition of section 452 of the Revised Statutes, disqualified to enter
public land.
Directions given for the formulation of a circular in accordance with the construc-
tion of law adopted herein.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, July 25,
1890.
On February 14,1883, Herbert McMicken, Albert J. Treadway, and
John P. Tweed made timber land entries for, respectively, the S. 4
the NW. , and the SW. of Sec. 20, T. 18 N., R. 3 W., Seattle land
district, in the then Territory of Washington. The entries were held
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for cancellation by your office, on June 11, 1888, because the entrymen
at the date of said entries were employees in the office of surveyor-gen-
eral of said Territory. On appeal here, the judgment of.yonr office was
affirmed (10 L. D., 97), and the case is brought before me again on a
motion to review and reverse the former decision.
The material facts in relation to the three entries being the same,
contrary to the usual practice, the three cases were consolidated and
considered together. Those facts, as stated in your office, decision, are
undisputed, and show that said tracts were " offered " lands and had
been such for seven years; that the entry men were clerks in the office
of the surveyor-general, as stated, but acquired their knowledge of the
character of the lands from personal inspection of the same, and that,
prior to making said entries, they informed the register and receiver of
their then employment, and inquired as to whether there was any in-
hibition against the proposed entries by them. "' The local officers de-
cided that the circtular of August 23, 1876 (prohibiting entry by local
officers and others), did not apply to them." Thereupon, the entries
.,were made, the money paid for the land, ad the final certificates issued
on February 14, 1883, as before stated. Subsequently, on August 17,
1883, said tracts were purchased by one Aden . King.
Section 452 of the Revised Statutes provides that-
The officers, clerks and employees in the General Land Office are prohibited from
directly or indirectlypurchasing or becoming interested in the purchase of any of the
public land; and any person who violates this section shall forthwith be removed
from his office.
It was held in my decision that said section-
was intended to extend the disqualification to acquire public lands to officers, clerks,
and employees in any of the branches or arms of the public service under the control
and supervision of the Commissioner in the discharge of his duties relating to the
survey and sale of the public lands. . . . . . Officers, clerks and employees in
the offices of surveyors-general fall clearly within the mischief contemplated by the
statute, and the reason If the law applies to them with equally as much force as to
those in the central office at Washington.
It is insisted that clerks in the office of a surveyor-general do not
come within the inhibition contained in the section of the Revised Stat-
utes before quoted. It is ingeniously argued that the surveyors and
surveying system of the United States were not a part of or under the
control of the General Land Office until placed there by the first section
of the act of July 4, 1836 (5 Stat., 107), now embodied in section 453 of
the Revised Statutes; that the prohibition to be found in section four-
teen of said act of 1836 only applied to officers whose salaries were
therein " provided for ;" that clerks in the surveyor's office not being
" provided for" were not intended to be included, and that section 452
of the Revised Statutes being a mere generalization of section fourteen
of the original act ought not to be construed as an enlargement of the
same so as to include classes not embraced in the original prohibition.
2497-VOL 11-7
98 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
In the case of the United States v. Bowen (100. U. S., 508), the su-
preme court say
The Revised Statutes must be treated as the legislative declaration of the statute
law on the subjects which they embrace on the first day of December, 1873. When
the meaning is plain, the courts cannot look to the statutes which have been revised
to see if Congress erred in that revision, but may do so when necessary to construe
doubtfnl language used in expressing the meaning of Congress.
Can it be said that there is such an ambiguity about section 452 as to
require a resort to the original act to ascertain the meaning of said sec-
tion.. Such ambiguity is not on the face of the section, for it plainly and
clearly prohibits officers, clerks and employees of the General Land
Office from being interested directly or indirectly in the purchase of the
public lands. This [prohibition can hardly be misunderstood by any
one reading it. I do not think therefore it is a case of ambiguity when
the language of the original act should be referred to, but that we must
accept said section as the expression of the legislative will.
It is therefore apparent that officers, clerks and employees of the
General Land Office are prohibited from being interested in the purchase
of the public lands. Are the entrymen herein either officers, clerks or
employees of the General Land Office 
Section 441 of the Revised Statutes says that the Secretary of the
Interior is charged with the supervision of the public lands, Section
462 of the Revised Statutes says there shall be in the Department of the
Interior a Commissioner of the General Land Office, and section 453
says:
The Commissioner of the General Land Office shall perform, under the direction of
the Secretary of the Interior, all executive duties appertaining to the surveying and
sale of the public lands of the United States, or in any wise respecting such public
lands, etc.
The surveyor-general is appointed by the President and his salary is
fixed by law. Congress makes an appropriation -therefor and for clerk
hire and other expenses in his office in gross. These appropriations are
expended by him. The clerks are selected and their compensation
fixed by him. But these appropriations are all contained in the general
appropriation bill for the Department of the Interior, which is charged,
through the Commissioner of the General Land Office, with the admin-
istration of the land affairs of the nation. Through the General Land
Office the money is advanced to the surveyor-general to meet the salaries
of clerks and other expenses of his office. All is done under the direc-
tion and supervision of the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
The surveyor-general is required to and does make report quarterly to
the Commissioner of all his expenses, and an annual report of all his
work for the year. These accounts are allowed or disallowed as seems
proper. Among the other expenses which undergo this scratiny is clerk
hire. tHis employment of clerks, as well as the aniounts to be paid them,
is regulated, in this manner, by the Commissioner. - The right to do so
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has never been questioned, so far as I can ascertain. Thus the clerks,
though selected by the surveyor-general, are paid by the Commissioner
at a compensation allowed by him, and it makes no difference that the
pay comes out of the appropriation for surveys, since the whole subject
is under the supervision of the Commissioner.'
For the reasons here given, in addition to those before stated, I have
no difficulty in affirming the former ruling that clerks in the office of
surveyor-general are clerks or employ6s in the office of the Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office, in contemplation of law, and there-
fore within the inhibition of section 452 of the Revised Statutes.
But it is urged in behalf of the entryman that this construction of
the law, if correct, is new, and should not be made retrospective so as
to affect entries which were made when a different construction of the
law prevailed in the Department.
If the statute were one admitting of a doubtful construction, there
might be some force in this last position. But in the face of what I
regard as its plain prohibition, in.a matter of so much importance, as a
proper administration of the land department by officers free from the
enticements of personal speculation, I do not feel that I would be justi-
fled in permitting a violation of the law in this instance, more than in
any other.
The motion is denied and the papers are herewith sent to you.
As the action of the register and receiver in this case may lead to the
belief, in the public mind, that the prohibition of the law does not
apply to all the officers and employees of the General Land Office, you
are directed to cause to be formulated a circular, in accordance with
the construction placed upon the law herein, which shall be so compre-
hensive and specific as to meet all the requirements of the law, and to
cover the cases of all officers or employees of the Land Department;
wherever located or employed. This circular when prepared will be
transmitted to me for approval.
DOUBLE MINIMUM LAND-ACTS OF JUNE 15, 1880, AND MARCH g, 1889.
JOHN BAXTER.
Land within the limits of a railroad grant, and reduced in price by the act of June
15, 1880, is again raised to double minimum if subsequently falling within the
limits of another grant.
Section 4, act of March 2, 1889, does not reduce the price of land within the limits
of a railroad grant, if the portion of railroad opposite thereto was completed
prior to the passage of said act.
Secretary Noble to tHe Commissioner of the General Land Office, July 25,
1890.
I am in receipt of your communication of June 21, 1890, transmitting
for my consideration the application of John S. Baxter for repayment
of one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, excess paid upon cash
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entry for the S. SW.- -, NW. SW. and SW. NW. j, Sec. 22, T.
49 N., R. 6 W., Ashland, Wisconsin.
It appears that said entry was made by Baxter August 14, 1889, and
payment was made thereon at the rate of two dollars and fifty cents
per acre. Application for repayment of said excess was made by Bax-
ter, which was refused by your office May 17, 1890, and he now files a
motion for review of said decision, which you have referred for my con-
sideration.
The land in controversy was increased to double minimum by being
within the limits of the grant to the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and
Omaha Railroad Company, as shown by map of definite location filed
June 17, 1858, and was offered at that price June 21, 1859.
The third section of the act of June 15, 1880 (21 Stat., 237), pro-
vided:-
That the price of lands now subject to entry which were raised to two dollars and
fifty cents per acre, and put in market prior to January, eighteen hundred and sixty-
one, by reason of the grant of alternate sections for railroad purposes is hereby re-
duced to one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre.
This land having been raised to double minimum prior to January,
1861, was by the terms of said act reduced to one dollar and twenty-
five cents per acre; but subsequently it fell within the limits of the
grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, by definite location,
made July 6, 1882, and by reason thereof was again raised to two dol-
lars and fifty cents per acre.
The fourth: section of the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 854), pro-
vides:
That the price of all sections and parts of sections of the public lands within the
limits of the portions of the several grants of lands to aid in the construction of rail-
roads which have been heretofore and which may hereafter be forfeited, which were
by the act making such grants or have since been increased to the double minimum
price, and, also, of all landa within the limits of any such railroad grant, but not
efmbraced in such grant lying adjacent to and coterminous with the portions of the
line of any such railroad which shall not be completed at the date of this act, is hereby
fixed at one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre.
This tract is within the limits of a portion of the Northern Pacific
Railroad Company that was completed at the date of the passage of the
act of March 2, 1889, and was therefore not affected by said act, but
the price remained at two dollars and fifty cents per acre, which was
the price of the land on August 14, 1889.
This case differs from the case of Jacob A. Gifford (8 L. D., 583), in
this: In the Gifford case the land was opposite a portion of the road
that had not been completed at the date of the act of March 2, 1889, and
the price of said land having been fixed by said act at one dollar and
twenty-five cents per acre, it was held that the double minimnum price
having been charged for said land upon an entry made subsequent to
the passage of the act, was erroneous, and repayment should therefore
be allowed. But in the present case the land was double minimum at
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the date of the purchase, and the price of two dollars and fifty cents
per acre was not erroneously charged. There is no raling of the Depart-
ment, either in the case of Jacob A. Gifford (supra), the decision re-
erred to in your letter, or in the case of George 1. Clark (6 L. D.,'157),
hat would authorize repayment of any part of the purchase money in
this case, but the doctrine therein announced is directly to the con-
trary. The application should be refused.
RULES OF PRACTICE-APPEAL.
TESUVIUS LODE.
The Department will not undertake to review a decision of the General Land Ofice
in the absence of an appeal, where de notice of the right to such remedy has
been given, and no reason is shown for failure to comply with the rules of prac-
tice.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the Genieral Land Office, Jly 25,
1890.
On June 5, last "Sam'l J. Wallace, for J. 0. Voorhies" filed a memo-
randum stating certain facts in reference to the Vesuvius Lode claim
in the Pueblo district, Colorado' and claiming that Voorhies was en-
titled to a )atent for a certain portion of the same.
The paper was referred to you for your consideration and a statement
of the facts. Your report, dated June 16, is now before me.
It appears that on December 31, 1883, Joseph Oscar Voorhies made
mineral entry upon said Vesuvius Lode claim, lying partly in Sec. 8,.
partly in Sec. 17, apd partly in Sec. 16, T. 22 S., R. 72 W.; that on Jan-
uary 8, 1885, your office held the entry for cancellation to the extent of
the portions lying in sections 16 and 17, on the ground that the title to
section 16 was in the State of Colorado under the grant for school pur-
poses, and because the portion in section 17 was embraced in a patent
issued to one David C. Douglas on January 2, 1880.
No appeal therefrom was taken. On February 14, 1890, your office
canceled said entry in accordance with said former decision, and by
letter of the same date directed that additional evidence be furnished
"of the existence of a vein or lode within the portion of the claim in
section 8, thecourse and direction thereof, and a certificate by the United
States surveyor-general showing the statutory expenditure of $500,
upon and for the development of the aforesaid portion in section 8," and
stated that in case of failure to submit such evidence within sixty days
from notice, the remainder of the entry would be held for cancellation.
You state that claimant has filed no appeal, although advised of his
right so to do, and you decline to recommend that the entry so can-
celed in part be re-instated, or that the unpatented portion be approved
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for patenting, as long as claimant fails to comply with your said require-
ments.
The memorandum filed is not sworn to. It alleges that claimant ob-
tained his right to said claim in accordance with law, that some one
surreptitiously obtained patent to the portion in section 17, " by means
of script; but subsequently gave quit claim to this claimant in recog-
nition of his rights; " that said claimant has in good faith spent thou-
sands of dollars on the lode.
Claimant asks that the government issue a patent for the part of the
claim in section 8, without requiring compliance with the directions of
your office.
The questions presented are not in any sense properly before the De-
partment. If claimant has been injured by the decision of your office
his remedy lies in appeal. It appears he has been notified of this and
has failed to avail himself of this remedy. No reason is given for his
failure. The vast amount of litigation in the Department renders it
necessary that certain rules of practice be adopted, to the end that cases
be regularly and certainly disposed of. The Department can not under-
take in justice to itself and claimants to waive an observance of such
rules when no cause whatever appears for so doing.
The application is accordingly dismissed.
CONTEST-APPLICATION-PROCEEDINGS BY THE GOVERNMENT.
DEAN v. PETERSON.
During the pendency of a rule to show cause why an entry should not be canceled for
failure to snbmit proof within the statutory period, an application to contest said
entry should not be allowed.
The rejection of an application to contest an entry carries with it the rejection of an
accompanying application to enter.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Ofge, July 28. 1890.
On April 7, 1879, Charles E. Peterson made homestead entry for the
NE. i, Sec. 11, T. 16 S., R. 23 W., Hays City now Wa Keeney, Kansas.
On June 12, 1886, a letter (not registered), to which no response has
been made, was sent (presumably) from the local office to Peterson at
the post-office nearest said tract, calling upon him to show cause why
his said entry should not be canceled for failure to make proof within
the statutory period of seven years.
On February 26, 1887, G. Frank Dean, alleging a failure by Peterson
to establish and maintain his residence on the land, applied to contest
the said entry, and also to make homestead entry for the land.
The local office rejected Dean's application to contest, on account of
the pendency of the said rule to show cause, and his application to
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enter on account of the existing entry of Peterson. This action was on
appeal by Dean sustained by your office decision of September 24, 1888.
Dean appeals.
The proceeding by the government against the Peterson entry (shown
by the records of your office to be uncanceled) was, at the time of
Dean's application to contest, and, so far as the record disclosed, is still
pending. As no rights can be acquired under an affidavit of contest
filed during the pendency of proceedings against the entry by the gov-
ernment (anning v. Fail, 10 L. D., 657), the said application was
properly rejected. Dean's homestead application must also be denied,
as the rejection of an application to contest necessarily carries with it
the rejection of the accompanying application to enter. Drury v. Shet-
terly, 9 L. D., 211; Arthur B. (Jornish, id., 569.
The decision appealed from is affirmed and your office is directed to
take prompt action with regard to the entry of Peterson.
INDIAN LANDS-ALIOTMENT-ACTS OF MAY 23, 1872, AND FEBRUARY
8, 1887.
JOHN AND PETE ANDERSON.
Members of the Citizen band of Pottawatomie Indians may elect whether they will
take allotments under the act of May 23,1872, or February 8, 1887.
New selections may be allowed under the act of 1872 in lieu of allotments thereunder
pending and unperfected at the passage of the acts of March 1, and 2, 1889, and
certificates of such allotments may issue on the payment of the sum per acre
originally given by the United States for the land.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, July 14, 1890.
I acknowledge the receipt of your communication of March 4, 1890,
relative to allotments of lands to John and Peter Anderson members
of the Citizen band of Pottawatomie Indians.
I concur in your opinion that these Indians are entitled to have the
lands selected allotted to them under the act of May 23, 1872, and to
certificates of allotment for such land upon the payment of thirty and
fifteen cents per acre respectively, if they so elect to take allotments
under said act; and that certificates should issue in the name of Julia
Anderson for the land allotted to her in 1875, upon similar payment of
fifteen cents per acre.
I transmit herewith an opinion of the Honorable Assistant Attorney
General for the Department of the Interior, in relation to the matter,
and ali order of the President, modifying executive orders of May 24,
1887, and July 12, 1889, and granting authority to the Citizen Potta-
watomie Indians to elect whether they will take allotments under the
act of 1872 or 1887.-
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OPINION.
Assistant Attorney General Shields to the Secretary of the Interior, June
11, 1890.
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt, by reference of Assistant
Secretary Bussey on the 31st of March, of a communication from the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs relative to the applications of two mem-
bers of the Citizen band of Pottawatomie Indians for allotments of lands
under the provision of the act of May 23, 1872 (17 Stats., 159). By said
reference, my opinion is asked " as to the price per acre to be paid by
the within-named Indians for the lands to be allotted to them."
Said act of 1872, entitled "An act to provide homes for the Potta-
watomie and absentee Shawnee Indians in the Indian Territory," pro-
vides for allotments of land to each member of the Pottawatomie
Citizen-band within the limits of the thirty-mile square tract selected
for the Pottawatomie Indians in the Indian Territory, west of the Semi-
nole reservation
To each head of a family, and to each other member twenty-one years of age, not
more than one quarter section, and to each minor of the tribe not more than eighty
acres, and such allotments shall be ade to include, asfar as possible, for each family,
the improvements whichthey have made.
Provision was made in said act for the issuance of certificates to the
allottees, and that the land allotted shall be exempt from taxation, and
" shall be alienable in fee. or leased or otherwise disposed of only to the
United States, or to persons of Indian blood, lawfully residing within
said Territory with permission of the President, and under such regula-
tions as the Secretary of the Interior shall prescribe." It was further
provided
That such allotments shall be made to such of the above-described persons as have
resided or shall hereafter reside three years continuously on such reservation, and
that the cost of such lands to the United States shall be paid fron ay fund now
held, or which may be hereafter held y the United States for the benefit of such
Indians, and charged as a part of their distributive share, or shall be paid by said
Indians before such certificates are issued,
It appears that under the provisions of said act twelve allotments
were made in 1875 to John Anderson and Peter Anderson and rnem-
bers of their families, and a schedule of the same was approved by See-
tary Chandler on November 23, 1875.
On May 23, 1887 (Ind. Div., v. 50, p. 358), the Department in a letter
to the President concurred in the opinion expressed by the Indian Of-
flee that the Citizen Pottowatomie Indians are entitled to allotments
under the act of February 8, 1887 (24 Stats., 388), if they so desired.
The President on May 24, same year, approved the recommendation of
the Department and duly authorized it to allow allotments to said In-
dians under said act of 1887.
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On July 10, 1889, the Department transmitted to the Presideut for
his action the recommendation of the Indian Office, in which the De-
partment concurred, that said
order of the President of May 24, 1887, be canceled, and a new order issued authoriz-
ing allotments thereon, so that children born since May 24, 1887, may receive allot-
ments, but that those who, since the date of the President's order above referred to,
have passed the age of eighteen years, or who have married, may receive the quantity
of land allowed them by the provisions of the act.
This recommendation was approved by the President on July 12, 1889,
and by departmental letter of July 13, same year, was transmitted to
the Indian Office, with the statement that said authority of the Presi-
dent was i' for the allotment of lands to he absentee Shawnee and Cit-
izen Pottawatoinies, located on the Pottawatomie reservation, Indian
Territory, under the provisions of the act of February 8, 1887."
It further appears that one of the applicants, namely, Johi Ander
son, on July 18, 1889, claimed the right to have allotted to him under
said act of 1887, the quantity of land allowed to allottees under said act
of 1872, free of payment to the United States for any part thereof; that
if this was not so, then he had the right to allotments under both acts,
as both were still in force; and that if wrong in both of said claims, he
should be allowed the quantity of land named in the act of 1872, upon
payment of the price as therein required. The Indian Office advised
the attorney of said Anderson, on September 4, 1889 (id., vol. 60, p 385),
that his clients must elect to take their allotments under one or the
other of said acts, and that they would not be allowed to take under "
both. The lonorable Commissioner expresses the opinion that said
Indians are entitled to allotments under said act of 1872; that, although
the lands selected by said applicants for themselves and families, ex-
cept the allotment in the name of Julia Anderson, are not those ap-
proved by Secretary Chandler, as aforesaid, yet, since the Department
has generally allowed allottees to change their selections upon sufficient
showing, at any time prior to the "issuance of the evidence of title,'
said applicants should be allowed allotments for lands selected by them
under said act of 1872, if there are no prior valid claims thereto, upon
the payment of thirty and fifteen cents per acre, respectively, and that
certificate shall issue in the name of Julia Anderson upon the al-
lotment made in her name in 1875, upon a like payment of fi 'teen cents
per acre. The lands applied for by John Anderson are part of the lands
of the Creek Nation of Indians ceded to the United States for homes
for such other civilized Indians as the United States may choose to set-
tle thereon, under the provisions of the treaty of Junne 14, 1866 (14 Stats.,
785), to the United States in consideration of the sum of thirty cents
per acre. (See Article III id., p. 786.) On March 1, 1889 (25 Stats.,
757), Congress ratified and confirmed the agreement made with said
Indians on January 19, 1889, by Secretary Vilas, whereby the Indians
made an absolute cession of said land, in consideration of a sum esti-
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mated to amount to $1.25 per acre. By the treaty of March 21, 1866
-(14 Stats., 755), the Seminoles ceded to the United States their lands
" to locate other Indians and freedmen thereon," the consideration be-
ing fifteen cents per acre, and by section twelve of the act ot Congress
approved March 2, 1889 (25 Stats., 1004) an additional sum of money
was appropriated "to pay in full the Seminole Nation of Indians for all
their right, title, interest and claim which said nation of Indians may
have in and to certain lands ceded" by said treaty of 1866, which is
estimated to amount to ninety-four cents per acre.
The question submitted is whether said applicants shall be required
to pay the amount originally allowed to said Creek and Seminole In-
dians, respectively, namely, thirty and fifteen cents per acre, or the
full amount paid by the United States for the complete Indian title and
claim.
The answer to said inquiry involves the further question whether
said applicants can have allotments under said act of 1872, or can be
allowed to have allotments under the act of 1887, at their election. If
said executive action, as above recited, is to remain unrevoked and un-
changed, then it would seem that the applicants would be required to
take allotments under said act of 1887.
Said letter tothe President transmitted the communication of theCom-
missioner of Indian Affairs " upon the subject of the allotment of lands
in severalty to members of the Citizen band of Pottawatomies and the
absentee Shawnee Indians" located upon the reservation as aforesaid.
It quotes from the report of the Commissioner relative to the amount
of land allowed to each allottee, as follows:
To each head of a family, and to each other member twenty-one years of age not
more than one hundred and sixty acres, and to each minor of the tribe not more than
eighty acres, the cost of the same to be reimbursed to the United States before cer-
tificates are issued. Three years continuous residence upon the reservation is also
required.
Under this provision, mariied women over twenty-one are entitled to not more
than eighty acres, while under the allotment act of February 8, 1887, they are en-
titled to no land. Minors are also entitled to not more than eighty acres, while under
the act of February 8, 1887, minors under eighteen, not orphans, are entitled to forty
acres.
And " as the Indians were required to pay for their land under the
act of 1872," the Commissioner expresses the opinion, 'i that the said
act can in no way govern the quantity of laud to be allotted under the
later act."
The statement of the Commissioner relative to the limitation of the
quantity of land to be allotted to the married women of the Potta-
watomies is erroneous, as the act of 1872 provides that each Indian
over twenty-one years of age may have not more than one hundred and
sixty acres.
The President was required to give direction "; for the allotments of
lands to the Indians indicated under the act of February 8, 1887,"
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which he did on May 24, 1887. The subsequent executive action did
not change the direction as to the act, under which allotments to said
Indians were to be made. This direction of the President is binding
upon this Department until changed or modified by the proper execu-
tive action. Until authority is given by the President to allow said
applicants to receive allotments under said act of 1872, in my judg-
ment, they can not be allowed to take allotments thereunder.
The question " as to the proper form in which patents should be
issued for lands allotted, and to be allotted, to the Lac de Flambeau
band of Chippewa Indians, in Wisconsin," was submitted for my opin-
ion by Acting Secretary Chandler. In my opinion, dated September 18,
1889, it was held (1) that the treaty of September 30, 1854 (10 Stats.,
1109), was not repealed, changed or modified by said act of 1887; (2)
that the right of allotment was conferred by said treaty of 1854, and
that patents for allotments thereunder should be in accordance with
the terms of said treaty, whether the selections and allotments were
made or the approvals signed before or after the passage of the act of
1887. This opinion was concurred in by you on September 23, 1889,
and transmitted to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for his informa-
tion (9 L. D., 392). It may be observed that the precise question sub-
mitted was: "' What kind of patent should issue where allotments were
made under the treaty of 1854, and subsequent to the act of 1887; ;" and:
the answer wasamade that they should issue under the provisions of
said treaty. There are expressions in said opinion which possibly con-
vey the impression that all allotments provided for by acts or treaties
prior to said act of 1887 must necessarily be made under the terms of the
prior act or treaty, but the language of the whole opinion shows that
it was not the intention to so hold. It must be remembered that sec-
tion one of the act of 1887 expressly provides:
That where the treaty or act of Congress setting apart sichres-rvation provides
for the allotment of lands in severalty in quantities in excess of those herein pro-
vided, the President, in making allotments upon such reservation, shall allot the lands
to each individual Indian belonging thereon in quantity as specified in such treaty
or act.
Since under said act of 1872 a larger amount of land may be taken
than under the act of 1887, the applicants should be allowed allotments
under the former act. It is true that under said act of 1872, the lands'
allotted must be paid for by the allottees; but that fact alone does not
deprive the Indians of the right to take under said act if they so elect.
As to the price, it would seem but just that the Indians be permitted
to pay the amount originally given by the United States for the land,
because they would have been so entitled at the time the allotments
were made prior to the acts of 1889 (supra), and as they relinquish
these lands for the new allotments desired, it is practically an ex-
change of lands, and I therefore concur in the opinion of the Commis-
sioner that the Indians, if allowed allotments under said act of 1872,
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should be required to pay for the land allotted the price designated in
said treaties under which they were ceded to the United States. But
I am clearly of the opinion that no allotments should be allowed under
said act of 1872, until said executive action be revoked or modified. I
see no objection, if authority be given by the President, to allowing
said Indians to elect under which of said acts they will take allot-
ments; but until the President so directs I am of the opinion that said
applicants can take new allotments only under the act of 1887, and-
should not be required to pay any price for the lands selected by them.
RAILROAD GRANT-ISSUANCE OF PATENTS.
UNION PACIFIC RY. Co., KANSAS DIVISION.
The failure of the Leavenworth, Pawnee and Western Company to signify under seal
its acceptance of the provisions of the act of July 1, 1862, does not defeat the
right to patents thereunder, for (1) section nine of said act, by which the grant
is made to this company, does not in terms require said acceptance to be under
seal; and (2) the resolution of the board of directors of said company accept-
ing said provisions, dlyecertified as the action of said board, was received by
the Department as.a valid acceptance of said provisions, and the validity thereof
subsequently recognized by the Department and Congress, the road constructed
and titles vested on the faith of that transaction.
The grant is not controlled by the designation of the general route but by the defi-
nite location of the road, and the departure of the company in its location and
construction of the road from the line of general route, as designated by the
map of 166, does not work an abridgement of the grant.
The President's acceptance and approval of the road, as constructed on its line of
definite location west of Fort Riley to the one hundredth meridian of longi-
tude, meets the statutory requirement that such route shall be subject to the
approval of the President, as the map of said route was accepted by the Secretary
of the Interior, and the road constructed on the faith of said acceptance.
Directions given for the issuance of patents.
Secretary Noble to the Conmissioner of the General Land Office, June 28,
1890.
By letter of December 17, 1887, your office submitted a statement
relative to the suspension of patents for lands in the State of Kansas
granted by "acts of July 1, 1862, and July 2,1861, to the Leavenworth,
Pawnee and Western, afterwards the Kansas Pacific railroad company,
now known as the Union Pacific railway company, Kansas division."
Said report states that "on October 1, 1883, the governor of the State
of Kansas addressed a letter to the Department in which after referring
to petition and argument respecting said grant filed in the Department
by Hon. S. J. Crawford, attorney for the State and to the fact that lists
embracing several hundred thousand acres had been, or were about to
be filed in this office for certification, regardless of the failure of said
company to comply with the law as shown by Mr. Crawford, he re-
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quested that nio more lands be certified to the railway company until
the grant had been adjusted according to law, in order that the rights
of the State as well as the settlers might be protected. November 3,
1883, Hon. S. J. Crawford filed in this office a printed copy of his pe-
tition and argument referred to by the governor and asked that the
issue of patents to said company be suspended until the questions sub-
mitted were determined."
It appears from said report that thereupon an order directing that
the issue of such patents be suspended, was made by your office.
Said report farther states that:
The Union Pacific Railway has, since 1883, filed lists of selections and applications
for patents for upwards of 800,000 acres and has paid the fees for selecting and sur-
veying the same.
On the 22nd October, 1886, Messrs. Shellabarger and Wilson, of this city, attorneys
for said company, requested that patents for such of the selected lands as were clearly
subject to the company's selection be issued at the earliest practicable day.
Your office after a review of the questions presented concluded in
said report that the points raised by Mr. Crawford " do not reach to
the right of the company to the lands now in controversy," and pro-
posed, with the approval of the Department, to prepare and submit for
approval lists of the selected lands, as a basis for patent.
I have considered the questions presented; as will appear by the fol-
lowing:
By section one of the act of Congress approved July 1, 1862, (12 Stat.,
489), the Union Pacific Railroad Company was authorized to construct
a railroad from a point on the one hundredth meridian of longitude
west from Greenwich, between the south margin of the valley of the
Republican River and the north margin of the valley of the Platte
River, in the Territory of Nebraska, to the western boundary of Ne-
vada Territory.
By section seven it was provided,
That within two years after the passage of this act said company shall designate
the general route of said road, as near as may be, and shall file a map of the same in
the Department of the Interior, whereupon the Secretary of the Interior shall canse
the lands within fifteen miles of said designated route, or routes to be withdrawn
from pre-emption private entry and sale; and when any portion of said route shall
be finally located, the Secretary of the Interior shall cause the said lands hereinbefore
granted to be surveyed and set off as fast as may be necessary for the purposes herein
named.
By section nine thereof the Leavenworth, Pawnee and Western Rail-
road Company of Kansas was authorized
To construct a railroad and telegraph line from the Missouri river at the mouth of
the Kansas river, on the south side thereof, so as to connect with the Pacific Railroad
of Missouri, to the aforesaid point, on the one hundredth meridian of longitude west
from Greenwich, as herein provided, upon the same terms and conditions in all
respects as are provided in this act for the construction of the railroad and telegraph
line first mentioned.
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Said section further provided that the route in Kansas west of the
meridian of Fort Riley was to be subject to the approval of the Presi-
dent to be determined by him on actual survey and the company was
required to file its acceptance of the conditions of said act in the De-
partmeut of the Interior within six months after the passage of the act.
It is urged by Mr. Crawford that said company failed to file its ac-
ceptance of said grant, under seal, and is therefore disqualified from
receiving the lands granted.
It should be noted that the provision in section seven of said act,
"That said company shall file their assent to this act under the seal of
said company in the Department of the Interior," applies in terms only
to the Union Pacific Company. The road in question is not mentioned
until section nine thereof is reached, and that section provides that it
shall file its "acceptance of the conditions of this act in the Depart-
ment of the Interior, within six months after the passage of this act."
The requirement of the seal is omitted.
But if this is not a conclusive answer to the objection, the records of
the Department show that on November 24, 1862, a resolution of the
board of directors of the Leavenworth Pawnee and Western railroad
company was received, transmitted by J. HI. McDowell, president of the
company, and certified by the secretary thereof, as taken by him from
the books of the company, accepting the provisions of said act. This
resolution was accepted by the Department as a proper one, and its re-
ceipt acknowledged. Subsequently, in response to a resolution of the
Senate, the Department transmitted a copy of said resolution to that
body, on March 4, 1864, pending the passage of the amendatory act of
that year increasing the grant to said company. The validity of the ac-
ceptance has never been questioned. The Department has acted on it,
the road has been built, and Congress with a full knowledge of the
character of the acceptance, has conferred additional grants on the
company.
The government in two of its branches, and the company have treated
the acceptance as valid and titles have vested on the faith of that trans-
action. As between them there can be no question of the validity of
the acceptance. Perhaps it will not be questioned that a corporation
may bind itself by acts not under seal. It is well settled in the United
States that the acts of a corporation evidenced by vote are as completely
binding upon it, and are as complete authority to its agents, as the
most solemn acts done under its corporate seal. Angell and Ames on
Corporations, section 257. Bank of United States v. Dandridge, 12
Wheat., 64; 2 Kent Com., 288; Garrison v. Combs, 22 Am., )ec. 120,
(7 J. J. Marshall 84, Kentucky).
The conditions of the amendatory act of 1864 were accepted by the
company, under seal.
The main objection urged against the issue of patents has reference
to a change of the route of the road. The following recital of facts be-
comes necessary.
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By letter dated July 2, 1862, Mr. Thomas Ewing, as attorney for the
Leavenworth, Pawnee, and Western railroad company, filed in your
office a map of the State of Kansas, and the Territory of Nebraska, on
which was indicated in pencil, the " probable route of the road from
a point on the Kansas river opposite the town of Lawrence, thence up
said river to the mouth of the epublican river thence up that riverto
the 100th meridian of longitude. On July 17, 1862, the local officers
for the proper land districts in Kansas and Nebraska were directed to
withdraw the lands within fifteen miles of said probable route from set
tlement and entry. This withdrawal was subsequently modified so as
to open the lands in the even numbered sections to entry under the pre-
emption and homestead laws at the double minimum price.
By said act of Congress approved July 2, 1864, (13 Stat., 356) the act
of July 1, 1862 was amended so as to increase the grant to ten sections
per mile, to be taken within a limit of twenty miles on each side of the
road, and to provide for the withdrawal of the odd sections within
twenty-five miles of the road on filing map of general route.
By section five of said act the time for designating the general route
of said railroad, and of filing the map of the same, and the time for the
completion of that part of the railroads required by the terms of the
act of 1862 of each company, was extended one year from the time des-
ignated in the act of 1862.
On July 1, 1865, a map showing the general route of the road in ques-
tion from the Missouri River to the one hundredth meridian of west
longitude, was filed. The line shown upon said map was almost iden-
tical with the line of " probable route " designated by the map filed by
Mr. Ewing in 1862. The map was referred to your office for appropriate
action and with your office letter of July 3, 1865, returned to the De-
partment, with the recommendation that as the odd sections within fif-
teen miles of the line shown thereon were already withdrawn, no fur-
ther withdrawal should be ordered until the road had been surveyed
and located and a map thereof filed in the Department. No further
withdrawal was made at that time.
By act of Congress approved July 3, 1866, (14 Stat., 79) amendatory
of said act of 1864, the Union Pacific Railway Company, eastern divis-
ion was authorized to designate the general route of its road, and file
a map of the same, at any time before December 1st, 1866, and upon the
filing of said map of general route, the Secretary of the Interior was
directed to withdraw from sale the lands along the entire line, so far as
the same might be designated. It was provided, however, that said
company should connect its road with the Union Pacific Railroad, but
not at a point more than fifty miles westwardly from the meridian of
Denver.
On July 11, 1866, the company filed a map designating the gen-
eral route of its road from Fort Riley, up the Smoky Hill River,.to the
western boundary of Kansas, whereupon the odd sections within twenty-
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five miles of such route were withdrawn from entry by order of the
Secretary of the Interior and in November following, such of the lands
withdrawn along the route up the Republican as were not within twen-
ty-five miles of the new route were restored to settlement and entry.
The road west of Fort Riley was definitely located in sections, the
maps of which were filed as follows:
From Fort Riley to Fort Harker, May 8, 1867.
From Fort Harker to Fort Hays, Sept. 21, 1867.
From Fort Hays to the 335th mile post, Dec. 6th, 1867.
From the 335th to the 405th mile post, May 6th, 1870.
From the 405th mile post to Denver, Colo., May 26, 1870.
The line of definite location as shown upon these mapls is not iden-
tical with the line of general route, the distance between the two lines
amounting in some places to as much as twenty-five miles.
Following the filing of these maps the withdrawal previously ordered
on the line of general route was adjusted to the line of definite loca-
tion, i. e., such of the lands within the twenty-five mile limits of the
withdrawal on general route as were not within twenty miles of the line
of definite location were restored to entry, and at the same time such
of the lands within twenty miles of the line of definite location as were
not within the limits of the withdrawal on general route were with-
drawn for the benefit of the grant.
It is urged that the action of the company in departing from its line
of general route, and locating and constructing its road upon another
and different route, was an abandonment of its grant to the extent of
such departure, or at least an abandonment of such lands as are ot-
side the withdrawal on general route, though within the withdrawal on
definite location.
This question is very thoroughly considered by your office in said re-
port, as follows:
If the designation of the line of 1866 was sch a designation of the line of the road
that the right of the company thereby attached to the odd numbered sections along
such line, it follows that such line could not afterwards be changed so as to affect the
grant without the consent of Congress. Van Wyck . Knevals, 106 U. S , 360.
The question then is whether the right of the company attached to lands along the
line of 1866 upon the filing of the map designating the same.
The grant to the Kansas Pacific Railway Company is of the alternate odd num-
bered sections within twenty miles on each side of its road, " not sold, reserved, or
otherwise disposed of by the United States, and to which a homestead or pre-emption
claim may not have attached at the ithe the line of said road is definitelyfixed."
The seventh section of the act of July 1, 1862, as amended by act of July 2, 1864,
provides:
"That within two years after the passage of this act said company shall designate
the general ronte of same in the Department of the Interior, whereupon the Sec-
retary of the Interior, shall cause the lands within twenty-five miles of said desig
nated route or routes to be withdrawn from pre-emption, private entry and sale."
Here, apparently, are two separate and distinct lines; first, a preliminary or gen-
* eral line, to be followed by a withdrawal of the odd sections within twenty-five miles
thereof, and, second, a final or definite line the designation of which identifies, and
attaches the company's right to the granted lands.
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Until the line of the road was definitely fixed the grant was in the nature of a float
requiring a definite ocation to attach or anchor it to the particular sections granted.
In the case of Kansas Pacific Railway v. Dunmeyer, (113 U. S., 629), the supreme
court, discussing the grant to said company, distinguished between the general route
and the definite location, and defined the purpose and effect of each, and its decision
in that case is conclusive of the question involved herein. Speaking of the line of
definite location the court said:
" Wherever the road might go the grant was limited originally to five sections, and,.
by theamendmentof 1864, to ten sections on eachside of it within the limit of twenty
miles."
" When the line was fixed, which we have already said was by the act of filing this
map of definite location in the General Land Office, then the criterion was established
by which the lands to which the road had a right were to be determined. Tpo-
graphically this determined which were the ten alternate sections on each side of that
line where the surveys had then been made."
And in the case of Buttz v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co., (119 U. S., 55), the court
said:
"The act of Congress not only contemplates the filing by the company in the office
of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, a a map showing the definite loca-
tion of the line of its road, and limits the grant to such alternate sections as have not,
at that time, been reserved, sold, granted, or otherwise appropriated, and are free
from pre-emption, grant, or other claims of rights, but it also contemplates a prelimi-
nary designation of the general route of the road, and the exclusion from sale, entry
or pre-emption of the adjoining odd sections, within forty miles on each side, until
the definite location is made."
These and similar decisions h old that the designation of the general oute in no way
controlled the grant, and that its purpose was to preserve the lands from other ap-
propriation until the road could be definitely located. Kansas Pacific Ry. Co., v.
Dunmeyer; Buttz v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., sftpra; Northern Pacific R. R. Co.,
10 C L. 0., 74.
In the Dunmeyer case, the supreme court, discussing the effect of the filing of the
map of general route of the Kansas Pacific Railway, said:
"This action does not like the filing of the line of definite location, vest in the
company a right to any specific piece of land. It establishes no claim to any par-
tienlar section with an odd number. It authorizes the Secretary to withdraw eertain
lands from sale, pre-emption, etc."
The grant being of the odd numbered sections within twenty miles of the line of
definite location, and no right to any specific lands being vested in the company by
the designation of the general route, it follows that in fixing its definite location,
the company was not necessarily required to conform to the line of general route.
Said report further truly states that,-
This Department has uniformly permitted a change of line after filing of a map of
general route, and after such change has adjusted the withdrawal on general route
to the line of definite location.
I concur in the conclusion reached by your office on this point.
Again it is urged that the designation of the route west of Fort
Riley and the withdrawal thereon were illegal because that portion of
the route was not approved by the President, and that consequently
the grant west of Fort Riley has failed.
It is said that, " In ordering the unauthorized, unlawful, and forbid-
den withdrawal of July 11, 1866, Secretary Harlan, following in the
footsteps of Commissioner Edmunds, seems to have disregarded all
statutory requirements, legal principles, and advisory opinions. In
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support of this objection the opinion of Assistant Attorney General
Smith of October 3, 1871, approved by Secretary Delano, ( C. L. L.,
365), is cited.
That opinion held that the Kansas Pacific did not acquire a right to
lands west of the meridian of Fort Riley under the act of 1862, be-
cause its route was not approved by the President, but that it did ac-
quire such right by the third section of the act of March 3, 1869, (15
Stat., 34). To this it must be answered that said opinion is in con-
flict with that of the United States supreme court, delivered in 1878,
in the case of the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Company v.
Kansas Pacific Railway Company, (97 U. S., 491). The court there held
(syllabus) that by the act of July 3, 1866 (14 Stat., 79), the Kansas
Pacific railway company
was authorized to designate the general route of its road, and to file a map there-
of at any time before December 1, 1866: Provided, that after the filing of the map
the lands along its entire line so far as designated, should be reserved from sale by
the Secretary of the Interior. Within the specified time, the company filed a map
designating as such general route a line from Fort Riley to the western boundary of
Kansas, by way of the Smoky Hill river. The lands upon this route embracing
among others, those now in controversy, were accordingly withdrawn from sale;
and in January, 1867, the road was completed for twenty five miles, approved by the
Commissioners appointed to examine it, and accepted by the President. Held, 1.
That the title of the company attaching to those lands by the location of the roady
followed by the construction thereof, took effect, by relation, as of the date of the
said act of 1P62, so as to cut-off all intervening claimants, except in the cases where
reservations were specially made in it, and the amendatory act of 1864. The lands
there in question lay west of Fort Riley.
The provision of the statute on this point is, "The route in Kansas,
west of the meridian of Fort Riley, to the aforesaid point, on the one
hundredth meridian of longitude, to be subject to the approval of the
President of the United States, and to be determined by him on actual
survey." 
The route of 1866 was not approved by the President in person.
The company however, constructed its road upon the line of definite
location and the same was accepted and approved by the President.
This would appear to meet the requirement of the granting act inde-
pendently of the decision of the supreme court. The map of the route
was filed and accepted by the Secretary of the Interior, and on the
faith of this the road was built. The President never disapproved of
the route.
As a matter of fact, however, it is evident that the Department, after
the passage of the act of 1866, treated this provision as not extending
to the new route authorized by said act, but as still applicable to the
abandoned route up the Republican where an actual survey and ap-
proval by the President was required for the purpose of ascertaining
the amount of bonds of the United States to which the company would
have been entitled had it constructed its road upon that route, it being
restricted to that amount by the terms of the act of 1866.
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A survey of the route from Fort Riley to a connection with the Union
Pacific Railroad at the 100th meridian was accordingly made during
the summer of 1868, under the direction of the Department of the In-
terior, by Brevet Major C. W. Howell, Capt. of Engineers, U. S. Army,
for the purpose of ascertaining " the most direct and practicable route
for a railroad upon the route prescribed by the provisions of the act
of 1862," which survey, together with the recommendation of Secretary
Browning that the amount of bonds to be issued to said company in
aid of the construction of its road along the new route be restricted to
the length of the old route as ascertained by said survey, was approved
by the President October 30, 1868.
Said report further says:
I deem it proper, however, to addthat the Pacific Railway commission has called
for much information from this office in respect to the status of grants of land to the
Pacific R. R. corporations, and I have understood that some recommendation may
possibly be made to Congress by said commission touching the control or disposition
of unpatented lands. I am not advised of the nature of the report that has been
made by the commission, hut I think it proper to submit for your consideration the
question of the expediency of deferring the perfection of railroad titles by issue of
further patents to the companies which are in default in their indebtedness to the
United States, pending the report of the commission, or of action by Congress in the
matter of the adjustment of such indebtedness. -
The facts with reference to this matter are as follows: Pursuant to
the provisions of the act of Congress of March 3, 1887, (24 Stat., 488).
The United States Pacific Railway commission on April 17, 1887, was
appointed by the President. The act was entitled, * An act authoriz-
ing an investigation of the books, accounts, and methods of railroads
which have received aid from the United States, and for other pur-
poses." The report of the commission was submitted to Congress with
a message from the President dated January 17, 1888.
The message was devoted largely to the question of the indebtedness
of said companies to the government. It says:
The majority of the commission are in favorof an extension of the time for thepay-
ment of the government indebredness of these companies, upon certain conditions.
But the chairman of the commission, presenting the minority report, recommends,
both upon principle and policy, the institution of proceedings for the forfeiture of
the charters of the corporations and the winding up of their affairs.
In reference to the land grants the President said:
I desire to call attention also to the fact that if all that was to be done on the part
of the government to fully vest in these companies the grants and advantages con-
templated by the acts passed in their interest has not yet been perfected, and if the
failure of such companies to perform in good faith their part of the contract justifies
such a course, the power rests with the Congress to withhold further performanceon
the part of the goyernment. If donated lands are not yet granted to these companies,
and if their violation of contract and of duty are such as in justice and morals forfeit
their rights to such lands, Congressional action should intervene to prevent further
consummation. Executive power must be exercised according to existing laws, and
executive discretion is probably not broad enough to reach such difficulties.
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With all the facts and the recommendations of the President befora
it, the Fiftieth Congress expired without enacting any further legisla-
tion on this subject.
I have thus carefully examined all the objections urged suggested
against the issuance of the patents here in question and have found no
reason to justify the further suspension of the same. The road has been
completed, the selections have been made, and the fees paid, and the
objections urged are not founded in law. There are noadverseclaims.
I, therefore, concur' in the proposal of your office that proper lists Of
the selected lands be prepared and submitted for approval, as a basis
for patent.
The existing law on this subject is found in the fourth section of said
act of 1862, as follows:
And be itfurther enacted, That whenever said company shall have completed forty
consecutive miles of any portion of said railroad and telegraph line, ready for the
service contemplated by this act, and supplied with all necessary drains, culverts,
viaducts, crossings, idings, bridges, turn-outs, watering-places, depots, equipments,.
furniture, and all other appurtenances of a first-class railroad, the rails and all the
other iron used in the construction and equipment of said road to be American manu-
facture of the best quality, the President of the United States shall appoint three com-
missioners to examine the same and report to him in rlation thereto; and if it shall
appear to him that forty consecutive miles of said railroad and telegraph line have
been completed and equipped in all respects as required by this act, then, upon
certificate of said commissioners to that effect, patents shall issue conveying the
Y9xs; right and title to said lands to said company, on each side of the road as far as the
same is completed, to the amount aforesaid; and patents shall in like manner issue
as each forty miles of said railroad and telegraph line are completed, upon certificate
of said commissioners.
OSAGE LAND-FINAL PROOF.
EWING v. CHILDERS.
The fact thatthe receiver's receipt is dated one day beyond the six months from the
time of making Osage filing is not such an irregularity as will defeat the entry,
where the proof and final affidavit were made within said period and good faith
is otherwise apparent.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, July 29, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of William H. Childers from your office
decision of December 19, 1888, in which you reject his final proof on
his Osage declaratory statement No. 6376, for the SW. 4 of Sec. 10, T.
27 S., R. 12 W., Larned, Kansas, and hold his filing for cancellation.
* He made his filing on said tract on November 14, 1884, alleging set-
tlement September 10th of that year.
Joanna E. Ewing filed Usage declaratory statement No. 5726, on
October 6, 1884, for the S. SE. 4 and E. 4 SW. of the same section,
alleging settlement September 15, 1884. She made her final proof be-
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fore A. S. Fay, probate judge of Pratt county, Kansas, on April 4,
1885, and obtained the receivers receipt No. 5012 for the first payment,
dated April 7, 1885.
On January 28, 1885, Childers gave notice of his intention to make
final proof on March 25, 1885, and Ewing filed protest against allowing
Childers' proof as being in conflict with her filing as to the E. i SW. i
,of said section.
Hearing was had on Ewing's protest, and on February 25, 1887, the
register and receiver held for rejection the final proof of Childers, and
on appeal you affirm that judgment.
The facts found by the local office and also by your said office de-
eision are fully set out, and, after a careful examination of the testi-
mony, I find such statements substantially correct.
The testimony shows that Childers purchased the improvements on
said tract from one Huston about September 1, 1884. The improve-
ments consisted of a"' dug-out," which Childers describes as " about six
feet high; had a door four feet high, a knob lock and good hinges; it
was dug down three and a half or four feet." The proof shows it was not
in a habitable condition during the winter; and while he called it his
home, the most he did, up to the time he made his proof; was to make
occasional visits to it.
Ewing made her home on the land from September 1, 1884, with oc-
easional absences therefrom; these absences being for the purpose of
making money to pay for the land were clearly excusable; her improve-
ments were ample; her good faith manifest.
It is insisted that she did not make her proof and payment within six
months after filing her declaratory statement, as required in proceed-
ings to obtain Osage lands. She filed her declaratory statement Octo-
ber 6, 1884; she made her proof April 4, 1885, and the receiver's receipt
for the first installment of $50 is dated April 7, 1885. The fact of the
receiver's receipt being dated one day beyond the six months from the
time of making an Osage filing is not such an irregularity as will defeat
the entry, where it is shown the proof and final affidavit were made
w ithin the six months, and good faith is otherwise apparent.
The decision of your office is affirmed.
PRACTICE-RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOCAL OFFICE.
SPERLING V. MCGOREW.
In hearings before the local officers, or other matters that come before them officially,
the record of such proceedings should show with exactness the dates when papers
are filed, or any actions are taken by them.
A rehearing is required where the record of proceedings in a contest is indefinite,
and it cannot be determined therefrom whether the defendant had due notice of
the day set for hearing.
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First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the GeneralM
Land Office, July 29, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Benj. H. McGrew from the decision
of your office, dated January 14, 1889, in the case of A. D. Sperling v.
said McGrew, holding for cancellation McGrew's timber culture entry
for the SE. , Sec. 25, T. 34 N., R. 47 W., (Valentine series) Chadron
land district, Nebraska.
This entry was made April 8, 1.884, and on April 10, 1886, Sperling-
initiated contest against the same, alleging that claimant had "; failed
to cultivate or partially cultivate the first year's breaking as required
by law, and has not cured the ladhes up to this date, and has put the
said timber claim in the hands of an attorney for sale."
It is further alleged that he (contestant) had made personal. inquiry
and caused inquiry to be made at Bordeaux, the entryman's last
known place of residence in Nebraska and after due diligence personal
service could not be had. Thereupon a hearing was ordered for July
14, 1886, depositions of witnesses to be taken July 7, 1886, before a
notary public of Chadron, notice of said hearing to be given claimant
by publication.
On the day appointed for the taking of depositions the contestant
* appeared in person and with his witnesses. The etryman appeared
by attorney and moved to dismiss the case on the ground of defective
notice. Contestant and his witnesses were sworn and testified and
were cross-examined by claimant's attorney. No testimony was offered
in behalf of the entry.
July 16, 1886, the local officers, after considering the case held that
personal service of the notice of hearing could have been made upon
the claimant, and that as his name was published in the notice as Mc.
Grea instead of McGrew, and as the evidence failed to show his good
faith, they recommended that the contest be dismissed.
From this finding the contestant appealed, and on June 30, 1888,
your office remanded the case for further hearing because of said de-
fective notice.
September 25, 1888, was set for the re-hearing and claimant was per-
sonally served with notice of the same by the sheriff of Dawson county,
Nebraska.
On the day fixed for trial both parties appeared at the local office,
but it does not appear that any testimony was then taken. The case
appears to have been continued until October 24, 1888, at whose in-
stance, or for what reason, is not shown by the record.
On said September 25, 1888, however, a second -affidavit of contest
was made by the contestant. This affidavit was not executed before
the register or receiver, and does not on its face purport to be an amend-
ment to the original affidavit of contest, and its allegations are entirely
different.
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When said additional or new affidavit was filed is not shown by the
record, but it seems to have been treated by the local office as an
amended affidavit, and sets forth that
the said entryman has failed to plant timber, trees, seeds or cuttings, during the year
ending 1888, upon the second five acres. The second five acres has not been culti-
vated this year except to plant a patch of potatoes, no seeds or trees have been
planted since 1886, and the breaking was growing up to weeds and grass and that
one James Striker claimed to have purchased the same conditional.
On October 24, 1888, the day to which the hearing appears to have
been continued, testimony was submitted by contestant on the allega-
tions contained in both the affidavits of contest. Contestee did not
appear at said hearing.
November 10, 1888, his attorney filed a motion for re-hearing, alleging
that he was not aware of the day set for the hearing until after October
24, 1888, when he received a letter from his client instructing him to
defend his rights in the premises.
The local officers overruled said motion and on November 24, 188S,
claimant appealed and your office affirmed the action of the local office
and held the entry for cancellation, whereupon claimant appealed to
this Department.
Referring to the testimony taken at the hearing of October 24, 1888,
it is to be noted that it is in the handwriting of F. M. Dorrington, who
was at the time contestant's attorney. The record as a whole, in this
case, is, to my mind, indefinite and unsatisfactory in many respects. As
already indicated, it does not show when the second affidavit of contest
was filed and the only evidence of service of notice, under said affidavit,
is the sworn statement of the attorney for contestant, Mr. Dorrington.
Against this is the statement of claimant's attorney in his motion for
re-hearing, that he was not aware of the day set for hearing until after
said day had passed.
Under all the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion
that a further hearing should be had. The decision appealed from is,
therefore, set aside, and the case is returned to your office for such steps
as may be necessary to such hearing.
The two affidavits of contest herein referred to may be treated as
consolidated and as together containing the charges to be met by the
entryman at the further hearing above directed.
In this connection I deem it proper to suggest that you call the atten-
tion of the local officers to the necessity for making their records com-
plete in the matters which come before them officially, in the way of
hearings, or otherwise. It will be observed that most of the difficulty
found in this case arises from the fact that the local officers did not
properly note the dates of filing papers and of actions taken by them,
at the several steps in the progress of the case.
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MINERAL ENTRY -CONFLICTING CLAIMS.
Moss ROSE LODE.
A mineral entry made during the existence of another entry for the same tract is ir-
regular, but may be allowed to stand on the cancellation of the previous entry.
A decision of the Department holding an entry for cancellation without prejudice
to the claimant's proceeding de ovo in a regular manner," is in effect only a per-
mit to the claimant to renew his application subject to all adverse rights.
Secretary Woble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, August
2,1890.
This record presents the appeal of Charles H. Pratt from your office
decision of May 16, 1889, holding for cancellation his mineral entry No.
244, made November 19, 1887d, for the Moss Rose lode claim in the Gun-
nison, Colorado, land district.
It appears that the greater part of the ground covered by said entry
was also embraced in mineral entry No. 150, for the Sylvanite No. 2
lode claim. The Sylvanite application was filed in the local office on
April 13, 1885, and the entry allowed July 11, 1885.
On September 10, 1885, Pratt filed a protest against the Sylvanite
entry, alleging inter alia that (as stated by your office) " there never
was any plat or notice posted in a conspicuous place upon the claim s
required by law."
Your office, after a hearing had to determine the matter thus alleged,
held October 27, 1887, the Sylvanite entry for cancellation " without
prejudice to the claimant's proceeding de novo-in a regular anner."
This action was on appeal sustained by the departmental decision of
December 19, 1888, (7 L. D., 554), which, on motion for review was ad-
hered to May 4, 1889 (8 L. D., 457).
The Moss Rose application was filed November 21, 1885, and during
the statutory period was adversed by the Sylvanite claimants. The re-
sulting suit was subsequently, August 23, 1886, dismissed by agreement
of counsel.
It appearing that the Moss Rose application was made during the
existence of the Sylvanite entry your office by the decision appealed
from held that the entry (Moss Rose) in question was invalid and should
be canceled.
I am not favorably impressed with this view of the case.
An entry, though made when land was not subject to appropriation,
on the removal of the bar may be allowed to stand. Schrotberger v.
Arnold (6 L. D., 425). See also E. S. Newman (8 L. D., 448).
The allowance of the Moss Rose entry during the existence of the
Sylvanite, may have been irregular, but the latter has been canceled
by order of the Department and so far as the record discloses the ques-
tion is between appellant and the government. It was, however, fur-
thermore held by your office that the allowance of the Moss Rose entry
DECISIONS RELATING T THE PUBLIC LANDS. 121
would operate to defeat the " manifest intention "' of the Department
in affirming (as stated) thejudgment of your office whereby the Sylvan-
ite entry was held for the cancellation " without prejudice to the claim-
ant's proceeding de novo in a regular manner," or in other words, that
under said judgment the Sylvanite claimants were entitled to renew
their application and pursue the same to entry in preference to and
without regard to the rights of the appellant.
The Department upon a proceeding instituted by the appellant (a
party in interest) found the Sylvanite entry to be invalid by reason of
illegal posting of notice on such claim. To hold the appellant's rights
in the premises inferior to those of the Sylvanite claimants is therefore,
obvious error. The effect of the said departmental decision was simply
to permit such claimants to renew their application subject of course
to all adverse rights.
The Moss Rose entry (if regular in other respects), will in accordance
with the views hereinbefore expressed remain intact.
The decision appealed from is reversed.
PRE-EMPTION-SECOND FILING-ALIEN.
BIRTCn V. OUDDIGAN.
A declaratory statement filed by one foreign born, who has not made a declaration of
intention to become a citizen, becomes valid if such declaration is made prior to
the intervention of a valid adverse right.
A second filing will only be allowed where the claimant by reason of a prior or ad-
verse right is unable to perfect title under the first.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 2, 1890.
1 have considered the appeal of William Cuddigan from your decision
of February 8, 1839, rejecting his claim and holding for cancellation
his declaratory statement for the SW. 1 of NW. i of Sec. 27, T. 45 N.,
R. 8 W., Montrose, Colorado.
Said filing was made May 24, 1886, al leging settlement August 1,
1885.
You held the same for cancellation as illegal for the reason that Cud-
digan had, at Winona, Minnesota, on September 13, filed a declaratory
statement for the NW. 4 of Sec. 9, T. 106, I. 23, alleging settlement
thereon July 28, 1856.
Appeal is taken by Caddigan upon the ground that said filing was
illegal and void, for the reason that at the time he made the same he
was not qualified to do so, as he was foreign born and did not declare
his intention to become a citizen of the United States until December
1, 1856, hence that he had a right to make a second filing.
The tract for which filing was made was approved to the State of
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Minnesota, December 1, 1862, under the act of Congress approved
March 3, 1857, making a grant of land to the Territory of Minnesota
to aid in the construction of railroads.
Counsel for the appellent in their argument say, Cuddigan declared
his intention to become a citizen December 1, 1856, " but never-after-
wards made any claim to the land on which his illegal and void filing
had been male. e did not ratify his first act, nor claim anything un-
der it, but abandoned the land, which was subsequently certified to the
Transit R. R. (o., under act of March 3, 1857."
In my opinion the evidence in the case does not sustain this view-
At the hearing Cuddigan testified that he had filed for land in Minne-
sota, and when asked why he was not able to prove uip on the same he
. 0 answered,
I had not the means, I was burned out and lost my title and the land fell to a rail-
road company. I lost by the fire my team and everything I had and as a result I
was unable to pay for the land within the time required by law, my filing was on a n
odd section within a railroad grant and on my failure it fell into the railroad's hands.
Ques. When you filed on this land you had a prior right to the land.
Ans. Yes.
Ques. And their right did not accrne until your rights were forfeited.
Ans. They had no rights until mine were forfeited.
Ques. At the time you settled upon the land in Minnesota on which you say you
made your filing was it government land thrown open to settlement and pre-emp-
* tion.
Ans. Yes.
He further testified:
Ques. Were you ever notified by the land office in Mianesota of the cancellation of
your filing on said See. 9, or of a contest of that filing.
Ans. No.
Ques. When you went to the land office to prove up what did the register tell you.
Ans. He told me to go home, I had lost my title, that the railroad had it.
It is thus evident that at the time Cuddigan declared his intention to
become a citizen December 1, 1856, he was asserting a claim to this
land, and that he continued to assert a claim to the same until after
the tract was held to have inured to the grant for railroad purposes un-
der an act approved months after he became qualified to perfect title.
It is a well established principle that a declaratory statement filed by
one foreign born, who has not declared his intention to become a citi-
zen, becomes valid upon the claimant declaring his intention to become
a citizen, if said declaration is made before a valid adverse right inter-
venes. Mann v. Huh (3 L. D., 452); Soustilie v. Lowery (6 L. D., 15).
The principle is also established that a second filing will only be al-
lowed when the claimant, by reason of a prior or superior right, is unable
to perfect title to the land. Allen v. Baird (6 L. D., 298).
Applying these rules to Cuddigan we find that prior to the initiation
of any adverse right he had qualified himself to perfect title to the land
claimed by him, and for which he had made a filing, and that his failare
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to thus perfect title was not owing to the presence of any adverse claim
or right. His second filing was therefore illegal.
Yonr decision is affirmed.
PlURCHASE PRIOR TO PATENT.-CONFLICTING EQUITIES.
MURPHY V. SANFORD.
The purchaser of land prior to the issuance of patent therefor takes an equity only,
and has no greater or different right than the entryman.
The protection afforded by equity to a bona fide purchaser without notice extends.
only to a purchaser that holds the legal title.
As between one holding under a pre-emption entry, where by mistake the patent
failed to describe the land actually purchased, and another claiming under a
subsequent location of such land, made with a knowledge of the facts with re-
spect to the prior purchase, the superior equity is with the former, and patent
should issue to correct the mistake.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, August
2, 1890.
I have considered the case of John Murphy v. Wayland W. Sanford
on appeal by the latter from your decision of February 17, 1890, hold-
ing for cancellation the soldier's additional homestead entry of Jay C.
Bacon for the NE. 4 of the SW. I of Sec. 4, T. 48 N., R. 14 W., Ashland,
Wisconsin land district.
On April 22, 1889, Jay 0. Bacon made soldier's additional homestead
entry for said land and on the next day, by his attorney in fact, one
Herbert R. Spencer, conveyed it to Wayland W. Sanford. Afterwards
Bacon and his wife executed in person another deed conveying said
land to Sanford.
On August 16, 1889, the local officers transmitted the affidavit of ones
John H. Murphy setting forth that he was the. owner of said tract of
land and had "enjoyed undisputed possession and occupancy of said
tract of land until one Jay 0. Bacon having discovered an error in the
United States patent filed an additional homestead entry for the NE.-
of the SW. I of said section" and that his ownership and possession of
said land were facts of general notoriety. Afterwards Murphy, by letter
of August 27, 1889, transmitted two patents, issued to Wellington
Gregory, one dated June 1, 1859 for the NW. 1 of the SW. 1 of said see-
tion, based upon pre-emption certificate No. 327, and the other dated
May 3, 1860, for the SE. of the SW. i and the W. i of the SW. 1 of said
section, based upon military bounty land warrant No. 22,827. At the
same time Murphy transmitted an abstract of the title to the SW. 1 o f
said section certified by one "K. W. Lewis, abstracter." The first item
in this abstract is as follows:-
The book of original entries on file in the office of county clerk shows that the SW.i-
of Sec. 4, T. 48, R. 14, was entered by Wellington Gregory 25 SepteALber 1856.
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Said abstract of title shows also the following conveyances viz:-
The two patents hereinbefore mentioned, filed for record May 4,
1886.
Warranty deed, Wellington Gregory to T. C. Tiernan, dated October
25, 1856, recorded May 18, 1857, conveying SW. I said section.
Mortgage, Tiernan' to Gregory, dated October 25, 1856, recorded
November 11, 1856, and satisfied August 24, 1857, describing SW.i
said section.
Will, Thomas C. Tiernan, to his wife and children by name, dated
June 20, 1862, filed for record April 17, 1886, devising and bequeathing
all his property.
Warranty deed, Heirs of T. C. Tiernan, deceased, to Charles N. Aker,
-dated March 31, 1886, recorded May 3, 1886, conveying SW. 1 said sec-
tion.
Warranty deed C. N. Akers t D. George Morrison, dated April 12,
1886, recorded May 3, 1886, conveying SW. i said section.
Warrantyadeed, D. George Morrison and wife to Tohn H. Murphy,
-dated April 29, 1886, recorded May 4, 1886, conveying SW. said sec-
tion.
Power of attorney, Jay C. Bacon and wife to Herbert R. Spencer,
-dated December 9, 1879, recorded April 23, 1889, authorizing the sale
and conveyance of "any lands he may acquire by him as an additional
homestead entry."
Duplicate receipt, United States to Jay C. Bacon, dated April 22,1889,
recorded April 23, 1889, for NE. SW.J said section.
Warranty deed, J C. Bacon and wife by attorney in fact Herbert R.
Spencer to Wayland W. Sanford, dated April 23, 1889, recorded same
day, conveying NE. i SW. I said section.
Confirmatory deed, Jay C. Bacon and wife to Wayland W. Sanford,
-dated May 1, 1889, recorded May 7, 18S9, conveying NE. 1 SW. 4 said
section.
Among the papers in this case I find also certain papers from the
files of your office and relating to the entries made by Wellington
Gregory. These papers show, and it is admitted by the attorney for
Sanford that Gregory filed pre-emption declaratory statement for said
SW. i of Sec. 4, and on September 25, 1856, submitted final proof in
support of said filing. It seems that he paid for said land with military
bounty land warrant No. 22,827, for one hundred and twenty acres, and
$50 in cash, separate receipts being issued. The receipt and certificate
issued upon the cash payment which are numbered 327, describe the
land covered thereby as the "north west quarter of the south west
,quarter " of said section four and the certificate has on the back this
memorandum-" Bal. of this claim satisfied by Wt. 22,827 act Mch. 3,
1855, for SE .4 SW i and W. 4 SW. 1.-The application accompanying
the warrant referred to describes the " SE. 4 of SW. I and W. i of SW. 4
of said section, and has on the back this memorandum-" Bal. of this
claim satisfied by certificate 327 for NW.4 SW. 1.77
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Sanford, through his attorney, filed in your office an abstract of title
of the SW. 1 of said section 4, certified by the register of deeds for
Douglas county as being " a true and, correct abstract of all deeds or
other conveyances on file or of record"in his office. This abstract shows'
substantially the same facts as the one filed by Murphy, except that it
makes no statement as to the matter set forth i item one of that
abstract. Accompanying this abstract was an affidavit executed by said
register of deeds, containing the following statement:
That none of the records in my office show the entry by Wellington Gregory of the
said land above described. Affiant says that there is a book in the office of the-
county clerk (auditor), or in the county treasurer's office that shows some of the
early land office entries, but affiant says said book is kept in said offices as a con-
venieuce in assessing taxes, but that said book forms no part of the public records of
my office as provided by statute.
He also filed affidavit of Herbert R. Spencer, stating that before the
purchase of this land by Sanford, he, affiant, went with said Sanford
and one N. S. Bowers to the office of the register of deeds for Douglas.
county, where said land is situated and they carefully searched the rec-
ords of said office, but found nothing to indicate thatthe United States
had sold or parted with the said land previous to the entry by Bacon.;
He further states that they visited the local land office and found nothing
in the records of that office to show that the land had been entered by
any one or that the United States had disposed of or sold said land pre-
vious to the sale to Bacon. There was filed also the affidavit of N. S.
BoWers stating that he was associated with Sanford in the purchase of
this land, having furnished a part of the purchase money; that before
making such purchase he wrote to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office as to the status of said tract and received a reply stating
that it was vacant public land; that he carefully examined the records
of the office of register of deeds for Douglas county, and the records of
the local land office and fotlfd no record of any conveyance of the title
to said tract by the United States and that he then joined in good
faith in the purchase of said land and in good faith paid his proportion
of the purchase money. They also filed copies of two letters of your-
office addressed to N. S. Bowers stating that the records of your office
showed said tract was vacant public land. Sanford also made affidavit
to the effect that he had made inquiry and had examined the records of-
the local land office and of the office of register of deeds for Douglas-
county, and finding nothing to show that the United States had parted
with title to said tract until the homestead entry of Bacon, purchased
said laud.
With these facts presented by the papers in the case, your office held
that the purchase by Gregory vested in him such a right to the land as-
served to segregate it from the public domain and that after that sale,
the government had no right or power to sell to another, and decided
that the patent to Gregory, dated June 1, 1859, should be canceled,
that a patent issue to John Murphy for the north east quarter of thee
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south west quarter of said section, and that Bacon's entry be held for
cancellation.
It may be well before considering the controverted questions in this
case to mention some points which are too well established by the de-
cisions of this Department and of the supreme court of the United
States to admit of dispute.
Bacon by his entry acquired not the legal title, but an equitable title
only to this tract of land. The legal title thereto still remains in the
United States. Sanford as the vendee of Bacon took an equitable title
only and occupies the same relationship to this case as his grantor, tLe
immediate claimant from the United States would have held had there
been no sale, that is, he stepped into the shoes of the entryman and
has no greater or different rights or equities. This was admitted in the
course of argument of this case by Sanford's attorney and it is un-
necessary to cite authorities in support of the proposition. Although
the attorney for Sanford describes him as a bona fide purchaser with-
out notice and seems to rely to a considerable extent on the protection
afforded purchasers of this description for the success of his client
here, yet I do not think the facts here presented bring him within that
category or that it is necessary to here discuss the extent of the pro-
tection to be afforded bona fide purchasers without notice. In order
to entitle one to protection as such a purchaser he must hold a legal
title. In Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 64 c, in speaking of the
protection afforded by equity to bona fide purchasers without notice,
it is said:
The purchaser, however, in all cases must hold a legal title, or be entitled to call
for it, in order to give him a full protection of his defense; for if his title be merely
equitable, then he must yield to a legal and equitable title in the adverse party.
And again in Sec. 1502, it is said:
To entitle himself to this protection, however, thepurchaser must not only be bona
fide, and without notice, and for a valuable consideration, but he must have paid the
purchase money. So, he must have purchased the legal title, and not be a mere pur-
chaser without a semblance of title; for even the purchaser of an equity is bound to
take notice of, and is bound by, a prior equity; and between equities the established
rule is, that he who has the prior equity in point of time, is entitled to a like priority
in point of right.
In Vattier v. Hinde (7 Pet., 252) the supreme court said:
The rules respecting a purchaser without notice are framed for the protection of
him who purchases a legal estate and pays the purchase money without knowledge
of an outstanding equity. They do not protect a person who acquires no semblance
of title. They apply fully only to the purchaser of the legal estate. Even the pur-
chaser of an equity is bound to take notice of any prior equity.
In Boone v. Chiles (10 Pet., 177) in stating the matters that must be
set forth in an answer claiming protection as a bona fide purchaser
without notice, it was said:
The title purchased must be apparently perfect, good in law, a vested estate in fee
simple, I Cr. 100; 3 Cr. 133, 5; 1 Wash. C. C., 75. It must be by a regular convey-
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ace; for the purchaser of an equitable title holds it subject to the equities upon it
in the hands of the vendor and has no better standing in a court of equity, 7 Cr. 48;
7 Pet., 271; Sugden 722. Such is the case which must be stated to give a defendant
the benefit of an answer or plea of an innocent purchaser without notice; the case
stated must be made out, evidence will not be permitted to be given of any other
matter not set out.
This same doctrine is adhered to in Root v. Shields (1 Woolworth's
Cir. Ct. Rep., 340).
Under these rulings it is clear that Sanford has not the qualifica-
tions necessary to entitle him to protection as a bona fide purchaser
without notice.
The question, then, to be determined in this case is as to which of
these parties, each claiming an equitable title to this land, has the better
claim thereto. The general rule applicable in such cases is expressed
in the maxim Qui prior et tempore, potior et jure. Mr. Broom in his
work on legal maxims 1,356 in discussing this maxim says:
So, when there are conflicting rights as to real property, courts of equity will inquire,
not which party was first in possession, but under what instrument he was in posses-
sion, and when his right is dated in point of time; or if there be no instrument, they
will ask when did the right arise-who had the prior right?
See also Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Sees. 381-1502. In the decis-
ion in Boone v. Chiles supra, it is said:
It is a general principle in courts of equity, that, where both parties claim by an
equitable title the one who is prior in time is deemed the better in right.
It is urgently insisted, however, on the part of Sanford that if Mur-
phy or any of his grantors, either immediate or remote, had exercised
ordinary care in the examination of his title papers the mistake in ques-
tion would have been discovered, and could have been corrected prior
to the intervention of this adverse claim; and that third parties who
were induced bv the condition of the title to this land, as disclosed by
the record, to invest money in the purchase thereof, have in the face of
this laches the stronger equities. This amounts to the claim that the
particular facts in this case take it out of the general rule. I
It should be noted in this connection that there is no statement by
or on behalf of Sanford that his grantor Bacon the immediate claimant
from the United States, ever made any examination prior to his entry
as to the condition of the title to this tract of land, and also that none
of the affidavits filed in Sanford's interest alleges ignorance on the,
part of Bacon, Sanford or Bowers of the existence of a claim of some
character to this land adverse to the title of the United States. Indeed
the examination of the records claimed to have been made, could not
result otherwise than in apprising the inquirer of the existence of such
a claim, for the records showed conveyances by Gregory and others of
the whole SWj- of said section including the land in controversy. This
knowledge having been gained, there was then demanded of the pro-
posed purchaser of an equity only, something more than ordinary dili-
gence-something more than an inquiry to ascertain whether such
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claim was a legal and perfect one. The examination thus demanded
would naturally have included both an inspection of the tax books of
the county in which the land w-as situated and inquiries in the neigh-
borhood of the land as to who claimed and controlled it. Such an ex-
amination being demanded, the claims of these parties must be deter-
mined in the light of the facts that would have been disclosed thereby,
and this is especially so in the absence of an allegation on their part of
ignorance of such facts. This examination and inquiry would have
disclosed that Gregory and his grantees had claimed said land since-
1856, as shown by the various conveyances and the payment of taxes.
An inquiry to ascertain when and by what authority this land was
assessed for taxation would have led to an examination of the book
which the register of deeds for said county explains was kept in the
office of the county clerk, or of the treasurer, which would have dis-
closed the fact that Gregory had purchased the whole of the southwest
quarter of said section. The submission of a statement of these facts,.
a knowledge of which these parties are chargeable with, to your office
would have resulted in the discovery of the error in issuing two patents
to the same party for the same tract of land. In fact the records of'
that county advertised the existence of such an error in that they
showed two patents issued by the United States to the same party,
Gregory, for the same piece of land. One purchasing an equitable title
to this land in the face of these circumstances must be held to have
acted with a knowledge of the facts in the ase, and to have deliber-
ately taken the chances of defeating whatever claim was outstanding.
It is true the information given by your office was based upon appar-
ently superficial examination of the records and the information im-
parted was incorrect and misleading, yet this cannot alter the facts as
they actually existed, or confer upon one receiving such information any
rights to which the facts would not entitle him.
It is true that Murphy and his grantors were guilty of a degree of
laches in allowing to go uncorrected for so long a period a mistake
which would have been discovered by an examination of their title
papers. It is, however, a well known fact that purchasers of public land
rely most implicitly upon the correctness of the title papers issued by
the officers of the government, and that it is not arT unusual occurrence
for patents to lie in the land office uncalled for even longer periods than
'in this case.
This case is upon that point not materially different from that of Sim-
mons v. Ogle (105 U. S., 271). Ogle rested his claim on the assertion
that his remote grantor John Winstanley bought the tract of land in-
volved from the United States on December 30,1835, although patent
never issued on said purchase. Simmons rested his claim on a patent
from the United States to himself, dated June 12, 1874. The cir-
cuit court rendered a decree in favor of Ogle. The supreme court
found from the evidence that Winstanly did not purchase this tract from
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the United States, but said in the course of the decision-" If the pur-
chase and payment now stated and alleged in the bill were satisfac-
torily established by the evidence, the decree should be affirmed."
It is clear in this case that Gregory actually bought this tract in con-
troversy and paid therefor the consideration prescribed by law; that he
had done everything required of him to acquire a vested right thereto.
It was said in the decision of the case of Wirth v. Branson (98 U. S.,
188):--
The rule is well settled, by a long course of decisions, that when public lands have
been surveyed and placed in the market, or otherwise opened to private acquisition,
a person who complies with all the requisites necessary to entitle him to a patent in
a particular lot or tract is to be regarded as the equitable owner thereof, and the land
is no longer open to location. The public faith has become pledged to him, and any
subsequent grant of the same land to another party is void, unless the first location
or entry be vacated and set aside.
See also Cornelius v. Kessel (128 U. S., 456), and authorities there
cited.
After a careful consideration of this case in connection with the ar-
guments advanced and the authorities cited by the attorneys, I am of
the opinion that the question as to which of these parties has the
stronger equities should be resolved in favor of Murphy.
Among the papers filed by Sanford is a certified transcript of the
record of Wellington Gregory's naturalization, which shows that natur-
alization papers were issued to him on November 9, 1868, upon the state-
ment " that he was naturalized in Superior City, Wis., in May 1854, and
that his naturalization papers were burned in the following year," and
due proof of residence and good character. Accompanying this was
the affidavit of the clerk of the circuit court of Douglas county setting
forth that he has in his custody "1 all records showing declarations
of intention to become citizens of the United States that have ever been
executed in said county of Douglas in which is located the City of Su-
perior," and that diligent search through said records from the organiza-
tion of the county in 18514 disclose the fact that Wellington Gregory
never made application for citizenship, or declared his intention of be-
coming a citizen of the United States." Although these papers are not
referred to in the argument of counsel, and it might therefore be con-
cluded that no stress is laid upon them, I have thought best to say that
in my opinion they are not sufficient to overcome the finding of the local
officers from the final proof submitted that Gregory was at the date of
said proof a qualified pre-emptor.
For the reasons herein stated I concur in the conclusion reached in
your office. It is not necessary to cancel either of the patents hereto-
fore issued. A patent should be issued for the tract in controversy,
the NE. of the SW. of said section 4, which should refer to the
former patent and state that it is in correction thereof, and should issue
to Wellington Gregory instead of in the name of the applicant Murphy.
With this modification the decision appealed from is affirmed.
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RAILROAD GRANT-ADJIUSTMENT-RESERVATION-LATERAL LIMITS.
MISSOURI, KANSAS, AND TEXAS By. Co.
The opinion expressed by the Department in 1860 that the right of the Indians to lands
in the New York Indian reservation had lapsed, and the subsequent proclama-
tion of the President directing the sale of said lands, acted upon for the period of
thirty years, recognized by Congress, and acquiesced in by the Indians, precludes
departmental action looking toward the recovery of title to lands lying within
* said reservation, and patented to this company under its grant of 1863, and the
acts amendatory thereof.
The lateral limits of the grant, as fixed by the original withdrawals, should not be re-
adjusted with the view of recovering title to lands patented to said company, that
may thus be shown to lie outside of said limits as re-adjnsted, for (1) the title to
said lands has passed out of the company; (2) it must be presumed that in making
the original withdrawals all matters necessary to a legal determination were duly
considered; and (3) the said withdrawals have stood unquestioned for a long term
of years, and titles that have vested thereunder should not now be disturbed.
The a]lowance of indemnity in accordance with the principles announced in the case
of the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Om aha Ry. Co., 6 L. D., 195, is ap-
* proved.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, August
2, 1890.
By letter of July 21, 1887, your office transmitted an " adjustment"
of the grant for the Missouri, Kansas and Texas railway company, and
stated that, " The limits of the grant upon which withdrawals were
ordered were laid off before all the lands were surveyed, and as to sur-
veyed lands the withdrawal limits were not adjusted to the smallest
legal subdivisions. Your offace further stated that it became necessary
therefore to define the exterior limits of the grant accurately, but ad-
justed to the smallest legal subdivisions of the public surveys. "This
made some slight variations on the extreme outward limits, and also
disclosed an error in the withdrawal maps in this, that in closing the
public surveys upon the first guide meridian east of the 6th principal
meridian the range thus made was two miles in width instead of one
mile, and as a result of which the limits of the grant had been laid down
one mile too wide wherever such range was embraced within the limits
of the withdrawal." Your office accordingly prepared and submitted "a
map showing with precision the lateral limits of the grant in conformity
with the principles laid down in the case of Leander Scott v. Kansas Pa-
cific railway company (5 L. D., 468)," and made the adjustment of the
grant in accordance therewith.
Continuing, yofir said office letter set out the various amounts of
land patented for said company, and concluded that it had received an
excess of 271,907.86i acres above what it is entitled to and recom-
mended that proper steps be taken to recover said excess from the com-
pany.
By letter of June 21, 1889, said adjustment was returned to your
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office with directions that the questions involved be again examined
and a report submitted in accordance with the present rulings of the
Department.
On November 18, 1889, your office transmitted a second adjustment
of said grant in which the following statement is made:
Total area of grant ...................................... 1,134,791.08
Deduct on account of moieties:
A. T. and S. F ........................................ 37,161.14
L. L. and G ........................................... 90,898.74
- -- 128,059.88
Net area of grant -.--.......--------..---..-..-. 1, 006,731. 20
Approved in granted limits ............................... 12,656. 53
to L. L. and G. within clear limits . -....- ... 1,663. 36
124,319..89
Loss to grant ............................................. 882,411. 31
Approved as indemnity ........................................ 494, 072. 38
Due as indemnity ............-.-............ 388,338. 93
I understand from this that the company has failed by 388,338.93
acres, to secure the total number of acres in its grant, after deducting
moieties for grants of even date.
The explanation of the different results reached by said adjustments
is stated by your office as follows:
In the former adjustment deduction was made on account of prior grants for rail-
roads, Indian reservations, and selections on account of grants to the State for in-
ternal improvements, etc. These deductions, under departmental decision in the
matter of the adjustment of the grant for the Omaha company (6 L. D., 195), are er-
roneous, and in the adjustment now presented indemnity has been allowed for such
losses.
The company claims its lands by virtue of the grants of March 3, 1363,
(12 Stat., 772), July 1, 1864 (13 Stat., 339), and July 26, 1866 (14 Stat.,
289). The first act makes a grant for the Atchison, Topeka and Santa
Fe road with a branch from where it crosses the Neosho, down the
Neosho valley to a point where the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Gal-
veston road enters said valley. The line of said branch as definitely
located left the main stem at Emporia and ran southeasterly, corre-
sponding with the road as afterwards built. The withdrawal for the
branch was made in 1863. The act of 1864, provided f6r a road from
Emporia, northward, via Council Grove, to a point near Fort Riley on
the branch Union Pacific railroad. No action was taken under this act
affecting the questions here in issue. The act of 1866 provided for a
road from Fort Riley " or near said military reservation, thence down
the valley of the Neosho river to the southern line of the State of Kan-
sas," being the line defined in said two former acts. The withdrawal
necessary for the entire line was made in 1867, and the road was built.
The grant was of " every alternate section of land or parts thereof des-
ignated by odd numbers, to the extent of five alternate sections per mile
on each side of said road, not exceeding in all ten sections per mile with
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a provision for indemnity lands to be selected not beyond twenty miles
from the line of the road.
By letter of October 31, 1887, your office referring to said first ad-
justment stated that an important matter in connection with said grant
had not been taken into consideration in making up the statement of
areas included in the grant This important matter was described by
your office as follows:
A portion of the lands through which this and certain other roads ran, is embraced
in the reservation established for the New York Indiaus by treaty of January 15,
1838 (7 Stat., 550), and that reservation does not appear to have been extinguished
at date of railroad grants, and has never been extinguished.
Your office further stated that on August 17, 1860, the Commissioner
of the General Land Office submitted to this Department a proposed
proclamation for the sale of the lands within said reservation, which
proclamation was signed by the President on August 21, 1860, in con-
formity with which said lands were offered for sale; that said (Jommis-
sioner apparently assumed the reservation had been extinguished, and
that assumption was erroneous as shown by the action of the govern-
ment in 1868, when " a treaty was concluded between the United States
and the New York Indians for the surrender of all claims under the
the treaty of 1838, but the treaty of 1868 was not ratified by the Sen-
ate; " that "it cannot of course be held that the President intended by
proclamation of sale to have formally or actually extinguished a treaty
reservation, or that it would have been competent for him to have done
so. . . . Reserved lands were not granted to such companies, and
their rights are derived from grant and not from executive action." It
was further stated that 276,602.24 acres have been patented to or for
railroad companies in said reservation, mostly for the company here in
question, and it was recommended that proper steps be taken to secure
the reconveyance or recovery of such lands under the provisions of the
act of March 3, 1887.
Against this recommendation the attorneys for the company urge that
the question has become res adjudicata by virtue of the decision of the
supreme court i the case of Kansas City, Lawrence and South Kansas
R. R. Co., v. The Attorney-General (118 U. S., 682). That action was
brought to set aside the title to certain lands, being a portion of those
herein under consideration. The appellant company supra, claimed as
the assignee of the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry. Co. The court held
that there was no sufficient reason found in the record for disturbing the
certificates and patents therefor issued to said latter company. In the
statement of said case which precedes the opinion of the court it is
recited:
Mr. William Lawrence (representing settlers), for appellee, argued the following
general propositions: .... . . . Sixth Proposition.-It is submitted that
the lands in controversy are not subject to any land grant, because included in the
New York Indian reservation under the treaty of January 15, 1838, never legally
revoked.
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After considering certain allegations of the bill, and concluding that
they furnished no reason for disturbing said titles, the court con-
cluded:
There are other grounds urged for granting the relief sought by the bill, but they
are not sufficient to justify such a decree, nor are they important enough to require
further discussion here.
On this statement it is claimed by said attorneys that the question
here presented. was properly before the court, and decided. An exam-
ination of the record of that case, however, shows that such claim is
not well founded. The question now before me was not put in issue by
the pleadings in that case. The New York Indian reservation was not
mentioned, either in the bill, the answer or the replication, nor was any
reference made thereto. The bill urged that the lands were excepted
from the grant for the Missouri, Kansas and Texas road by reason of
conflict with other railroad grants; because the road was not constructed
to a certain point contemplated in the grant; and becausethecompany
had received more lands than it was entitled to, etc. After considering
these three propositions the court concluded with the expression above
cited. But the " other grounds " there spoken of must be held to be
those put in issue by the pleadings, of which there were several. Cer-
tainly no judgment could have gone against the company, on the record,
on a plea which it had no opportunity of answering, nor do I think the
mere mention of an extraneous fact by an attorney in argument would
place that fact in issue, " where the second action between the same
parties is upon a different claim or demand the judgment in the prior
action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points
controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict
was rendered." Cromwell v. County of Sac. (94 U. S., 351).
However, I find myself unable to agree in said recommendation that
steps be taken to secure the reconveyance of these lands under the act
of March 3, 1887, for the following reasons.
By said treaty of 1838 the New York Indians ceded and relinquished
to the United States all their right, title and interest to the lands
secured to them at Green Bay, in the Territory of Wisconsin, by the
Menomonee treaty of 1831 (except a small tract); and in consideration
thereof the United States agreed to set apart the land subsequently
embraced in said New York Indian reservation, " to have and to hold
the same in fee simple to the said tribes or nations of Indians, by patent
from the President of the United States" issued in conformity with
section 3, of the act of May 28, 1830, (4 Stats., 411), the proviso of
which declares that " sch lands shall revert to the United States if the
Indians become extinct or abandon the same." It was agreed that said
Indians then residing in New York should remove to said lands so set
apart, and that such of the tribes as fail " to accept and agree to re-
move" within five years "or such other time as the President may
from time to time appoint shall forfeit all interest in the lands so set
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apart to the United States." The United States agreed to appropriate
$400,000 to aid said Indians in removing from their homes, etc. But
few of the Indians went to said lands, and of these but thirty-two re-
ceived " certificates of allotment " for their respective shares of. land.
In a report to the Department, subsequently transmitted to Congress,
and dated February 9, 1883, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Price
stated that no time was ever fixed by the President within which the
removal must be made, that but $20,477.50, of the $400,000 promised,
were appropriated, and that on the other hand the Indians, in any con-
siderable numbers, never manifested a desire to remove to the western
lands, but on the contrary opposed such removal.
In a letter dated April 19, 1858, to the chairman of the committee on
Indian Affairs of the House of Representatives in reference to a bill
then pending affecting these lands Secretary Thompson said:-(Vol.
3, p. 93, Ind. Div.),
The Indians who have failed to remove have by the express terms of the treaty of
1838 forfeited their title to the reserve and a dne regard for the interest of the white
population of Kansas would seem to require that this large and valuable body of land
should no longer be withheld from settlement.
On June 16, 1860, he wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, as
follows: (Vol. 3, p. 327, Ind. Div.),
Herewith is returned, with my approval en dorsed thereon, the list of locations made
for the New York Indians, in Kansas, which was transmitted with your report of the
9th inst.
Your recommendation that the balance of the tract heretofore reserved for the New
York Indians in Kansas, be turned over to the General Land Office, to be disposed of as
other public lands, is approved, and you will so inform the Commissioner,
The proclamation of the President of 1860, referred to by your office
thereafter directed public sale in certain townships, of the public lands
not covered by individual Indian locations, " in the late " New York In-
dian reservation. From that time at least the lands in said reservation
have been treated as subject to the operation of the la nd laws. Mean-
while the lands have been disposed of and numerous towns have grown
up thereon. On November 5, 1.857 (11 Stat., 735), a treaty was con-
eluded with the Tonawanda band of Senecas (one of said tribes), by
which said band relinquished all its claims to said land under the treaty
of 1838, in consideration of which the United States agreed to pay
and invest for them the sum of $256,000. On June 20, 1884, the Senate
committee on Indian Affairs referred to the court of claims a bill, to
provide for a settlement with said New York Indians for the " unexe-
cuted stipulation" of said treaty of 1838. Thereupon suit was entered
praying for a money indemnity in lieu of said lands so lost. The suit
is still pending. t does not appear that the Indians are now making
claim for the land itself.
It thus appears that for thirty years both the executive and legislative
branches of the government have acted on the theory that the right of
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said Indians to these lands had expired. While there is force in the
suggestion of your office that the executive, ordinarily, has not power
to extinguish a reservation created by treaty, in this case, the expressed
opinion of this Department that the Indian right had lapsed, and the
proclamation of the President following thereupon, directing the sale of
the lands, acted upon for thirty years, must be considered a bar to any
further action on the part of this Department looking to the disturb-
ance of titles long since vested thereunder. The proclamation directed
the sale of 1,222,240 acres of the 1,824,000 acres embraced in the reserve.
It was recommended by your office and the Secretary. See Pueblo of
San Francisco (5 L. D., 483); Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company
(8 Ibi., 165); United States v. Burlington and Missouri R. R. Co. (93
U. S., 841).
I come now to the question of the re-adjustment of the limits of said
grant. The original withdrawal from the crossing of the Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe railroad, at Emporia, southward was made in
1863; from Emporia northward, in 1867. These withdrawals have re-
mained constantly in force, and in accordance therewith lands have
ever since been patented or certified. In other words the lines thus
established have been accepted as the limits of the grant for over twenty
years. It is now proposed to re-adjust these limits, and bring suit to
recover the title to such lands as have been patented outside the new
limits. It appears that the Missouri, Kansas and Texas company has
sold all the lands it received under the grant, and it may be presumed
that in the lapse of time the title to much of it, has changed hands many
times. It appears from an inspection of the diagram submitted that
the old and new limits follow the same general course there3 being a
slight variation throughout the entire length. They cross each other
many times, and consequently some lands that lay within the old limits
are outside the new, and vice versa. As far as the question relates to,
lands lying along the ten-mile or granted limits I have little difficulty;
for, any lands patented as granted lands, which now appear to be out-
side the granted limits, would necessarily fall within the indemnity
limits, and consequently under the operation of the grant. These lands
it may be assumed, therefore, in the absence of adverse claims would
have passed to the grant, as indemnity though at present charged to
it as granted lands. I cannot conceive that under these circumstances
a court would lend its aid to set aside the existing title. If on the other
hand lands along such limits have been treated as indemnity lands, and
now appear to be in the granted belt, the cause of complaint would
seem to be in the company rather than in the government.
As to the lands along the outer or indemnity limit a somewhat dif-
ferent question arises. Your office finds that 21,421.99 acres lying
within the original indemnity limit and patented as indemnity lands,
are outside the new limit and consequently beyond the operation of the
grant. This arises from two causes: first, because the old limits were
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not adjusted to the smallest legal sbdivisions, and second, because in
closing the public surveys-upon the first guide meridian east of the
6th principal meridian a tier of sections in the range thus made was
two miles in width instead of one" as a result of which the limits of the
grant were laid down one mile too wide,"; wherever such range was
embraced within the limits of the withdrawal.
The company insists that your office is in error as to this second class
of lands on the ground that it is entitled to every alternate odd num-
bered section " to the extent of five alternate sections per mile on each
* side of said road, and not exceeding in all ten sections per mile," as
such sections may be found suriveyed; that it takes the section itself or
its equivalent in area, whether greater or less than 640 acres.
I do not find it necessary to consider the merits of this contention,
for the purposes of this case. When the withdrawals were made it was
well known to the Department that sections as surveyed, frequently
exceeded six hundred and forty acres, or one square mile in area.
While it does not appear affirmatively that the question was considered
by the Department or your office in making the withdrawals, that fact
itself lends color to the presumption that it was, at that time, not con.
sidered a necessary factor in defining the limits of such withdrawals.
It should be presumed that the Secretary considered all matters neces-
sary to a proper and legal determination of the questions before him.
His action in this matter has been followed, unquestioned, for many
years, though the existence of the irregular survey must have been
known. Under these circumstances I cannot conceive it to be the duty
of the Department to re-open this question, sua sponte, and take steps
looking, to the (listurbance of titles so vested. But if this view is not
conclusive, the question must be disposed of with that relating to the
lands which now appear to be beyond the limits by reason of a more
accurate measurement. It should be premised that the grant remains
unsatisfied, by several hundred thousand acres. During the many years
intervening since the withdrawals, the accurady of the limits has not
been questioned. Meanwhile the lands, sparsely settled in 1867, have
been practically all disposed of. Titles that vested under the deliberate
action of the Department have passed from hand to hand many times.
Under these circumstances, as was said by Secretary Vilas, in the case
of St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Ry. Co. (8 L. D., 255), I am com-
pelled to recognize at the outset that the question is presented at such
a time and under such conditions as impose limitations upon judgment
which would not affect its examination as an original question.
The question here is between the government and the company. If
the original withdrawals were erroneous, the fault is due to the govern-
ment and not the company. "If it be inequitable to grant he relief
prayed against a citizen, such relief will be refused by a court of equity,
though the United States be the suitor," said Mr. Justice Field in de-
livering the opinion of the court in the case of United States v. Flint
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(4 Sawyer, 58, affirmed in 98 U. S., 61). He further said, after stating
that no laches in bringing suit can be imputed to the United States:-
Yet the facility with which the truth could have been originally shown by them
the changed condition of parties and property from lapse of time; the diffi-
culty from this cause of meeting objections which might perhaps at the time have been
readily explained; and the acquisition of interests by third parties upon the faith of
the decree, are elements which will always be considered by the court in determining
whether it be equitzble tb grant tie ralief prayed. All the attendant c'r umstances
will be weighed, that no wrong be done to the citizens, though the government be
the suitor.
In the case of the Atlantic and Pacific R. R. Co. (8 L. D 165), it was
said:-
Under such circumstances, and after the lapse of so many years, many decisions of
the supreme court demonstrate that it can not be expected the patents would be set
aside and thereby the property rights acquired under them and so long enjoyed with-
out challenge, sacrificed by a different interpretation of the granting act from that
which was deliberately adopted and acted upon. The only probable consequence of
instituting such a litigation would be uncertainty, depreciation of values for a time
and distress to a large community and numerous citizens.
I therefore conclude, basingmy judgement on the decisions of the
courts, and the Department, and on the equitable considerations in
favor of the vested titles that no action should be taken by this De-
partment looking to a re-adjustment of said limits.
In your said letter of November 18, 1889, you say:
In the former adjustment a changewas made not only in the limits of the grant for
the road under consideration, but all roads coming in conflict therewith, the limits
were changed as far as the conflict extended.
The other roads referred to are I presume the Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe, the Leavenworth, Lawrence, and Galveston roads, under the
act of 1863, and the Union Pacific by act of 1862. On the principles
above announced these limits should not be re-adjusted within the
limits of this road, at least for any purpose looking to the disturbance
of titles so vested.
You further state:
From Emporia southward in the conflict with the grant for the Atchison Topeka
and Santa Fe R. R. Co., the grant is of even date, while north of this point the grant
for the latter company is the prior grant, and upon establishing a terminal at this
point to separate the grants, it is found that the Missouri Kansas and Texas R. R.
Co., received patents for 6,845.62 acres north of said terminal. Until the adjustment
submitted by Mr. Sparks, no terminal was ever established, but the line of the Atchi-
son Topeka and Santa Fe R. R., seems to have been the dividing line recognized, at
the time the lands were patented.
In the conflict between said companies the Missouri Kansas and Texas R. R. Co.
received patents for 12,653.92 acres as indemnity, of lands situated within the primary
limits of the grant of the Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe R. R. Co., and in the conflict
with the Leavenworth Lawrence and Galveston R. R. Co., the Missouri Kansas and
Texas R. R. Co, received patents for 6,315.93 acres as indemnity, which are shown to
be within the primary limits of the grant for the Leavenworth Lawrence and Galves-
ton Co.
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In the adjustment herewith submitted the company is charged with receivilg these
lands, but as it is clearly shown, that as the adjustment stands, the company is en-
titled to more land than could be found within its limits, a further consideration of
the matter, as affects the adjustment, is unnecessary.
As the title to these lands so patented is not disputed by either of the
other companies, I do not find it necessary for the purposes of this case
to consider this question further.
The allowance of indemnity in accordance with the principles an-
nounced in the case of Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Ry.
Co., (6 L. D., 195) is approved.
Said first adjustment is accordingly modified and that submitted by
your letter of November 18, 18S9, is approved.
In your letter of December 12, 1889, it is shown that there is "' due as
indemnity" to the company 389,458.93 acres, instead of 389,338.93 as
appeared from the former letter.
RAILROAD GRANT-INDEMNITY SELECTION-PRE-EMPTION FILING.
NORTHERN PACIFIC R. K. CO. V. MOLING.
The right to select a tract as indemnity under a railroad grant, is not defeated by the
mere fact that the selection is within the primary limits of another grant, if the
tract is vacant public land at date of selection.
The expiration of the statutory life of a pre-emption filing, without proof and pay-
ment having been m'ade thereunder, warrants the presumption that all claims
under such filing are abandoned.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, August
2, 1890.
I have considered the case of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company
v. John Petter Moling on appeal by theformer from your office decision
of November 2, 1886, rejecting its application to select as indemnity the
following tracts of land, viz: the SW. of the NW. 4 and the NW.
of the SW.4 of Sec. 29, Tp. 131 N., R. 39 W., 5th P. M., Fergus Falls,
Minnesota, land district.
These tracts are geographically within the ten miles (granted) limits
of the grant for the benefit of the St. Paul Minneapolis and Manitoba
(St. Vincent Extension) Railway Company, under which rights are held
to have attached December 19, 1871.
Said tracts are also within the thirty miles (indemnity) limits of the
grant for the Northern Pacific Railroad Company under which grant a
withdrawal was ordered by your office letter of December 26, 1871, re-
ceived at the district land office January 10, 1872. The plat of this
township was filed in the local office March 27, 1873, and on June 16,
of that year John Benson filed pre-emption declaratory statement No.
1519 (unoffered series) for these tracts and other land alleging settle-
ment thereon January 10, 1871, which filing has not been canceled.
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On December 29, 1883, the Northern Pacific Railroad Company ap-
plied to select these tracts as indemnity for tracts alleged to have been
lost from its grant, which application the local officers rejected for the
reason that the land was " in the granted limits to St. Paul, Minneapolis
and Manitoba Railway Company and included in declaratory statement
No. 1,519 filed June 16, 1873, alleging settlement January 10, 1871, not
canceled " from which action the company appealed.
On January 29, 1881, John Petter Moling applied to make homestead
entry for this land. A hearing was ordered by the local officers, with
notice to Moling and the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway
Company to determine the status of the land. On the date fixed for
said hearing these parties appeared and on the testimony submitted
the local officers decided that Benson's claim excepted the land from
the grant and that Moling's application should be allowed, from which
decision the company appealed.
In your office the respective appeals of the St. Paul, Minneapolis and
Manitoba Railway Company and the Northern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany seem to have been considered and passed upon in one and the
same decision.
It was held that the land in controversy was excepted from the grant
to the former company by reason of the settlement and filing of Benson
which existed at the date the right of said company attached under its
grant.
In regard to the claim of the latter company it was said in your office
decision-
The Northern Pacific Railroad Company wns not made a party to the hearing al-
though it was p claimant, by virtue of its application and appeal for the land. Its
rights are not prejudiced however, because it is not entitled under any circumstances
to select the land because one company can not go into tile granted limits of another
to seek indemnity and for the further reason that a pria facie valid pre-emption fil-
ing of. record, is a bar to the selection of the land embraced therein for indemnity
purposes under the grant.
Moling's application to enter was rejected for the reason that his
entry could not be properly admitted while the Northern Pacific Rail-
road Company's appeal was pending.
From this decision the Northern Pacific Railroad Company alone ap-
pealed so that the only question now before this Department for con-
sideration is as to its claim.
The mere fact that this land was within the limits of the grant to the
State of Minnesota, since in fact it was not granted land, does not con-
stitute a bar tWits selection as indemnity under another grant. Allers
v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. etal., (9 L. D., 452).
The fact that these tracts were within the limits of the former grant
does not afford sufficient grounds for the rejection of the application
of the Northern Pacific R. R. Co., to select them as indemnity, and the
action of the local officers and of your office in so far as the same was
based upon that ground can not be sustained.
14') DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
I cannot concur in the conclusion that Benson's filing was sufficient
to prevent the selection of this land as indemnity under the present
application. At the date of the application December 29, 1883, the
time prescribed for making proof under said filing had expired. The
presumption then arose that all claims under that filing had been
abandoned. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Stovenour (10 L. D., 645).
This presumption is not attempted to be rebutted, but on the other
hand is strengthened by the testimony submitted in the hearing had
between the homestead applicant and the St. Paul, Minneapolis and
Manitoba Railway company, which shows that Benson had no family
and that he died in 1875.
Under these circumstances the tracts in dispute must be held to have
been at the date of the application to select the same as indemnity,
vacant public land and therefore subject to such selection.
The decision appealed from is reversed, the homestead application of
Moling is rejected and the application by the Northern Pacific B. R.
Co., to select said land as indemnity will be allowed unless some reason
not shown by the record now before me appears for refusing the same.
HOMESTEAD CONTEST-APPEAL-POSSESSION.
KELLER V. BULLINGTON.
The General Land Office has no jurisdiction over a case after an appeal is iled frol
its.decision therein.
The occupation and possession of pblic land, for the purpose of working a stone
quarry thereon, confers no right or title, either as against the United, States, or
others having a valid claim under its laws.
The fact that land entered under the homestead law contains a stone quarry, or that
the entrymau knew such fact when he applied to enter does not vitiate the entry,
if good faith is otherwise apparent.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 2, 1890.
The record in the case of Keller v. Bullington, transmitted from your
office to this Department by letter dated the 20th of October, 1888, has
been considered. It involves the title to the N of the SE of Sec.
23, T. 5. S. R. 11 W., of the Huntsville, Alabama, land district.
From this record it appears that on the first day of February, 1887,
Bnllington made a homestead entry (No. 15,806) of the land above
described. 
-
On the 14th of June, 1887, Keller filed an affidavit of contest, al-
leging, in substance, that he purchased at public sale, in 1884, from
Robert B. Lindsay, administrator of F. C. Vinson, deceased, a large
tract of land in Colbert county, Alabama, and that this land, thus pur-
chased, and afterwards conveyed to him, covered the tract embraced in
Bullington's homestead entry, and consequently that his right to the
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same was prior and superior to that of Bullington. He further stated
that his land contained a stone-quarry; that in October, 1886, he sold
a half interest in his said land to W. S. Hull and authorized him to
open the said quarry; that Hull had opened this quarry at great ex-
pense and was engaged in operating the same, as Blington well
knew, at the time he (the said Bullington) made his homestead entry;
that this entry was not made in good faith, according to the true intent
and spirit of the homestead law, but with the view of getting posses-
sion of the said stone-quarry, and for purposes of speculation.
On filing this affidavit of contest a hearing was asked for and ordered.
After due notice, both parties appeared before the local officers at
Huntsville, with their respective witnesses and attorneys, and sub-
mitted their testimony. When this testimony was considered, the
register and receiver of the local office sustained the contest and
recommended the cancellation of Bullington's entry. Thereupon, he
appealed to your office where on the 6th of April, 1888, said decision
was affirmed and the entry held for cancellation. Bullington then ap-
pealed to this Department. His appeal bears date the 30th of April,
1888, and was filed on the same day. Afterwards, to wit, on the 2nd of
May, 1888, his appeal having never been acted upon or withdrawn, he
applied for a reconsideration of your office decision of April 6, 1888.
On this application, your office, on the 28th of June, 1888, reconsid-
ered and revoked its decision, dismissed the contest, and allowed Bul-
lington to proceed and perfect his title. From this last-named decision,
Keller appealed. His appeal was entered on the 16th of August, 1883,
and on the 29th of the following May he filed a paper in this Depart-
ment stating, in effect, that his appeal had been taken simply to save
any rights that might have been forfeited in consequence of his neglect
to appeal, and that he denied the right of the Commissioner of the
General Land Office to reconsider and revoke his decision after an ap-
peal from that decision had been filed.
This position, thus brought to the notice of this Department, is sus-
tained by numerous decisions. The filing of an appeal from a decision
of the Commissioner places the case beyond his jurisdiction. Sapp v.
Anderson, (9 L. D., 165); McGovern v. Bartels (3 C. L. D., 70); King
v. Leitensdorfer (3 L. D., ItO); Gray v. Ward, et al, (5 L. D., 410) ; John
M. Walker, et al, (5 L. D., 501); Ida May Taylor, (6 L. D., 107); Ru-
dolph Wurlitzer (6 L. D., 315).
Following the rules here laid down, the application for a re-hearing
filed in your office on the 2nd of May, 1888, and all papers in support
thereof, must be, and hereby are, excluded from the consideration of this
case. Then it rests upon the decision of your office made April 6, 1888,
and the appeal therefrom. This appeal presents all the questions of
law and fact involved in the controversy, and submits the whole case
for consideration and final decision according to its actual merit.
It appears from the record that Keller, on making a careful examina-
142 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
tion of his title papers, found that he had no right whatever, under his
purchase from Vinson's administrator, to the land covered by Bulling-
ton's entry, but still insists that he and Hull have rights, even superior
to those of Bullington, in and to portions of the said tract by reason of
their having occupied and worked the stone-quarry thereon as above
stated. But such occupation and possession confers no right of title
against the United States, or against those having a valid claim of title
under its laws. An occupant of public land claiming title by virtue of
his possession, as against an adverse claimant, must show that he occu-
pies and holds the same under some proceeding or law purporting to
give him at least a right of possession. Deffeback v. Hawke (115 U. S.,
392); Sparks v. Pierce, (id., 408).
Keller does not pretend to hold the land in question under any law
or proceeding purporting to give him a legal right to its possession or
ownership from the United States. He assails Bullington's title, con-
tending that when he made his entry he knew that the land embraced
within its boundaries covered the stone-quarry above mentioned, and
that his object in making the entry was to secure the land and the
quarry for speculative purposes.
If it can be shown that the entry was made for speculative purposes
in violation of the homestead law, it should, of course, be canceled;
but the mere fact that the land contains a stone-quarry, or that the
entryman knew of its existence at the time he made his application to
enter, does not vitiate his homestead entry. Under an act of March
3, 1883, (22 Stats., 487), all public lands in the State of Alabama, except
those previously reported as containing coal and iron, are subject to
disposal as agricultural lands. There is no evidence found in the record
tending to show that this land had been reported as containing coal
and iron in March, 1883, when said act took effect.
An effort has been made to show that Bllington, after making his
entry, had sold or offered to sell his interest in the land, but it appears
in evidence that he refused to sell or agree to sell without consulting
the local officers of his land district as to his rights under the homestead
law to make such sale, and when advised by them that he had no such
right, nothing further was heard in reference to the sale.
At the time that Bullington made his entry, the land was unappro-
priated public land, subject to entry under the homestead law. He was
fully qualified to make the same and he immediately commenced build-
ing a house, a corn-crib, several cabins, and other improvements and cul-
tivated about four acres of the land in crops. He was in full possession
of the property, with his family, when this contest commenced, on the
14th of June, 1887, about four and a half months after he made his
entry. It appeared in evidence that portions of the land embraced
therein are mountainous and unfit for cultivation; but I think the pre-
ponderance of the testimony tends to show that the most of it can be
cultivated in cereals, fruits and vegetables, or used for grazing purposes.
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It frther shows that Ballington in good faith had complied with the
requirements of the homestead law as to residence, cultivation and im-
provements up to the time that this contest was inaugurated.
If it should appear when he submits his final proof that he has not
honestly and fairly complied with the spirit of the homestead law then
his entry can be attacked, but during the four mon ths he has been upon
the tract, I am impressed with the belief that he has acted in good faith,
hence, the decision of your office of April 6, 1888, is reversed and the
contest dismissed.
RAILROAD GRA1NT-PRE-EMPTION CLAIM.
NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. CO. V. STUART.
Land covered by a prima facie valid pre-emption filing at date of withdrawal on gen-
eral route is excepted thereby from the operation of said withdrawal.
A pre-emptor is not estopped from proving that his settlement was made at a differ-
ent and earlier date than that alleged in his declaratory statement.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, August
2, 1890.
I have considered the case of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company
v. James Stuart, involving pre-emption cash entry made by the latter
for the SE. -of the SW. , the NE. 1 of the SE. 1, and the S. I of the
SE. 1, of Sec. 21, T. 13 N., R. 19 E., North Yakima land district, Wash-
ington.
Said Stuart filed declaratory statement for the tract described on
March 6, 1886, alleging settlement in March, 1885, and made proof and
payment on July 9, 1886.
The local officers, at the end of the quarter, forwarded the papers in
the case of this and other entries made during the quarter, for the ex-
amination of your office.
Your office, when it came to act upon Stuart's proof, observed that
the tract covered by his entry was' located within the limits of the
withdrawal ordered upon the map of general route of the amended
branch line of the Northern Pacific Railroad company-which order
was received at the local office July 18, 1879; also within the granted
limits upon the map of definite location-filed May 24, 1884.
Your office thereupon by letter of December 10, 1887, directed the
attention of the local officers to the location of the tract within railroad
limits as above set forth, but approved Stuart's entry; and at the same
time notified the railroad company of Stuart's entry, and of their right
of appeal from the action of your office approving the same.
The company appealed to the Department, January 23, 1888.
In addition to the facts hereinbefore mentioned, the records of your
office show that one Ira A. Johnson filed declaratory statement for said
tract October 5, alleging settlement September 6, 1878.
It will be seen that at the date of the receipt by the local office of the
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order of withdrawal upon the map of general route, (July 18, 1879,
supra,) Johnson's unexpired filing, prima facie valid, excepted the tract
therefrom. (NorthernPacific R. R. Co., v. Stovenour, 10 L. D., 645).
Stuart's declaratory statement alleges settlement in March, " 1885."7
And in his final proof, made July 19, 1886, in reply to the question,
"When did you first make settlement on the above described land,"
Stuart answered, " March 5, 1885."
On the other band: in reply to the next question, " When did you
first establish actual residence on the land you now seek to enter "
Stuart answers, "' March, 1882.1
One of these answers must be an error on the part of Stuart-or of
the person making out his papers (which are evidently not in Stuart's
handwriting). To determine which is correct, reference must be had to
other evidence in the record.
Samuel Hubbard, one of claimant's final proof witnesses, testifies
that he has known claimant since October, 1884; and in response to
the question, "1 When did he commence his residence thereon " answers,
"Before I knew him." This shows residence before October, 1881.
Charles Z. Cheney, the claimant's other witness, in response to the
question, "When did claimant first settle on his claim " answers,
"March, 1882; " and in response to the further question, " When did
he commence his residence thereon?" answers, "March, 1882."
The above-named witnesses were cross-examined. On cross-exami-
nation witness Cheney says: " Claimant has raised corn, grain, pota-
toes, and vegetables of all kinds; he has cut and stacked hay each year
for four years."
The amount of improvements made by the claimant-aside from
those purchased by him from a former occupant of the tract-are large
even for four years.
There is a strong preponderance of evidence to show that Stuart's
settlement and residence were made in March, 1882.
Notwithstanding claimant's declaratory statement alleged settlement
in 1885, he was not thereby estopped from proving that it was actually
made at another and earlier date. "The law gives him a right to the
land from the date of his settlement; and his right is not to be defeated
by a discrepant allegation he may have made, when it is shown th'at it
was made by mistake" (Zinkiand v..Brown, 3 L. D., 380; Tipp v.,Thomas,
ib., 102).
Holding that Stuart's settlement dates from March, 1882, such settle-
ment excepted the tract from the grant upon the subsequent filing (May
24, 1884, supra,) of the map of definite location.
The railroad company does not deny that Stuart's settlement and res-
idence preceded the filing of the map of definite location, but claims the
tract solely on the ground that it was error to hold that Johnson's filing
excepted the land from the withdrawal on the map of general route.
The decision of your office, holding the tract subject to entry by Stu-
art, is affirmed.
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TIMBER LAND ENTRY-PRE-EMPTION CLAIM.
TENNY v. JOHNSON ET AL.
A timber land entry under the act of June 3 1878, can not be allowed for land in-
eluded within a bona fide pre-enption claim, and the right of the pre-emptor is
not affected by the fact that his improvements are not on the particular sub-
division in conflict.
Iii determining the good fith of a pre-emnption claim, asserted for land subject to
entry under said act of 1878, it is competent to consider the character of the land
involved.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 2, 1890.
I have considered the case of John R. Tenny against Charles A.
Johnson and Alexander Sealauder on appeal by the former from your
decision of January 9, 1889, rejecting his application to enter the W. 
SE. 4 and E. SW. 4 Sec. 33 T. 24 N., R. 1 W., Olympia, Washing-
ton land district.
The facts are as follows:
On July 6, 1885, Alexander R. Sealander fled pre-emption declara-
tory statement for the S. SE. 4 of Sec. 33 and W. 4 SW. See. 34,
T. 24 N., R. 1. W., Olympia land district, alleging settlement June 23,
1885.
On July 11, 1885, Charles A. Johnson filed pre-emption declaratory
statement for the SW. 4 SW. 4, E. C SW. and NW. 4 SE. 4 of See. 33,
same township and range, alleging settlement June 23, 1885.
On April 17, 1886, John R. Tenny filed an application to enter the E.
4 SW. 4 and W. SE. 4 See. 33, same township and range, under the
timber and stone act of June 3rd 1878 and tendered proof and payment
therefore July ]3, 1886, and supplemental proof August 12, 1886. This
application being in conflict with Sealander's declaratory atatement for
the SW. i SE. 1 of said section 33, and with Johnson's declaratory state-
meut for the E. i SW. i and NW. i of SE. 4 of said section 33, a hearing
was ordered on August 13,1886 to be held at the land office at Olympia,
October 4, 1886, to determine the validity of said pre-emption declara-
tory statements.
By stipulation of the parties the testimony was taken at Seattle,
Washington, before a notary public, at which hearing Johnson ap-
peared in person and Sealander and Tenny by attorneys. The testi-
mony was taken and returned to the office and on March 5, 1887, the
register and receiver decided that said tracts sought to be entered by
Tenny were not on April 17, 1886, subject to said entry and Tenny's
application was rejected. From this decision he appealed to your office
and on January 9, 1889, you affirmed said decision, from which judg-
ment he appealed to this Department.
The testimony introduced by Tenny's attorney related chiefly to the
nature of the land, and it showed that said land was somewhat broken
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and that the greater portion of it was covered by fir and pine timber.
It showed incidently that the pre-emptors had each made some im-
provements on their respective lands, but that these improvements
were not on the particular land sought to be entered by Tenny.
The testimony introduced by Johnson and Sealander showed that
each had built a cabin on his land and made some clearing. Sealander
being sick was unable to attend the bearing. The testimony showed
that Johnson had a comfortable house twenty-four by fourteen feet and
about five acres cleare4 and in cultivation; that he had raised very
good vegetables on the land; that his family had been living in the
house from January, 1886, except during a portion of the time when
his children were at school. Tenny did not appear at the hearing and
no witness of the seven called in his behalf appears to have ever known
or ever seen him.
The fact that the particular tracts sought to be Ifurchased by Tenny
did not cover the particular subdivisions upon which the pre-emptor's
improvements were situated cannot affect their rights in the premises,
nor does the fact that the greater portion of the laud is excellent timber
land, make any difference in the case. The testimony as to the quality
of the land involved, was, however, competent as reflecting upon the
bona fides of the pre-emptors, the objection thereto and motion to rule
out were not well taken.
In Porter v. Throop (6 L. D., 691) these questions were fully discussed
and decided. It was said-
While as a matter of fact, there were no improvements or settlement on the one
hundred and twenty acres of land in dispute, in contemplation of law, Throop's im-
provements and settlement on the forty acre tract not in dispute covered the entire
tract.
As to the other point it was said-
The exception in the act of June 3, 1878, is in favor not of the 'settler ' but of the
'bona fide settler' . . . . and while the act in exempting from its operation
lands claimed by a ' bona fide settler' ex vi termnia recognizes that there may be a
bona fide settlement oni lands of the character described therein, that is lands chiefly
valuable for timber and 'nfit for ordinary agricultural purposes,'. and
the fact that the land is of such a character, might be a circumstance, taken in con-
nection with other facts of the case, shedding light upon the question of the bonafides
of the settler.
I have considered all the testimony in the case, and I find that both
Johnson and Sealander have acted in good faith in the matter of their
pre-emption claims, and after a careful examination of the entire record
I find no sufficient reason for disturbing the conclusion reached by
both your office and the local officers and the decision of your office
is therefore affirmed. Tenny's application to enter said land is re-
jected.
It appears from the record in the case that a motion to dismiss the
appeal was filed. The motion is not found with the papers, and the
ease being one of some importance, I have reviewed the entire record,
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and passed upon the merits of the case, disregarding the motion to dis-
miss, of which the appellee in view of the conclusion reached, can not
complain.
PRIVATE CLAIM- INDEMNITY.
ASA HICKMAN.
The right to indemnity under section 3, act of June 2, 1858, does not exist if the claim
under which such right is asserted was satisfied by location prior to the passage
of said act.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Oce, August
2, 1890.
In the report of the register and receiver for the southwestern dis-
trict of Louisiana, made under the act of March 3, 1823 (3 Stat., 756),
providing for the examination of titles to land between the Rio Hondo
and Sabine River, the claim of Asa Hickman, assignee of John May-
hew, d class No. 233 for six hundred and forty acres on the bayou San-
taburb, by virtue of inhabitation, occupation and cultivation, was
recommended for confirmation. American State Papers, Green's Ed.,
Vol. 4 p. 69.
By the act of May 24, 1828 6 Stat., 382), the claims in the third class
above (with a few express exceptions, that of Hickman not being
among the exceptions), were confirmed.
By application, dated December 12, 1887, Leo Vandigaer, the duly
appointed curator of the vacant succession of Asa ickman, deceased,
alleging that the claim mentioned remained " wholly unlocated and
unsatisfied," applied to the surveyor-general at New Orleans for the
issue of certificates of location, " under section three of the act of June
2, 1858 " (11 Stat.. 294), in satisfaction of said claim.
The register and receiver at Nachitoches certify, that the records of
their office show that the claim mentioned has not been located or sat-
isfied, as provided by the confirmatory act of May, 1828, supra, and
their certificate, dated October 14, 1887, accompanies the said applica-
tion.
By letter, dated December 24, 1887, the surveyor-general at New
Orleans, after stating that the records of his office show that said claim
" has never been located, surveyed or satisfied by the government,"
transmitted, in satisfaction thereof, eight certificates of location of
eighty acres each for authentication by your office.
On April 25,1888, your office, finding said claim to have been located
in place on Sec. 35, T. 7 N., R. 9 W., in the Nachitoches, formerly
Opelousas, land district, and that consequently it was not entitled to
indemnity, held for cancellation the said certificates of location.
From this action the applicant appeals here.
Your office found the claim to be so located for the reason that in
patent certificate No. 626, in favor of Asa Hickman his heirs and as-
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signs, dated at the Opelousas land office September 13, 133 and signed
by the register it was designated as section 35 etc., that the tract books
of your office " show that said section is reserved to satisfy this claim"
and that the receiver at Nachitoches, by letter of January 27, 1888, re-
ports that the said section is entered in the tract book as " purchased
by Jno. Mayhew . . . . Asa Hickman, assignee."
In the tract books of your office opposite said section 35, is entered
the said claim of Asa Hickman and also another claim of like nature
by William Hickman.
The receiver at Nachitoches in his said letter of January 27, 1888, in
response to your office instructions to report the status of said section
35, reports further that on the township map the claim of " William
Hickman" is marked upon the said section and that the same claim is
entered in a list of Rio Hondo claims on file in the Nachitoches office
as embracing the whole of section .35. It also appears from said letter
and from the records of your office that a patent certificate No. 107
dated April 21, 1853, for said section 35 has been issued in favor of
William Hickman.
Subsequently to his appeal the applicant filed-under rule one hun-
dred of practice-certain papers as additional evidence. Among the
papers thus filed I find a certified copy of the township plat approved
July 14, 1832, on file in the surveyor-general's office; a certified copy
of sections 26, 27, 34 and 35 " as taken from the map of said township
approved July 17, 1832 " on file in the land office at Nachitoches, and a
certified copy of an extract from the original field notes of the survey
of said township, that have been approved and which are on file in the
surveyor-general's office.
On both of the maps referred to "Asa Hickman" is marked upon
the south half of sections 26 and 27, and "William Hickman" on section
35. The field notes mentioned are those of the deputy surveyor who in
July 1832 ran the interior sectional lines of said township, and who
with reference to the line between sections 26 and 35 stated that " Asa
Hickman " claims section 26 and " William Hickman" section 35.
The evidence concerning the location of the claim in question seems
therefore to be the said patent certificate to Asa Hickman, and the
tract books referred to showing the location of the claim involved to be
on said section 35, the township plats and the surveyor's notes which
tend to show that it was located on sections 26 and 27, the certificate
of the local officers, and the statement of the surveyor-general to the
effect that it has not been located at all.
In the report of the register and receiver at Opelousas supra, the
claim involved, to wit, that of Asa Hickman is thus described " bounded
above by other land claimed by the claimant, on other sides by vacant
land." By the same report the said claim of William Hickman, also
for six hundred and forty acres is described as " situated on the Bayou
Santaburb bounded on the lower side by land claimed by William Cuin-
mings. Am. State Papers, Vol. 4, p. 49, No. 107.
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On the township plat (filed as aforesaid) in the surveyor generals
offle, section 16 is marked " Wm. Hickman " and a house is sketched
thereon. The land in section 21 immediately adjoining 16 on the south
or by which it is "bounded on the lower side" is marked "Williams Cum-
mings." On the same plat the south half of section 26 adjoining sec-
tion 35 on the north or by which that section (35) is " bounded above"
is marked Asa Hickmn.
When therefore the said boundaries of the claim involved and of the
William Hickman claim, as given by the commissioners before whom
was produced the original evidence upon which both claims are based,
are considered in connection with the township plat in the surveyor
general's office, it seems clear that the true location of the claim in
question to be as shown by the patent certificate to Asa Hickman and
by the tract books of your office, i. e., on the said section 35. And also
that the marking of William Hickman's claim upon said section 35, and
the issue of a patent certificate in his name for the same section in 1853
were erroneous.
The 2d section of the confirmatory act of 1828, supra provides that
claims confirmed thereby shall be located "under the direction of the
register and receiver . . . . in conformity with the legal subdi-
visions of the public surveys and shall include the improvements of the
claimants respectively."
On the said township plat in the surveyor general's office, a house is
marked as being upon the other land of Asa Hickman in section 26,
while no improvements are marked on section 35. ounsel contend
that the improvements of Asa Hickman upon the claim involved, being
thus shown to have been on section 26, it was error to hold that it had
been located on section 35. The fact that an improvement is noted on
the adjoining land of the claimant, by no means shows that his im-
provements upon the claim in question had been disregarded in locating
the same. Counsel contend that as the confirmatory act of 1828, supra,
provided for the location of the claim in question, " under the direction
of the register and receiver," the patent certificate to Asa Hickman ex-
ecated by the register alone is not proper proof of the location of the
claim.
In support of this contention several cases are cited wherein certifi-
cates having been issued by the register, your office, before issuing
patents under section 2447, Revised Statutes, act of December 22,1854,
10 Stat., 599, required the local officers to issue their joint certificate of
location nunc pro tune.
In this connection I am advised that the files of your office contain a
considerable number of " patent" certificates for claims confirmed by
the act of 1828 that have been transmitted by the local officers in the
regular course of business, but that said files contain but few " loca-
tion or " final " certificates.
These locations or final certificates are, in most instances shown to
have been filed by or for the respective claimants.
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It thus appears that in locating the claims so confirmed the custom
of the local office was to issue to the party applicant as his evidence of
title a location or final certificate whereby the confirmation and loca-
tion of his claim were duly set forth and to transmit for the files of your
office a certificate showing their action in premises. The certificate so
transmitted was, as in the case at bar, the patent certificate.
But the confirmatory act of 1828 supra, made no provision for the
patenting of claims confirmed thereby, and no such provision was made
until the act of December 1854 spra. As no patent could have been
legally issued upon patent certificates transmitted before the date of
the last named act it follows that such certificates were forwarded for
the information of your office.
The final or location certificate that was undoubtedly issued to Asa
Hickman for the claim involved is not in the record. But that such
certificate was duly issued and the claim involved properly located, can
not in the face of the said certificate bearing date but little more than
five years after the act of 1828, whereby the register certifies to your
office the location of the same, and which location corresponds with the
description upon which the claim was confirmed, at this time be sue-
cessfully controverted.
For reasons stated I must find that the claim in question was located
upon the said section 35 on or before September 13, 1833, the date of
the patent certificate to Asa Hickman.
The said claim having been so located, it follows that the same was
not unsatisfied at the date of the act of June 2, 1858 supra, under
which indemnity is asked.
The decision appealed from is affirmed.
MINING CLAIM-ADVERSE PROCEEDINGS.
BROWN ET AL. . BOND ET AL.
The local office has no authority to allow a mineral entry during the pendency of
adverse judicial proceedings.
The failure of an agent, who files an adverse claim, to furnish therewith proof in
corroboration of his sworn statement of authority, will not defeat the right of
the adverse claimant to have the controversy settled by judicial proceedings.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, July
2, 1890.
This case comes before the Department upon the appeal of appli-
cants from the decision of your office of October 17, 1889, holding for
cancellation mineral entry No. 133, Glenwood Springs, Colorado, made
by David R. C. Brown and associates for the Franklin Lode claim,
Pitkin county. Colorado, alleging the following grounds of error:
1. Error in finding from the record that J. W. Deane was the duly authorized
agent or attorney in fact of the Rhoderic Dhu lode claimants, or either of then, for
the purpose of filing the adverse claim.
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2. Error in finding from the record that ay adverse claim was filed against the
Franklin lode claim during the period of publication of notice of an application for
a patent therefor, or at any other time.
3. Error in finding that the owners of the Rhoderic Dhu lode claim were entitled
to any notice of the rejection of their so-called adverse claim or of the action of the
re ister and receiver in allowing the entry of the Franklin claim.
4. Error in holding the entry of the Franklin. claim for cancellation on the law
and the evidence of the case.
The application was filed August 2, 1887, and within the period of
sixty days of publication required by law an adverse claim was filed
by J. W. Deane, Esq., alleging, under oath, that he is the legal repre-
sentative of the owners of the Roderick Dhu lode claim, which con-
flicts with the Franklin.
The material issue presented by this appeal is, whether an adverse
claim was filed in accordance with the provisions of law and the rules
and regulations of the Department governing such claims. If it were,
then the local officers were without jurisdiction to allow an entry upon
the application, because the filing of such an adverse claim by opera-
tion of its own force stays all proceedings, except the publication of
notice and making and filing of affidavit thereof, until the controversy
shall be decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, or the adverse
claim waived. Revised Statutes, section 2326.
The record shows that notice of the application for patent was
published in a weekly newspaper, consecutively, from August 6,1887,
the date of the first insertion, to October 8, 1887, the date of the last.
The rules and regulations of the Department required that in all cases
sixty days must intervene between the first and last insertion of the
notice, and that when published in a weekly paper ten consecutive in-
sertions are necessary. In this case the sixty days of publication did
not expire until October 6, and hence an adverse claim filed On October
5, was within the time required by law.
The adverse claim filed by Deane, as attorney for the Roderick Dhu
claimants, was endorsed by the register, " filed October 5, 1887,7 and
was included in the abstract of adverse claims received from that office
during the month of October, 1887, and for which the legal fee required
for filing adverse claims was collected and accounted for. It is there-
fore evident that the claim was filed within the time required by law.
The only ground upon which the local officers allowed the entry of
the Franklin lode claim seems to have been, because the adverse claims
" were signed by attorneys without showing or filing proper authority
or proof," in conformity with the law and circular of instructions issued
by the Department, and the main ground of error alleged by applicants
in the decision of your office is in reversing this finding of the local office,
and in finding that Deane was the duly authorized agent or attorney in
fact of the Roderick Dhu Lode claimants, or either of them, for the pur-
pose of filing the adverse claim.
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The act of April 26, 1882 (22 Stat., 49), provides:
That the adverse clain required by section twenty-three hundred and twenty-six
of the Revised Statutes may be verified by the oath of any dnly authorized agent or
attorney-in-fact of the adverse claimant cognizant of the facts stated.
On May 9, 1882, the Department issued a circular of instructions to
registers and receivers, carrying into effect the provisions of said act (L
L. D., 685), in which it is directed that-
Where an agent or attorney-in-fact verifies the adverse claim, he must distinctly
swear that he is such agent or attorney, and accompany his affidavit by proof thereof.
The adverse claim filed by Deane on October 5, 1887 (No. 70), pur-
ports to be in behalf of George Bond, D. M. Van lloevenbergh and
other owners of the Roderick Dhu lode mining claim, and for them and
as their legal representatives." The nature, boundaries and extent of
said adverse claim were fully set forth, as required by law, and the ab-
stract of title of the Roderick Dha lode claim and the adverse plat show-
ing conflict between said claim and the Franklin lode claim were filed
as exhibits thereto, to which reference was made.
In verifying the protest, Deane swears:
That he is the attorney and legal representative of the adverse claimants, above
named, in this protest and adverse claim above subscribed by him because he is fa-
miliar with the facts and represents ovners whose addresses are not at present known
and whose rights in the premises it is necessary to protect. That he has read the
same and knows the contents thereof. That the same is true in substance and it fact,
and that this adverse claim is made in good faith and to protect a better and prior
title.
On the day said claim was filed, the register of the United States
land office at Glenwood Springs, Colorado, addressed the following let-
ter to George Bond and D. M. Van lloevenbergh:-
You are hereby notified that your adverse and protest No. 70 " Rhoderick Dhu"
veins M., application No. 143, survey No. 463-2, Franklin lode, D. R. C. Brown et al.,
claimants, has been this day filed in the records of this office.
You are also notified that you will be required to commence proceedings within
thirty days in a court of competent jurisdiction to determine the question of right of
possession, and prosecute the same with reasonable diligence to final judgment, fail-
ing to do which your adverse will be considered waived, and the application of sur-
vey 4632 for patent be allowed.
On November ., 1887, the adverse claimants instituted in the dis-
trict court for the county of Pitkin, State of Colorado, suit in support
of their adverse claim as owners of the Roderick Dhu mining claim
against the Franklin Mining Company and others as claimants and
applicants for patent of the Franklin lode mining claim, and on August
30, 1889, the clerk of said court certified that said suit is still pending and
undetermined in said court. It was after the institution of said suit that
the entry was allowed. Subsequently, the owners of the Rhoderick Dhu
lode mining claim, through their attorney filed a petition to the Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office, alleging that on October 5, 1887, " J.
W. Deane, Esq., was the agent, attorney and legal representative of D. M.
Van Hoevenbergh and others, owners of the Rhoderick Dhu lode min.
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ing claim, and as such filed a protest in the land office at Glenwood
Springs, Colorado, protesting against the issuance of a patent or re-
ceiver's receipt to the owners of the Franklin lode mining claim for that
lode." The petitioners prayed that " they may be granted a hearing
before some competent officer as to the matter and things set up in this
petition, and that the receiver's receipt heretofore issued to the Frank-
lin lode mining claim be held for cancellation and that your petitioners
be permitted to file additional proof of the agency of said J. W. Deane,
who filed the protest herein." This petition was verified by the affida-
vit of H. T. Tissington, one of the owners of said Rhoderick Dlh claim,
made in behalf of himself and Van Hoevenbergh, Bond, and othe
owners, in which he stated that the contents of said petition were
known to him, and that " the same is true of his own knowledge, except
as to those matters which are therein stated upon information and be-
lief, and as to them he believes it to be true."
The petition in this case and the affidavits and papers filed in support
thereof show that Deane was in fact the duly authorized agent and at-
torney of the owners of the Roderick Dhu lode claim on October 5,
1887, with authority to file the adverse claim for said owners, and he
had under the law authority to verify it, if cognizant of the facts stated.
But the contention of the applicants for patent is that the statute con-
templates that the direct and specific authority to act in the particular
matter must exist and appear at the time of the filing. To this it may
be replied, that such authority did in fact exist, and substantially ap-
pear at the time of filing of the adverse claim. That part of the rules
and regulations of the Department which requires that ' where an agent
or attorney in fact verifies the adverse claim, he must distinctly swear
that he is such agent or attorney," was complied with by Deane when
he filed the protest, alleging under oath "that he is the attorney and
legal representativeof the adverse claimants above named in thisprotest
and adverse claim", and the only omission was in failing to comply with
the remaining requirements of the rule, to wit: and accompany his
affidavit by proof thereof." That he was such agent subsequently ap-
pears by the affidavit of one of the owners to the petition herein, which
was not the ratification of an unauthorized act of Deane, but proof of
the fact that authority did exist at the date of the filing of the adverse.
So that the sole question is, whether the failure of an agent to file ac-
companying proof, in corroboration of his affidavit, as required by the
rules, will defeat the right of the adverse claimant to have the contro-
versy settled by a court of competent jurisdiction.
The act merely requires that the adverse claim "1 may be verified by
the oath of any duly authorized agent or attorney in fact of the adverse
claimant cognizant of the facts stated," and it is only by the rules and
regulations of the Department that he is required to make affidavit that
he is the agent and attorney, and to accompany his affidavit with proof
thereof.
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While the Secretary of the Interior has the power to establish rules
and regulations to give effect to the provisions of an act which have all
the force and effect of law, if not in contravention of it, yet the ailure
to comply with the technical requirements of the rules anti regulations
was a mere irregularity, and will not defeat the right of the claimant to
have the controversy settled by the appropriate tribunal, if he has com-
plied with the statute.
The material question is. whether the person filing the adverse claim
was in fact the duly authorized agent of the persons for whom he pur-
ported to act.
Besides, the local officers notified the claimant on the day the adverse
claim was presented, that it had been filed with the records of that of-
fice, and they were notified and required to commence proceedings
within thirty days in a court of competent jurisdiction to determine the
question of right of possession, and to prosecute said claim to final judg-.
ment, and upon failure to do so the adverse claim would be considered
waived and the application for patent be allowed. Acting upon this
notification, the adverse claimants commenced their suit in the proper
district court within thirty days and three days before the entry was
allowed by the local officers. This removed from the land office for the
time being all jurisdiction in the premises, and any action taken by
them afterwards was void and of no effect.
In the case of Reed v. Hoyt, 1 L. D., 603, which was a case where an
adverse claim of Silas Reed against an application for a mine in Utah
was rejected by Commissioner McFarland, because sworn to in Boston,
Massachusetts, Secretary Teller said that:-
As it appears, however, that suit was commenced on this claim within the required
time, and is now pending, I am unwilling, upon technical reasons, to interpose
objections to an adjudication of the claim by the appropriate tribunal.
In MeMaster's case, 2 L. D., 706, it was held by Secretary Teller that:
Although section 2326 of the Revised Statutes requires that " an adverse claim shall
be upon oath of the person or persons making the same," and the present claim
was filed upon the oath of their attorney only, and although your decision dismissing
the adverse claim became final against such claimants for want of appeal s o far as
respects proceedings in the Land Department, I am of the opinion that the claim
having acquired a status in the courts, the question of its regularity and validity
should be left to the judgment of the court, and that pending the proceeding this
Department should take no action therein.
It will be observed that the application in this case was made uder
the act of May 10, 1872, which required the adverse claim to be veri-
fled by the oath of the claimants themselves, and an agent was not
authorized to verify it.
Again, in the case of Meyer et at. v. ilyman, 7 L. D., 83, it was held
by Secretary Vilas that an entry allowed pripr to the final disposition
of adverse proceedings must be canceled, where it appears that such
adverse claim is still undetermined. See also Richmond Mining Com-
pany v. Rose, 114 U. S., 576.
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All of the questions herein presented can be determined by the court
in which the suit on the adverse is pending, and that court having ac-
quired jurisdiction of the case prior to the allowance of the entry, it
was therefore improvidently allowed, and the decision of your office
holding it for cancellation is affirmed.
[NOTE: An application for the recall of this decision was denied by
Secretary Noble, August 5, 1890.]
DESERT LAND ENTRY-APPLICATION.
JACOB P. OSWALD.
The failure of an applicant for desert land to show personal knowledge of the land
entered, does not call for cancellation, if the entry was allowed in accordance
with existing practice which did not require such showing on the part of the
applicant.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, August
4, 1890.
With your letter of July 5, 1889, you transmit the appeal of Jacob
P. Oswald from your office decision of February 15, 1889, holding for
cancellation his desert land entry No. 460, made July 13, 1887, for the
W. 4 NE. , Sec. 26, T. 44 N., R. 98 W., Evanston, Wyoming.
It appears that Oswald is a citizen of St. Louis, Missouri, and that
his declaration for said entry was executed in that city June 17, 1887.
It was forwarded to the local land office, accompanied by two affidavits
made by Jay L. Torrey and James T. McGinnis, who testified from per-
sonal knowledge and observation that they had frequently passed over
the land, and that the same "is desert land "-the affidavits being
otherwise in regular form and containing the usual averments required
of witnesses in desert land entries.
The register and receiver permittel the entry, and issued the usual
certificate on the payment of the twenty-five cents per acre.
The declaration of claimant stated: " that I became acquainted with
said land by representations of parties well acquainted therewith."
By your office letter of November 22, 1887, you directed the local
officers to inform the claimant * that he must furnish within sixty days
from notice a supplemental affidavit fully setting forth his personal in-
spection of each subdivision of the land and his knowledge of the char-
acter thereof being desert, in default of which his entry will be held
for cancellation."
On January 7, 1888, Mr. P. A. Torrey, of St. Louis, Missouri, the at-
torney for claimant, addressed a communication to your office, in which
he says
It is no relief to say that they (referring to eight claimants, inclnding claimant
herein,) are allowed sixty days to obtain personal knowledge of the land and submit
proofs needed, for these men can not leave their daily work for the purpose or afford
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the expense connected therewith. As these men do not now possess personal knowl-
edge of the character of the land in question and can not obtain it on possible terms,
and since it is perfectly evident that they performed to the letter and the spirit their
part of the iplied agreement, I earnestly beg on their behalf that the decision of
the Honorable Commissioner in these cases be reconsidered and the entries allowed
to stand.
On Februaiy 13, 1888, you acknowledged the receipt of Mr. Torrey's
letter, and declined to reconsider your requirement that claimant should
have personal knowledge of the desert character of the land before
entry, citing as authority the case of Matthew J. Byrnes, decided by
Assistant Commissioner Stockslager July 20,1886 (13 C. L. O., 108).
After due notice, and on failure to meet your office requirement, you
held the entry for cancellation.
The errors assigned are the following:
1. The ruling appealed from is not in accord with the established
rules and regulations of the Department.
2. It is not in accord with the act of Congress relating to the recla-
mation of desert lands.
The second section of the act to provide for the sale of desert lands
fn certain States and Territories, approved March 3, 1877 (19 Stat.,
377), is as follows:
That all lands, exclusive of timber lands and mineral lands, which will not with-
out irrigation produce some agricultural crop, shall e deemed desert lands within
the meaning of this act which fact shall be ascertained by proof of two or more cred
ible witnesses under oath, whose affidavits shall be filed in the land office in which
said tract of land may be situated.
Section 3 of said act provides that the determination of what ray
be considered desert land shall be subject to the decision and regulation
of the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
There is nothing in the act requiring applicants to have a personal
knowledge of the desert character of the land; but it does require that
such desert character shall be ascertained by "proof of two or more
eredible witnesses." But the determination of what may be considered
desert land " shall be subject to the decision and regulation of the Com-
missioner of the General Land Office."
By a general circular issued by Commissioner Sparks and approved
June 27, 1887 (5 L. ID., 708), applicants for desert lands were required
"hereafter" to have a personal knowledge of lands intended to be
entered. That the required affidavit could not be made by an agent,
nor " upon information and belief," but must be made from a personal
examination of the lands. But it was provided in that circular that
"Nothing herein. will be construed to have a retroactive effect in cases
where the official regulations of this department in force at the date
of entry were complied with." This circular was mailed to the local
land office on July 15, 1887, and August 1, thereafter, was fixed as the
date when its requirements should take effect, a reasonable time being
allowed for its transmission and promulgation. See circular approved
December 3, 1889 (9 L. D., 672).
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Prior to June 27, 1887, and certainly up to September 1, 1884, it was
not the practice of your office to require applicants for desert lands to
have a personal knowledge of their desert character. See letter of
Commissioner McFarland in case of Fritz W. Guenis et al., September
1, 1884, addressed to the local office at Evanston, Wyoming.
On July 20, 1886, in the case of Matthew J. Byrnes, supra, Assistant
Commissioner Stockslager decided that "the desert land act contem-
plated that persons entering land thereunder shall have a personal
knowledge of the land they propose to enter, obtained from an examina-
tion of each and every legal subdivision thereof, which fact must be
set forth in the declaration."
But I am unable to find that such a construction or interpretation of
the act was ever prior to that time given, and then only applied to the
Byrnes case, at the Visalia, California, land office; nor was such in-
terpretation ever of general force or the public advised of the new re-
quirement, until August 1, 1887, the date when the general circular of
June 27, 1887, supra, took effect, and it expressly provided that such
construction was not to have a " retroactive effect."
The claimant herein made his application July 13, 1887; such appli-
cation was made in accordance with existing regulations, which did not
then require an applicant for desert lands to have a personal knowledge
of the same, and his application was properly allowed. James Bow-
man (8 L. D., 408).
I therefore direct that the entry be allowed, subject to future com-
pliance with the law.
Your said office decision is reversed.
RAILROAD GRANT-CONFLICTING ENTRY-SWAMP SELECTION.
ST. LOUIS, IRON MOUNTAIN AND SOUTHERN PRY. Co.
Land covered by an entry at date of definite location is excepted thereby from the
operation of the grant, and the subsequent cancellation of the entry does not
affect the status of the land under the grant.
The act of July 28, 1866, reviving the grant of Febi nary 9, 1853, was not a new dona-
tion of lands included within the limits of the original grant, but a waiver of the
right of the government to insist upon the terms of reversion contained in said
grant.
Under the provisions of this grant, that " any and all lands reserved to the United
States by any act of Congress, for the purpose of aiding in any object of internal
improvement, or in any manner for any purpose whatsoever, be and the same are
hereby reserved to the United States from the operation of this act," lands covered
by prima fafie valid swamp selections at the date when said grant becomes effect-
ive are excepted therefrom.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, August
4, 1890.
The appeal of the St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railroad
Company from the decision of your office, dated April 11, 1888, reject-
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ing its claim to the lands hereinafter described is before me for consid-
eration.
The company claims said land under the act of February 9, 1853 (10
Stats., 155), as revived and extended by the act of July 28, 1866 (14
Stats., 338), granting to the States of Arkansas and Missouri, respect-,
ively, certain lands to aid in making a railroad from a point on the
Mississippi river, opposite the mouth of the Ohio river, in the State of
Missouri, by the way of Little Rock, to the Texas boundary line, near
Fulton in Arkansas, together with certain branches therein designated.
It appears that the line of road was definitely located August 11,
1855, and consequently that the claim of the company then attached to
the lands in place, granted by the original act.
The additional lands in place, granted by the act of July 28, 1866,
were reserved by the act from all future appropriation to any other pur-
pose than that therein contemplated, and the claim of the company at-
tached thereto at the dat6 of the passage of the act.
On May 31, 1881, as appears from your office decision, the said com-
pany " listed " the SE. of SW. 1, Sec. 6, T. 2 N., R. 14 W., and, on Jan-
uary 7, 1882, the following described tracts, to wit:-
SE. SW. , See. 18, T. 16 N., R. 3 E.,
SW.j " 12 " 18" "3"
W. SE. ," 20" 19" "4"
SW. NW. , " 22 " 16 " " 1
Lot 5 of NW.fi 30" 3" " 9"
in the Little Rock land district, Arkansas, within the six miles granted
limits of said act of February 9, 1853; that on the same day said com-
pany listed" the following described tracts, situated in the same land
district, and within the five mile additional limits granted by the act of
July 28, 1866, to wit:-
NE.41, SW , Sec. , T. 14 N., R. 2 E.,
Lots2and3ofNW.}, " 31, " 9 " "2W.,
W. SW., "23, " 11 " " 2 "
NW. & NW. SW., " 1, "16" "2"
W.j lot 2 NE.ji " 3,." 12 " "4
S. 4 NE. , " 27, " 3 " " S
March 5, 1855, one Claiborne Wright entered the tract first described.
This, it will be observed, was five months before the line of railroad was
definitely located.
June 15, 1858, Wright's said entry was canceled, and the purchase
money refunded.
All the described tracts, except the one entered by Wright, were,
prior to August 11, 1855-the date of definite location of road-selected
by the State of Arkansas as swamp lands. The State's claim to these
lands under the swamp land act was rejected by your office, and said
selections canceled February 25, 1882. As one of said tracts was
covered by Wright's entry, and all the others by unadjudicated swamp
selections at the time the company's claim attached to the lands granted
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for its use, your office held that they were thereby excepted from said
railroad grants.
The company, by its attorneys, objects to said decision, and assign
error therein as follows:
1st. In holding that the said SE. j of SW. , Sec. 6, T. 2 N., R. 14 W., was excepted
from said company's grant by the entry of one Claiborne Wright existing at date of
definite location of the line of road, said entry having been canceled long before the
act of July 28, 1866, reviving and extending said grant.
2nd. In holding the remainder of said tracts excepted from said company's grant
by an alleged selection thereof by the State of Arkansas under the prior swamp land
grant to said State: (a) Because only land actually swamp or so found by the Secre-
tary of the Interior are within the exception from said railroad grant; (b) The claim
of the State under such swamp grant was rejected by the General Land Office on
March 15, 1881, upon the formal admission of record made by the State that said lands
were not swamp lauds, and the want of record proof that said lands were in fact
swamp or overflowed within the meaning of that grant; (c) The lands being ad-
mitted not of the character contemplated by the swamp land grant, same were sub-
ject ro disposal by Congress and lawfully inure to this company under the grant
male to it by Congress.
Section 2 of the act of February 9, 1853, l)rovides:
That there be and is hereby granted to the States of Arkansas and Missouri, re-
spectively, for the purpose of aiding in making the railroad and branches as afore-
said, within their respective limits, every alternate section of land designated by
even numbers, for six sections in width on each side of said road and branches; but
in case it shall appear that the United States have, when the line or rocte of said
road is definitely fixed by the authority aforesaid, sold any part of any section hereby
granted, or that the right of pre-emption has attached to the same, then it shall be
lawful for any agent or agents, to be appointed by the Governors of said States, to
select, subject to the approval aforesaid, from the lands of the United States most
contignons to the tier of sections above specified, so much land in alternate sections
or parts of sections as shall be equal to such lands as the United States have sold, or
to which the right of pre-emption has attached as aforesaid, which lands, being equal
in quantity to one half of six sections in width on each side of said road, the States of
Arkansas and Missonri shall have and hold to and for the use and purpose aforesaid:
Provided, That the lands to be located shall in no case be further than fifteen miles
from the line of the road: And provided further, That the lands hereby granted shall
be applied in the construction of said road, and shall be disposed of only as the work
progresses, and shall be applied to no other purpose whatsoever: And provided further,
That any and all lands reserved to the United States by any act of Congress, for the
purpose of aiding in any object of internal improvement, or in any manner for any
purpose whatsoever, be and the same are hereby reserved to the United States from
the operation of this act, except so far as it may be found necessary to locate the
routes of the said railroad and branches through such reserved lands.
Section 1 of the act of July 28, 1866, provides:
That the " Act granting the right of way and making a, grant of land to the States
of Arkansas and Missouri to aid in the construction of a railroad from a point upon
the Mississippi opposite the mouth of the Ohio river, via Little Rock, to the Texas
boundary, near Fulton, in Arkansas, with branches to Fort Smith and the Mississippi
River," approved February nine, eighteen hundred and fifty--three, with all the pro-
visions therein made, be and the same is hereby, revived and extended for the term
of ten years from the passage of this act; and all the lands therein granted, which
reverted to the United States under the provisions of said act, be, and the same are
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hereby, restored to the same custody, control, and condition, and made subject to the
uses and trusts in all respects as they were before and at the time such reversion took
effect."
and section 2 of said act provides:
That there is hereby granted, added to, and made part of the donation of lands
hereby renewed and made subject to the same uses and trusts, and under the same
custody, control, and conditions, and to be held and disposed of in the same manner
as if included in the original grant, all the alternate sections and parts of sections,
designated by odd numbers, lying along the outer line of lands heretofore granted,andi
within five miles on each side thereof, excepting lands reserved or otherwise appro-
priated by law, or to which the right of pre-emption or homestead settlement has
attached.
The status of these lands when the grant took effect must determine
whether they are subject thereto. Neilson v. Northern Pacific R. R. (o.
et al. (9 L. D.,402 ;) Showell v. Central Pacific R. R. Co. (10 id., 137).
As for the tract covered by the entry of Wright, it is clearly ex-
cepted froin the original grant under the clause in the act of 1853, pro-
viding for indemnity in case the " United States have when the line or
route of said road is definitely fixed, by the authority aforesaid, sold
any part of any section hereby granted, or that the right of pre-emption
has attached to the same," etc. The subsequent cancellation of the
entry could not change the status of the land, or operate in favor.of the
company (Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Kerry, 10 L. D., 290), unless it
was thereby brought within the grant under the reviving act of 1866.
An examination of said act does not, however, bear out this theory.
It did not purport to grant lands that were excluded from the opera-
tion of the former act, but only to " revive " and " renew "; said act " with
all the provisions therein made," for the further period of ten years. It
was not a new donation of the lands included within the limits of the
original grant, but a waiver of the right of the government to insist
upon the terms of reversion contained in said grant. Alabama and
Chattanooga R. R. Co. v. Clabourn, 6 L. D., 427.
As for the tracts covered by the swamp selections, the provisions in
section 2 of the original grant " That any and all lands reserved to the
United States by any act of Congress, for the purpose of aiding in any
object of internal improvement, or in any manner for any purpose, what-
soever, be and the same are hereby reserved to the United States from
the operation of this act," works an exclusion of these lands from the
grant; for at the date when the grant became effective, both within the
original and additional limits, said lands were covered by prima faoie
valid selections under the swamp grant. The words of exception are
broad in their significance and leave but slight room for construction.
Lands reserved in any manner or for any purpose whatsoever are ex-
pressly excluded from the grant. In the administration of the swamp
grant lands formally claimed thereunder must of necessity, during the
pendency of such claim be reserved from any other disposition, and this
is the ruling of the Department. Starr v. State of Minnesota, 8 L. D.,
644; State of Oregon, 9 id. 360,
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The same rule has been applied in cases of indemnity school selec-
tions, even where it subsequently transpired that the selection was in-
valid. Niven v. State of California, 6 L. D., 439; Call v. Southern Pa-
cific l. R. Co., 11 IL. D., 49.
The same effect is given to a railroad indemnity selection, it being
held to preclude the allowance of an entry for the land covered thereby.
Rudolph Nemitz, 7 L. D., 80. It would therefore appear that the De-
partment has uniformly construed the formal assertion of a claim to a
particular tract of land under a congressional grant to work a reserva-
tion of such tract during the pendency of such claim. Indeed the rec-
ognition of any other rule would frequently operate to defeat the exe-
cution of a grant in accordance with its terms.
As the condition of the lands at the time when the grant becomes
operative determines whether they are included therein, it must be held
that the pending swamp selections excluded the lands covered thereby
from the operation of this grant.
The decision of your office is accordingly affirmed.
TIMBER CULTURE CONTEST-AGENT.
DAVIES V. KILLGORE.
A timber culture entryman who entrusts the care of his claim to an agent is respon-
sible for the negligence of said agent in performing the requisite acts of eompli-
ance with law.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 4, 1890.
This appeal involves timber-culture entry No. 5241, made by Charles
Killgore October 26, 1883, for the W. j of the NW. 4 and the W. j of the
SW. 4, Sec. 6, T. 14 N., R. 19 W., Grand Island, Nebraska.
James Davies filed affidavit of contest November 10, 1886, alleging
that " defendant has not planted or caused to be planted to trees, seeds
or cuttings five acres of said tract from date of entry up to November
8,1886." By stipulation the testimony was taken before A. B. Samson,
notary public, at Broken Bow, Custer County, Nebraska. Three wit-
nesses were examined by contestant, all swearing that, up to November
10, 1886, no seeds, trees or cuttings had been planted on the land em-
braced in the entry. No witnesses were introduced by the defendant,
but by agreement of counsel it was stipulated that, on the part of de-
fendant,
Charles Killgore will swear that he is a non-resident of the State of Nebraska and
has been for two years last past; that when leaving for Wyoming Territory, two
years ago, he paid William Smiddy to attend to his timber claim for him, and agreed
to pay him for doing the work necessary to comply with the timber-culture law the
sum of twenty-live dollars per year and that he has paid him that sum for the past
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two years, and further agreed that he should have the benefit of any crop that should
be raised on the broken land on said claim; also that said William Smiddy would
swear that-he received the above consideration, and agreed to attend to the work
and arranged for all the work to be done up to the time of planting timber on said
tract; that about the last of August or first of September, 1886, himself and four
other men went on to the tract for the purpose of planting box elder seeds thereon,
and did so plant five acres of land with box elder seeds, and that the land so planted
was on that that he had been shown as being on Charles Kilgore's timber claim, and
that he always supposed until to-day, the day of hearing, that it was on Kilgore's
timber claim, and he now ascertains that said seeds were planted on a timber claim
adjoining this one on the north, with which he was not concerned in the least, in-
stead of on the Kilgore timber claim as intended; and that another wi tness will swear
that he went there with Smiddy to help him plant seeds on the Kilgore timber claim
and that the seeds were planted where directed by Smiddy.
Onthisevideneethe register and receiver found in favor ofthe contest-
ant, and recommended the cancellation of the entry. On appeal to your
office, the decision of the local officers was reversed and the contest
dismissed, and the contestant has appealed to this Deparment.
While it has been and still is the policy of this Department to deal
liberally with entrymen who are honestly endeavoring to comply with
the requirements of law in perfecting their entries. still it has always
held that the entryman should exercise ordinary diligence, and if his
failure is attributable to the lack of such diligence his mistakes
ought not to be rectified at the sacrifice of the inchoate rights of others
who are diligent and honest in the prosecution of their claims.
In the case under consideration the claimant, Killgore, made entry
under the timber-culture law, which requires at least eight years to
perfect his title, and contented himself with employing an agent at
twenty-five dollars a year to attend to all the requirements of the law,
while he took up his permanent residence in another State, and, appar-
ently, thereafter gave no heed to his claim.
It is true that the presence of an entryman on his claim is not re-
quired under the timber-culture act, yet, if he chooses to entrust the
culture of timber to an agent, he will be held responsible for his negli-
gence and can not plead exemption from responsibilty for his careless
or heedless mistakes in failing to comply with the law upon the ground
that he has employed and aid him to do the work necessary to per-
fect the entry. (iemstreet v. Greenup, 4 L. D., 493.)
The only question to determine then is, did Smiddy exercise ordi-
nary care and prudence in ascertaining the true location of defendant's
entry. The evidence of his diligence is set out in the stipulation from
which it appears that Smiddy planted the five acres on land that " he
had been shown as being on Charles Kilgore's timber claim." There is
no statement as to who showed him the tract or that the person show-
ing him resided in the vicinity, or knew anything about the location of
the claim, and there is no explanation of how he came to rely upon the
judgment of the person directing him where to plant.
It further appears from the record that Siddy had been for two
years in charge of the timber culture on this claim, during which time
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he had "arranged for all the work to be done up to the time of plant-
ing timber," and after such two years supervision does not know where
the Oaim is located.
I do not think this Department would be justified in excusing mis-
takes so heedlessly made as this evidently was, and as the claimant
must be held responsible for the carelessness of his agent, the decision
of your office is reversed and the entry of Kilgore canceled.
RAILROAD GRANT-PRE-EMPTION FILING.
UNION PACIFIC RY. (JO. V. PHILLIPS.
A primafacie valid pre-emption filing existing at date of definite location excepts the
land covered thereby from the operation of the grant; and the fact that the pre-
emptor did not reside upon, cultivate, or improve the land included in his claim,
does not relieve the grant from the effect of said filing.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General, Land Office, August
4, 1890.
On December 3, 1889, the Department rendered decision in the case
of the Union Pacific Railway Company v. George G. Phillips, involving
the SE. of the SW. 4 of Sec. 5, T. 1 N., R. 66 W., Denver land dis-
trict, Colorado.
Said Phillips applied to make. timber-culture entry of the tract
described; but his application was rejected by the local officers, on the
ground that it was within the granted limits of the Union Pacific Rail-
way.
The line of road of said railway was definitely located opposite said
tract on August 20, 1869.
On April 21, 1866, one Thomas Laws had filed pre-emption declara-
tory statement for said tract (with others); which filing was canceled
November 13, 1873, for relinquishment, executed by said Laws August
14, 1873.
Said departmental decision (of December 3, 1889,) held that, as the
tract in question was unoffered, Laws's filing was at date of the definite
location of the road an unexpired filing; and as such served to except
the tract from the grant.
Counsel for the railroad company alleged that said departmental
decision had been rendered on an incomplete record, and at his request
the Department, on December 7, 1889, directed your office to return
the decision, together with the entire record in the case, with a view to
a further examination thereof in the light of the additional papers.
Your office, on December 21, 1889, transmitted the record as directed.
On inspection of the record, it appears that the paper belonging
therewith that was not originally transmitted, was an affidavit of
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Thomas Laws, executed August 14, 1873, in which said Laws declared
that he had " never resided upon, or improved, or cultivated, said land
in any way or manner whatever."
Counsel for the railroad company contend that yvithout settlement,
improvement, or cultivation, a pre-emption filing is a nullity, and could
not except the tract from the grant.
This contention can not be maintained.
The question as to whether the pre-emptor ... . . . inhabited and im-
proved the land, and performed other duties required by the pre-emption law, is not
a matter that concerns the company. . . . . . . It is sufficient that there was,
at the date of the withdrawal, a claim to the land in dispute of such a nature and
character as the act defines; and any question as to the lawfulness of such claim at
that date, or as to the performance by the claimant of certain specified conditions, is
immaterial (Northern Pac. R. R. Co. v. Stovenour, 10 L. D.,645; citing Kans. Pac. R.
R. v. Dunmeyer, 113 U. S., 629-641; Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U. S., 761).
I see no reason, therefore, why said departmental decision of Decem-
ber 3, 1889, should not be promulgated by your office, and the same is
herewith returned for that purpose.
OSAGE LAND-SECTION 2260, I. S.-RESIDENCE.
JACUmAN v. MCDANIELS.
One who quits or abandons residence on his own land, to reside on Osage land in the
same State, is disqualified thereby.to purchase said land.
A settler who purchases land from the State, by virtue of his residence thereon, is pre-
cluded thereby from subsequently claiming residence on public land during the
period covered by his proof under the State law.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 5, 1890.
With your letter of June 22, 1889, you transmit the appeal of William
D. McDaniels from your office decision of January 2, 1889, wherein you
hold for cancellation his Osage declaratory statement No. 6952, filed by
him December 20, 1884, for the NW. of See. 22, T. 34 S., R. 20 W.,
Larned, Kansas, alleging settlement September 20, 1884.
Harry B. Jackman filed Osage declaratory statement, No. 8653, April
29, 1885, for the same tract, alleging settlement January 27, 1885.
On November 23, 1885, McDaniels made final proof in support of his
filing; Jackman protested against allowing the final proof of McDaniels,
asserting a prior right to the land and on December 12, 1885, he made his
final proof.
Hearing was had on Jackman's protest and, on February 17 1887,
the local officers decided in favor of Jackman and recommended the
cancellation of McDaniels' filing and on appeal, you affirm that finding.
I have examined the testimony and the same is correctly set forth in
your said office decision.
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The principal errors assigned are as follows:-
1. In holding that a certificate of the probate judge of Barber county,
Kansas, to a claimed fact is evidence in the case when such certificate
is made in general terms.
2. In holding that appellant moved from his own (the school tract)
to the land in question without stronger proof as to the identity of the
appellant with the person whom it is claimed entered the tract of school
land December 23, 1884; that it cannot be assumed in the absence of
proof that both are one and the same person.
The certificate alluded to is as follows:
STATE OF KANSAS, Barber Co. ss.
In the Probate Court in said county.
In the matter of the application of William McDaniel to purchase the SE. i, See.
16, T. 34, R. 20, he having proven his continuous residence on said land by two affi-
davits of William Bott and John L. MeDaniel. It is, therefore ordered and adjudged
that said applicant be allowed to purchase said land at the appraised value, viz.,
$480 this 23rd day of December, 1884.
H. H. HARVEY,
Probate Juldge.
[SEAL.] I hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy as appears of
record in my office.
H. H. HARVEY,
Probate Jidge.
The statutes of Kansas, Laws of 1876, Ch. 122, Art. 14, invest probate
courts with jurisdiction to hear and determine whether a settler upon
school land is qualified to purchase the land at the appraised value and
its decision upon the facts daly submitted and upon every question in-
volved is binding upon both the settler and the State unless appealed
from. (State v. Dennis, 39 Kan., 509).
The statutes of Kansas (Sec. 5298, Chap. 92, Laws of 1881) authorize
a petitioner for such lands to purchase same on making proof that such
petitioner "has settled upon and improved" the lands as set forth in
his petition, and the certificate of the probate judge above set out,
shows that Mcl~aniels on December 23, 1884, ' proved" his continuous
residence on the school land, and thereupon he was permitted to pur-
chase the same at the appraised value.
The certificate objected to is informal in failing to show what the
original is from which the " copy" was made; but the testimony of Mc-
Daniels himself, shows he purchased the school lands and he identifies
himself as the same William MeDaniels, who made the purchase of the
school lands.
A settler on Osage lands must have the qualifications of a pre-emptor;
no person who quits or abandons his residence on his own land to reside
on the public land in the same State or Territory shall acquire the right
of pre-emption. Section 2260, Revised Statutes of the United States.
McDaniels was not a qualified pre-emptor at the time he made his fil-
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ing since he was then living on the school lands as shown by him De-
cember 23, following, on which day he purchased his school lands; more-
over, the statutes of Kansas required him to show continuous residence
prior to purchasing school lands, and having obtained the benefits of
his own State laws in obtaining school lands, he can not be permitted
to deny the finding of the probate court, on his own petition, namely,
that he resided on the school lands, in order to show that he was re-
siding on government lands during the same period, for the purpose of
pre-empting the same.
The filing of McDaniels is, therefore, canceled, and your said office
decision is affirmed.
CONTEST-WITHElDRAWAL OF CONTESTANT.
WELLS V. HEWITT.
In cases of contest the government is a party in interest and is not precluded by the
withdrawal of the contestant from considering the evidence, and passing upon the
rights of the entryman; but the government will not on its own motion cancel
an entry unless bad faith is clearly shown.
In determining whether a claimant for public land has manifested good faith in the
assertion of his claim, his mental, as well as his physical, condition may be con-
sidered.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Offlce, August 6, 1890.
By letter of June 27, 1.88%, you transmitted the papers in the case
of Sumner J. Wells v. Oliver N. Hewitt on appeal by the latter from
your office decision of October 22, 1888, holding for cancellation his
homestead entry for the SE1. of Sec. 29, T. 13 N., R. 61 W., Fargo,
Dakota land district, upon the contest of Wells charging failure to
establish actual residence. By letter of April 12, 1890, you trans-
mitted the withdrawal by Wells of his contest. This withdrawal is ac-
cepted and Wells' connection with the case is thereby ended. In cases
of contest the government is a party in interest, and is not precluded
by a contestant withdrawing his contest from considering the evidence
and passing upon the right of the entryman as between himself and
the government. Overton v. oskin (7 L. D., 394). While this is true,
yet the government will not of its own motion cancel an entry if bad
faith on his part is not clearly shown. Bell v. Bolles (9 L. D., 148).
I think the evidence in this case shows that this entryman had not,
prior to the contest established an actual residence on his claim and
therefore justified the conclusion reached in your office, as between him
and Wells, yet after contest he established his residence and has culti-
vated and improved the tract to such an extent that as between him and
the government, I am not prepared to say that the facts present stch
a degree of bad faith on his part as to demand that he shall not
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be given further opportunity to support his entry in the absence of any
adverse claim or rights, and especially so as he will be obliged to show
on submitting his final proof, that he has fairly complied with the spirit
of the law.
He made his entry January 3, 1884, the contest was initiated May
15, 1886, and the hearing had July 6th following.
The testimony shows that the entryman is an honest, hard-working
man, who can easily be imposed upon. He went UpOD the land in the
fall of 1883, and built a small house or shanty and dug a well. In De-
cember he went to his sister's and lived during the winter of 1883-4.
In the spring he returned to his claim and found that some one had re-
moved his house. He secured timber at considerable cost and built
another in June, 1884, and broke fifteen or eighteen acres of land.
While breaking he lived in his house, and during the summer dug
another well. He was very poor and worked about at different places
to get means to live upon and to improve and cultivate the land. He
was frequently on the tract working a few days at a time. Built a sod
and pole stable at quite an expense, having to haul the poles about fifty
miles. Voted in the precinct where the land is situated, claimed it as
his home and says he hadno other. In this heis corroborated. At the
initiation of the contest he had a pair of oxen, a wagon, a plow and was
preparing to cultivate twenty-five or thirty acres of land which he had
broken.
While his residence is not at all satisfactory, yet I do not find such
evidence of bad faith as to absolutely demand the cancellation of his
entry. Judging him charitably, I am inclined, under all the circum-
stances of the case. to give him until he submits his final proof to show
a compliance with the law,if he can. He is to bejudgedin the light of
his mental as well as his physical condition for the purpose of getting at
his intent during the time he has been asserting claim to this tract.
Using these cardinal principles as a guide, I am inclined to the belief
that he in the exercise of his understanding and means, intended to
honestly comply with the law and rules of the Department. Whether
he will be able to show a compliance with the homestead act as to resi-
dence, remains to be determined by future considerations, but for the
present, let this entry stand and give him a further opportunity to sat-
isfy the Department that in reason and fairness he is entitled to the tract
in question.
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RAILROAD GRANT-INDEMNITY SELECTIONS.
LITTLE ROCK AND MEMPHIS R. R. Co.
Under the grant of February 9, 1853, as revived and extended by the act of July 28,
1866, the aid given by Congress was intended equally for every part of the road and
its branches, and deficiencies existing on one of said branches may be made up by
selections from lands within the indemnity limits of the other branch.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the eneral Land Oice, August
2, 1890.
By letter of October 10, 1889, you submitted list 7, of indemnity se-
lections, embracing 31,192.24 acres, made by the Little Rock and Mem-
phis Railroad Company, successor to the Memphis and Little Rock
Railroad Company under the act of Congress approved July 28, 866
(14 Stats., 338), which revived and extended the act of February 9, 1853
(10 Stats., 155). The list is submitted for such action as may be deemed
proper in the premises.
The question presented is whether, under said grant, lands may be
taken along one branch of the road, as indemnity for lands lost on the
other.
The act of 1853 provided for the construction of a railroad " from a
point on the Mississippi river, opposite the mouth of the Ohio, in the
State of Missouri, via Little Rock, to the Texas boundary line near Ful-
ton, in Arkansas, with branches from Little Rock in Arkansas, to the
Mississippi river, and to Fort Smith in said State."
The lands in said list are opposite the Little Rock and Fort Smith or
western branch of the road, but selected in lieu of losses along the Little
Rock and Memphis or eastern branch.
The granting clause of said act was as follows:
That there be and is hereby granted to the States of Arkansas and Missonri, respect-
ively, for the purpose of aiding in making the railroad and branches as aforesaid,
within their respective limits, every alternate section of land designated by even
numbers, for six sections in width on each side of said road and branches.
The indemnity clause is:
But in case it shall appear that the United States have, when the line or route of
said road is defliitely fixed by the authority aforesaid, sold any part of any section
hereby granted, or that the right of pre-emption has attached to the same, then it
shall be lawful for any agent or agents, to be appointed by the governor of said
State, to select, subject to the approval aforesaid, from the lands of the United States
most contiguous to the tier of sections above specified, so much land in alternate
sections or parts of sections as shall be equal to such lands as the United States have
sold, or to which the right of pre-eniption has attached as aforesaid, which lands,
being equal in quantity to one-half of six sections in width on each side of said road,
the States of Arkansas and Missouri shall have and hold to and for the use and pur-
pose aforesaid: Provided, That the lands to be located shall in no ease be further than
fifteen miles from the line of the road.
There is certainly no expression in this clause that would limit indem-
nity selections to the branch on which the loss occurred. The only lim-
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itations on the right of selection thus made, are that the lands so selected
shall be lands of the United States, " most contiguous to the tier of
sections above specified, " (i. e., to the granted sections), equal to the
amount so lost as described, and in no case further than fifteen miles
from the line of the road. That the word " road "o as here used, includes
the branches as well as the main stem is evident from the fact that
most of the indemnity lands along the lines of the branches lay more
than fifteen miles from the main stem. To say that the word " road "
means only the main stem would, therefore, practically, defeat the in-
demnity grant for the branches, a conclusion obviously opposed to the
purpose of the grant. For a like reason the word "road" as used
throughout the indemnity clause necessarily includes the branches. It
therefore appears that in providing for indemnity selections Congress
made no distinction between the main line as such and the branches.
Nor does it appear from the grant by the State of Arkansas to the
Memphis and Little Rock railroad company that the legislature con-
templated a change in that respect. The act of the legislature of Ar-
kansas of January 19, 1855, provides:
That the lands within this State, along the length of the Memphis and Little
Rock railroad from Hopefield, opposite the city of Mernphis, in the State of Tennessee,
to Little Rock, with the right conferred by the act of Congress of selecting other
land in lieu of such lands as may have been sold or otherwise appropriated by the
United Stares and which lands were granted by an act of Congress to the States of
Arkansas and Missouri, to aid in the constructing a railroad from a point on the Miss-
issippi River, opposite the month of the Ohio River, by way of Little Rock, to the
Texas boundary near Fulton, in Arkansas, with branches to Fort Smith and the Miss-
issippi River, approved February 9th, 1853, are hereby granted to the Memphis and
Little Rock Railroad Company so that they may b- legally applied in aid of the con-
struction of said branch railroad separately from said main trunk line, or the Fort
Smith branch thereof.
Section seven of said act provides:
That said lands shall be selected by said company in conformity with said act of
Congress, and when so selected, all the title of the State of Arkansas, in and to said
'anls shall be fully vested in said company for the purposes set forth in said act of
Congress.
It will be observe d that the right of selection as defined by Congress
is not abridged by this act; on the contrary it is expressly declared
that such lands shall be selected in conformity with the act of Congress.
Furthermore, a consideration of the nature of the grant points to a like
solution. The grant was to the State, for the purpose of aiding in the
construction of a railroad with two branches. In case sufficient vacant
lands were found within the granted limits the grant was satisfied there-
from. Along the line of the Memphis branch the deficit within the
granted limits was very great, owing principally to the swampy charcter
of the country, such lands having theretofore been granted to the
State.
The company having exhaustedthelands opposite said branch now asks
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to be allowed to select lands along the Fort Smith branch not needed in
aid of the construction of the latter. It appears from the records of
your office that in 1883 the grant for the Little Rock and Fort Smi t h road
or western branch, having been so far adjusted as to permit of the res-
toration of the vacant lands along said line, theretofore withdrawn for
said road, to the mass of public lands, your office by letters of March
31, of that year, to the various local offices concerned, directed the res-
toration to the public domain of all such vacant unappropriated lands,
not included within the limits of any other grant. The restoration was
accordingly made. It thus appears that said western branch road can
have no legal claim to the lands here selected, nor has it asserted any.
It has received its full quota under the grant and within. its own limits.
It must be conceded that the aid given by Congress was intended
equally for every part of the road and branches. Unless legislation to the
contrary has intervened this intent should be carried out. It has been
seen that the State legislation is in harmony with the granting act in
this matter. There is therefore nothing in the legislation to warrant
a denial of the right now asserted, and the nature of the aid extended
by Congress indicates that such selection should be allowed.
But we are not without authority on this point. On August 5,1852,
your office held, in the matter of the Illinois Central railroad that a de-
ficiency on the main line might be made up by selection of indemnity
on a branch, and vice versa. This rule was followed in the construction
of the grant. It was also applied in the administration of the grant of
May 15, 1856, to the State of Iowa, made in almost similar terms, so far
as the point in question goes, with the present, for a road from Lyon
City, etc., " with a branch from the mouth of the Tete des Morts to the
nearest point on said road." (11 Stats., 9.)
On December 2, 1875, in the case of the road now known as the St.
Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba railway; having a grant similar to that
here in question, viz., the act of March 3, 1857 (11 Stats., 195), Secre-
tary Chandler held that the lands withdrawn for the main line and
branch were "equally liable to selection on account of either line," the
grant to both being treated as an undivided grant. (2 C. L. O., 134).
This ruling was adhered to by Secretary Vilas (8 L. D., 255).
In the latter case the Secretary said:
Limiting the view to the act making the grant to the State of Minnesota, it is to
be noted that, irrespective of the question of whether the branch " could be treated
as a part of the "road," it is plain that it was the purpose of Congress that any de-
ficiency in the granted limits, should be made up from the indemnity limits without
restriction to selection of lands within the limits of coterminons sections. In other
words, there can be no doubt that Congress intended that if a deficiency occurred at
any point in the granted limits and there were lands within the indemnity limits
sufficient to supply all the deficiencies in the granted limits, selections might be made
of lands wherever found in the indemnity limits longitudinally to an extent sufficient
to supply such deficiencies.
For a further discussion of the question, reference is made to the
case.
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In the consideration of the matter my predecessor was led to say that
the same rule had been applied to the grant to the States of Arkansas
and Missouri, here in question. This statement does not appear to be
borne oat by the record. In a letter dated August 6, 1858, from Com-
missioner Hendricks to Secretary Thompson, it was said:
In the case of the grant to Arkansas, by act of February 9, 1853, transferred by the
State to several companies,-the adjustment of which commenced under my prede-
cessor, and has lately been completed,-the trunk and branches were treated as sep-
arate roads, and the rights and extent of each determined on the principle laid down
by this office on the 30th March last, above mentioned. I would also state that Ar-
kansas in transferring the railroad grant to the several companies, makes a grant to
each in severalty, transferring the lands etc., upon the main trunk to one company
and upon the branches to others.
The decision of your office therein referred to as of "'30th March last "
was in reference to the Minneapolis and Cedar Valley railroad also
under the grant of March 3, 1857, supra, and held, " the selections for
the branch road in lieu of the lands disposed of within the six miles
limits of te same, must be made from the alternate odd numbered sec-
tions outside of six and within fifteen miles of the line of route of said
branch."
However the error of fact in my predecessor's decision was not at all
vital to the case or to his argument. By reference to the above extract
it will be seen he reached the same conclusion independently of said
fact. This more fully appears from the farther discussion in the opinion.
Again, the statement by Commissioner Hendricks loses much of its
importance in the light of other facts. The statement was not made
in any case then pending before him, but was a mere recital in a letter
which primarily referred to a different grant. A careful research in
your office satisfactorily discloses the fact that the question was never
formally presented to Mr. Hendricks in any case. Indeed, this pres-
entation is the first of which any record remains. Certainly the matter
has heretofore never reached the Secretary.
Whether the State had the power to abridge or modify the right of
selection as defined by Congress, need not be discussed, for in this in-
stance she transferred it intact as it was given by Congress. The ques-
tion, therefore, reverts to a consideration of the Congressional enact-
ment. In this aspect, that question is in all material respects similar to
those cases already cited, and decided by the Department as stated.
In the light of precedents the branch having selected vacant public
lands within the limits defined by the grant, in the absence of adverse
claims, is entitled to the relief sought.
The list is accordingly returned with my approval.
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FINAL PROOF PROCEEDINGS-ADVERSE CLAIMANT-IMPROVEMNIENTS.
FINDLEY . FORD.
Adverse claimants of record are entitled to special notice of intention to submit
final proof, and where proof is submitted without such notice, republication is re-
quired with special citation to the adverse claimant.
The pre-enmption law does not specify the nature or extent of the improvements re-
quired of the settler, only requiring that they should be such as to indicate good
faith.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 6, 1890.
I have considered the case of David M. Findley v. Patrick Ford on the
appeal of the former from your decision of March 15, 1889, accepting
the final proof of Ford for SE. 4 of NW. i and SW. 4 of NE. i and W. 4
of SE. 1 Sec. 28, T. 26 S.,. R E1}., M. D. M. San Francisco, California
land district and dismissing protest of appellant against the same. The
record shows that on July 9, 1886 Ford tiled pre-emption declaratory
statement for said land, alleging settlement July 2, 1886, that Findley
had filed declaratory statement for said land October 4, 1883, alleging
settlement October 2, 1883.
On March 30, 1886, Elisha Terrill filed pre-emption declaratory state-
ment No. 2L, 635, for this land iii controversy, alleging settlement March
14, of the same year. On December 9, 1886, Ford gave notice by pub-
lication of his intention to make final proof on January 24, 1887. On
said day D. M. Findley and others filed a protest against said proof
alleging therein that said Findley had occupied the said land for three
years past and further that Ford had not complied with the require-
ments of the law in the matter of his pre-emption.
Ford offered his final proof at the close of which Findley, by his at-
torney cross-examined him and his witnesses and offered testimony
adverse to Ford's claim.
Upon consideration of the testimony the register and receiver found:-
1st. That Ford initiated his claim by trespassing upon the enclosure
of others to establish his settlement, and-
2nd. That his residence, cultivation and improvements are not suffi-
cient to show good faith.
Upon these findings they recommend that his final proof be rejected
and that his claim be canceled. From this decision he appealed and on
March 15, 1889, you reversed the judgment appealed from, dismissed
the contest and allowed Ford's final proof. From which action Findley
appealed. He does not assert any claim to the land under his declara-
tory statement, and shows by his testimony that at the time of filing
the same he owned and resided with his family upon a ninety acre tract
of land near Arroyo Grande, California, which home he would have to
quit or abandon to make residence on the land in controversy. His
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pre-emption declaratory statement had expired by limitation; he had
never offered final proof and his attorney in his brief admits that Find-
ley appears not as a claimant but as a contestant.
Then the questions to be determined are:-
1st. What is the effect of the failure of Ford to serve Terrill with
notice of his intention to make his final proof 
2nd. Did Ford comply with the pre-emption law ?
Taking these questions in their order, it is admitted that Terrill was
not notified by Ford of his intention to make final proof. "Adverse
claimants of record should always be specially cited both in homestead
and pre-emption notices of intention to make proof." Instructions, No-
vember 25, 1884, 3 L. D., 196; Tuttle v. Parkin, 9 L. D., 495. So that
I take it that before this entry can be perfected notice should be given
in compliance with these rules.
As to Ford's compliance with the law, the testimony shows that after
filing his declaratory statement he built a cabin on the land eight by
ten feet, seven or eight feet high, with plank roof, battened door and
earth floor. It was rather an inferior structure but in July 1886, he
placed therein a bed, table, cooking utensils, some dishes etc., and began
living therein. Some time later he procured a cooking stove and put it
in his house. He testified that he had lived there continuously since
making the filing; that he was an unmarried man, and had worked
some for his neighbors, but slept at his house generally when so work-
ing; he had cleared and prepared for plowing some four acres of ground
and had plowed about two acres; he had also prepared about one hun-
dred fence posts preparatory to fencing his laud. In these matters he
is corroborated.
In the protest it is alleged that Findley had occupied the ground for
three years, and as the testimony showed that Ford had taken the lum-
ber for his house through the fence of Wear, who is an adjoining land
proprietor, it is seriously claimed by Findley that Ford was thereby a
mere trespasser and can acquire no rights by settlement, residence or
improvement on the land, and he cites numerous decisions to support
his position, but I do not deem it necessary to repeat them here, for it
must be remembered that in the case at bar there was no occupant of
the land, no one in possession thereof, rightfully or otherwise, no grow-
ing crops thereon, no fence around this specific tract, so that this mat-
ter of trespass, so fully argued and so much relied upon by the local
officers, is a mere abstract proposition, inapplicable to the facts in this
case.
While the improvements of Ford are quite meagre, the testimony
shows that he had established and maintained a residence upon the
land for more than six months prior to offering final proof. In the case
of Chas. S. Hofwalt (9 L. D., 1), it is said-" Pre-emption is a prefer-
ence right of entry based upon settlement, inhabitancy and cultiva-
tion . . . . . . . The pre-emption act does not specify the nature
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or extent of the improvements and only requires that they should be
such as would indicate the good faith of the entryman."
In the case of John E. Tyrl (3 L. D., 49), where it appears that the
entryman had cleared about one half acre of the land but cultivated no
portion of it nor raised any crop thereon, it is held that clearing the
land of timber for the purpose of planting it, is cultivation within the
meaning of section 2301 Revised Statutes.
Under these decisions and this testimony Ford's proof should be ac-
cepted, but as Terrill has not had his day in court, your decision is
modified as follows: The protest of Findley and others is dismissed.
Ford will make new publication of notice and specially cite Elisha Ter-
rill, and in the absence of protest, and the failure of Terrill to show
cause, if any, why his declaratory statement should not be canceled and
Ford's proof allowed, the proof already made will be accepted and if
there is no other legal objection, the entry will be passed to patent.
PRACTICE-STARE DECISIS.
JOHN T. NAFF.
The General Land Office in the disposition of cases that fall within well settled rul-
ings of the Department must be governed by such rulings until they are reversed
by departmental authority.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Offlice, August
8, 1890.
I am in receipt of a communication from Acting Commissioner Stone,
dated August 5, 1890, calling the attention of the Secretary of the In-
terior, " with a view to repayment, to the pre-emption filing No. 4,813 of
John T. Naff, made at the Spokane Falls land office, on the 15th day of
July, 1884, for the E. SE. SW. SE. , and the SE. SW. of Sec.
12, T. 19 N., R. 43 E., W. M."
After making a statement relative to the final proof and payment for
said land, the embezzlement by the absconding receiver of the local
office of the $400 first paid by the pre-emptor, and the making of new
proof and payment for said land, the Acting Commissioner states:
Heretofore the decisions of this Department have been to the effect that no repay-
ments of purchase money can be made unless strictly provided for by statutes; even
when the money has been paid twice (see 5 L. D., 114). If this be the spirit of the
rulings of the Department, there an be no doubt that great injustice is being done
to settlers, and has been done in the past. It is not to be presumed that there shall
be a particular statute to cover every particular right, wrong, or remedy.
The Commissioner further says:-
It was not the intention of Congress to pass so many many wise, just and liberal laws
providing homes for settlers, and then permitthemto be harassed, and their rights in-
jured by harsh implications of this department. The mass of unwritten laws are as
great, and of as much weight, as the written laws. Many rights are not re-enforced
by statutes.
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He is therefore of the opinion, "in view of the circumstances of this
case .that repayment should be made."
No application bysaid Naff for repayment accompanies said cornmuni-
cation, nor, indeed, is it expressly stated that he has made any.
The Acting Commissioner makes an argument in support of the right
of Naff to repayment, but does not specifically request any instructions
in the premises. It is true he cites the case of the Heirs of Isaac W.
Tal kington (5 L. D., 114), which holds a contrary view to that expressed
by him.
It is not intended to express any opinion herein relative to the right
of Mr. Naff to repayment. If he has such right, he must show it prima.
rily to your office, and, if its decision be adverse to him, he has the right
of appeal. But, in passing upon the question, your office must be gov-
erned by the well settled rulings of the Department, which alone has
the authority to overrule its own decisions. Any other procedure would
make the appellate tribunal inferior to the subordinate and necessarily
createinextricable confusion. Troy's Heirs v. Southern Pacifie Railroad
Company (2L.D.,523); J.I.Kopperud,l0L.D.,93. Nounwrittenlaw
can overturn the departmental decisions, duly rendered and promulgated
for the guidance of all concerned. If Mr. Naff has made application for
repayment, the same should be duly considered by your office in the
light of the departmental rulings, and, if adverse to him, he should be
advised of his right of appeal to the Secretary of the Interior, and if he
exercise such right, his case will be carefully considered.
CONTESTANT-PREFERENCE RIGHT-SETTLEMENT.
POWERS v. ADY.
A successful contestant, who has due notice of the cancellation of the entry and fails
to exercise the preference right within the statutory period, has thereafter no
right of entry that can be asserted in the presence of a valid intervening adverse
claim.
Personal acts f the settler are essential to the acquisition of settlement rights.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 8, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Anna V. Powers from your decision
of December 27, 1888, rejecting her application to enter the SW. of
Sec. 11, T. 122, R. 77, Aberdeen, Dakota.
The facts in the case are stated in your office letter.
The contestant Powers had full notice of the cancellation of the prior
entry on the land which she had contested, and failed to exercise the
right given her by the statute of making entry for the tract within
thirty days from the date of the receipt of said notice, and even if this
failure was the result of ill health and want of means, it is beyond the
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power of this Department to afford relief in the presence of a valid
adverse claim.
From an examination of the evidence I am not satisfied that she
acted in perfect good faith in the matter of delaying her application to
enter. The explanation given by the contestant and her father of the
attempted sale of the right to enter the land is not satisfactory. It is,
however, unnecessary to discuss that question at length.
Up to the date of hearing the contestant had not made a bona fide
settlement on the land or established a residence thereon.
The slight improvement put upon the tract by the father at the
request of the contestant, consisting of a little breaking and the com-
mencement of a sod shanty, can not be considered a personal settlement.
McLean v. Foster (2 L. D., 175): Byer v. Burrill (6 L. D., 521).
The contestant did not even go upon the land after the improvements
were made until more than a month after Ady had made his homestead
entry, and her presence for two separate nights only, in a sod shanty
without a floor and without a stove or any article of furniture, or any
of the appliances for housekeeping, can not be considered a settlement
in the absence of any subsequent act indicating a desire to make a
bona fide residence.
'Your decision is affirmed.
PROCEEDINGS ON SPECIAL AGENT'S REPORT-EVIDENCE.
UNITED STATES V. O'DOWD.
In a hearing ordered to test the validity of an entry the testimony offered on final
proof can not be considered, but due weight should be given to the legal presump-
tion that the entry is valid.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 8, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Anthony O'Dowd from the decision
of your office dated May 15, 1889, holding for cancellation his pre-emp-
tion cash entry, for the NW i, Sec. 5, T. 122 N., R. 65 W., Aberdeen
Land District, South Dakota.
* * * * *
As it appears from the record in the case at bar, the claimant and his
transferees were duly notified of the time and place of the hearing, and
failed to appear thereat, either in person or by attorney. While the
evidence given by the witnesses for the government at said hearing is
general in its character, and was drawn out by leading questions, yet it
establishes a prima facie case against said entry. Under these circum-
stances it was incumbent upon the entryman to offer proof in support of
his entry, if he desires. to uphold the same. James Copeland (4 L. D.,
275); Etienne Martel (6 L. D., 285).
The testimony submitted as final proof cannot be considered in arriv-
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 17 7
ing at a conclusion in this case, but due weight should be given to the
fact that an entry had been allowed. Tangerman et al. v. Aurora Hill
Mining (o. (9 L. D., 538).
For the reasons herein given the decision appealed from is affirmed.
TIMBER CULTURE CONTEST-GOOD FAITH OF CONTESTANT.
MCANULTY V. WOOD.
A contestant will not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong to establish
a charge of non-compliance with law, and thus secure a preference right of entry.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 10,1890.
On August 25, 1886, Wm. A. McAnulty filed a contest against the
timber culture entry of Seeley C. Wood, made November 30, 1883, for
the N. 4 NE. i and N. 4 NW. 4- See. 33, T. 21 S., II. 21 W., Larned,
Kansas, charging that said entryiman " failed to break the ten acres
required by law during the first two years of his said entry and up to
the present time, and said Seeley C. Wood has offered for sale, and has
sold his right and title to said tract of land for a valuable considera-
tion.".
The testimony taken at the bearing upon said contest shows that there
were not ten acres broken on the tract in controversy during the first
and second years of the entry. McAnulty, the contestant swears that
Wood the entryman broke what was supposed to be five acres the first
year and employed him (MeAnulty) to break the other five the second
year. He states that he measured the breaking done by Wood, and
broke the same quantity; that he agreed to complete the amount of
breaking required by law with the understanding that Wood had five
acres broken, and he, witness, was to break .the same amount, but he
did not break five acres because there was not five acres broken by the
entryman. He testified that there were about eight acres and twelve
rods in the piece measured by him, but there was also an acre of break-
ing on the tract not included in the breaking measured by him.
The local officers found that-
There appears to have been the full amount of breaking done to meet the require-
ments of the law, but the plaintiff and some other parties, by a system of ' horse
back survey ' starting from a point that they were not positive was an established
corner by the government survey, throw a portion of the breaking intended to
have been on tract in dispute, upon an adjoining quarter section,-
which finding was affirmed by your office.
While it is true that the plan adopted by contestant to find the exact
line of the claim was too uncertain to establish definitely the line-the
north-east corner having been located by mere conjecture-yet one of
the witnesses testified that he saw the corner stone before it was re-
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moved, and knew the line from having built a fence on the prolongation
of the east line of the claim. There was also no evidence offered by
Wood denying the accuracy of the line as found. or to show where the
true line was or that the breaking was all upon the claim in controversy.
But it is shown by the testimony of contestant that he was employed
by the entryman to break five acres the second year, both parties sup-
posing that the first breaking embraced the full quantity of five acres,
and that it was understood that the breaking to be done by contestant
would complete the full quantity required by law. He swears that he
knew there was only eight acres and twelve rods broken, but he failed
to communicate it to Wood. He further swears that W. S. Wood, a
son of the entryman, offered to sell him the tract and then offered to
sell it to another, when he, the contestant, told W. S. Wood that he
could get it cheaper by contesting it.
I do not think the contestant has shown such good faith in the prem-
ises as to prevent the entryman from caring the default, even in face of
this contest, and as it is shown by the testimony thatpriorto the hearing
the defendant had two more acres broken, thus completing the amount
required by law, to cancel this entry and award to contestant the prefer-
ence right of entry would be to aid him in taking advantage of his own
wrong.
There was no testimony showing that the entryman had offered to
sell the tract, the only testimony upon this point being that W. S. Wood,
a son of the entrymen, had offered to sell, but there was no evidence
showing that he was the agent of the entryman, or had authority to
make such an offer.
For the reasons above stated the decision of your office dismissing
the contest is affirmed.
SETTLEMENT RIGHTS-RELINQUISHMENT.
CASON . LADD.
One who is occupying land as the tenant of an entryman, acquires no right as a set-
tler, on the relinquishment of the entry, that cn be set up to defeat the inter-
vening entry of another.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 11, 1890.
The tract in controversy, to wit, the S.& SEj. Sec. 31, T. 18 S R. 6
W., Larned land district, Kansas, was formerly embraced in the tim-
ber culture entry of Joseph l. Ieavitt which was relinquished Novem-
ber 12, 1885. On the same day Zachius E. Ladd made timber culture
entry of said tract and on November 20th following Daniel E. Cason
applied to make homestead entry of the tract alleging settlement April
15, 1885, which was also allowed. Ladd then filed application to have
the homestead entry of Cason canceled and upon a hearing had thereon
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the local officers held said entry for cancellation, which decision was
affirmed by your office.
From said last decision Cason appealed alleging the following grounds
of error:-
First. Error in holding that the entry of Ladd segregated the land as against the
claim of Cason who was an actual settler upon the land at the time the entry of
Leavitt was canceled, and the entry of Ladd was made of record, and with the in-
tention of claiming the same as a homestead.
Second. Error in not holding that the right of Cason attached o instanti upon the
cancellation of Leavitt's entry.
Third. Error in holding that Cason could not legally enter the land as against
Ladd because he went upon the tract as the tenant of Leavitt, for the reason that
Leavitt's right ceased the instant his entry was canceled and the tract then became
public land, and the right of Cason that instant attached, by reason of his residence
upon the land at the time with the intention of claiming the same as a homestead.
Fourth. Error in not holding that the entry of Ladd was subject to the prior right
of Cason by reason of Cason's prior settlement.
The testimony shows that Cason went upon the land as the tenant
of Leavitt while the land was covered by Leavitt's timber culture en-
try, and was upon the land at the date of the filing of the relinquish-
ment of said entry by Leavitt. Cason acquired no rights by virtue of
his occupancy of the land as the tenant of Leavitt while the land was
segregated by Leavitt's entry, and not having gone upon the land with
the intention of making it his home and to acquire it under the settle-
ment laws, his right as a settler did not attach upon the cancellation
of Leavitt's entry, but could only attach from the moment he went
upon the land with the intention of making it his home under the set-
tlement laws and performing some act indicative of such intent. Frank-
lin v. Nurch (10 L. D., 582).
Ladd's entry having been made the same day the relinquishment was
filed, the subsequent entry of Cason was improperly allowed.
The decision of your office canceling said entry is therefore affirmed.
PRACTICE-SECOND CONTEST-APPEAL-ENTRY.
DRUMMOND V. REEVE.
A charge of non-compliance with law directed against an entry, coupled with an alle-
gation that the pending snit of another against such entry is collusive, affords a
proper basis for a contest.
Failure to appeal from the rejection of an application to contest an entry defeats all
rights of the contestant thereunder.
An application to enter land, covered by the prior entry of another, can not be enter-
tained in the absence of a charge against the validity of such entry.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the omnissioner of the General
Land Office, August 13, 1890.
The appeal of William Drummond from your office decision of August
27, 1888, is now before me, and the accompanying record shows that on
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August 4, 1881, Oliver P. Reeve made timber-culture entry No. 4086,
for lots 3, 4 and E. of SW. Sec. 6, T. 24 S., R. 33 W., Garden City,
Kansas.
August 20, 1886, W. H. Harris initiated a contest against said entry,
and accompanied it with an application to enter the tract under the
timber culture law. September 13, 1886, George R. Moore also filed
contest, and application to enter the same under said act.
Each of these contests charged non-compliance with the law in rela-
tion to cultivation and planting the land with trees.
On September 25, 1886, William Drummond, the appellant herein,
applied to the receiver to make homestead entry of the same tract, and
accompanied his application with an affidavit of contest against the
entry of Reeve, alleging in addition to failure to comply with the tim-
ber-culture act, that the contests of Harris and Moore were of a friendly
nature, that each of them was a warm friend of the defendant Reeve,
and that their respective contests were brought for the purpose of
"smuggling " the land and preventing a legal contest, and that said
Reeve has repeatedly offered to sell his relinquishment to said tract for
a valuable consideration. The application of Drummond to enter and
contest was rejected by the receiver, the affidavit of contest being en-
dorsed:
Presented and rejected this 25th day of September, 1886, for the reason that there
are at this date two contests undetermined and pending upon said tract.
S. THANi-LOUSER, Rec'r.
Underneath this endorsement the following appears:
Thirty days for appeal to the Hon. Commissioner.
November 17, 1886, Reeve filed a relinquishment of his entry, and on
the same day the same was canceled, the contests of Harris and Moore
dismissed, and Anna M. Boyle allowed to make timber-culture entry
No. 8431 for the tract.
Upon Reeve's relinquishment is the following endorsement written
with a pencil:
CONTEST CLERK: Notify contestant of filing of this relinq. and contestant's pref.
ight.
C. F. M. NLES, Reg.
On the 27th of the same month Drummond again applied to make
homestead entry of the land, which application bears the following en-
dorsement:-
Presented and rejected this 27th day of November, i886, at 11:15 a. m., for the rea-
son that there is at present a filing upon the tract, viz: Anna M. Boyle, November
17, '86. There appears however to be some grounds for the accusation of fraud in
third contest of William Drummond v. O. P. Reeve, as Anna M. Boyle, the present
entryman is contestant in neither case, having a prior right over the case of Drum-
mond v. Reeve. Both of these contests were dismissed by Rec. November 17, '86,
the date of Anna M. Boyle's T. C. filing. Thirty days for appeal to Hon. Coin. Gel.
Land Office.
C. F. M. NILES, Reg.
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December 27th following, Drummond filed his appeal from this action
of the register.
January 11, 1887, Anna M. Boyle filed a motion to dismiss the ap-
peal, because it was not filed in time, and because a copy of the appeal
was served on Boyle instead of Reeve.
Your predecessor overruled the motion to dismiss the appeal, but
affirmed the action of the register in rejecting Drummond's homestead
application of November 27, 1886, and held that the action of the re-
ceiver in rejecting appellant's application to contest, made September
25, 1886, was wrong, but that he-is bound thereby by his failure to ap-
peal within the thirty days allowed him; he also held that the action
of the register in dismissing the contests of Harris and Moore on the
filing of Reeve's relinquishment was wrong, but that their interests are
lost by their having failed to appeal therefrom, but he concluded his
judgment by allowing Drummond " the privilege of appeal from so
much of this decision as denies his application to enter said tract, and
no more." From this judgment Drummond now appeals to this De-
partment.
*The action of the receiver in rejecting Drummond's application to
contest the entry of Reeve was unauthorized by law, and gave rise tQ
all the complications that subsequently appear in this case. This of-
fered contest of appellant alleged collusion with the claimant upon the
part of both prior contestants, and the record in the case undoubtedly
gives color to such charge. But having failed to appeal from the rejec-
tion of his contest application of September 25th, he has lost his rights
thereunder. Hawkins et al. v. Lamm, (9 [g. D., 18); Conly v. Price,
(ib., 490).
And the timber-culture of Boyle having been allowed prior to his
last application of November 27, to enter under the homestead law,
such application not having been accompanied by an affidavit of con-
test against the Boyle entry, was properly rejected. Hence, Drummond
has no standing before the Department, for the reasons:
1st. He failed to appeal from the rejection of his application to con-
test the entry of Reeve.
2nd. FTe failed to accompany his application of November 27, to make
homestead entry, with an affidavit of contest, charging that the relin-
quishment of Reeve and the entry of Boyle were the result of a collu-
sive contest, prosecuted for such franldulent purpose.
The decision of your office is therefore, affirmed.
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HOMESTEAD SETTLEMENT-PRE-EMPTION CLAIM.
BEEBE V. CALLAHAN.
The validity of a homestead settlement is not affected by the fact that it is made
pending te issuance of final certificate on pre-emption proof, previously sub-
mitted by the settler in due compliance with law.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 13, 1890.
,.
I have considered the appeal of George W. Beebe from the decision
of your office dated February 7, 1889, in the case of said Beebe v.
Enoch Callahan, holding for cancellation the former's preemption
declaratory statement for the N. of NE. i Sec. 11, and N W. of NW.
i Sec. 12, T. 31 N., R. 15 W., Niobrara land district, Nebraska.
May 30, 1884, Callahan made homestead entry for said tract, and on
March 23, 1885, in accordance with published notice, he offered final
commutation proof for said land before the clerk of the district court
at O'Neill, Nebraska and on the same day Beebe filed a protest against
the acceptance of Callahan's commutation proof alleging that he,
Beebe, made settlement on said tract May 9, 1884, and established
actual residence thereon June 4th which was continuous, and filed his
pre-emption declaratory statement for the same June 12, 1884; that
he could prove that Callahan did not settle upon nor make improve.
ments o the land until one or two weeks after May 9, 1884.
Both the final proof and protest having been transmitted to the local
office, hearing was ordered and set for June 11, 1885, before the regis-
ter and receiver. On the day appointed the parties appeared in person
and by their respective attorneys. A large amount of testimony was
offered by both parties and the local officers from an examination there-
of, found that Callahan made settlement upon the land May 7, 1884,
and that he established actual residence on the land July 5,1884, which
was continuous; that he has a well and nine acres of breaking, and
had raised a crop on a portion of the breaking one season; that he
had " made final proof in support of a re-emption filing for the E. W
NW. i and W. a NE. 4 Sec. 12, T. 31, R. 16 W.. . . . . April
23, 1884, . . . and as . . . final certificate bears date May 16,
1884,"1 he was not qualified to make settlement for other lands prior
to that date, and although his settlement was prior to the time Beebe
settled on the land, they rejected his commutation proof and recom-
mended his homestead entry for cancellation. From this judgment he
appealed to your office, where, on February 7, 1889, after considering
the evidence, you concurred in the findings of the register and receiver
as to the prior settlement, residence and improvement of Callahan on
the tract in dispute, but reversed that portion of their findings as to
the illegality of claimant's settlement, citing as authority for so doing
the case of Joseph W. Mitchell (7 L. D., 455), and held protestant's
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pre-emption declaratory statement for cancellation and returned the
commutation proof "for frther attention." From this decision Beebe
appealed to this Department.
Reviewing the evidence in the case, I think it fairly shows that Cal-
lahan made settlement on the tract covered by his homestead entry,
and established his residence thereon with his family, to the exclusion
of one elsewhere, within the time required by law, and that the same
was continuous.
This case as to the qualifications of Callahan to make a settlement at
the date he alleges seems to come within the rule laid down in the de-
cision cited by your office and in the later decision of the same case,
(8 L. D., 268).
The judgment appealed from seems to be justified by the facts, and
in accordance with the rulings applicable to such cases, and is there-
fore affirmed.
PRACTICE-EVIDENCE-DEPOSITIONS-TIMBER CULTURE.
FIERCE v. McDoUGAL.
Fail ure to endorse the title of the cause on the envelope enclosing depositions does
not necessarily exclude the depositions from consideration, where no apparent
prejudice to the interests of either party results from the absence of such en-
dorsement.
A technical objection to the regularity of depositions, can not be raised on trial, by
one who participates in the examination of the witnesses, and, at such time,
takes no exception to the proceedings.
An irregularity in the transmission of depositions may be waived by agreement of
counsel.
A timber culture entry must be canceled if the evidence shows that the failure to
secure a growth of timber results from the want of ordinary diligence on the
part of the entryman.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 16, J 890.
This case comes before the Department upon the appeal of C. Mc-
Dougal from the decision of your office holding for cancellation his
timber-culture entry, made February 23, 1874, for the SE. 1 Sec. 23, T.
18,1 . 18 W., Wa Keeney, Kansas.
Contest was filed against said entry February 24, 1885, by Henry
Fierce, alleging that the entryman had failed to plow, plant, and culti-
vate to trees ten acres, as required by law, specifically setting forth in
his affidavit the grounds upon which said allegation is based.
At the hearing ordered upon this contest counsel for the entryman
moved to suppress the depositions of witnesses McFadden, Burns, [fart,
Miller, Donleavy and Koon, upon the ground that said depositions were
not transmitted to the local officers according to law, there being no
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endorsement on the sealed package indicating the character of its con-
tents, or that the depositions were sealed by or in the presence of the
officers before whom they were taken. He also moved to suppress the
testimony of witnesses Hayes, Anderson, Reed, Wood, and McFadden,
upon the ground that there was no stipulation between the parties to
take said testimony before A. H. Morris, and the official character of
Morris was not authenticated.
These motions were overruled by the local officers, and upon the tes-
timony submitted they found that the charges in the affidavit of con-
test were sustained, and recommended the cancellation of the entry.
From said several rulings and findings the entryman appealed, and
upon consideration thereof your office affirmed the rulings and findings
of the local office and held the entry for cancellation. Whereupon the
entryman appealed, alleging error in said decision, substantially as fol-
lows:
(1) In holding that the depositions of McFadden and others were
taken under a commission regularly issued, and that the omission of
the endorsement of the title of the case on the envelope was not essen-
tial and material, and was not a fatal defect.
(2) In holding that there was any stipulation between the litigants
to authorize the taking of the depositions of Hayes, nderson, and
others before A. Et. Morris, and in considering said testimony as evi.
dence.
(3) In holding that there was any substantial (lefault in complying
with the requirements of the law during any of the years following the
entry to date of hearing.
The records show that the contestant, in compliance with rule 24,
rules of practice, made affidavit before the local officers that McFadden
Burns and the other witnesses therein named were material witnesses
for contestant, and resided more than fifty miles from the local office,
and at the same time filed interrogatories to be propounded to said wit-
nesses, stating their names and residence, which were served upon the
opposite party. Upon this a commission was issued by the local offi-
cers, appointing A. J. Yawger, clerk of the district court for Rush county,
Kansas, to execute the same, and in pursuance thereof, said testimony
was taken by the person named therein, and was returned to the local
officers in compliance with rules 28, 29 and 30, of practice, except in
failing to have "the title of the case endorsed on the envelope."
While it is true that rule 30 requires that the title shall be endorsed
on the envelope containing the deposition and should be observed, yet,
I do net think a failure so to do is necessarily fatal to the taking of the
deposition. A rule of the Department may always be waived in the
interest of substantial justice, as rules are made to facilitate rather than
to embarrass and defeat it. Caledonia Mining Company v. Rowen, 2
L. D., 719.
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There is nothing in the record to show that the failure to make this
endorsement was prejudicial to the rights of either party to the contro-
versy. The depositions appear to have been fairly taken and correctly
mirror the facts as given by the witnesses. Under such circumstances,
I do not believe there was any substantial error in the local office over-
ruling the motion to suppress the depositions for that reason. Neither
do I think there was any error in overruling the motion to suppress the
testimony of Hayes and other witnesses, taken before A. H. Morris.
The evidence of these witnesses was taken under a stipulation signed
by Fierce, the contestant, and A. H. Bain, as attorney for contestee,
agreeing that the testimony shall be taken at Walnut City, Kansas, "be-
fore any officer authorized to administer an oath, that may be agreed
upon by contestant and T. E. McDowell, attorney for contestee 0 - *
* waiving all irregularities in the manner in which said depositions
shall be taken and filed." Mlr. McDougal was represented by his attor-
ney. The testimony of said witnesses was taken without objection on
his part, as was also that of three of Fierce's witnesses. While it does
not appear that there was any express agreement designating Morris as
the person to take the testimony, yet under such circumstances it must
be held that he waived any objection to the evidence being taken by
him under the stipulation.
The doctrine of estoppel will apply to him in such case in all its rigor.
He will not be permitted to. appear, conduct an examination of wit-
nesses, offer his own proof, raise no objection to the proceedings, and
when the testimony is offered on the trial, for the first time make an
objection of this technical character. No complaint is made that the
evidence of the witnesses was not taken by Mr. Morris as given, or that
Mr. NeDougal did not have an equal opportunity with his adversary
to examine the witnesses produced at the hearing, on the contrary, it
woul(l appear that Mr. Fierce represented his own case against the
attorney of McDougal, hence, it would seem that he has no ground of
complaint on that score.
This testimony was not transmitted by mail, but was delivered to the
local officers by contestant, and subsequently be and Bain, attorney for
contestee, signed an agreement, reciting that whereas the testimony of
Hayes, Anderson and Reed on behalf of contestee and of Wood and
McFadden on behalf of contestant was taken before said Morris, a jus-
tice of the peace, and was not transmitted by mail, but delivered to the
local officers by said contestant: "Now, therefore, the undersigned con-
testant, and contestee hereby waive any and all objections to the irreg-
ularity that may exist in thus transmitting said depositions, and the
same shall be treated in all respects as if they had been regularly trans-
mitted by the United States mail."
I find no denial of the authority of said attorneys toactfor and to bind
the contestee by their said agreements, nor is there any denial that said
agreements were signed by counsel as above set forth. It is my judg-
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ment that the action of the local office on these preliminary motions
was justified. As to the merits of the case, it appears that this entry
was made February 23, 1874, eleven years before the contest was filed.
The testimony shows that the entryman, by his agent, planted the ten
acres required by law with seeds and cuttings, during the first five years
of the entry, but they failed to grow, and he continued to replant ten
acres each year from 1878 to 1885, except two years, when no work was
done, but at the date of the hearin"' no trees of any size or age were
growing on the claim, except a few straggling sprouts from old roots,
and the land on which the seeds and cuttings were planted was then
overgrown with weeds and grass. The failureof thecattingsandseeds
to grow is accounted for by the witnesses for the contestee by reason of
excessive drought, and they swear that the seeds and cuttings did not
even sprout on account of the dry weather, and, hence, there was no
necessity for cultivation. But it is shown by the testimony that crops
on the adjacent farms were abundant during these years, and that tree
culture was successful on other claims in that locality during the same
period. Even the witnesses for the contestee admit that during those
years there were good seasons part of the time, and that the land had
not been properly cultivated, while the testimony of the witnesses in-
troduced by contestant shows that the soil on this claim is fertile and
that if the planting and cultivation had been done in the proper manner,
trees could have been successfully planted and grown.
Considering all of the testimony, there is sufficient in it to warrant
the finding of the local office and of your office that the entryman could
have secured a growth of timber by the exercise of ordinary care in
planting and cultivation, and failing in this his entry must be canceled.
Your decision is affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT-WITHDRAWAL-UNSURVEYED LAND.
OLNEY V. HASTINGS AND DAKOTA By. (o. (On Review).
A withdrawal in aid of a railroad grant takes effect upon unsurveyed, as well as sur-
veyed land.
The status of land at date of definite location determines whether it is sbject to
the grant, irrespective of any subsequent order of withdrawal.
A plea that a withdrawal cannot take effect before the company accepts the condi-
tions imposed bythe State in conferring the grant upon the company, if effective
for any purpose, can only be set up on behalf of one who has been induced, by
such condition of affairs to go upon land otherwise subject to said withdrawal.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, Augut
19, 1890.
The attorney for Frank P. Olney has filed a motion for reconsideration
and revocation of departmental decision of February 10, 1890 (10 L. D.,
136) in the case of Olney v. Hastings and Dakota Ry. Co. involving the
NW. of Sec. 15, T. 120 N., R. 43 W., Marshall (formerly Benson) land
district Minnesota.
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This land is within the primary limits of the grant of July 4, 1866 (14
Stat., 87) to the State of Minnesota to aid in the construction of a rail-
road from Houston to the western boundary of the State, as shown by
the map of definite location filed June 26, 1867. (n April 22, 1868, a
withdrawal of all lands within the limits of the grant was ordered, notice
thereof being received at the local office May 11, 1868. On April 12,
1870, the plat of survey of this township was filed and on September 9,
1870, one Augustus E. Field filed pre-emption declaratory statement
for said tract alleging settlement June 10, 1869. On November 14, 1887,
Olney applied to make homestead entry for said land which application
was rejected by the local officers because of the grant to the company.
Upon appeal to your office the decision of the local officers was re-
versed upon the theory that prior to February 14, 1871, it had been the
uniform holding that "1 withdrawals were not effective on unsurveyed
lands until the plat thereof was filed and that settlements made prior
thereto were allowed to be perfected" and that Field's settlement exist-
ing at the date of the filing of the township plat served to except the
land from the grant. Upon appeal to this Department that decision
was reversed by the decision now sought by the motion under consider-
ation to be revoked.
In support of said motion it is alleged that the following errors
appear in said decision-
(1) Error in holding the withdrawal for the benefit of the railroad company was
effective upon unsurveyed lands.
(2) Error in holding withdrawal made for land opposite portions of the road not
completed within the time limited in granting act and before date of acceptance of
act of legislature of Minnesota of February 8,1878, could be effective for any purpose.
(3) Error in holding the withdrawal made opposite this land April 22, 1868, and
the only withdrawal made, was effective, although made before the railroad com-
pany accepted the act of the legislature of Minnesota, dated March 7, 1867, which
conferred the grant upon the company.
(4) Error in holding the grant took effect upon the land in controversy although
at date of definite location it was unsurveyed and prior to and at date of survey it
was ocenpied by an actual settler under the pre-emption law.
(5) Error in holding the land was not absolutely excepted from the grant.
(6) Error in rejecting the application of Olney to enter the land.
(7) Error in holding that Olney is not entitled to relief under the act of April 21,
1876.
It is not seriously contended that a withdrawal does not under the
present ruling, take effect before survey. The change in the rulings of
Department was made about the time indicated in the Commissioner's
decision above referred to and it is admitted by all that since then
it has been held that such withdrawals operate as to unsurveyed as
well as surveyed land. This disposes of the first allegation of error
adversely to the motion.
The second and third allegations may be considered and disposed of
together. The plea that the withdrawal could not take effect before the
acceptance by the railroad company of the conditions of the act of the
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State legislature conferring the benefits o the grant upon the com-
pany or that the company had failed to formally signify its acceptance
of such act if available for any purpose could only be in behalf of one
who was induced by the condition of affairs to go on sewh laid and not
in behalf of one who like Olney went on the and after the conditions-
of the grant had been accepted and complied with. There is no suffi-
* cient reason advanced in these two allegations for the action asked by
this motion. The case of' Hastings and Dakota Ry. Co. v. Bailey (2 L.
D., 540) cited does not sustain the contention of counsel, for in that
case the Department refused to decide what effect a withdrawal imade
before the grant was conferred upon the company would have as to land
upon which an entry was allowed before the date of the act of the State
legislature conferring the grant upon the comnpany.
The question as to whether this land was or was not excepted from
the order of withdrawal is of little importance. in this case. The right
of the State is determined by the condition of the laud at the (late of
the filing of the map of definite location of the road in aid of the con-
struction of which the land is to be appropriated. This land was vacant
unappropriated publi3 land at the date this grant attached and must
be held to have passed thereunder.
What might have been the effect of Field's claim, it having been
allowed in accordance with the rulings of the Department then in force,
if he had not abandoned it but were here asserting rights thereunder
it is unnecessary to decide. No right is being asserted by Field or any
one claiming through him. CertainlyOlney can not be allowed'to plead
with success, that because there was at one time a claim that would
have been entitled to protection because made in accordance with cer-
tain rulings his claim initiated years after a change in such rulings is
entitled to the sama protection. The fourth allegation of error can not
be sustained.
The fifth and sixth allegations are merely formal and need nt be
considered apart from the others.
It is insisted that it was error to hold that Olney was not entitled to
relief under the act of April 21, 176, but it is not specifically stated
which section of that act applies to his case. In the brief filed in sup-
port of this motion, after reciting the class of claims covered by each of
the three sections the following language is used:
It is not elear that Field's case woald fall within auv of these classes. I it is held
the grant and the withdrawal could be effective pon unsurveyed land, then it would
not, as Field's settlement and filing was after notice was received at the local office.
Again after referring to a large number of cases decided under said
act, it is said:
These cases are referred to for the purpose of showing that, if it is intended to hold
Field if applying, might be relieved under the act of April 1, 187, bat that no one
e1se could if applying under him, it is not in harmony with previous rlings of the
Department.
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It was not however intended to hold in the decision complained of
that Field would have been entitled to relief under said act. The only
section of that act that could by any possible construction have appli-
cation to Field's case is section one, and it was said in the decision
under consideration-" In the first place section one of the act of April
21, 1876, has no bearing on this case." It is thus seen that the bypothe-
sis upon which all those cases are referred to has no existence. Olney's
claim does not fall within the provisions of said act. He did not assert
any claim to said land before notice of withdrawal reached the local
office, and therefore does not come within the provisions of the first
section of said act. No valid pre-emption or homestead claim existed
for this land at the date of the withdrawal and therefore the second
section does not apply. Olney has not been allowed to make an entry
and he does not therefore come within the provisions of the third see-
tion.
In addition it may be said that in each of the cases cited in behalf of
Olney there was at the date notice of the withdrawal reached the local
office as to the land involved in existence a valid claim and in that ma-
terial particular those cases differ from this case of Olney. This motion
can not be sustained upon the ground that Olney is entitled to relief
under the act of April 21, 1876. After a careful review and reconsid-
eration of this case in the light of the argument filed and the cases cited
in support of the motion to revoke and rescind the decision heretofore
rendered, I find no sufficient reason for such action. Said motion is
therefore over-ruled and the decision heretofore rendered is adhered to.
TIMBER- CULTURE CONTEST-BREAKING-GOOD FAITH.
HARRISON v. SCHLAGENHAUF.
Failure to break the full amount of acreage required by statute does not call for can-
cellation, where good faith is manifest, and the default is cured when discovered.
Acts performed in compliance with law after contest is filed, but prior to seivice of
notice, may be accepted a s indicative of good faith, if not induced by actual no-
tice of the pending contest.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 19, 1890.
Jacob Schlagenhauf made timber-culture entry of the NW. j See 30,
T. 12 S., R. 23 W., Wa Keeney, Kansas, December 18, 1883, and on
December 19,1885, William S. Harrison filed affidavit of contest against
said entry, alleging failure " to break, plow, or cultivate the second five
acres during the second year, or at any time since date of entry."
Service of said notice of contest was made by publication, the first
notice appearing January 7, 1886.
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Upon the hearing had thereon, the local officers found that the pre-
ponderance of testimony is in favor of the contestant, and that the en-
try should be canceled. Upon appeal therefrom, your office reversed
said finding and held that the law had been substantially complied
with, and dismissed the contest. From said decision the contestant
appealed.
Prior to October, 1885, about five acres of the tract had been broken
and cropped to oats one year, and during that month said five acres
were planted to trees and tree seeds. On December 22, and 23, 1885,
the second breaking was done, but upon actual measurement of both
tracts the entire quantity of land broken was found to contain a frac-
tion less than ten acres.
The only questions involved in this case are, whether the failure to
break the full quantity of ten acres was such a default as to work a for-
feiture of the claim, and, if not, whether the breaking of said quantity
of land after contest and prior to service of notice will defeat it.
One of the witnesses introduced by the contestant testified that be is
a competent surveyor, and upon actual measurement of the tract found
it to contain nine acres and one hundred and twenty-eight rods,
while one of the witnesses introduced by contestee, who is also a sur-
veyor, testified that by the survey made by him he found it to contain
nine acres and thirteen sixteenths of an acre. It is shown by the testi-
mony of the agent of the entryman who did the last breaking, that he
supposed when he finished plowing that he had broken over ten acres
with the land first broken. The failure to break the fall quantity of ten
acres, lacking only a small fraction of an acre, was clearly the result of
a mere error of judgment, and is not such a failure to comply with the
law as to warrant the forfeiture of the claim.
It is contended by contestant that the entryman had notice of said
contest prior to January 7, 1886, from the admission of Warner, the
agent who did the last breaking, that he knew the second plowing was
done on the 22d and 23d of December, 1885, because he caught Elar-
rison and Ferris surveying the land on the 21st, and marked it in an
almanac. This does not prove that either the agent or the entryman
knew at the time that a contest had been filed against the entry, and
although an attempt to cure a default after a contest has been filed,
but before service, can not be accepted as evidence of good faith, if such
action is induced by the contest, yet the default may be cured, if the
action was not induced by actual notice of the pendency of the contest.
Besides, in this case Warner, the agent, testified that he supposed
from information received from Reddick, who did the first breaking, that
eleven acres had been broken, and the entryman swears from informa-
tion received by him he believed the fll quantity of land had been
broken, as he paid Reddick for breaking that quantity, and, although
this is denied by Reddick, it is confirmed by the letter of Reddick to
J. T. Buck. He swears that the first intimation he had of the deficiency
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was obtained from a letter written by Warner, his agent, which he re-
ceived between the 19th and 23d of December, 1885. "A timber cult-
ure entry will not be canceled for failure to break the requisite num-
-ber of acres, where the entryman honestly supposed that he bad complied
with the law, and made good the deficiency as soon as practicable after
its discovery." Purmort v. Zerfing (9 L. D., 180).
The decision of your office is affirmed.
PRACTICE-APPLICATION-APPEAL-POSSESSION.
MASSEY V. MALACHI.
The rights of an applicant for public land should not be prejudiced by mistake of the
local office.
The failure of an applicant to appeal from the rejection of his application, does not
impair his claim, if he is not advised of his right of appeal to the Commissioner.
When an application is rejected by the local office, the date of its presentation, and
the reason for the rejection should be noted thereon.
One who goes upon land covered by the open and notorious occupancy and possession
of another is bound to take notice of any rights that may exist in the prior occu-
pant.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 19, 1890.
I have considered the case of Robert J. Massey v. Lindsey Malachi
on appeal by the former from your decision of February 23, 1889, dis-
missing his contest against the homestead entry of the latter, for the E.
i NW. J and W. 4 NE.A of Sec. 30, T. 18 S., R. 2 W., Montgomery, Ala-
bama land district.
Malachi made homestead entry for said land on October 30, 1886, and
on February 26, 1887, Massey filed affidavit of contest against the same
alleging:
That he had resided upon the laud since 1831; that the said Lindsey Malachi knew
that the contestant resided upon said land at the time he entered the tract; that said
tract is not settled upon and cultivated by said party as required by law, and that
contestant is the only person, with his family, who resides upon said tract, and that
he has resided on said tract and improed and cultivated the same since January
or February 1881, and that he had applied to enter the same several times before the
same was entered by said Lindsey Malachi, and that his applications have been re-
jected by the register of the local office and his money returned to his attorney, E. K.
Fulton.
Notice of contest was given, and the hearing set for May 10, 1887, on
which day Massey appeared with counsel and witnesses. Malachi ap-
peared and asked continuance because of the absence of his attorney.
A continuance was denied and the testimony taken, and upon consider-
ation of the same the register and receiver held the entry of Malachi
for cancellation, from which order he appealed to your office, and on
February 23, 1889, you reversed said decision and dismissed said con-
test, from which ju(gment Massey appealed to this office.
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Counsel for Malachi has filed a demurrer, motion and answer to the
specifications of error assigned in the appeal. I have considered each
objection, and am of opinion that they are not well taken, In my
judgment the specifications are sufficient in law and substantially true
in fact.
The record shows that in 1881, Massey applied to enter the tract in
controversy, but his application was rejected because the local officers
believed it was listed as coal land. The books of your office do not
show that said tract in question was ever reported as mineral or coal
land, but on the contrary that the same was subject to entry as agri-
cultural land.
In 1885, he again applied to make homestead entry of the tract, and
on August 24, 1885, the local officers notified him of the rejection of his
application, saying-" The application is not allowed because, upon ex-
amination of the mineral list on file in this office, I find that. the land
mentioned has been classed coal, and is not subject to 'd entry." Massey
was not advised of his right of appeal, and in each case he did what he
could to place an entry on record. The local officers through a mistake,
rejected his applications through no fault of his, and he should not be
prejudiced by the error of the register and receiver.
Now turning to the evidence in the case, from an examination of the
testimony, I think it substantially establishes the allegations of the
affidavit of contest. It shows that the contestant made settlement upon
the land in February 1881; that he erected a house with kitchen at-
tached, built a corn-crib, two stables, a barn, and cleared between
twenty and twenty-three acres of land which he fenced and cultivated
until after the entry of Malachi. Daring the time from 1881 till 1887,
he resided with his family on the land, with the exception of a short
time when his family were absent so that his children could attend
school; during this time, his stock and property except some household
goods were kept on the tract and he made his home there and cultivated
the land during their absence.
In the spring of 1837, Malachi went upon the land and erected a board
box house, twelve by fourteen feet, without any chimney; he made no
other improvement; he moved some household goods into the house
and stayed there a part of the time,-he says his wife's health was such
he could not move his family into the house.
In your decision you give much prominence to the fact that Massey
did not appeal from the action of the local officers rejecting his applica-
tion, and because no appeal was taken within thirty days, you say he
can not now be heard to allege that he has the superior right to enter
said land. It is sufficient to say he was not advised "of his right of
appeal to the Commissioner as required by paragraph 2 of rule 66, of
Practice.
'It may be further noted that the local officers failed to indorse upon
said application either the date when presented, or their reasons for
rejecting it as required by paragraph 1, of same rule.
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Again you reject his claim because adverse rights have intervened;
but when 'Malachi went upon this land, Massey had his improvements
thereon, as well as bisstock and property; his fields were enclosed, and
he had been for five years in open notorious possession, of all of which
Malachi had full knowledge when he went upon the tract. It is quite.
clear that Massey was prior in time, in making settlement upon the land
and in filing his application to enter the same, and the testimony does not
show any abandonment of his claim to make entry and make his home
upon the land. Aside from this, the equity of the case is with Massey.
It was not his fault that his entry was not allowed, his improvements
are lasting and valuable, while those of Malachi. are very meagre. It
seems that both the law and equity would allow the claim of Massey.
Your decision is reversed. Massey will be allowed thirty days from.
notice of this decision within which to complete his entry by payment
of fees, etc. Malachi's entry will, in the meantime, be suspended and
in the event that Massey completes his, Malachi's entry will be canceled,
otherwise it will remain intact.
CONTEST-PROCEEDINGS BY THE GOVERNMENT.
LOUIS V. TAYLOR.
No rights can be acquired under an affidavit of contest filed during the pendency of
an order on the etryman to show cause wy his entry should not be canceled
for failure o submit final proof within the statutory period.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 19, 1890.
On June 20,1888, William A. Louis filed an affidavit of contest (alleg-
ing abandonment) against the homestead entry made by John W. Tay-
lor August 15, 1879, for the SE. - Sec. 8, T. 11 S., . 32 W., (Hays City
series) Wa Keeney, Kansas.
The said affidavit was, as shown by endorsement, rejected at the local
office for the reason that " the government has already taken steps to
procure the cancellation of this entry." This action on appeal by Louis
was affirmed by your office decision of September 18, 1888. Louis ap-
peals.
It appears that your office, by letter dated January 6, 1888, instructed
the local officers to " advise Taylor that the statutory period within
which proof is required to be submitted had expired, and to cite him to
show cause within thirty days why his entry should not be declared
forfeited and canceled for non-compliance with said legal requirement; "
that notice of said order was sent to Louis by registered letters, which
were " returned uncalled for," and that so far as the record discloses
the proceeding referred to is still pending.
2 4 97-vOL 11-13
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The case at bar is in all material respects similar to that of Dean v.
Peterson (11 L. D., 102), involving land in the same district, wherein
the Department held that no rights could be acquired under an affidavit
of contest filed during the pendency of proceedings by the government
against the entry. See also Canning v. Fail (10 L. D., 657); Drury v.
Shetterly (9 L. D., 211); Arthur B. Cornish (Id., 569).
The decision appealed from is in accordance with the foregoing and
is hereby affirmed.
MOTION FOR REVIEW-TRANSFEREE.
OTTO SOLDAN.
A transferee who desires to be heard on review must set up facts sufficient to show
that he is entitled to such hearing.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, August
19, 1890.
The attorney for D. Rhomberg claiming to be the assignee of the
mortgage of Otto Soldan has filed a motion for review of departmental
decision of October 23, 1888, rejecting Soldan's commutation proof un-
der his homestead entry for the E. 4 of the SE. i Sec. 21 and the W. i
of the SW. of Sec. 22, T. 113 N., R. 61 W., Huron South Dakota land
district.
In support of this motion for review the following allegations are
made:-
First: Said decision is not in accordance with the law, as construed by the Depart-
ment in many decisions.
Second: That the rule of law as established in the decisions of the Honorable Sec-
retary of the Interior, was ignored and not applied to the case herein. We ask that
the case be reviewed in the light of the established rule of law.
This motion was not however filed until February 20, 1890, a year
and four months after the rendition of the decision complained of.
In support of his right to appear in the case Rhomberg files his affi-
davit dated February 13, 189u, as follows:-
I, D. Rhomberg being duly sworn depose and say that said Otto Soldan, executed
a mortgage to F. T. Walker, that said mortgage was duly assigned to affiant; that
this afflant has had no notice of the decision of the Hon. Secretary, from the local
land office at Huron S. D., but only learned of said decision indirectly.,
That affiant is informed and believes such information to be true, that the claimant
Otto Soldan is dead; that it will be impossible for that reason to comply with the
said decision requiring new proof to be made; that affiant is now the owner and as-
signee of the said mortgage.
The facts presented by this affidavit are not sufficient to show the
right of this party to be heard. It is not stated when this mortgage
was executed or when the petitioner here became the owner thereof by
assignment. One or both of these events may have occurred after the
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time prescribed for the filing of motions of this character had expired.
Again it is riot shown that the petitioner ever filed in the local office a
statement showing his interest in the entry as is required to entitle him
to notice of any action had in regard thereto. John J. Dean (10 L. D.,
446). If he purchased after the decision complained of was rendered or
if he failed to take such action as was necessary to entitle him to re-
ceive notice, he can not be heard to complain of not receiving notice of
that decision. He fails to state when he came to a knowledge of the
decision complained of or that the motion now presented was within a
reasonable time thereafter.
On account of the failure to set up such facts as show he is entitled
to be now heard the motion for review must be and is hereby denied.
RAILROAD GRANT-PRE-EMPTION FILING.
CENTRAL PACIFIC R. R. Co.
A prima facie valid preemption filing of record, at the date when the grant becomes
effective, excepts the land covered thereby from the operation of the grant.
Under the pre-emption act of March 3, 1843, a filing for unoffered land protected the
claimn of the settler until the commencement of public sale, and this protection
was not modified until the passage of the acts of July 14, 1870, and March 3,
1871.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Ofce, August 19,
1890.
I have considered the appeal of the Central Pacific railroad company
from your office decision of March 12, 1889, affirming the action of the
local officers in rejecting list 25, embracing the SE. I Sec. 33, T. 12 N.,
R. 7 E., M. D. M., Sacramento, California.
The tract is within the limits of the grant for said company as shown
by the map designating the route of the road, filed June 30, 1862, upon
which a withdrawal was ordered August 2, 1862, and as shown by the
map of definite location filed March 26, 1864.
The township plat was filed in the local office in the year 1856. It
appears from the records that on May 28, 1857, one H. H. Jones filed
declaratory statement for the tract, alleging settlement on January 16,
1854.
in September 12, 1885, the company offered testimony before the
local officers to show that Jones had never actually made settlement
on the tract and those officers decided thathe had never lived on the land.
The papers were forwarded, and your office on January 23, 1886, held
that Jones' filing subsisting at the date the company's rights attached
excepted the tract from the grant. On appeal that decision was affirmeitd
by the Department July 17, 1888, on the authority of the case of Malone
v. Union Pacific Railroad Company (7 L. D., 13). Notice of this decis-
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ion was given the company on August 27, 1887. It appears that on-
August 28, 1888, one Frank C. Taylor made homestead entry for the
tract which on July 1,1889, he commuted to cash entry. On January14,
1889, the company presented said list 25 to the local officers. It em-
braced only the land in question, and was rejected on the authority of
the decision of the Department, sujpra.
On this appeal the attorney for the company states that on March 28,
1889, he discovered that this tract was proclaimed for sale by the Pres-
ident's proclamation of June 30, 1858, and urges that as Jones had not
made proof and payment on the date fixed for the opening of the sales,
February 14, 1859, his filing was thereafter invalid.
While it is true that the proclamation included said township 12 N.,
of range 7 E., it also declared that-
No ' mineral lands', or tracts containing mineral deposits are to be offered at the
public sales, such mineral lands being hereby expressly excepted and excluded from
sale or other disposal, pursuant to the requirements of the act of Congress approved
March 3, 1853.
Pursuant to this direction the local officers withheld from offering
and sale all of said section 33, as appears by their report dated March
18, 1859. After stating all the offerings and sales made in said town-
ship and range, the report concludes, All the balance of the township
reserved, mineral lands." All of section 33 was so reserved.
It thus appears that the tract in question remained in the category
of unoffered lands, and was not proclaimed for sale. The pre-emption
act of March 3, 1843 (5 Stat., 62u), provided that the settler on unof-
fered land might make proof and payment at any time before the com-
mencement of the public sale, which should embrace his land. Until
such time arrived the filing protected the claim of the settler. This was
the status of the law at the time said company's rights attached, and it
so continued until modified by the act of July 14, 1870 (16 Stat. 279),
which provided that-
All claimants of preemption rights shall hereafter, when no shorter period of time
is now prescribed by law, make the proper proof and payment for the lands claimed,
within eighteen months after the date prescribed for filing their declaratory notices
shall have expired: Provided, That where said date shall have elapsed before the
passage of this act, said pre-emptors shall have one year after the passage hereof in
which to make such proof and payment.
By joint resolution of March 3, 1871 (Ibid. 601), the time was still
further extended twelve months, making in all the thirty months now
incorporated in section 2267 of the Revised Statutes.
From this it appears that the filing in question did not expire by lim-
itation until July 14, 1872. As it was of record and prima facie valid
at the date the company's rights attached it served to except the tract
from the operation of the grant, under the ruling announced in the
Malone case upra. See also Northern Pacific R. R. (Jo. v. Stovenour
(10 L. D., 645).
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Other questions are suggested by the record in the case, but this dis-
-position renders it unnecessary to consider them.
The decision appealed from is affirmed.
HOMESTEAD CONTEST-SETTLEMENT RIGHTS.
POOL V. MOLOUGHNEY.
A settlement claim on land covered by the entry of another attaches instantly on the
cancellation of such entry.
No rights are secured as against the government by settlement on land withdrawn
from entry, but, as between two claimants for such land priority of settlement
may be considered.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the eneral
Land Office, August 20, 1890.
I have considered the case of Joseph Pool v. Patrick Moloughney,
involving the S. of the SE. , the NW. - of the SE. , and the NE. t
-of the SW. of Sec. 9, T. 26 S., R. 10 E., San Francisco land district,
-California.
Moloughney made soldier's homestead entry of tract described on
May 24, 1886-the same day upon which it was restored to the public
-domain from a reservation theretofore made for the benefit of the At-
lantic and Pacific Railroad.
On July 23, 1886-within two months after the tract had been restored
to the public domain-Joseph Pool filed his homestead application, ac-
eompanied by the proper affidavits, alleging settlement May 14, 1886.
The local office issued notice to Moloughney, summoning him to ap-
pear, on October 11th ensuing, before the county clerk of the county in
which the land was situated, and show cause why his entry should not
'be canceled, and Pool be allowed to make entry of said land.
Testimony in the case was taken at the time and place mentioned in
-the notice, both parties appearing in person and by counsel. The testi-
mony shows that in 1885 Pool's brother rented the land from a third
party who owned the improvements thereon; that Pool and his brother
cultivated crops thereon in partnership; that in October, 1885, the
brother bought the improvements, and sold them to Pool on May 14,
1886; that said improvements consisted of a four-room dwelling-house,
a barn, and about sixty-five acres under fence-tbe most of which was
under cultivation; that when Moloughney made his entry, Pool had
twenty-five acres of barley and twelve acres of wheat on the land; that
after the date when Pool purchased the improvements of his brother,
and before Moloughney's entry, Pool had been much of the time em-
ployed on the tract, cutting hay and doing other farm work-although
he did not establish actual residence thereon until June 10, 1886, for the
reason that his brother could not sooner vacate the house, because of
.sickness in his family.
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As to Moloughney, it appeared that he never saw the tract until
some time in August, 1886; and that he established residence thereom,
in September of the same year.
The notice of the hearing failed to fix a time for a final hearing before
the local officers; but they rendered judgment January21, 1887, in favor
of Pool. If there were any irregularities in the mode of procedare, no
objection was made thereto at the time.
Your office, on January 24, 1889, rendered a decision affirming the-
judgment of the local officers.
From your decision Moloughney appeals on the following grounds:
(1) The decision is contrary to the law and the evidence.
(2) The original notice addressed to Molonghney, fixed no time for a hearing before-
the register and receiver; and the informality or want of such notice was not waived
by Moloughney.
(3) The soldier's homestead entry, No. 7533, filed by Patrick Moloughney on May
24, 1886, was the only legal filing upon the land in question, as the land was only re--
stored to the public domain on the 24th of May, 1886, and prior to that date could.
not have been located upon as public land.
The appeal does not question the finding of your office as to facts.
The first allegation is so general in its nature-failing to " clearly and'
concisely designate the error" complained of-that itrequires no notice
(Rule 88 of Practice).
The second objection is raised for the first time on the appeal from
your office. As Moloughney appeared in obedience to the notice atthe
time and place fixed therein, without protest or objection, and in his
appeal from the decision of the local office to your office still omitted
to make any protest or objection as to the sufficiency of the notice, he,
must be held to have waived such objection, and it is too late to raise
it now. As said in Gumaer v. Carine (9 TL. D., 643), " this is too well
settled to require the citation of authorities."
The third objection, if literally true, does not necessarily carry with,
it a decision in favor of oloughney. While it may be conceded that
Moloughney's homestead was the only legal "filing" on the landA
(on May 24, 1886), it by no means follows that such filing constituted.
the only legal claim. The Department has repeatedly held that..
where land had been covered by a homestead or other entry that
was afterward canceled, settlement upon the tract prior to such can-
cellation, especially if attended by the possession and ownership of
valuable improvements, whether made or purchased, was sufficient to-
constitute a legal claim, that would attach to the land the instant it
become again a part of the public domain. See MeAvinney v. Mc-
Namara (3 L. D., 552); Millis v. Burge (4 L. D., 446); Cathran v. Davis
(5 L. D., 249); Wiley v. Raymond (6 L. D., 246); Kruger v. Dumbolton
(7 L. D., 212). The same rule has been applied where land has been,
withdrawn for the benefit of a railroad company. See Peterson v.
Kitchen (2, C. L. O., 181); Houf v. Gilbert (5 L.-D., 239).
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Furthermore, the Department has repeatedly held that while no
party could secure any right as against the United States, by vir-
tue of a settlement made upon a tract withdrawn from entry, still as
between two claimants the question of priority of settlement can
properly be considered in determining their rights to the tract in con-
test. See Geer v. Farrington (4 L. D., 410); Gudmunson v. Morgan (5
L. D., 147); Rothwell v. Crockett (9 L. D., 89); Wiley v. Raymond (6
L. I)., 246); Tarrv. Burnham (6 L. D., 709).
Your decision is affirmed.
TIMBER CULTURE CONTEST-SECOND CONTEST-NOTICE.
BURDICK v. ROBINSON.
The right to proceed under a contest, held in abeyance pending final action on the
prior suit of another against the same entry, matures on the withdrawal of the
prior contest.
The failure of the local office to act on an application to contest will not defeat the
right of the contestant thereunder.
An application to enter is not essential to the validity of a timber culture contest.
Questions affecting the sufficiency of notice can only be raised by the defendant, or
those claiming under him.
Where the Commissioner directs the taking of additional testimony, his authority to
render a decision on the whole record as finally presented, is not affected by the
action of the local office on the evidence submitted at the reheating.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August21, 1890.
The appeal of Maggie J. Burdick from your office decision of Jan-
uary 14, 1889, in the case of Maggie J. Burdick v. Charles C. Robin-
son, has been considered.
May 28, 1878, Peter C. Johnson made timber-culture entry No. 912
for the SW. J of Sec. 32, T. 103, R. 53, Mitchell, Dakota.
Many contests were initiated and withdrawn. or abandoned, which
will notbenoticed, here, becausethey are not necessary totbe deterinina-
tion of the rights of the parties in thiscase. For my purpose the record
shows that on January 30, 1883, Elizabeth A. Cooper filed affidavit of
contest against said entry, and on February 12, 1883, the defendant
Robinson likewise left at the local office an affidavit for the purpose of
contesting said entry, and asked that said affidavit be filed and notice
issued, but the filing was delayed until the 27th day of February, 1883,
for the reasons hereinafter set out.
February 27, 1883, Maggie J. Burdick initiated a contest against said
entry, and on the 12th day of June, 1883, she moved the register and
receiver to dismiss the Robinson contest because of her priority of
right to contest the entry by the filing of the affidavit. This motion
was sustained at the ex-parte hearing, July 25, 1883, and her affidavit
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(of contest) allowed on the same day, from which decision Robinson
appealed to the Coinmissiner of the General Land Office, and the only
question presented by the record is, whether Robinson or Burclick is
the prior bonaftde contestant, Robinson having procured the withdrawal
of the Cooper contest prior to filing his own, and the abandonment and
default of the entryrnan, Johnson, being conceded.
The evidence accompanying the record above noted shows that this
matter has been twice considered by the local officers: first in 1883 by
William Letcher, register, and Hiram Barber, Jr., receiver; second, in
1886 by George B. Everitt, register, and T. F. Singiser, receiver. The
last investigation was ordered by the Commissioner on examination of
the record presented by the appeal of Charles C. Robinson from the
decision of the first-named officers, dismissing his contest on motion of
Maggie J. Burdick. The reasons assigned by the register and receiver
for dismissing the Robinson contest on the motion of Burdick are, that
there was no sufficient affidavit to authorize service by publication, and
that in his application to enter, accompanying said affidavit, he incor-
rectly lescribes the land contested. The defect in the affidavit was fail-
ure to show diligence to secure personal service. The defect in the
application to enter was in describing the land as in range 54, instead
of range 53. The receiver also found that Burdick's contest was en-
titled to priority. The rehearing was had January 4, 1886, on which
the register and receiver awarded the right of contest to Robinson.
Burdick appealed from their decision to the Commissioner, who affirmed
the ecision of the local officers, and Burdick now appeals therefrom to
this Department. The evidence on rehearing shows that on the 12th
of February, 1883, Robinson left with the contest clerk of the land office
at itchell. an affidavit of contest against Johnson's entry, and that
the clerk refused to file it, because Elizabeth H. Cooper had a contest on
file against the same entry. He, however, retained the papers to await
the Cooper contest. On February 20, 1887, Robinson by the payment
of fifty dollars to Cooper procured the withdrawal of her contest, and
on the same day presented the same to the clerk and asked that notice
be issued thereon. The clerk, one Crennan, informed him that his
papers were lost and that he would make further search for them, and,
if he could not find them, he would notify Robinson and he would be
allowed to file other papers; that on February 26, 1887, Tiffany, attor-
ney for Robinson, presented to Crennan a new set of papers, but Cren-
nan rejected them, for the reason that he had not searched sufficiently
for the original one; that on the 27th day of February, 1887, the papers
were accepted and notice issued to Robinson. This evidence is con-
tained in the affidavit of D. C. Tiffany, attorney for Robinson, and is
corroborated by Robinson. J. P. Crennan, the clerk, also subscribes to
an affidavit admitting the tender of the Robinson contest on February
20, 1887.
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These affidavits were filed at the first hearing, July, 1883, and are in
the main corroborated by the testimony taken in January, 1886 The
preponderance of the evidence also clearly shows that the Burdick con-
test was offered and accepted by the sa me clerk, (Crennan, on the morn-
ing of February 27, 1883, a few moments prior to the final reception of
the duplicate application of Robinson as sworn to by Tiffany.
The fact is undisputed that on the 20th of February, 1883, Robinson
presented the withdrawal of the Cooper contest to the clerk, Crennan.
'This left the entry open to his contest, in virtue of the affidavit which
beleftwiththe clerkon February 12th to be filed, but was not then filed or
accepted on account of the pendency of the Cooper contest. His rights
should be held to have attached at the date of withdrawal of Cooper'scon-
test. It is undisputed that he then ask ed to have his con t est aceepted; this
was not done, because the clerk had lost or mislaid the papers. This was
not the fault of Robinson, and it would not be right to make him suffer
for the laches of an officer. His application, therefore, to contest,
proffered on February 20, 1833, must be regarded, so far as his rights
are concerned, as if it had been accepted and made of record. (Dunn
v. Shepherd, 10 L. D., 139; Baird v. Chapman's Heirs et al., 10 L. D.,
210; Hawkins et al. v. Lamm, 9 L. D., 18). This saves all inquiry as
to his application of the 26th February following, or as to who first
secured the ear and favor of the clerk on the morning of the 27th, and
as Burdick's affidavit of contest was not filed until the 27th, Robinson
was prior in point of time. But it is insisted by counsel for appellant
that, granting that the Robinson contest was prior to Burdick's still it
should have been dismissed at the hearing, because, first, the applica-
tion accompanying it described the land as in range 51, while the entry
-contested was in range 53, and, second, because the officers obtained no
jurisdiction of the person of claimant, Johnson, by reason of the affida-
vit being insufficient to authorize notice by publication.
Section 2of the act of May 14, 1880 (21 Stat., 140), provides that a
successful contestant shall be allowed thirty days after notice of can-
celation in which to " enter said lands."
This act, unaided by any regulation of the Department, does away
with the necessity of accompanying the contest with an application to
enter, as by the terms of the law thirty days after cancellation are al-
lowed in which to make such application, and, although the circular of
the Department construing this section was not promulgated until 1887
(6 L. D., 284), the law has been in force since its passage in 1880, and
the rule in Bundy v. Livingston (1 L. D., 152), was eliminated by the
act itself, and the circular of 1887 was simply declaratory thereof.
Robinson's contest having been initiated since the act of 1880 referred
to, no application to enter was required to be filed with his affidavit of
contest. It follows then that a defective application to enter will not
defeat the right of contest, for the law allows a successful contestant
thirty days after cancellation of the entry in which to file a proper ap-
plication to enter.
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The second point, namely: insufficient affidavit to authorize notice-
by publication, can only be invoked by the entryman, or those claiming
under him. The service of notice on the defendant was a condition
subsequent to the filing of a contest, and default therein can not affect
the priority of the filing. If the notice to the claimant was insufficient,
it was the duty of the register and receiver to cause a proper notice to-
be issued, and if this was not done, then the judgment of cancellation
is irregular, and this fact may be shown by the entryinan or waived by
him, and can not affect the priorities of opposing contestants. (Hop-
kins v. Daniels et al., 4 L. D., 126).
The objection that there is no jurat to the affidavit of Robinson, filed
as ex-parte testimony in support of his contest, can have no bearing on
the question of priority. This is a matter affecting only the rights of
the entryman, and his default in cultivation, etc., abundantly appears
from the testimony.
The only other objection of counsel for appellant, not of a general nat-
ure, is that " no decision has ever been rendered on the appeal of Rob-
inson from the action of the register and receiver in dismissing his,
contest."
While the letter of the Commissioner to the register and receiver di-
recting further testimony to be taken is not among the papers accom-
panying the appeal, it sufficiently appears from the record that such
other testimony was ordered to aid the Commissioner in the determina-
tion of the appeal of Robinson, and while the local officers might have
reported the testimony so taken without appending thereto their con-
clusions in the form of a decision, such action on their part does not
preclude the Commissioner from rendering his decision on the whole
record as presented.
I find nothing in the record impeaching the bona fides of Robinson,.
and it is unnecessary to inquire into that of Burdick.
The decision of your office is accordingly affirmed.
JAAW,9 I NOTICE-ATTORNEY-PREFERENCE RIGHT OF ENTRY.
KINSINGER V. PECK.
Notice of the cancellation of an entry given the attorney of the successful contestant
is notice to said contestant, and his failnre to assert the preference ri.,ht of
entry, within thirty days after sch notice, defeats the exercise of such right
thereafter.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General'
Land Office. August 22,1890.
I have considered the case of Christian M. Kinsinger v. Charles EI.
Peck on appeal by the former from your office decision of April 20, 1890,
rejecting his application to make timber culture entry of the SW.i
NE.1, SE.I NW. , NE. SW.4 and NW. SE. I, Sec. 1,T. 5 N. R_
33 W., 6th P. M. McCook, Nebraska.
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It appears that Kinsinger brought contest against the timber culture
entry of one Tacke covering said tract and procured the cancellation of
the same. Notice of the cancellation was given his attorney on Decem-
ber 20, 1887.
On January 3ty, 188'l, Peck made timber culture entry for the tract.
On March 2, 1888, Kinsinger applied to enter the land under thetimber
culture law, but his application was rejected on account of Peck's prior
entry. Kinsinger claimed to be entitled to the preference right of entry,
and your office ordered a hearingin the premises. It appeared from the
testimony that Kinsinger's attorney in the Tacke case made a charge of
$10 for his services therein. This Kinsinger refused to pay, claiming
that the amount was unreasonably large. As the attorney had not
received his fee when he was notified of the cancellation of the entry,
he failed and refused to send notice to Kinsinger. He claims that his
connection with the case was terminated by Kinsinger's refusal, prior
thereto. to pay the fee.
Whatever may be the merits of that controversy, it is clear that
notice was properly sent to the attorney of record. Service upon the
attorney is service upon theclient. Underthelaw Kinsinger was obliged
to make entry within thirty days from such service, in order to secure his
preference right. The officers of the government having done their
fall duty are in no manner responsible for Kinsinger's default, and the
interests of the present entryman can not be prejudiced by any misun-
derstauding that may exist between Kinsinger and his attorney.
The decision appealed from is affirmed.
PEIRANO ET AL. V. iPENDOLA.
Motion for review or departmental decision rendered May 3, 1890, 10?
L. D., 536, dismissed by Secretary Noble, August 22, 1890.
PRIVATE CLAIM-WESTERN BOUNDARY OF TEXAS.
SANGRE DE CHRISTo GRANT.
At the date of the confirmatory act the land embraced within this claim belonged
to the United States, if not to the grantees, and it was therefore competent for
Congress to confirm the title thereto in the grantees, either by confirming the
grant made by the Mexican government, or by a grant de novo.
The duty of the Commissioner to direct the survey of private grants, made by compe-
tent authority, and to issue patent thereon, is not limited to grants covered by
the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
Suit to vacate the patent issued under this grant not advised.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, August
22, 1890.
On May 9, 1890, Mr. 0. P. Mcains presented to this Department a
communication, in relation to the Sangre de Christo grant, which was
referred to you, and your report, of July 22, 1890, upon the subject
matter thereof, is now before me.
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Claiming to represent certain " homestead and pre-emption settlers"
withiu the limits of the said grant, Mr. McNains urges that this De-
partment recommend to the Attorney General that he institute suit to
vacate the patent heretofore issued to the confirmee of said grant, " be-
cause the survey as set forth in said alleged patent is without authority
of law."
The grounds upon which this application is made as set forth in the
communication are to the effect, that the land embraced within said
grant, being situated east of the Rio Grande River, was, in 1843, the
date of the grant thereof by the Mexican authorities, within the limits
of the then Republic of Texas, whose independence, with the Rio Grande
river to its source as its western boundary, was acknowledged by
Mexico in 1836. Thereupon, it is urged the Mexican authorities had
ino right to make an extra-territorial grant, and such grant is not pro-
tected by the law of nations, nor the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
whereby the rights of private property within the territory ceded by
Mexico to the United States are secured and guaranteed.
The grant in question was made in 1843 by Don Manuel Armijo, polit-
ical governor and military commander of the department of New Mex-
ico. It was examined and reported upon favorably, under section 8 of
the act of July 22, 1854 (10 Stat.. 308), by the surveyor general of New
Mexico, which report was transmitted to Congress, and the grant was
confirmed by that body, as claim No. 4, on June 21, 1860 (12 Stat., 71).
The validity of this confirmation, its effect and the extent thereof
*came before the supreme court in the case of Tameling v. United States
Freehold, etc., Company (93 . S., 64). On page 663, the court say:
'the surveyor-general reaches the conclusion that the grant is a good and valid one,
and that a legal title vests in Charles Beaubien to the land embraced within the
imits contained in the petition. The grant was approved and recommended for
-confirmation by Congress. Congress acted upon the claim 'as recommended for con-
firmation by the surveyor-general.' The confirmation being absolute and uncondi-
bional, without any limitation as to quantity, we must regard it as effectual and
-operative for the etire tract . . . . . In Ryan et a. v. Carter et al., spra p.
78, we recognized and enforced as the settled doctrine of this court, that such an act
- passes the title of the United States as effectually as if it contained in terms a grant
de evo, and that a grant may be made by a law as well as by a patent pursuant to
law.
On page 82 of the opinion, in the Ryan case referred to, speaking of
the act of Congress of 1812, confirming certain land claims in Missouri,
the court say:-
It (the act) does not require the production of proofs before any commission or other
tribunal established for that special purpose, but confirms, IJroprio vigore, the rights,
titlles, and claims to the lands embraced by it, and operates as a grant to all intents
-and purposes. Repeated decisions of this court have declared that such a statute
passes the title of the United States as effectually as if it contained in terms a grant
-de ovo, and that a grant may be made by law, as well as by a patent pursuant to law.
In view of these decisions it is not necessary to express a definite
-opinion as to whether or not the Sangre de Christo Rancho was within
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the borders of Texas at the date of its grant by the Mexican authori-
ties. That Texas claimed the Rio Grande river, to its source, as its-
western boundary, and that, to some extent, the claim was recognized
by the Mexican authorities is apparent from the treaty of May 1836,.
whereby Santa Anna, the President of Mexico, recognized the inde-
pendence of the Republic of Texas. After Texas was admitted to the-
Union, she seems to have re-asserted her claim to the Rio Grande, as,
her western boundary, to its source. Whilst this claim does not appear
to have been entirely acquiesced in, the United States, in 1850, pur-
chased and Texas ceded any claim she might have to territory north of
the thirty-second degree of north latitude, west of the one hundred and
third meridian west from Greenwich. For this cession the United
States paied $10,000,000. and the much larger portion of the ceded terri-
tory was made a part of the Territory of New Mexico as then organized.
See act of September 9, 1850 (9 Stat., 446).
It thus results that, whether the lands embraced within the lines of
the Sangre de Christo grant were, at the date thereof, within the de-
partment of New Mexico, where the Mexican governor had authority
to make such a grant, or within the Republic of Texas which was not
subject to his jurisdiction, it is clear that at the date of the passage of
the act of June 21, 1860, supra, confirming said grant as claim No. 4,
the land in question belonged to the United States, if not to the
grantees; and it was entirely competent for Congress to grant or con-
firm it to Beaubien; such grant or confirmation operating, as was in-
tended, to secure to the confirmee all the estate of the United States in
the premises, whether by confirming the grant made by the former gov-
ernment, or by making a grant de novo where none existed before.
The grant having thus been made by competent authority, it became
the duty of the Commissioner of the General Land Office to cause a sur-
vey to be made and patent to issue thereon; his supervision and duty in
this respect, as to private grants, not being limited, as intimated, to-
grants covered by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
It is fair to assume that the matters now urged were considered by
Congress, before making the grant referred to. The question of the
western boundary of Texas was exhaustively debated by the eminent
statesmen of that (lay, before the compromise of 1850 was made, whereby
Texas released her claim to the territory in question; and it is not to
be supposed that a matter which had theretofore been so fully dis-
cussed would be ignored when the propriety of confirming the grant
was before Congress, or its committees.
On a review of the whole subject I see no sufficient reason for inter-
posing, and therefore decline to recommend that suit be brought to
cancel the patent, as requested.
Herewith is sent to you the communication of Mr. McMains, for-
record, and you will advise him of the conclusion herein arrived at.
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DESERT LAND ENTRY-CHARACTER OF LAND.
SINS V. PHALEN.
Land bordering on a stream of water, and that produces a natural growth of grass in
paying quantities, is not subject to desert entry.
The fact that the entry embraces land not subject thereto does not necessarily make
the entire entry fraudulent.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 25, 1890.
I have considered the respective appeals of John Phalen and John
Sims, Jr., from your decision of January 21, 1889, Phalan appeals from
your order holding for cancellation the N. I of SE. of his entry, and
Sims appeals from so much of your judgment as allows the §. g of the
NE. thereof to stand.
The record shows that Phalen made desert land entry No. 1844, on
June 11, 1886, for the N. of SE. and the S. of NE. of Sec. 12, T.
f N., R. 7 E., Salt Lake, Utah.
On October 18, 1886, Sims filed a complaint alleging that the entry of
Phalen was fraudulent, for the reason that the land embraced therein
was not desert land, especially the N. i of the SE. -. Thereupon, a
hearing was ordered and set for December 1, 1886. Both parties ap-
peared and submitted their testimony, and while it is conflicting, yet I
think it is clear that a portion of the N. of SE. 1 is a bog," that a
stream of water, fed by springs passes through the tract, and that a bet-
ter crop would be produced if the land was drained than if irrigated,
that for several years a crop of hay has been cut on said land. The ev-
idence is, owever, irreconcilable as to the amount of hay cut, the value
of the crop, and as to the number of acres of "boggy"land. The con-
testant and his witnesses assert that there is from forty to fifty acres
of this character of land, while the witnesses for the claimant place the
amount at from eight to fifteen acres.
The fact that parties were anxious year after year to secure the crop
is evidence that the same was considered remunerative.
Under the established ruling of the Department, I am of the opinion
that the N. of SE. is not desert land, and that the entry for said
eighty acres must be canceled. Keys v. Rumsey (10 L. D., 558).
As for the S. of NE. X, I do not think the charge that the entry
thereof is fraudulent should be entertained. There is no evidence
whatever to show that it is not desert land, and the fact that the entry-
man included in his entry land that was not subject thereto, does not
necessarily make the entire entry fraudulent. The presumption is that
he acted in good faith and I do not find sufficient evidence either direct
or circumstantial to justify me in concluding that bad faith actuated
the claimant in making this entry as to the last named tract.
Your decision is therefore, affirmed.
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HOMESTEAD ENTRY-RESIDENCE-HUSBAND AND WIFE.
JOHN 0. AND MINERVA C. GARNER.
A husband and wife, while living together in snch relation, cannot maintain separate
residence at the same time, in a house built across the line between two settle-
ment claims, so that each can secure a claim by virtue of such residence.
In such a case, where residence hag been thus maintained, the claimants may elect
which tract they will retain.
The case of Maria Good, 5 L. D., 196, cited and distinguished.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 25, 1890.
On July 5,1886, John Q. Garner made homestead entry for N. SE. t
and SE. - NE. See. 7, and on the same day Minerva C. Martin made
homestead entry for W. * SE. 4 Sec. 6, and W. J NE. I See. 7, all in
T. 20 S., R. 26 W., Wa Keeney, Kansas. The claims are adjoining.
On August 29,1886, the claimants were married, and on June 16, 1888
made commutation proof. It showed that they took up their residence
in a house built across the line dividing the claims, on November 22,
1886, and so continued to reside until date of proof. At that time they
had one child.
The local officers rejected both proofs. Your office on February 5,
1889, held that "' married residence cannot be maintained on separate
tracts," and directed that claimants be required " to elect which one of
said entries they will retain, after which election, the other will be can-
eceled."'
Claimants appealed, urging that their acts in the premises have been
entirely lawful. This contention is not in harmony with the decisions
of this Department: "A husband and wife while living together in such
relation cannot maintain separate residence at the same time, in a house
built across the line between two settlement claims, so that each can
secure a claim by virtue of such residence." Thomas E. Henderson, 10
L. D., 266; L. A. Tavener, 9 L. D., 426.
Inasmuch as these parties have maintained residence in a house built
across the line dividing the claims, I find nothing inconsistent in their
claiming residence on either one of the tracts.
They urge that they have been misled in the premises by certain let-
ters from your office. I find from the records thereof that Joatn C. Gar-
ner, by letter of October 30, 1886, inquired of your office in substance
whether a woman who makes a homestead entry forfeits her right by
marrying thereafter, and that you responded that she did not, provided
she continued to reside upon and cultivate the land for the prescribed
period. It will be noticed that this letter was written after both entries
had been made. Furthermore, an examination of the letter discloses
that while Garner stated he had married Miss Martin, who had made a
homestead entry, he did not state that he had made such an entry. The
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issue here presented therefore was not submitted to your office at all,
It is true that in the case of Maria Good (5 L. D., 196), it was held that
the right acquired by the original homestead entry of a single woman
is not affected by her marriage prior to final proof, but in that case it
did not appear that the husbiand and wife clainel separate homestead
residences while living as one family. Herein lies the essential differ--
ence between the cases.
Said decision is accordingly affirmed.
PREFERENCE RIGHT OF ENTRY-ADVERSE CLAIM-FILING.
DALLAS v. LYTTLE.
The failure of a sccessful contestant to exercise the preference right of entry within
the period accorded, defeats his subsequent right of entry in the presence of a
valid intervening adverse claim; and this is true though sch contestant may
have believed that his entry was in fact of record, and, acting upon such belief;
proceeded thereafter to ltivate the land as required by the timber clture law.
A pre-emption filing, defective for want of previous settlement, is made good by sb-
sequent settlement, in the absence of any intervening adverse claims.
V First Assistant Secretary Chandler to te Commissioner of the General-
Land Office, Ausi 2), 1890.
I have considered the case of Green W. Dallas v. Rachel Lyttle, on
appeal of the former from your office decision of March 11, 1889, in which
it appears from the record that June 25, 1884, Rachel Lyttle filed her
declaratory statement No. 2525, for lots 3 and 4, and S. of NW.4 Sec.
3, T 30 N., R. 2 E., B. M., Lewiston, Idaho. October 9, 1886, shegave
due notice that she would make her final proof on November 22, 1886.
On November 8, 1886 [4], Dallas made timber culture entry No. 693
of the same land, and on November 22, 1886, the day fixed for hearing
the final proof of Lyttle, he iled objections, verified by his affidavit,
against the allowance of the proof, alleging that he had made timber
culture entry for the same tract some years prior thereto, the date of
which he did not know, that defendant's settlement was made long
after her filing, and that she had failed to comply with the requirements
of the pre-emption law, and asked that testimony might be taken on his
said affidavit at Mount daho, it being more convenient for the wit-
nesses.
The register and receiver took the final proof of the defendant, and
then ordere(l that further testimony, as requested by Dallas, should be
taken at ount Idaho, before the deputy clerk of the United States
district court, oi January 20, 1887, which was done, and from the evi-
dence taken, the local officers on February 24, 1887, recommended that
her final proof be allowed, and that Dallas' timber culture entry be can-
celed. From this action he appealed to your office, where, reviewing
the evidence you approved the finding of the register and receiver, and.
he now appeals to this Department.
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He bases his claim to the land on the following facts:
Some time prior to June 29. 1880, Cornelius J. Curtain made timber
culture entry for the same tract, and on said last date Dallas filed his
affidavit of contest (unaccompanied by any application to enter),
against the entry of Curtain. The contest was successful, and on May
10, 1881, as appears from the register's letter book, he was notified of
the cancellation of (Yurtain's entry, and allowed sixty days to make
entry of the land.
It appears that he mistook this notice for a receiver's duplicate re-
ceipt, and believing that his entry had been allowed, he failed to exer-
cise his right to enter within the prescribed time. Under the belief
that he had complied with the law and that his entry was of record, in
1882, he plowed and planted to tree seeds five acres of the land, and
thereafter to some extent cultivated and replanted the same up to the
date of defendant's settlement and filing in 1884. Some time during
1884, and a short time previous to his entry he, for the first time, dis-
covered that there was no record of his ever having exercised his prefer-
ence right, or that he had at any time entered or applied to enter the
land. In his testimony he states that, on the day his contest against
the entry of' Curtain was heard and sustained, he applied to enter the
land, and left the necessary fees and commissions with the officers for
that purpose, and that when he received the notice above referred to
he did not examine it, but took it for granted that it was the receiver's
receipt as aforesaid, and left it with a neighbor to keep for him, but it
was burned when his house was destroyed by fire in June, 1884. Eis
neighbor (Bartley), who was the custodian of this paper, says that when
looking for his own timber culture receipt one (lay, he " got hold of 17
Dallas' paper and read it down to where his name occurred, and so far
he " didn't see any difierence in his and mine." This is all the evidence
offered, going to show that Dallas ever applied to enter the tract prior
to November 8, 1884, and the evidence of these two witnesses is mate-
rially weakened on cross-examination.
The evidence tends almost irresistibly to the conclusion that Dallas
inadvertently failed to exercise his right of preference, and that his
first entry or application to enter was that of November 8, 1884, sub-
sequent to the filing of Lyttle.
There is abundant evidence as to the good faith of Mrs. Lyttle in her
residence upon and cultivation of the tract. It shows that she has
built a house, with a kitchen attachment, which, though not expensive,
is comfortable and suitably furnished; that she has fenced and culti-
vated to crop three acres, planted a garden, and dug a well;- that she
is a widow with two children, and she has constantly resided on the
tract ever since her settlement, except when absent nursing to support
herself and children, and with the exception of two or three months in
the winter of 1884-5, before herhouse was quite finished; that, in March,
1885, she, with the money she had earned through the winter by nurs-
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ing, finished her house; that all her absences have been of short duration
and caused by her occupation as nurse. This is clearly shown by the
testimony of her neighbors.
It is true, her settlement on the land did not actually occur until
July 3, 1884, eight days subsequent to her filing, but as no adverse
claim intervened between the filing and settlement, the default in the
latter was cured. (Gray . Nye, 6 L. D., 232). While this conclusion
may work a hardship to Mr. Dallas on account of his sleeping upon his
supposed entry, and on account of the loss of his labor andimprove-
ments as a result thereof, yet, all this is brought upon him by his in-
attention to the contents of his notice. Mrs. Lyttle having made entry
of the tract when it was subject to appropriation and free from adverse
claim, she cannot be sacrificed to avoid a disaster to Dallas which
might with ordinary prudence and care, have been avoided.
The decision of your office, dismissing his contest and cancelling his
timber-culture entry, is accordingly affirmed.
CONTEST--RELINQUISHlMENT-PREFERENCE RIGHT.
OSBORNE V. CROW.
A relinquishment filed during the pendency of a contest is presumed to be the result
of the contest, but sch presumption is not conclusive, ad on proof that the
relinquishment is not the result of the contest, the right of the contestant must
depend upon his ability to sustain the charge against the entry.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office,.August 25, 1890.
On February 2, 1887, Clarence 1l. Osborne filed a ontest against the
timber-culture entry of Francis M. Crow, for the NE. - Sec. 13, T. 3 N.,
R. 39 W., McCook, Nebraska, alleging that the claimant failed to
break or plow five acres on said tract at any time prior to that date.
From the testimony taken at the hearing ordered upon this contest,
the local officers found that in view of the good faith of the entryman,
the contest should be dismissed. This decision was affirmed by your
office on December 21, 1888.
It appears from the evidence that the entryman paid for breaking
five acres of land, but upon actual measurement it was found to con-
tain a little more than four acres, but in view of his good faith, and
there being reasons for believing that the contest was speculative be-
cause the contestant had offered to discontine the case on payment of
$50, you sustained the entry and disniissed the contest.
On January 5, 1889, the local officers referring to said decision, in-
formed your office that the entryman fflect a relinquishment of his entry
October 21, 1888, prior to said decision, and Susan Sage made timber
culture entry for the tract; that Osborne was, on October 27, 1888,
notified of the filing of said relinquishment and of his preference right
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of entry; that although the decision of the local office was against him
his appeal therefrom preserved his right and the relinquishment closed
the ease in his favor. On November 9, 1888, Osborne filed declaratory
statement for said tract. They also reported that no notice of the
decision of December 21,1886, had been given to Osborne.
On February 8, 1889, your office held that as the case was tried upon
its merits and the contest dismissed, the relinquishment could not be
the result of said contest, and the contestant had therefore no pref-
erence right of entry; that he must depend upon his case and if no
appeal was taken from it, the judgment would become final and the
entry of Sage would be allowed to stand. The local officers were then
directed to notify Osborne of the decision dismissing his contest and of
his right of appeal therefrom.
Notice was given to Osborne accordingly and on May 7, 1889, the
local officers transmitted his appeal from the decision of the Commis-
sioner of February 8, 1889, alleging substantially that the Commissioner
erred in holding that he was not a successful contestant, and that the
relinquishment was not presumed to be the result of his contest; that
he errel in deciding the case upon the testimony without eference to
the filing of the relinquishment, and in holding the contestant, in order
to secure the preference right must prosecute his case successfully to a
close on the testimony presentedl.
No appeal was filed from the decision of your office holding that the
contestant had not sustained his charges, and that the contest should
be dismissed, and his failure-to appeal therefrom may be taken as an
admission of the correctness of said ruling.
It is true that at the date of the decision of your office, the entry
had been relinquished, but the decision of the local officers being ad-
verse to the contestant it was necessary to render a decision to deter-
mine the rights of the contestant. The affirmance of the decision of
the local officers was in effect a ruling that the relinquishment did not
inure to the benefit of the contestant, and that he had no preference
right by virtue of his contest. The effect of this decision could only
have been avoided by securing its reversal upon appeal to the Secre-
tary.
The rule that a relinquishment filed pending a contest is presumed to
be the result of the contest is founded upon the theory that the entry-
man by filing the relinquishment has admitted the truth of the charge,
but when the charge is not sustained no such presumption can attach.
It has therefore been held that while a relinquishment filed penling a
contest is presumed to be the result of the contest, such presumption
is not conclusive, and upon proof that the relinquishment was not the
result of the contest, the contestant must depend upon his ability to
sustain the charge. Mitchell v. Robinson (3 L. D., 546); McClellan v.
Biggerstafi (7 L. D., 42); Kurtz v. Summers (Ib., 46); Sorensen v.
Becker (8 L. D., 357); Loughrey v. Webb (9 L. D., 440).
The decision of your office is affirmed.
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LANDS WITHDRAWN FOR RESERVOIR PUYRPOSES-CIRCULAR.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
Washington, D. C., July 22, 1890.
Registers and Receivers of the United States Land Offices
at Ashland,Eau Claire, and Wausau, Wisconsin,
and St. Cloud and Taylor's Falls, Minnesota:
GENTLEMEN: The act of Congress approved June 20, 1890, entitled
"An act to authorize the President of the United States to cause cer-
tain lands heretofore withdrawn from market for reservoir purposes to
be restored to the public domain subject to entry under the homestead
law with certain restrictions," a copy of which is hereto attached, makes
provision for the entry of the lands so restored.
You will observe that the statute, by its terms, does not take effect
until December 20, 1890. No entry for, or settlement upon, said lands
will be allowed until the expiration of that time, and the lands are made
subject to entrv under the homestead law only.
Any person applying to enter or file for a homestead on said lands
will be required first to make affidavit, in addition to other require-
ments, that he did not violate the law by entering upon. and occupying
any portion of said lands prior to December 20, 1890, the affidavit to
accompany your returns for the entry allowed. Blank forms for said
affidavit will be transmitted to you in due time.
No comment upon the provisions of the second section of the act ap-
pears to be necessary, as the records of your office should show all dis-
posals of land therein mentioned, and it is presumed that l)arties desir-
ing to enter any. of the restored lands will have knowledge of the reser-
vation by the government of the rights, and the denial of right to com-
pensation, therein mentioned.
Very respectfully,
LEWIS A. GROFF,
Commissioner.
Approved:
JOHN W. NOBLE,
Secretary.
[PUBLIC-NO. 170.J
AN ACT to authorize the President of the United States to cause certain lands heretofore withdrawn
from market for reservoir purposes to be restored to the pulbic domain subject to entry under the
homestead law, with certain restrictions.
Be it enacted by the Senate and ffoseof Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled: That there is hereby restored to the public domain all the lands
described in certain proclamations of the President of the United Slates, dated March
swenty-second, eighteen hundred and eighty, Executive Docttment numbered eight
hundred and fifty-nine; also, April fifth, eighteen hundred and eighty-one, Executive
Document numbered eight hundred and sixty-eight; also, February twentieth, eight-
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eon hndred ant eighty-two. P aecritive Docuine-rit ninberel eight hundred and
seventy-four, withdrawing and witholding certain lands from market or entry and
reserving the same to aid in the constrnctiou of certain reservoirs to be built at the
headwaters of the Mississippi and Saint Croix Rivers, in the States of Minnesota and
Wisconsin, and of the Chippewi and Wisconsin Rivers, in the State of Wisconsin;
and that these lands, when so restored, shall be subject to homestead entry only.
SEC. 2. That in all cases where any of the lnds rest ird to the public domain by
the first section of this act have heretofore been sold or disposed of by the proper offi-
cers of the United States uuder color of the public land laws, and the consideration re-
ceived therefor is still retained by the government, the title of the purchasers may be
confirmed if in the opinion of the Secretary of the Interior justice requires it; but all
the lands by said first section restored shall at all times remain subject to the right
of the United States to construct and maintain dans for the purpose of ereating reser-
voirs in aid of navigation; and no claim or right to compensation shall accrue from
the overflowing of said lands on account of the constructiou and maintenance of such
dams and reservoirs.
SEc. 3. That no right of any kind shall attach byreason of settlement or squatting
upon any of the lands hereinbefore described before the day on which such lands shall
be subject to homestead entry at the several land offices, and until said lands are
opened for settlement no person shall enter upon and occupy the same, and any per-
son violating this provision shall never be permitted to enter any of said lands or
acquire any title thereto. This act shall take effect six months after its approval by,
the President of the United States.
Approved June 20, 1890.
MINERAL APPxICATION-CDONFlICTING RIGHTS.
J. B. RICE.
An application to make mineral entry duly presented at the local office, but held with
out action during the absence of the register, operates to reserve the land covered
thereby until final action thereon.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 28,1891L
The application of J. B. Rice for patent to the Snow Flake placer
claim, for thirty acres in the Sacramento, California, land district, em-
braced also the twenty acres include(l in a like application by Enoch
Redding for the " Enoch Re, ding" placer claim.
Lt appears that on July 30. 188, Redding's application was duly pre-
sented at the local office, and, it being the relister's custom to person-
ally examine such applications " before allowing filingc or order of publi-
cation," the clerk in charge inclosed said application in a package,
endorsed " presented for filing July 30, 1888, and not filed by reason of
the absence of the register; " that at his attorney's request Rice's ap-
plication was on July 31, 1838, taken by a clerk in the local office and
presented to the register at his residence; and the register then in-
structed the clerk to file Rice's papers as of July 31, 1888; that on
August 2, 1838, the attorneys for Redding filed a petition asking that
all procedings under the Rice application be vacated, and that the Red-
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ding application be filed as of July 30, 1888. This petition, after argu-
ment by counsel for the respective parties, was granted by the local office,
and Rice appealed.
On February 5, 1889, your office finding the Redding petition to be
first in time, held the Rice application for "rejection and cancellation
. . to the extent of the conflict and allowed Redding's appli-
eation to stand. Rice again appeals.
Redding's application was pending in the local office when that of
Rice was made of record, hence, Redding being first in point of time
his application operated to reserve the land from any other disposition
until final action was taken thereon. Griffin v. Pettigrew, 10 L. D., 510,
and cases cited. Indeed I think his application should be treated as
filed when it was presented and so left with said clerk for that purpose.
Rice's application has, therefore, been properly rejected.
The action of your office in this regard and in allowing the application
of Redding is accordingly affirmed.
MINING CLAIM-HEARING-PRACTICE-SPECIFICATION OF ERROR.
DEVEREUX ET AL. V. HUNTER ET AL.
In case of protest against a mineral application the local office is authorize I to order
a, hearing to determine the character of the claim. and whether there has been
due compliance with the mining lw.
Specifications of error 9hould clearly and concisely designate the alleged errors.
* First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 28, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of G. W. Hfunter et al., claimants for he
Mount Yale placer claim, survey No. 3976, application No. 3185, filed
July 10, 1885, in the Leadville, Colorado, land office, from your office
decision of February 13, 1889, rejecting said application and. liolulingy the
same for cancellation.
The record shows that on July 10, 18S5, G. W. Ranter et al., filed, in
the local land office at Leadville, Colorado, a plat, as required by law,
of their claim upon the Mount Yale placer, containing 144.5 acres.
Notice of application for a patent was published from July 11, to Sep-
tem 13,1885. No adverse claim was filed. On the 27th day of August,
1885, Thomas G. and John J. Devereux filed in the local office their pro-
test against the application, alleging that the claim is not placer land,
and that it embraces within its boundaries a portion of a nainbir of
known lode claims, among which are the Inez, Big Missouri, St. John
and Albert Emerald, upon all of which the assessment work has been
done from year to year according to law, and the same verified by affi-
davit of record in the recorder's office of the proper county. No action
was taken upon this protest. On the 9th day of March, 886. G. W.
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Hunter et al. made their application to prchase the tract in contro-
versy, and on the 10th day of March said protestants filed in the local
office a second protest, in which they re-affirm the grounds alleged in
the first, and allege three other grounds, in effect, alleging that all the
ground embraced within said placer mining claim is strictly lode mining
ground, inaccessible to water, and that neither the sum of $500, nor any
other sum whatever, has been expended upon said pretended placer
claim, or for its benefit, for the purpose of working or developing the
same as placer mining ground. And that said pretended placer claim
was located, has been held, and is now sought to be entered by appli-
cants solely for the valuable lode mineral deposits which underlie it,
and for no other purpose. And upon these facts protestants base the
charge that said placer claim is fraudulent and the allowance of the
entry and issuance of a patent would be a fraud upon the government
and upon' the protestants. On the 11th day of March, 1886, the prot-
estants filed in the local office the affidavits of Adam Paterson and
Robert Berry. corroborating their protest, in so far as the character of
the ground included in the boundaries of the placer not being placer
ground and that the placer survey is intersected with lode mining claims.
Thereupon, a hearing was ordered by and had before the local officers,
at which both parties appeared and introduced testimony.
Upon the evidence introduced before them, the register and receiver
did not agree, and rendered opinions accordingly, the receiver in favor
of the entry, and the register against it. From their decisions the par-
ties, respectively, appeal to your office, and thereupon your office. on
the 13th day of February, 1889, found that the lands involved are pot
placer lands, subject to entry under the mining laws, and rejected the
application and held it for cancellation. From your decision the appli-
cants for patent appeal.
The appellant assigns several grounds of alleged error. One of the
errors urged and relied on is, that the local officers had no Authority to
order a hearing, and that the Department of the Interior has no juris-
diction in the premises.
The order for a hearing was properly made by the local officers. The
jurisdiction of the land department to order a hearing to determine
whether there has been due compliance with the mining law is too well
settled to admit of extended discussion. Sweeney v. Wilson, 10 L. D.,
157; Bodie Tunnel and Mining Cempany v. Bechtel Consolidated Mining
Company, 1 L. D., 584; Alice Placer Mine, 4 L. D., 314.
The fourth, fifth and sixth errors assigned by appellant are largely
in the nature of reasons or arguments, and, in my judgment, present
immaterial questions, when viewed in the light of the record in the case.
The seventh and last assignment of error is: " Because of the manifest
errors in the conclusions of law and fact arrived at by the Cominis-
sioner in making the decision appealed from." This specification is too
indefinite to present any question.
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Role of Practice 88 requires a specification of errors, "1 which shall
clearly and concisely designate the errors of which he complains."
After carefully examining all of the evidence in the case, I find there-
from the facts to be substantially as found by your office, which are set
out in said decision, and are hereby referred to as fully as if set out
herein.. I find no reason for disturbing the decision appealed fron and
it is accordingly affirmed.
]PRIVATE CASH ENTRY-NON-MINERAL AFFIDAVIT.
GEORGE S. BUSH.
A non-mineral affidavit is properly required to accompany an application to make
private cash entry.
First Assistant Secretary handler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 27, 1890.
This is an appeal by George S. Bush fromn your office decision of
March 29, 1889, affirming the action of the local office in rejecting his
several applicatians to make private cash entries for certain described
(offered) tracts in T. 30 N., R. 5 W., Seattle, Washington, " because no
non-mineral affidavit accompanies the same."
The tracts involved. if " valuable for minerals," are reserved from sale
(Sec. 2318 R. S.), and consequently not subject to private entry. The
non-mineral affidavit is simply the means adopted by the Department
for ascertaining the character of land so applied for, and consequently
by requiring it the Department neither adds to nor subtracts (as ap-
pellant contends) from the statute. By your oyice letter of September
24,1872, such affidavitwas madearequLisiteto "allenitriesunder the ag-
ricultural land laws " in the Olympia, now Seattle, land district. The
pending applications were therefore properly rejected for failure to file
the same.
The decision appealed from is affirmed.
OSAGE LAND-ACTUAL SETTLEMENT.
UNITED STATES V. SWEENEY.
Actual settlement must be shown by residence following the alleged act of settlement,
and the proof required to establish the fact of such settlement under the act of
May 28, 1880, is no less in degree than the proof required under the pre-emption
law.
First Assistant Secretary Chandlter to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 29, 1890.
Ihave considered the appeal of S. S. Singer, transferee from the de-
cisioa of your office cancelling Osage cash entry made by Dennis Swee-
ney for the W. A SE. Sec. 19, T, 33 S., R. a W., Rth P. M. Wichita
series, Topeka, Kansas.
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This entry was held for cancellation as fraudulent upon the report of
Special Agent Drew, bat afterwards a hearing was ordered before the
local officers and thereat M. C. McLain, Esq., appeared as attorney for
A. E. Lee and S. S. Singer transferees. Upon the testimony taken on
the trial the local officers found that said entry was fraudulent for want
of residence, improvement and cultivation, and recommended the can-
cellation of the entry. From this decision no appeal was filed, and on
October 27, 1888, your office declared said decision final for failure to
appeal therefrom, and canceled the entry.
On February 12, 1889, the local officers transmitted to your office an
appeal from the judgment of your office, which you declined to enter-
tain for the reason that said parties received due notice of the decision
of the local office, and failed to appeal within the prescribed time.
Whereupon appellant applied for a writ of certiorari which was granted,
and said appeal is now before me.
In his final proof th- clainant states that he first made settlement
and established actual residence on the land the 18th day of May 1861,
and yet his final proof was made June 2, 1881, having remained on the
land only fifteen days from the (late of settlement to date of final proof.
No declaratory statement was filed until June 9th-seven days after
making final proof and the day his cash entry was allowed.
Considering the fact that his final proof was submitted within fifteen
days from the date of his alleged settlement, in connection with the
testimony taken on the hearillg, which shows that he left the claim
shortly afterwards, having mortgaged it to secure a loan of one hundred
and twenty-five dollars, negotiated with B. F. Lee as agent, who was
also the husband of A. E. Lee, who afterwards purchased the land, it
shows that he never established a bonafide settlement and residence
upon the land, as contemplated by the act. The improvements with
the exception of an acre or two of plowed land, were muade by a former
settlhr, and the assignees failed to show that the entryman ever occu-
pied the dug-out a single night. The local officers found that Sweeney
never occupied the house and never had a residenee upon the land.
This finding is, in my judgment, amply supported by the evidence.
The main allegation of error in the appeal of Singer from the decision
of your office is, in holding that the law governing Osage entries re-
quires residence, improvement and cultivation, that it only requires
that he shall be an actual settler on the land at date of entry, having
the qualification of an pre-emptor. Such is not the rule of this Depart-
ment. Actual settlement must be shown by residence following the
alleged act of settlement, and the proof required to establish the fact
of actual settlement under the act of May 28, 1880, ( 21 Stats., 143),
governing Osage entries, is no less in degree than the proof required
under the pre-emption law. United States v. Atterbery, ([L. D., 36);
United States v. Jones (lb. 23).
The decision of your office is affirmed.
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PRACTICE-AFFIDAVIT OF CONTEST.
HANES v. BEATTY.
Where a contestant presents at the local office an affidavit of contest properly pre-
pared for signature, and ready for the administration of the oath thereto by hiin-
self and corroborating witnesses, it is the duty of one of the local officers, if called
upon so to do, to administer said oath to said contestant and his witnesses, pre-
paratory to filing such affidavit; and the failure or refusal of the local office to
take such action will not defeat the contestant's right of priority.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 29, 1890.
I have considered the ease of Abram C. lanies v. Robert M. Beatty, oil
appeal by anes from your office decision of February 8, 1889, sustain-
ing the action of the local officers, and awarding to Beatty a priar right
to contest the homestead entry made by James L. Plummer, December
19, 1879, for the SW. See. 28, T. 22 S., R. 34 V., Garden City, Kansas.
The evidence shows that on the morning of June 21, 1888, the said
Beatty, accompanied by two corroborating witnesses, appeared at the
"filing window" of the local office, with the intention of initiating con-
test against said Plummer's homestead entry. As a basis for such con-
test, one of. Beatty's corroborating witnesses, David F. Speare, pre-
sented to the filing clerk of the office, Mr. W.W. Glasscock, an affidavit
that ad previously been prepared, except that the names of the con-
testant and of his corroborating witnesses were not written on the face
of the paper, and they had not signed the same; and he requested that
the oath be administered to the three (Beatty and his two witnesses)
then and there present. What then occurred is thus stated by MIr.
Speare in his testimony taken at the hearing:
I .was the first man at the window of the land office. Robert M. Beatty, contestant,
and Charles G. Lindgren, were by my side when handed the papers to Glasscock.
He looked at the papers, put the number, '16,165,' on the affidavit, and said I wonId
have to go before a notary pblic and be sworn. I told him the contestant and cor-
roborating witnesses were in readiness to sign the affidavit and be sworn-which I
had seen done before at the window of the land office. He said he would not do it.
The same witness further states that Mr. Cleary, special examiner of
your office, informed him that the contest papers could be signed at the
window and sworn to by the register or receiver of the land office.
Contestant, Hanes, in his testimony at the hearing, says:
There was another party at the door at the time the door opened. The other party,
a little in advance, put his papers in the window. The clerk looked at the papers.
Said he, " They are not dated nor sworn to; they are worthless." I think those are
about the words he used, as near as I can recollect.
The filing clerk, Glasseock, testifying upon the same point, says:
"The papers being incomplete, I told the person preseating said papers
to go and have them fixed up."
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Being asked in what respect the papers were incomplete, the witness
said: " The contestant had not been sworn to the affidavit of contest,
and no corroborating witnesses appeared on the corroboratiang affida-
vit;" but he does not state that he made this explanation to the person
presenting the affidavit.
Beatty and his corroborating witnesses went to the nearest notary's
office, where the oath was administered to them and the blanks that
had before existed in the contest affidavit were filled, and within half
an hour they returned to the land office, and again tendered said affi-
davit.
In the meantime, however, Hanes had offered his affidavit of contest,
which had been received and noted. dipon Beatty's return, and the
(second) presentation of his affidavit, the receiver inquired into the
facts of the case, and upon being informed thereof, directed that Beat-
ty's contest be held as having been filed prior to that of Hanes. Upon
consideration of the testimony taken at the hearing (the substance of
which has been hereinbefore given), the register and receiver found the
rights of Beatty to be superior to those of EIanes. Thereupon hlabes
appealed to your office, which affirmed thejudgment of the local officers.
Hanes now appeals to the Department.
In my opinion, the objections made by the filing clerk to the affidavit
of contest,, whether those stated by himself or those stated by the cou-
testant, are insufficient and unsatisfactory. It was the duty of one of
the local officers, when called upon to do so, to administer the oath to
the contestant and his witnesses. It was the duty of the witnesses to
subscribe the affidavits in his presence, and the law presumes that they
did. After the affidavits were subscribed and the oath administered it
was the duty of the officer administering the oath to add in the jurat
the date when the affidavit was " subscribed and sworn to before " him.
The affidavits were in a proper condition tb sign and have the oath
administered when presented. The contestant did all he could or was v
required under the law to do. If neither of the local officers were pres-
ent, the applicant to contest ought not to lose his rights because of
their neglect. (Lytle v. State of Arkansas, 9 How., 333). Beatty had
substantially complied with the requirements of the law; and your de-
cision awarding to him the prior right of contest is affirmed.
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ARTI LANDS-CIrPCULAR.
DEPARTMENT OF TE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
Washington, D. ., August 9, 1890.
Registers and Receivers, United States Land Offices.
GENTLEMIIN: On the 5th of August, 1889, 9 L. D., 282, a circular
was addressed to you by direction of the Elon. Secretary of the Interior,
calling your attention to the provisions of the act of October 2, 1888,
25 Stat., 526, relative to the lands in the arid regions of the United
States and instructing you thereunder, which reacts as follows, viz:
Information having reached this Department that parties are endeavoring to make
filings on arid lands reserved for reservoirs, irrigatingditches, and canals, and for the
purpose of controlling the waters of lakes and rivers and their tributaries in the arid
regions, am directed by the Hon. Secretary of the 'interiort) call your special atten-
tion to the act of Congress approved October 2, 1853, U. S. Statutes at Large, vol. 25,
page 526, as follows:
"For the purpose of investigating the extent to which the arid region of the United
States can be redeemed by irrigation, and the segregation of the irrigable lauds in
such arid region, and for the selection of sites for reservoirs and other hydranlic works
necessary for the storage and utilization of water for irri ratioa ant the prevention
of floods and overflows, and to make the necessary aps, including the pay of em-
ploy6s in field and in office, the cost of all instruments, apparatus, and materials,
and all other necessary expenses connected therewith, the work to be performed by
the Geological Survey, uder the dire tion of the Secretary of the Interior, the sin
of one hundred thousand lollars or so miuch thereof as may be necessary. And the
Director of the Geological Survey, under the supervision of the Secretary of the In-
terior, shall mnake a report t Congress on the first Monday in December of each year,
showing how the said money has been expended, the amount used for actual survey
and engineer work in the field in locating sites for reservoirs, and an itemized account
,of the expenditures nder this appropriation. And all the lands which mar here-
after be desigaatedl or selected by sch United States surveys for sites for reservoirs,
ditches, or t ils for rri r itioa purposes an I all the Lan l ma le ssooptible of irri-
gation b-snch reservoirs, ditches, or canals are from this time henceforth hereby
reserve I fro n s athe property of the Unit-At States, al shall not be subject after
the passage of this act to entry, settlement or ocenpation until farther provided by
law: Prorided, that the President at any time in his discretion, by proclamation, may
open any portion or all of the lands reserved by this provision to settlement aller
the homestead laws." v
The object sought to be accomplished by the foregoing provision is unmistakable.
The- water sources and the arid lands that may be irrigate by the system of national
irrigation are now reserved to be hereafter, when redeemed to agricalture, transferred
to the people of the Territories in which they are situated for homesteads. The act
of Congress aud common justice require that they should be faithfully preserved for
these declared purposes.
The statute provides that all lands which may hereafter be designated or selected
by the Geological Survey as sites for reservoirs, ditches, or canals for irrigating pur-
poses, and all lands made susceptible of irrigation by such reservoirs, ditches, or canals
are since the passage of said act absolutely reserved from sale as property of the
United States, and shalt not be subject after the passage of the act to entry, settle-
ment, or occnpation until further provided bylaw, or the President. by proclamation,
may open said lands to settlement.
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Neither individuals nor corporations have the right to make filings upon a'y lands
thus reserved, nor can they be permitted to obtain control of the lakes ant streams
that are susceptible of uses for irrigating purposes.
You will, therefore, inmediately cancel all filings made since October 2, le-68, on
such sites for reservoirs, ditches, or canals for irrigating purposes and all lands that
may be susceptible of irrigation by such reservoirs, ditches, or canals, whether made
by individuals or corporations, and you will hereafter receive no filings upon any
such lands.
This order you will carry into effect without delay.
It is found that, notwithst nding said act and the instructions given
thereunder by said circular, numerous filings and entries of lands within
the arid regions appear to have been permitted to be made, subsequent
to October 2, 1888, the date of the passage of the act. These entries
and filings were made at the risk of the parties.
Under date of the 2d of April, [890, the matter of the proper Course
of proceeding under said act was submitted by this otice to the Hon.
Secretary of the Interior with a request for instructions thsrein. [t
appears that the subject was laid by the Secretary before the Hon.
Attorney-General for his opinion, who, under date of the 27ti of Mav,
1890, gave an opinion from which the following is an extract, viz:
The object of the act is manifest. It was to prevent the entry upon and the settle-
ment and sale of all that part of the arid region of the public lands of the ITnited
States which could be improved by general system of irrigation, and all lands which
might be designated or selected by the United States surveys as sites for the reser-
voirs, ditches, or canals in such systems. Unquestionably it would seriously interfere
with the operation and purpose of the act if the sites necessary for reservoirs in sach
plan of irrigation could be entered upon by homestead settlers. So, too, it would be
obviously unjust if pending the survey made with a view to their segregation for
improvement by irrigation these lands should be entered upon and settled as arid
lands of the United States. It was, therefore, the purpose of Congress by this act to
suspend all rights of entry upon any lands which would come within the improving
operation of the plans of irrigation to be reported by the Director of the Geological
Survey under this act. Language could hardly be stronger than are the words of
the act in expressing this intention.
All the lands which may hereafter be designated or selected, etc., are from this
time henceforth hereby reserved from sale, etc., and shall not be subject after the
passage of this act to entry, etc., until farther provided by law.
There can be no question that if an entry was made upon land which was there-
after designated in a United States survey as a site for a reservoir, or which was by
such reservoir made susceptible of irrigation, the entry would be invalid, and the
land so entered upon would remain the property of the United States, the reservation
thereof dating back to the passage of this act.
The far-reaching eflect of this construction cannot deprive the words of the act of
their ordinary and necessary meaning. The proviso that " the President at any time
in his discretion, by proclamation, may open any portion or all of the lands so re-
served," was the legislative mode of modifying and avoiding the far-reaching effect
of the act, whenever it should appear to the Executive to have too wide an operation.
Entries should not be permitted, therefore, upon any part of the arid regions which
might possibly come within the operation of this act.
These proceedings having consumed some time, I am now in receipt
of the Secretary's letter of the 4th instant, in which, after alluding to
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previous correspondence and the opinion of the Attorney-General from
which an extract is above quoted, he directs that this office shall pro
ceed to carry the law " into effect, according to the terms and instruc-
tions already existing from the Secretary," referring to the instructions
contained in circular of August 5, 1889, above given.
I have to call your special and particular attention to the foregoing
order from the head of the Department, and to direct in reference to
the subject matter that you proceed strictly in accordance therewith.
Although, in any case, there be at the time no designation of the land
involved therein as a selection for a site or sites for reservoirs, ditches,
or canals for irrigation purposes, or as land thereby made susceptible of
irrigation, that fact is not to be considered as showing that the land is
open to entry, as, although not yet so selected, it may be liable to such
selection, under said act, which is held to withdraw all lands so liable
from disposal. You will, therefore, permit no entryorfilingot any lands
lying within the arid regions that may be included in your laid district,
on any condition whatever, but will promptly reject any application
that may be made for such an entry or filing, with the usual right of
appeal. You will take any necessary action to ascertain the proper
limits of the arid regions, and whether any lands in your districts are
incladed therein, and if you have any doubt thereof, you may submit
the question to this office for specific instructions.
Any entries or filings of lands within the arid regions which may have
already been allowed, subsequent to the passage of the act of October
2, 1888, and reported to this office, will be taken up and acted upon
according to the principles indicated herein, as soon as practicable in
the course of official business.
Very respectfully,
LEWIS A. GROFF,
Commissioner.
SWAMP LAND INDEMNITY CLAIM.
STATE OF ILLINOIS, (LIVINGSTON COUNTY).
In the investigation of claims nder\the swamp grant the proceedings of the special
agent should be in accordance with departmental regulations.
Secretary Noble to the Comrnmissioner of the General Land ffice, Agust
30, 1890.
The State of Illinois has appealed from your dffice decision of May
14, 1887, rejecting its application for cash indemnity for certain lands
in Livingston county, in said State, alleged to be swamp and ov erflowed,
and if so, inuring to the State under the acts of September 28, 1850
(9 Stat., 519), and March 2, 1855 (10 Stat., 631).
In the investigation of the claimed swamp-lands of this county, ac-
cording to the record transmitted, there appears to have been no pre-
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tense even, on the part of the special agent of your office (Mr. W. F.
Elliott), of complying with the rules and regulations of the D)epartment
relative to the taking of proofs in cases of sw amp-land indemnity
claims (Copp's Land Laws, Ed. of 1882, Vol. 2, 1042).
(1 Under these rules, the agent is requested to secure such reliable
information as he can obtain from personal examination and observa-
tion. The agent reports that he made a " personal examination "; the
State agent asserts that the agent of your office " described the selec-
tions simply as he saw them while driving hurriedly by them in a
buggy"-furnishing no proof of this, however, beyond his own asser-
tioU. Whether the assertion be true or not i a natter of no impor-
tance, in view of other facts disclosed by the record.
(2) The departmental rules require that the agent shall obtain H a
knowledge of the land daring a series of years extending as near to the
date of- the grant as possible." Instead of this, the agent reports the
condition of the land as he found it. There are affidavits of five per-
sons, who have resided in said county from sixteen to thirty-seven
years, to the effect that the season of 1886-when agent Elliott made
his examination-was one of the driest ever known in that vicinity. A
comparison of Agent Elliott's report with that of Special Agent Walker,
of your office, relative to some-of the same tracts, would seem, to cor-
roborate this statement, and show that his report, if correct, must have
shown the condition of the tracts referred to in a very exceptional year.
(3) The departmental rules require that the agent shall iform him-
self of the character of the land not alone by personal examination and
observation, but " by inquiry of the owner or resident, if any there be,
and of persons residing in the vicinity having personal knowledge of
the past and present character of the laud." In all properly conducted
examinations, the affidavits of such owners, residents, or persons resid-
ing in the vicinity, are taken, and transmitted with the record; but
nothing of the kind appears in this case. On the contrary, the special
agent says (see last page of his report):
In this embarrassing ease I had to act solely on my own judgment as to
the correctness of my position on any tract of land.
(4) Upon the completion of this examination, at least thirty days
notice shall be given the State, or claimants under the State, of the time
and place when and where testimony will be received ouchin te char-
acter of the lands described. Agent Elliott gave no such notice (ac-
cording to the twelfth assignment of error herewith); he makes no rec-
ord of any such notice; on the contrary he mentions as a matter of
dissatisfaction the fact that the State Agent (r. litt), or his deputy
(Mr. Lewis), have one or both been here all the time," and complains
of it as " a source of annoyance." (See bottom of first page of Report.)
He seems not to have had the least idea that they were his appointed
co-workers, whose duty it was to assist in the task of determining what
land belonged to the State and what to the United States government.
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(5) Having been properly notified, the State should be given oppor-
tunity to offer "the testimony of at least two respectable and disinter-
ested witnesses wh-o have personal and exact knowledge of the cond2i-
tion of the land during a series of years."' In all properly conducted
examinations, the affidavits of such witnesses on the part of the State
are taken, and transmitted with the record. Bat no such testimony
appears in this case; and as matter of fact none was taken.
It will be seen that in several important respects the examination in
the case at bar has failed to comply with the requirements of the de-
partmental regulations. The facts furnished in the report of the ageht
of your office are wholly isufficient to serve as a basis for action by
your office or the Departiment, either in accepting or rejecting the claim
of the State. As was said by the Department in the case of Rardin
Coun ty, Iowa (5 L. D., 236):
The evidence already presented as to the claim under consideration certainly does
not bind your office or the Department to a final adjudication.
To hold that it does would be contrary to reason, and would, in effect, lead to the
final adjudication, certification, and passing of rights and titles in violation of lawv-
which, as to claims of the class here in question, requires due proof before the Coin-
missioner of the General Land Office.
It being clear that, in the case at bar, "due proof " of the character
of the lands in question has not been given, you are directed to cause
a re-examination thereof to be made in accordance with departmental
regulations for such causes made and provided.
RAILROAD GRkNT-PRE-EMPTION FILING.
UNION PACIFIC RY. 0O. V. HAINES. (ON REVIEW).
The existence of a prima facie valid pre-emption filing of record at the date when the
grant grant becomes effective, raises a presumption of settlement as alleged, and
of the actual existence of the claim, which is conclusive as against the grant, in
the absence of an allegation that said filing was void ab initio.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Comnissioner of the General Land Office,
September 1, 1890.
On November 30, 1889, I rendered a decision in the case of Union
Pacific Railroad Company affirming the decision of your office rejecting
the claim of said company for the NW. 1 of SE. J Sec. 3, T. 3 S., R. 70
W., Denver Colorado, upon the ground that the tract was excepted
from the operation of the grant by reason of the unexpired filing (de-
claratory statement No. 3180) of Fred Shumph, made March 7, 1867,
appearing of record at date of definite location.
Before the promulgation of said decision by your office, counsel for
the railway company filed an application to have said decision recalled
upon the ground that the case was considered by the Department with-
out having the whole record before it. It is alleged in said application
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that the pre-em~tion claimant whose filing appeared of record at date
of definite location, was Fred chnauffer and not Fred Shumph as
stated in the decision of your office and of the Department, and that
the files and records of your office show that a hearing was had in the
case of The Denver Pacific Railroad Company against Henry Moore
and Fred Schnauffer involving the right to the NW. 1 of SE. of said
section 3, and other lands, and upon the testimony presented at said
hearing, the local officers found that said Moore and chnauafer never
resided upon or improved or cultivated the land, an( recommended the
cancellation of the declaratory statements 1526 and 3180, which was
affirmed by your office June 4, 1874, holding that by reason thereof the
land was not excepted from the grant to the company and that as their
old filings had then expired, the case was closed.
In view of said allegation, I recalled said decision by letter of Decem-
ber 28, 1889, and on January 8,1890 you returned the papers and also
submitted therewith the record of the hearing and a copy of the decis-
ion of your office of June 4, 1874, referred to in the application of coun-
sel for the railroad company.
The records of your office show that declaratory statement 3180 filed
March 7, 1867 for the NW. of SE. I Sec. 3 T. 3 S., R. 70 W., Deaver,
Colorado, was filed by Fred Schnaiffer and it does not appear that any
filing for said tract was ever made by Fred Shumph or by any other per-
son except the one above mentioned.
It also appears that a hearing was had in the case of the Denver Pa-
cific Railroad Company v. Hienry Moore and Fred Schnauffer, involving
the right to the NW. i of SE. 4 of Sec. 3, and other lands, said NW. 1
being embraced only in declaratory statement 3180 of Schinauffer; that
upon the testimony taken at said hearing the local officers found that
said Moore and Schnauffer never resided upon, improved or cultivated
said tract, and on June 4, 1874, your office in passing upon said case
held as follows:-
The testimony submitted shows that neither Moore or Schnauffer have ever re-
sided upon or had any improvements on the land in contest. I am therefore of the
opinion that at the date of the railroad right attaching, there was no valid subsist-
ing claim to the land which excepted it from the operation of the grant.
The filings of Moore and Schnanffer having long since expired by limitation, the
case has been closed.
But at the date of the definite location of the road this tract was covered
by a prima facie valid pre-emption filing of record, and said filing not
having expired at that date excepted the land from the operation of the
grant for all time. The question as to whether the pre-emptor under
such filing inhabited, cultivated and improved the tract, or made set-
tlement thereon, can not be raised by the company. Such a filing raises
a presumption of settlement as alleged, and of the actual existence of
the claim, in the absence of allegations that it was void ab initio, which
is conclusive as against the grant. Northern Pacific Railroad Company
2497-vOL 11-15
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v. Stovenour, 10 L. D., 645; Northern Pacific Railroad Company v.
Fugelli, ib., 288; Randall v. St. Paul and Sioux City Railroad Com-
pany, ib., 54.
The mere fact that the Commissioner, upon an ex partehearingordered
upon the application of the company, has held that Schnauffer never
resided upon the land, and that therefore there was no valid subsisting
claim to the land which excepted it from the operation of the grant will
not prevent the Department from re-adjudicating that question at any
time prior to certification, and if the lands so excepted had been certi-
fied or patented, it would be the duty of this Department, under the act
of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat., 556), to demand of the company a reconvey-
ance of the land, and upon refusal of the company to reconvey, to
transmit the papers to the Attorney General that proceedings might be
instituted for the recovery of the title. (Boyer v. Union Pacific Ry.
Co. 10 L. D. 568).
The additional record submitted with your letter of January 8, 1890,
presents no grounds for reversing the decision of the Department of
November 30, 1889, and it is therefore affirmed.
PRIVATE CLAIM-APPEAL-ACT OF FEBRUARY 25, 1869.
HEIRS OF ALFRED BENT.
The provisions of section 1, act of February 25,1869, do not authorize an appeal from
the decision of the local officers on claims presented under the Vigil and St. Vrain
grant.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, September 1, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of George Thompson from your office
decision of October 17, 1888, refusing to consider the appeal of the heirs
of Alfred Bent from the judgment of the register and receiver at Pu-
eblo, Colorado, dated February 23, 1874, rejecting their claim to a por-
tion of the land embraced within the limits of the private land claim of
Cornelio Vigil and Ceran St. Vrain, known as the Las Animas grant.
Thompson is the present owner of the derivative claim of the heirs
of Alfred Bent, under the Vigil and St. Vrain grant.
The facts in connection with this claim are fully set forth in the vari-
ous letters from your office addressed to the local officers at Pueblo, and
to the attorneys in the case.
The only question to be determined at this time is, should the ap-
peal of the heirs of Alfred Bent from the decision of the register and
receiver, dated February 23, 1874, rejecting their claim under said
grant, be taken up and considered and decided upon its merits.
The first section of the act of February 25, 1869 (15 Stat., 275), pro-
vides that claimants under the Vigil and St. Vrain grant may estab-
lish their claims to the satisfaction of the register and receiver, but the
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act is silent as to the right of appeal from the decision of said officers.
Your office, however, held that the right of appeal to the Commissioner,
and from his decision to the Secretary, existed, and Secretary Delano,
under dates of October 27, 1874, and January 23, 1875, affirmed said
judgment.
Soon after the last mentioned date, William Craig, one of the deriv-
ative claimants under the grant, who contended that the right of ap-
peal did not exist, made application to the President of the United
States for an order directing the surveyor-general of Colorado to issue
to him a plat of the land awarded to him by the register and receiver.
The President referred the question involved to the Attorney General
for an expression of his opinion. In this opinion, rendered May 15,
1876 (15 Opinions Attorney-General, 94), the Attorney General, after
full consideration of the question, held that no appeal could be enter-
tained by the Land Department from the decision of the register and
receiver. Acting upon this opinion, the President directed that plats
of the land awarded to Craig by the register and receiver issue to him,
thus holding that the decision rendered by those officers was final.
On Jul'y 3, 1877, the supreme court of the District of Columbia, upon
the application of Thomas Leitensdorfer for a writ of mandamus to
compel the Commissioner of the General Land Office to proceed with
the hearing of his appeal from the decision of the register and receiver
in a case similar to the one now under consideration, denied said ap-
plication holding that no appeal lay in such a case, and in the case of
Craig v. Leitensdorfer, decided at the October term, 1887 (123 U. S.,
189), the supreme court declined to express any opinion on that ques-
tion.
The Department is thus left without the guidance of a decision by
the highest judicial tribunal on this importantquestion. In view, how-
ever, of the opinion of the Attorney General, the action of the Presi-
dent of the United States, and the decision of the supreme court of
the District of Columbia, I do not feel that I would be justified, atthis
time, in holding to an opinion contrary to that expressed bythesehigh
officers of the government, and the judicial tribunal named.
I am confirmed in this opinion by the action of Secretary Teller, in
the case of Rafael Chacon (2 L. D., 590), and by the further fact that
approved plats of survey, of the land awarded by the register and re-
ceiver, have been delivered to the claimants, as evidence of title, for all
the land confirmed to Vigil and St. Vrain by the act of June 1, 1860
(12 Stat. 71), with the exception of 3012 acres, and of this amount 3006
acres were awarded to different claimants by the register and receiver,
and the claims are now awaiting adjustment by the Land Departiient.
The government has thus parted with all the title it possessed to
nearly all the land confirmed, and the remaining portion of the land
embraced within the exterior limits of the grant has been declared sub-
ject to settlement and entry under the public land laws.
Your decision is therefore affirmed.
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SWAMP LAND CLAIM-WAIVER.
STATE OF ILLINOIS (MOUJLTRIE COUNTY).
The claim of the State, while pending on adjustment, should not he considered as
"waived," in the absence of a formal waiver, filed with the record, and signed
by the agent of the State, or his duly authorized deputy.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, August
30, 1890.
The State of Illinois has appealed from your office decision of Jan-
uary 22, 1886, rejecting its application for cash indemnity for certain
lands in Moultrie county, in said State, alleged to be swamp and over-
fl6wed, and if so, inuring to the State under the acts of September 28,
1850 9 Stat., 519), and March 2, 1855 (10 Stat., 634).
There are eight allegations of error, which are word for word the
same as the first eight allegations of error in the case of Champaign
county, Illinois ( L. D., 121); and the case at bar, being in all essen-
tial respects similiar to the Champaign county case, will be reconsidered
and disposed of by your office in accordance with the rules laid down
therein.
The special agent of your office (Mr. A. B. Evans), in his report, has
written opposite a considerable number of descriptions, "1 State waives,"
and attached to your office decision appealed from is a memorandum,
reading: " The State offered no proof on any of the tracts held for rejec-
tion, and waived its claim." It would seem thatif the State had waived
its claim to all the tracts held for rejection by your office, it would not
appeal from your office decision holding the same for rejection; but in
the record I find a certified copy of the following resolution passed by
the board of supervisors of Moultrie county, on the 14th day of Septem-
ber, 1886:
Resolved, That the State Agent, Isaac R. Hitt, be requested to appeal from the de-
cision of the Commissioner of the General Land Offlce to the Secretary of the Interior,
in the matter of the claim of Moultrie county, Illinois, v. The United States, growing
out of the swamp-land grant.
This is but one of several cases, in the investigation of claims for
swamp-land indemnity by the State of Illinois, where the special agent
has alleged that the State had waived its claim, but where the county
authorities (acting for the State), or the State agent, denied having
made any waiver. The only safe rule to follow in this respect is that
laid down in the case of Dallas county, Iowa decided by the Depart-
ment February 14, 1890-not reported):
You will consider a claim as waived only where a formal waiver, signed by the State
agent or his duly authorized deputy, is to be found on file in the record.
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 229
RAILROAD LANDS-ACT OF MARCH 3, 187.
INSTRUCTIONS.
The right of purchase from the government, conferred by section 5, act of March 3,
1887, is not limited to the immediate purchaser from the company, but may be ex-
ercised by any bon afide purchaser of the land who has the requisite qualification
in the matter of citizenship; and if the applicant is not the original purchaser
from the company it is immaterial what the qualifications of his immediate
grantor, or the intervening purchasers may have been.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, August
30, 1890.
I am in receipt of your communication of August 1, 1890, relating to
the act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat., 556), and the departmental circular
of instructions issued thereunder February 13, 1889 (8 L. D., 348), based
upoi the case of Samuel L. Campbell (id., 27). You call attention to
the fifth section of the act, and to that part of the circular applicable
thereto.
This section provides:
That where any said company shall have sold to itizens of the United States, or
to persons who have declared their intention to'become such citizens, as a part of its
grant, lands not conveyed to or for the use of such company, said lands being the
numbered sections prescribed inthe grant, and beingeoterminous with the constructed
parts of said road, and where the lands so sold are for any reason excepted from the
operation of the grant to said company, it shall be lawful for the bona fid6 purchaser
thereof from said company to make payment to the United Stateb for said lands at
the ordinary government price for like lands, and thereupon patents shall issue there-
for to the said bona fide purchaser his heirs or assigns: Provided, That all lands shall
be excepted from the provisions of this section which, at the date of such sales were
in the bona fide occupation of adverse claimants under the pre-emption or homestead
laws of the United States, and whose claims and occupation have not since been vol-
untarily abandoned, as to which excepted lands the said pre-emption and homestead
claimants shall be permitted to perfect their proofs and entries and receive patents
therefor: Provided further, That this section shall not apply to lands settled upon sub-
sequent to the first day of December. 1882, by persons claiming to enter the same under
the settlement laws of the United Staies, as to which lands the parties claiming the
same as aforesaid shall be entitled to prove up and enter as in other like cases.
The circular prescribes that applicants to purchase under this section
must submit proof showing, among other things-
3. That it (the land) was sold by the company to the applicant, or one under whom
he claims, as a part of its grant, and
7. That the applicant is, or has declared his intention to become, a citizen of the
United States.
You state that-
Under the instructions, either the original purchaser, or his transferee, may pur-
chase under this section, and in the event that the applicant be the transferee of the
original purchaser, he is only required to show that he is, or has declared his inten-
tion to become, a citizen of the United States.
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Commenting thereon you further say-
A reading of the act will show that only such sales as had been made by the com-
pany to a citizen, or person having declared his intention to become such, were to be
respected; in other words, it was to defeat purchases by foreigners, and the section
required the bona fide purchaser of the company to make payment to the United
States. As the instructions stand, if the purchaser from the company was a foreigner,
and he sold to a citizen, the citizen might make proof, and thus the intention of the
statute is indirectly defeated.
You thereupon express the opinion " that the statute contemplated
the purchase to be made by or through the original purchaser of the
company, and that it is necessary to be shown that he is such a person
as is contemplated by the act; and you recommend that the instruc-
tions be amended accordingly.
Your construction of the act seems to be based upon the theory that
the transferee of the immediate purchaser from the company must nec-
essarily occupy the same position, as regards his right to purchase from
the government, as that of his immediate grantor; in other words, if
the original purchaser from the company is for any reason not qualified
to purchase from the government, no grantee of such original purchaser
whether otherwise qualified or not, can become a purchaser under the
act.
I do not think this construction is sound. The section in question
was evidently intended by Congress for the benefit of citizens of the
United States, or persons having declared their intention to become
such, who in good faith, shall have purchased lands within the limits of
railroad grants and coterminous with constructed parts of the roads,
with the bona fide belief that the company had title thereto. It can
make no difference, in my judgment, whether the applicant is the im-
mediate purchaser from the company, or a purchaser one or more de-
grees removed. If he is a bona fide purchaser of the land, and has the
required qualifications as to citizenship, he is within the intendmtiit of
the statute, and if he be not the original purchaser from the company
it is immaterial what the qualifications of his immediate grantor, or the
intervening purchasers may have been. If his immediate grantor was
a foreigner, and his purchase was simply for the purpose of acquiring
title from the government for the benefit of the foreigner, he would not
be a bona fide purchaser, and would not therefore come within the terms
of the act.
It was not in any sense, the intention of Congress to confirm sales
made by the company, but rather to afford to citizens, or persons hav-
ing declared their intention to become such, who were bonafide pur-
chasers of lands to which the company had no title, a means of acquir-
ing title from the government, to the exclusion of settlers or purchasers
under the general land laws.
I am of the opinion that the instructions in question are sufficiently
explicit, and that they properly declare the law.
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SIOUX INDIAN LANDS-1OM\IESTEAD.
RICHARD GRIFFIN.
A homestead entry erroneously allowed for land within the Sioux Indian reservation,
may remain intact, on the release of said land from sch reservation, and take
effect as of the date when the land was opened to settlement.
Agricultural lands, formerly within said reservation, and opened to settlement under
the act of March 2,1889, are subject to disposition only nder the homestead
law.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Covmnissio er of the General
Land Office, September 2, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Richard Griffin from the decision of
your office, dated June 9, 1887, holding for cancellation his homestead
entry No. 14,821, of the SE. 1 of Sec. 21, T. 104 N., R. 69 W., and also
his timber culture entry, No. 11,182, of the SW. , of said section, town-
ship and range, Mitchell land district, South Dakota, both dated Novem-
ber 26, 1880, because said entries were " within the limits of the Sioux
Indian reservation in Dakota Territory."
It appears that one of the boundaries of said reservation was not
clearly defined by the first survey thereof, so that settlers were liable
to locate upon the reserved lands; that it was generally understood
that American creek was the boundary of "the Crow creek reserve" on
the south; that said creek was in fact the southern boundary of said
reservation, so far as it had any well defined channel east to the range
line, between the ranges Nos. 69 and 70 W.; that in 1882 the southern
boundary was fixed by a survey, which showed that the land covered
by said entries was within the Indian reservation.
In an affidavit, dated May 19, 1886, and duly corroborated, Mr. Grif-
fin swears that he commenced residing upon his said homestead about
May 1, 1881, and has continuously lived upon and improved said tract
until the date of said affidavit; that he came to the local office to make
final proof in support of his homestead claim, when he learned, for the
first time, that his entry had been suspended by your office, on Novem-,
ber 14, 1882; that when he entered said tract he received from said
local office a plat which showed that all of township 104, range 69,
south of the American creek, was subject to entry and no part of the
Indian reservation; that by a subsequent survey all of the land in said
township, north of the south line of affiant's said homestead falls within
the reservation; that he made said entry in good faith; that he "1 con-
tested the timber entry on the west," adjoining his homestead, and
upon the cancellation thereof, made said timber culture entry, upon
which he had broken nearly eleven acres; that in view of the foregoing
facts, said Griffin requested that his said entries " be allowed to stand
until such time as the Indian reservation bill, now before Congress,
shall be finally passed upon."
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Your office denied said application on June 9, 1887, and held said
entries for cancellation, as aforesaid.
The appeal and specification of errors are defective in being too gen-
feral, and might be dismissed for that reason. But, in view of the sub-
sequent legislation of Congress by which a portion of said reservation,
including the land in question, was opened to settlement, I have con-
eluded to examine the record in this case.
By the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 888), the Sioux reservation was
divided into separate reservations, with distinct boundaries, and the
residue, including the land in question, was released to the United
States.
There does not appear to be any question of the good faith of the ap-
plicant, and I see no good reason why his said homestead entry should
not e allowed to remain intact, and take effect from the date when the
land covered thereby became subject to settlement under the provisions
of said act of 1889, and the claimant allowed to perfect his entry under
the requirements of said act.
Inasmuch as section 12 of the act expressly provides " that all lands
adapted to agriculture, with or without irrigation, so sold or released to
the United States by any Indian tribe, shall be held by the United States
for the sole purpose of securing homes to actual and bona fide settlers
only, in tracts not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres to any one
person," etc., it is apparent that Mr. Griffin can not acquire title to the
land covered by his timber culture entry, under the provisions of the
timber culture act, for the reason this land is only subject to homestead
entry. His said timber culture entry must therefore be canceled.
The decision of your office is modified accordingly.
PRACTICE-RES JVDICATA.
MARY . STEPHENSON.
A decision of the Department, long acquiesced in, will not be reconsidered on the mere
allegation of error in construing the law.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the eneral Land Office,
September 2, 1890.
I have before me a motion filed on the 2th lt. for review of the de-
cision of the Department, dated December 3, 18S6, affirming the action
of your office in inserting in a soldiers' additional homestead certificate
issued to Mary C. Stephenson, widow of lexander C. Stephenson, a
clause requiring her to furnish at date of entry, evidence "that she is
still the widow of A. C. Stephenson." With the record is a letter from
A. A. Hosmer, the attorney in the case, requesting that the motion " be
considered as a petition for the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction
of the Secretary and that he will direct the issue of a new certificate of
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Mrs. Stephenson's right, omitting therefrom the clause interpolated in
the one previously issued requiring her to submit to the district land
office proof at the date of filing her application for an additional entry,
that she is still living and has not remarried-thus making the certifi-
cate conform to the rules and practice adhered to in all other like cases.
It appqars that on March 15, 1883, Mrs. Stephenson made application
to your office for a certificate of her right, as widow of said Alexander
C., to make soldiers' additional homestead entry of one hundred and
twenty acres. On May 11, 1885, your office issued a certificate of the
right but with the clause above described inserted. It appears the at-
torney protested and thereupon, by decision of October 19, 1885, Com-
missioner Sparks formally refused to eliminate said clause from the
certificate (5 L. D, 264). Appeal was taken and on December 3, 1886,
the action of your office was affirmed by the Department. From that
time the matter has rested.
Section 2304 of the Revised Statutes, describes the classes of soldiers
and sailors who are entitled under section '2306 to make additional home-
stead entry. The latter section provides that
Every person entitled under the provisions of section 2304 to enter a homestead,
who may have heretofore entered under the homestead law a quantity of land less
than one hundred and sixty acres, shall be permitted to enter so much land as when
added to the quantity previously entered, shall not exceed one hundred and sixty
acres.
Section 2307 provides
In case of the death of any person who would he entitled to a homestead finder the
provisions of section 23 4, his widow, if unmarried, or in ease of her death or mar-
riage, then his minor orphan children, by a guardian duly 'appointed and officially
accredited at the Department of the Interior, shall be entitled to all the benefits
enumerated in this chapter, sobject to all the provisions as to settlement and improve-
ment therein contained.
In his said decision the Commissioner, after setting out these enact-
ments, said:
Any one can see by a glauce at the statues referred to. that Mrs. Stephenson's
right to additional entry depends upon her continuing to be the widow of A. C.
Stephenson; that if she has since remarried, or died, the right belongs to minor
orphan children, if any, or ceases altogether, as a claim against the United States
I regard all cases of the kind as properly subject to the same rule. 
am not aware that any certificatehas been issnedl in disregard thereof since my atten-
tion was called to the point, in the Stephenson case, and if any has been, it has
resulted from inadvertence.
There are no new facts presented with this application. The ques-
tion is the same that was passed on by the Department in 1886, the
issue being that the regulations of the Department did not authorize
the insertion of said clause. This issue was presented to the Secretary
and by. him decided against the claimant. In this decision claimant
has acquiesced for almost four years. In the meantime no attempt
has been made to secure another examination of the case, and no reason
is assigned for the delay. Under these circumstances, the Department
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can not undertake to re-open the case on a mere allegation that the
decision was erroneous. The amount of routine work is already great,
the claims of those who are here in regular order are pressing, and
to open this case and re-examine it on its merits would e to invite
applications for re-examination of all cases decided since 1886, in
which errors of law might be alleged. Such an undertaking can not be
assumed. The Department has repeatedly refused such applications.
State of Kansas (5 L. D., 243); A. T. Lamphere (8 L. D., 134). See
also State of Oregon (9 L. D., 360).
The attorney urges that the decision of the Department was inadvert-
ent. There is no proof of this allegation, and the presumption is to
the contrary. Furthermore, ithe record shows the issue was clearly
presented.
The application is accordingly dismissed. This disposition of the
case renders it unnecessary to consider the cases cited by applicant as
at variance with the decision of 1886, supra.
MINING CLAIM-EQUITABLE ADJUDICATION.
SILVER KING QUARTZ MINE.
A mineral entry may be referred to the board of equitable adjudication where the
published notice of application is not as explicit in the matter of description as
the notice posted on the claim.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the GeneraZ Land
Office, September 3, 1890.
In the matter of mineral entry No. 59, made July 20, 1887, for the
"Silver King Quartz Mine," lot 37, T. 10 N., R. 1 E., Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia, the Oro Grande Mining Company appeals from your office decis-
ion of December 12, 1888, requiring republication (and posting) of the
application for patent to said claim.
The order appealed from was made for the reason- that in the pub-
lished notice of the application. upon which the said entry was allowed,
the description of the course and distance of the line (shown by the
survey), connecting the claim with the public surveys, had been
omitted.
It appears that on September 21,1885, Charles T. Bradley and others
filed an application for patent for said Silver King mine and also for
the adjoining Calico Queen claim; that the latter was, on November
19, 1885, " adversed; " and said application, so far as it related to the
Calico Queen), was withdrawn June 18, 1887; that during the fall of
1885 notice of the Silver King application, showing the exterior bound-
aries and location of said claim, with reference to those adjoining, was
duly published, and was posted in the local office, together with the
official plat showing said connecting line, on the claim.
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In the similar case of Mimbres Mining Company (8 L. D., 457), where
a description of the line connecting the claim with the public surveys
had been omitted from the published notice of application, the Depart-
ment held that, if the same is not as explicit in the matter of descrip-
tion as the notice posted on the claim, such defect is properly charge-
able to the register, and may be cured by reference to the board of
equitable adjudication. The case at bar is in my opinion clearly within
the rule stated. The entry in question will therefore be so referred.
The decision appealed from is modified accordingly.
HOMEISTEAD ENTRY-CO'iNit-UTATION-EQ-JITABLE ADJUJDICATION.
SUSIE COREY.
The right of conmutation depends upon prior compliance with the homestead law.
Where a homesteader in good faith cultivates and improves his land, but dies wiih-
out having established residence thereon, the widow may submit proof showing
her residence on the land, and connection with the claim, after the death of the
entryman, with the view to an equitable confirmation of the entry.
An appeal regularly taken under the rules of practice should not be dismissed.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, Septemler 3, 1890.
I have considered the ease of Susie Corey, on appeal from your office
decision of February 16, 1889, dismissing her appeal from the decision
of the local officers rejecting her final proof of homestead entry for
SW. 3, Sec. 12, T. 138 N., R. 78 W., Bismarck, North Dakota, land dis-
trict.
Her late husband, Emer N. Corey, deceased, made homestead entry
for this land on June 8, 1883. He died December 12, 1886, and the
claimant as his widow, offered final proof on October 2, 1888, which was
rejected by the local officers, from which decision she appealed and your
office on February 16. 1889, dismissed her appeal from which decision
she again appealed.
It appears from the record that her appeal was regularly taken in
accordance with the rules of practice; there was no motion to dismiss
it and the decision dismissing it was erroneously made.
The testimony shows, that Corey in his lifetime, made said entry
while he was holding the office of clerk of the United States district
court for the sixth judicial district of Dakota Territory; that he went
upon the land in 1883 and caused valuable improvements to be made
thereon and cultivated the land each year up to his death; that he in-
tended to make his residence on the land, and his improvements and
cultivation were to that end, but he retained his residence in Bismarck
until his death.
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In April, 1887, the claimant Susie Corey moved with her children onto
the land and has since made her residence thereon. Emer N. Corey was
a private in Co. A, 179th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, but the evidence
does not show the length of time for which he is entitled to credit by
reason of military service.
While your decision dismissed her appeal, you passed ulpon the merits
of the case and allowed her to commute the entry under section 2301,
U. S. Revised Statutes.
By the uniform decisions of this Department-" The right of com-
mutation depends upon prior compliance with the homestead law."
Saml. II. Vandivoort (7 L. D., 86); Greenwood v. Peters ( L. D., 237).
Frank W. Hewitt, 8 L. D., 566.
It'is quite clear that the entryman during his lifetime did not make
a legal residence upon the land, and his improvements, though valua-
ble are not the equivalent of residence. His widow, however. estab-
lished, and has maintained a residence since April, 1887.
Considering all the circumstances of the case, the apparent good
faith of the entryman and this claimant, the fact that she is entitled to
some credit for the military service of her late husband, and the neglect
to show the length of time for which such credit should be given, there
being no adverse claim, the claimant will be allowed ninety days from
notice hereof within which to make further proof, showing all the facts
as to her connection with the land since October, 1888, also the length
of time for which she is entitled to credit by reason of the military serv-
ice of her late husband, and if such additional proof, with that on file,
shows a substantial compliance with law, the proof, in the absence of
protest or adverse claim, will be accepted, certificate issued, and the
entry referred to the board of Equitable Adjudication for its considera-
tion under the appropriate rule. See E. M. Dronberger (10 L. D., 88),
also Rule 33-Rules of board of Equitable Adjudication (10 L. D., 503).
Your decision is moditied accordingly.
MINING CLAIM-SURVEY-CIRCULAR OE DECEMBER 4, 1854.
PLEVNA LODE.
The surface right is an adjunct of the lode claim, and cannot extend beyond the
point where the lode intersects the exterior line of a senior location.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Ojffce,
September 3, 1890.
This is an appeal by the Ontario Silver Mining Company from your
office decision of December 10, 1887, requiring the survey under
which the Ontario Silver Mining Company made mineral entry No.
1,161, November 17, 1885 for the Plevna lode mining claim situated in
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the Ointah mining district, Summit county, Salt Lake City land dis-
trict, Utah to be amended. The "Plevna" claim was located )Jay 19,
1885, surveyed May 21, 1885, and the survey approved June 9th ollow-
ing. Application for patent therefor was filed July 27, 1885, and pub-
lication began five days thereafter. Said survey overlaps on its east-
erly end the 'i Clara" lode claim, which was located June 28, 1872.
You held that in making said survey, the principle announced in
circular "N ," " approved Decmber 4, 188t, (3 L. D., 540, had been dis-
regarded, and directed that " within that portion of the 'P]evna ' sur-
vey, to which the claimant's rights are restricted by said circular, it
must have a new survey of its claim made, the end lines of which must
be parallel."
Section one of said circular provides that the rights granted to loca-
tors are restricted to locations on veins, lodes, or ledges, situated on
the public domain, and directs that when the survey conflicts with a
prior valid lode claim or entry, and the ground in conflict is excluded,
the claimant's right to the lode claimed termninates where the lode in its
onward course or strike intersects the exterior boundary of such ex-
cluded ground and passes within it." Section two of said circular pro-
vides further, that "'the end lines of survey should not, therefore, be
established beyond such intersection, unless it should be necessary so
to do for the purpose of including ground held and claimed under a loca-
tion, which was made upon public land and valid at the time it was
made."
In the present case no part of the space in conflict is embraced in the
"Plevna " application or entry, but said space is expressly excluded
therefrom. From the survey as it now stands, the lode, which is pre-
sumably in the center of the claim, strikes the exterior line of the
" Clara" lode claim, at a point westerly of the line surveyed as its east-
erly end line.
As was held in the similar case of the Engineer Mining and Develop-
ing Company (8 L. D., 361), the surface right, being simply an adjnnct
to the lode claim, could not extend beyond the termination of such
claim, to wit: the point where the lode intersects the exterior line of
the senior location.
It was, therefore, proper to require the end lines of the survey to be
re-adjusted, so s to accord with the requirement of the circular re-
ferred to.
rhe decision appealed from is affirmed.
LARGEY ET AL. V. BLACK.
Motion for review of departmental decision rendered February 13,
1890, 10 L. D., 156, denied by Acting Secretary Chandler, September 4,
1890.
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PRACTICE-CERTIORARI-RULE 84.
PETERSON v. FORT.
An application for certiorari will be denied if not made under oath.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
September 4, 1890.
Catherine Peterson by her attorney has filed an application for an
order directing your office to certify to this Department the record of pro-
ceedings in the case of Catherine Peterson v. George W. Fort, involving
homestead entry No. 11,800 made by Minnie F. Conrad (nee Fort) for
the E. of NW. , NW. of NW. Sec. 20 and NE. of NE. j Sec. 19T.
32 N.. R. 15 W., Niobrara, Nebraska land district. She sets forth in
said application that she filed in your office a good and sufficient appeal
from a certain decision rendered by you adversely to her in said case,
and that you denied said appeal because not filed in time.
Rule 83, rules of practice, provides that parties may apply to the Sec-
retary for an order directing the Commissioner to certify proceeding to
him, in certain cases and rule 84, provides that:-
Applications to the Secretary nder the preceding rule shall be made in -writing
under oath, and shall fully and specifically set forth, the grounds upon which the ap-
plication is made.
The application before me is not made "under oath" and can not
therefore be considered as the basis for the writ of certiorari asked for.
The application is therefore denied.
RAILROAD GRANT-MINERAL LAND.
CENTRAL PACIFIC R. R. CO. ET AL. V. VALENTINE.
The discovery of the mineral character of land at any time prior to the issuance of
patent therefor, or certification where patent is not required, effectually excludes
such land from a railroad grant which contains a provision excepting all mineral
lands therefrom.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, August
30, 1890.
The lands involved in this case are described as lots 1, 2, 3 and 4,
and the SEJ of the SEI, Sec. 33 T. 15 N., R. 9 E., Sacremento, California.
The tracts are within the primary limits of the grant to the Central
Pacific Railroad Company, under the acts of July 1, 1862, (12 Stats.,
489), and July 2, 1864 (13 Stats., 356), being situated less than five
miles from the line of said company's road as definitely located and con-
structed. The public surveys were extended over them in 1865. The
official survey of the township was approved by the surveyor-general
December 26, 1865, and the township plat was filed in the local office
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March 2), 1866. The tracts in question were designated on the plat as
agricultural lands. The map of definite location of the company's road
opposite thereto, was filed October 27, 1866, although the road appears
to have been constructed as early as September, 1865.
In March, 1866, the " RisingSun" lode claim, running from a point near
the northeastcorner, to a point near the southwest corner of the SE. i of
said section 33, was located by one Neff, and on May 11, 1870, patent
was issued therefor without protest or objection by the railroad company.
A segregation survey of this claim was made prior to patent, and thus
was rendered necessary the " lotting " of the lands in the quarter sec-
tion not included in such claim, except as to the SE. i thereof, which
was left intact. In 1866, a lode claim, then called the Milford Claim,"
was located immediately south of and adjoining the " Rising Sun."
This claim was relocated in July, 1883, by Phillip Nicholas and Joseph
Werry, under the name of the "Big Oak Tree" quartz claim. Other
lode claims were located immediately adjoining the "Rising Sun," as
follows: "The Golden Eagle," to the north and east, in August, 1883;
the ; Werry Claim," to the west, in January, 1884, and the "L Little Pine
Tree," to the south and west in July, 1883.
On August 18,: 1885, the railroad company applied to the local office
for a hearing to determine the character of certain lands, including
the tracts here in question. The hearing was accordingly had, but for
some unexplained reason, no evidence was introduced thereat relative
to these tracts. Your office thereupon held, on November 11, 1886,
that the return of the surveyor-general as to the character thereof was
unchanged by the testimony, but erroneously stated the return to be
that the lands were mineral in character.
The lands were listed by the railroad company on December 3, 1885,
as having inured to it under its said grant, but they have never been
certified or patented to the company.
On January 28, 1888, your office, upon the petition of the defendant,
S. D. Valentine, directed that a hearing be had to ascertain the char-
acter of said lands, with a view to determining the rights of the con-
tending claimants relative thereto. The hearing took place in March,
1888, all the parties interested being present, either in person or by
attorney. The material facts disclosed by the testimony, in the main
undisputed, are as follows: Subsequently to the entry of the " Rising
Sun " claim, its owners purchased the "' Milford Claim" from the orig-
inal locators thereof, and continued to do assessment work thereon for
some years thereafter. After the same was relocated in 1883, as already
stated, by Nicholas and Werry, as the " Big Oak Tree " claim, the de
fendant, S. D. Valentine, purchased it from said relocators, and now
claims to be the rightful owner thereof. In 1886, Marie A. Valentine,
who was a creditor of the company which owned and operated the
"Rising Sun11 claim, purchased from the railroad company, through
her attorney, B. E. Valentine, the intervenor herein, all the lands in
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controversy. This purchase was made with full knowledge that the
lands, in part, at least, were valuable for minerals. The company
refused to convey them with warranty of title. but gave simply a deed
without covenants, conveying such title only as it had.
It was not known at the date of the grant to the company, nor at the
date (December 26, 1865) of the approval by the surveyor-general of
the official survey of the township in which the lands lie, that they, or
any part thereof were valuable for minerals. Subsequently to those
dates, however, the "ising Sun" mineral claim has been located and
patented, as stated, and other mineral locations have been made, ad-
joining the " Rising Sun" claim, as hereinbefore mentioned; and in each
of these locations quartz, or veins bearing gold have been discovered
of sufficient promise to justify the development of the same. About
$30,000 have already been mined from the "Big Oak Tree" claim;
about $1,500 have been expended in work and improvements on the
" Werry Claim," and smaller amounts have been likewise expended,
respectively, upon the "Golden Eagle" and " Little Pine Tree" claims.
Upon the facts thus proven the local officers rendered dissenting
opinions. The register held, in effect, (1) that the title to the lands in
question became vested in the railroad company under its grant as of
the date thereof; (2) that at that date none of the lands were within
any of the exceptions from the grant "by reason of any status as miu-
eral lands ;" (3) that the subsequent discovery of mineral therein cannot
affect the rights of the railroad company or its grantees, and (4) that
the company is entitled to patent for all the lands in controversv.
The receiver held, in effect, (1) that all the lands embraced in the
mineral loationsknown asthe "Big Oak Tree," "The Little Pine Tree,"
the "Werry Claim," and the " Golden Eagle," are mineral lands, and
that the railroad company acquired no rights thereto under its grant;
(2) that the residue of the lands in said quarter section are agricultural
in character, and (3) that a survey should be ordered for the purpose of
segregating the mineral from the agricultural lands.
On March 18, 1889, your office affirmed the decision of the receiver,
and thereby, in effect, rejected the claim of the railroad company to
the lands embfaced in the mineral locations aforesaid. From this
decision the company, and B. E. Valentine, on behalf of the intervening
purchaser, Marie A. Valentine, have jointly appealed.
Two questions are presented by the appeal:
I. It is contended that the grant to the railroad company is a grant
in presenti, and that, thereby, the title to the lands in question became
vested in the company, upon the approval of the official survey thereof,
as of the date of the grant, and that the subsequent discovery of mineral
thereon cannot operate to divest such title or in any way aftect the rights
of the company.
II. It is further contended that the facts proven do not show the lands
embraced in the mineral locations known as the " Little Pine Tree," the
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" Werry Claim," and the " Golden Eagle," to be mineral lands " within
the meaning of that term as used in the granting act.
In answer to these contentions, it is urged by counsel for the defend'
ant, appellee; I. That if the mineral character of lands within the limits
of the grant to the railroad company be discovered at any time prior to
patent, or certification, such discovery establishes the non-patentability
of the land and operates to defeat the claim of the company thereto;
and that such has been the uniform ruling of the Department for many
years. II. That under the facts proven all the lands embraced in the
several mineral locations involved herein, are clearly mineral in char-
acter.
It is not denied that the lands covered by the " Big Oak Tree " claimn'
are mineral lands. The undisputed facts relative to the other claims
in question are that mineral has been discovered in each of them of suf'
ficient promise to justify the expenditure of large sums of money, as
much as $1,500 on one of them, and a smaller amount on each of the
others, with a view to their development, respectively, as mining claims.
The evidence is sufficient, in my judgment, to warrant the finding of the-
receiver that the lands are " mineral lands " within the meaning of that
term as used in the granting act; and your office having affirmed that
finding, and no good reason being furnished for disturbing it, the same
is sustained.
But did these lands pass to the railroad company under its grant ?
As we have seen, their mineral character was not known until after the
company's road opposite thereto had been definitely located and con-
structed, nor until after the official survey, on the plat of which they
were designated as agricultural lands, had been approved by the sur-
veyoi-general. In other words, they were not known to be " mineral
lands " until after the right of the company had attached tinder its
grant.
The grant to the company by the act of 1862, is in the following an-
guage:
That there be, and is hereby, granted to said company, every alternate
section of public land, designated by odd numbers, to the amount of five alternate
sections per mile on each side of said railroad, on the line tereof, and within the
limits of ten miles on each side of said road, not sold, reserved, or otherwise disposed
of, .at the time the line of said road is definitely fixed: Provided, That
all mineral lands shall be excepted from the operation of this act. (Section 3, act,
1862).
The act of 1864, which was amendatory of the act of 1862, enlarged
the grant from five to ten sections per mile on each side of said road,
and provided, among other things, that the term " mineral land" when-
ever used therein, or in the original act, should not be construed to
include " coal and iron land," and that no lands granted by that or the
original act, should include any mineral lands (Sec. 4, act 1864).
It will be observed that by the terms of the grant itself all " mineral
lands," other than "coal and iron," are expressly excepted from its
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operation. It would seem, therefore, that no such lands were granted
or intended to be granted to the railroad company.
The appellants contend, however, that the exception stated includes
only such lands as were either returned as mineral by the surveyor-gen-
eral, or were known to be mineral at the date when the grant acquired
precision, and title vested thereunder; that the requisite precision
was acquired, as touching the lands in question, by the completion and
approval of the public survey thereof, the definite line of the company's
road having been located prior to such survey; and that title thereupon
vested, by relation, as of the date of the granting act. In other words,
the contention is that the exception should be construed to mean only
lands returned as mineral, or known to be mineral, at the date when
the grant acquired precision; in this case the date of the approval of
the official survey.
There can be no question that the grant to the railroad company is a
grant inprcesenti, passing a present title to all lands intended to be
granted thereby, or, in other words, coming within its descriptive terms,
only to be defeated by reason of failure, on the part of the company to
perform the stipulated conditions subsequent. In the case of Leaven-
worth, Lawrence and Galveston R. R. Co v. United States (92 U. S.
741), .the supreme court said of the words "there be and is hereby
granted," quoted from the grant under consideration in that case, that
they " are words of absolute donation, and import a grant in prcesenti.
This court has held that they can have no other meaning; and the land
department, in this interpretation of them, has uniformly administered
every previous similar grant;" citing Railroad Company v. Smith, 9
Wall., 95; Schulenburg v.Harriman, 21 Id., 60; 1 Lester 513; 8 Opins.
257; 11 Id. 47. See also Mining Company v. Mining Company, (102 U.
S., 167); Van Wyck v. Knevals (106 U. S., 360). It is fully conceded,
therefore, that as to all the lands subject to the grant now under consid-
eration, the title, when it became vested related back to the date of the
granting act.
But the effect of the contention of the appellants is that mineral lands
are subject to and pass under the grant, if their character as such be
not known, and they are not returned as mineral, at the date when the
company's title vests; and that the subsequent discovery of their min-
eral character, though prior to patent, or certification where patent is
not required, cannot affect the claim of the railroad company thereto.
I cannot agree that this contention is sound. The exception from the
grant is explicit, unequivocal and absolute. It is "that all mineral
lands shall be excepted from the operation of this act." There can be
no reasonable question about the interpretation of this language. It
clearly means that no "mineral lands " were granted or intended to be
granted by the act. The discovery of the mineral character of lands
within the lateral limits of the grant, after the date when it acquired
precision, only proves that such lands were always mineral lands, and
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serves to bring them clearly within the excepting clause of the grant.
They are, and were, no less " mineral lands" because not known to be
such, at the date of the grant, or at the date when it acquired precision.
It is not questioned that the Land Department has jurisdiction until
patent, or certification, as the case may be, to the company, to deter-
mine whether any of the lands within the lateral limits of the grant had
been, at the time the line of the road was definitely fixed, "sold, re-
served, or otherwise disposed of," or was subject to " a pre-emption or
homestead claim," and therefore excepted from the grant. That such
jurisdiction exists, there can be no doubt, and I am unable to perceive
upon what principle of logic or process of reasoning it can be claimed
that a like jurisdiction does not exist, for the purpose of determining
whether the lands are mineral, and for that reason, excepted from the
grant. Manifestly, the jurisdiction- to determine the exception is the
same, whether the inquiry is instituted as to the character of the land,
or as to its particular status, at the date when the rights of the company
attached under the grant. If, in the prosecution of the inquiry, the lands
are discovered to be mineral, or if, prior to patent, or certification where
patent is not required, such discovery is otherwise made, and brought
to the attention of the Land Department, in either event, the discovery
proves the lands to have been mineral at the date mentioned, and serves
to bring them within the excepting clause of the grant. No date is fixed
in the grant at which the mineral character of the lands must be known,
in order to bring them within the exception. If in fact mineral, they
are within the exception, according to the plain terms thereof, whether
their mineral character is known at the time of definite location or ap-
proval of survey, or not.
The counsel for appellants, among the many authorities cited in sup-
port of their contention, rely specially upon the cases of Abraham L.
Miner (9 L. D., 408); Francouer v. Newhouse (40 Fed. Rep., 618); and
Wright v. Roseberry (121- U. S., 488).
It is proper that these authorities should be briefly noticed. The case
of Abraham L. Miner involved construction of the act of March 3, 1853
(10 Stats., 244), which, among other things, made a grant to the State
of California, of sections sixteen and thirty-six of every township, for
public school purposes. The question arose in that case as to when the
title of the State vested under the grant, and it was held by the De-
partment that sch title vested, if at all, at the date of the completion
of the official survey; and that if the land was in fact mineral, though
not known to be such at that date, the subsequent discovery of its min-
eral character would not divest the State's title which had already passed.
It is to be observed however, that the California school grant, was a
grant without any express exception of mineral lands. Such being the
case, the Miner decision should be understood as going no further than
to hold that under the construction given to that grant by the prior
decisions of the Department and of the supreme court of the United
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States, the title to the State school lands vests, if at all, at the date of
survey, and if the land is in fact mineral, though not then known to be
such, the subsequent discovery of its mineral character will not divest
the title which has already passed. This was the only point in that
case. It was ex parte and only one side of the question was presented,
and its authority must be confined to the question therein presented for
decision.
In Cohens v. the State of Virginia, 6 Wheat., 264-399, Chief-Justice
Marshall said:
It is a maxim not to be disregarded that general expressions in every opinion are to
be taken in connection with the case in which they are used. If they go beyond the
case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent
suit when the very point is presented for decision. The reason for this maxim is ob-
vious. The question aetually before the court is investigated with care and con-
sidered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it are con-
sidered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other
cases is seldom completely investigated.
So, in Carroll v. Carroll, 16 How., 275-287, the supreme court, refer-
ring to the last-cited case, said:
Therefore this court, and other courts, organized under the common law, has never
held itself bound by any part of an opinion in any case, which was not needful to
the ascertainment of the right, or title in question between the parties.
Under this rule, statements, illustrations and arguments, not neces-
sary to the decision of the precise question before the court in the Miner
case, are not necessarily binding on the Department. The allusions in
that case to the Colorado case (7 L. D., 490), and the Spong case (5 L.
D., 193), and the conclusion sought to be drawn therefrom, were wholly
unnecessary to a decision of the question therein considered, and can-
not therefore be quoted as authority.
But the reasoning of the Miner case, giving it its full force, would
not apply to railroad grants, as they specially except mineral lands and
also except lands for other reasons. All the lands within the primary
limits of a railroad grant do not necessarily pass to the railroad, but
only such as are not within the exceptions named in the grant, and the
Secretary of the Interior is clothed with the authority of determining
in the first instance which lands pass by the grant and which do not
pass, and this he does by approving lists for certification or patent.
Such is not the practice with reference to sections sixteen and thirty-
six granted to the States for school purposes.
The case of Francouer v. Newhouse was decided by the circuit court
of the N orthern District of California, in December, 1889. It was a case
in all material respects similar to this one, and involved a construction
of the same grant. In that case it was said by Judge Sawyer, who
delivered the opinion of the court, that:
The parties to this grant, both the United States and the grantee, must be pre-
sumed to have contemplated a grant in view of the condition of the lands as they
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were known, or appeared to be, at the time the grant took effect. In the exception
of ' mineral lands ' from the grant, Congress must have Sneant not only lauds min-
eral in fact, but lands known to be mineral, or, at most, such as were apparently
mineral and generally recognized as such.
And the court thereupon held that the exception of " mineral lands"
in the grant in question only extends to lands known to be mineral, or
apparently mineral, at the time when the grant attached; and that the
discovery of mineral in the land after that date does not defeat the
company's title. In other words, the effect of the decision in that case
is, that the exception must be construed as if it had been written
"lands known to be mineral, or, at least, apparently mineral, at the
date when the grant attached." Such a construction requires the im-
portation of words into the statute in order to change its meaning.
This, there is no authority to do. Newhall v. Sanger (92 U. S., 765).
It may be further said that the Francouer case is not binding, but is
rather only persuasive authority, so far as this Department is concerned.
I do not think it sufficiently persuasive, however, to warrant a depart-
ure from what has been the uniform practice of the land department
for many years, namely, to withhold patents for mineral lands within
railroad grants, without reference to the time when-their mineral char-
acter may have been discovered. Moreover, it is my judgment that
the cases cited from the supreme court by Judge Sawyer, namely, the
Colorado Coal Company v. United States (123 U. S., 307), and Deffeback
v. awke (115 U. S., 392), do not sustain the text of his opinion. These
were cases which arose under the pre-emption and town-site laws of
the United States, and were determined solely with reference to prin-
ciples applicable to the administration of those laws, and did not, in
any sense, involve the construction of land grants to railroads. The
mineral exception in the pre-emption act is of "lands on which are sit-
uated any known mines." In the Colorado Coal Company case, the
court, construing said act, held that in order to bring lands within the
exception stated, their character as mineral must be known at the date
of the sale. In Deffeback v. Hawke, the question at issue involved the
exception of mineral lands from the operation of the town-site laws,
which is that
Where mineral veins are possessed. which possession is recognized by local author-
ity, and to the extent so possessed and recognized, the title to town-lots to be ac-
quired shall be subject to such recognized possession and the necessary use thereof;
. that no title shall be equired under . . . . this chapter, to any
mine of gold, silver, cinnabar, or copper, or to any valid mining claim, or possession
held under existing laws. (See sections 2386 and 2392 R. S.).
The court, in construing this exception, held that it included only
such lands as were known to be mineral at the date of sale. It is thus
seen that those cases are in no material sense similar to the Francouer
case, or the case at bar.
The case of Wright v. Roseberry, supra, which involved the construc-
tion of the swamp-land grant of September 28, 1850, is cited to show
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that patents issued under legislative grants, in prcesenti, do not operate
to vest the title, but are intended to define or identify the land, and
evidence the title vested by the grant. But all this may be freely ad-
mitted, without aid, in my judgment, to the contention that mineral
lands passed by the grant, if their character was not known at the date
when the grant acquired precision. The very fact, if it be true, that
the office of the patent is to define and identify the land granted, and
to evidence the title which vested by the act, necessarily iplies that
there exists jurisdiction in some tribunal to ascertain and determine
what lands were subject to the grant and capable of passing thereun-
der. Now, this jurisdiction is in the Land Department, and it contin-
ues, as we have seen until the lands have been either patented or cer-
tified to, or for the use of, the railroad company. By reason of this
jurisdiction it has been the practice of that department, for many years
past, to refuse to issue patents to railroad companies for lands found to
be mineral in character, at any time before the date of the patent.
Moreover, I am informed by the officers in charge of the Mineral Di-
vision of the Land Department, that ever since the year 1867 (the date
when that division was organized) it has been the uniform practice to
allow and maintain mineral locations within the geographical limits of
railroad grants, based upon discoveries made at any time before patent,
or certification, where patent is not required. This practice, having
been uniformly followed and generally accepted for so long a time, there
should be, in my judgment, the clearest evidence of error, as well as
the strongest reasons of policy and justice controlling, before a depart-
ure from it should be sanctioned. It has, in effect, become a rule of
property.
I am,-therefore, constrained to hold, in view of the foregoing, that
there is no error in the conclusion of your said office decision, and the
same is hereby affirned.
CONTEST-FAILURE OF CHARGE-FINAL DESERT PROOF.
GILKISON V. OUGHAI'NHOUR.
If the charge a laid against the entry is not supported by the evidence, and good
faith is apparent on the part of the entryman, though his compliance with law
is not satisfactorily shown, the contest may be dismissed, and the entryman per-
mitted to submit supplemental proof in sdpport of his entry.
The final proof under a desert entry should definitely show what proportion of each
legal sub-division has been irrigated.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 5, 1890.
With your letter of July 25, 1889, you transmit the appeal of J. D1.
Gilkison from your office decision of February 14,1889, dismissing his
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contest against desert land entry No. 75, made by William A. Coughan-
hour, on March 2, 1883, on Sec. 20, T. 6 S., R. 39 E., La Grande, Oregon,
Final proof was offered on said tract March 1, 1886. Before the
register and receiver had passed upon the sufficiency of the same, James
M. Gilkison, Harrison Wicks, Socrates Mann, and William M. Dixon
filed their several contest affidavits against said entry, as to the NW 
the SW.J, the NE.J, and the SE.+ of said section, respectively.
Notices werd issued on these affidavits fixing hearings for September
1, 2, 3, and 4, 1886, respectively.
On September 1, the hearing was begun in the case of Gilkison v.
Coughanhour, and the same was concluded November 23, 1886.
By stipulations, duly entered of record, it was agreed by Wicks,
Mann and Dixon, respectively, that the lands in controversy in their
several contests were of the same character, as to being desert or non-
desert lands, as the land embraced in Gilkison's case; that the facts
were the same, and that their cases should be heard and decided by the
Department upon the evidence taken in the Gilkison case.
The several contestants filed substantially the same charges against
the entry, namely:-
1. That the land embraced in said entry is not desert land within the
meaning of the statute.
2. That claimant has not reclaimed the lands within the time pro-
vided by Congress to make final proof, thereby forfeiting the entry.
At the hearing there was no testimony taken as to the reclamation
of the land, it being entirely directed to the issueas to whetherthe land
was desert or non-desert in character.
The register and receiver dismissed the contest, but held that clainm-
ant failed in getting water on the land as required by law. Both parties
prosecuted appeals from this judgment, and by your said office decision-
you held the land desert in character within the meaning of the law,'
and, also, that the final proof shows that the land has been reclaimed.
I have carefully examined the testimony, and fully agree with you
that a preponderance of the same is to the effect, that the land in con-
troversy will not produce a remunerative crop in a season of ordinary
rainfall, and that the land is essentially desert in character within the
meaning of the statute.
The proof was made two days before the expiration of the three years
allowed to reclaim the land. Claimant appears to have the right to the
use of sufficient water to irrigate the land.
The only question, therefore, is, whether the proof is sufficient to
show the land reclaimed.
In claimants testimony, which in the main is corroborated, I find the
following:-
I have made a ditch and am now prepared to thoroughly irrigate the entire tract.
I have raised no crops. In 1863 water was condncted'on the land in May, and was
spread over the land by flooding, though not in sufficient quantity to thoroughly ir-
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rigate all the land; the ditch was completed late last fall, but not in time to tor-
oughly irrigate the land. I have a ditch constructed now which will carry a suffi-
cient amount of water to thoroughly irrigate the entire tract; but as the ditch was
only finished late last fall, and the freezing weather has prevented my bringing the
water on to the land, except for a short time in November, I could not construct the
ditch and run thq water in the ditch at the same time, and there is only about five
months in each year that work can be prosecuted or carried on successfully in that
part of the country. I failed to get water on the land in sufficient quantity in time
to complete my proof within the time, and that the ditch has been filled with snow
and ice during the winter, which has prevented my compliance, and further that I
have used all proper diligence in trying to get the water on the land.
One of the witnesses, Hagan, testifies that in no season has there
been sufficient water conveyed upon the land to irrigate the entire tract;
that during May, 1883, there was conveyed to the land about one inch
of water, but there were then no small ditches to distribute it. It was
then irrigated by flooding, and it spread over "the most of it." It was
then turned off to enlarge the ditch. In 1883 the ditch was four and a
half miles long, sixteen inches deep and three feet wide. In the fall of
1885 the ditch was enlarged and extended. It is now thirteen and a
half miles long, and for the greater part four and a half feet wide and
sixteen inches deep, and lateral ditches have been constructed to con-
vey the water to every part of the land.
It is shown also that the construction of the ditch was delay'ed by
reason of one Young disputing the right to run it through his homestead,
which seems to have been entered subsequent to the desert entry. The
ditch had then been partly constructed, and by reason of this difficulty
new surveys had to be made and changed from former location-running
around Young's homestead-requiring more time and expense, and sub-
jecting claimant to annoyance and delay, so that the ditch was not
completed until November, 1885, and the freezing up of the water pre-
vented the land being thoroughly irrigated.
It will thus be seen that claimant has acted in apparent good faith;
he has expended a large sum of money to reclaim the tract; but the
proof of the reclamation isnotsatisfactory. It does not affirmatively ap-
pear what proportion of each legal subdivision has been irrigated. The
water may have been brought to the land in sufficient quantities to re-
claim it. Possibly, but for the freezing weather in the winter of 1885-
'86, the water would have been running over and through each subdi-
vision of the land; but the incident of the freezing weather and the
consequent failure to irrigate the land, can not excuse claimant from
showing its reclamation. In all cases "satisfactory proof" must be
made.
As the contestants have failed to sustain their several charges that
the land is non-desert in character, and have introduced no testimony
whatever that the land was not reclaimed within the time prescribed
by law; and since claimant should not be held responsible by reason of
the circumstances attending his efforts to reclaim this tract, as above
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set out, the several contests should be, and they are hereby, dismissed.
But as this proof fails to show definitely what proportion of each legal
subdivision has been irrigated, supplementary proof will be required
to supply this deficiency. Sixty days from due notice hereof will be
allowed for compliance with this requirement. Your decision is accord-
ingly modified.
PRACTICE-NOTICE OF APPEAL.
BRAKE V. CALIFORNIA AND OREGON R. R. Co.
AD appeal will not be considered in the absence of proper service of notice thereof
on the opposite party.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
September 8, 1890.
On September 24, 1883, Lillie R. Brake made private cash entry for
lots l and 2, Sec. 3, T. 39 B., R. 1 W., W. P.M., Roseburg land district,
Oregon.
March 27, 1884, your office informed the local office that said tracts
were within the granted limits of the Oregon and California Railroad
Company, under the grant of July 25, 1866, (14 Stats., 239); that said
road was definitely located opposite said tracts September 4, 1883;
that the odd numbered sections in the twenty and thirty mile limits
were withdrawn from market October 27, notice of which was filed in
the local office November 7, 1883, and on account thereof, said entry
was held for cancellation.
She appealed from that portion of your decision holding for cancella-
tion her entry for lot 2, alleging that said lot was offered for sale Octo-
ber 13, 1862, and was subject to sale when she made her entry, and
that no approved map or plats of said railroad were filed in the local
office until fourteen days after her right had attached. She asked that
her entry for lot 2 be allowed to stand and that the money paid for lot
1 be refunded.
Accompanying her appeal she filed her own affidavit in which she
alleged 1 I have this day deposited in the post-office at Ashland, Ore-
gon, a true copy of the foregoing notice, and this affidavit directed to
Henry Villard, President of the Oregon and California Railroad, at
New York City, New York, where I am informed and believe the said
President ofthesaid railroad post-office address now is, and that I paid
the postage on the same."
Rule 93 requires that a copy of the notice of appeal, specification of
errors, and all arguments of either party, shall be served on the oppo-
site party within the time allowed for filing the same.
Rule 94.-Such service shall be made personally or by registered
letter, and Rule 95,-Proof of personal service shall be the written
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acknowledgment of the party served or the affidavit of the person
making the service attached to the papers served, and stating time,
place, and manner of service.
Notice of this appeal has not been properly given the railroad com-
pany, and the same will not, nder the rules and the decisions in Hun-
toon v. Devereux (10 L. D., 408), and Bundy v. Fremont Townsite (a
L. D., 595), be considered, but must be and is hereby dismissed.
MINING CLAIM-SURVEY-CIRCULAR OF DECEMBER 4,1884.
CONSOLIDATED MINING CO.
In the survey of a lode claim that conflicts with a prior valid claim, that is excepted
from the application, the applicant's right does not extend beyond an end line
passing through the point where the lode intersects the exterior line of the senior
location.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 8 1890.
I have considered the appeal of the Consolidated Mining Company
from your decision of December 27, 1888, holding the survey of the
*Eighth of January " lode claim lot No. 158, Ophir mining district of
Salt Lake City, Utah land district, to be in violation of circular of De-
cember 4, 1884, and directing a new survey thereof.
This claim was located January 8, 1884 and surveyed June 23, and
24, 1885. An inspection of the plat and field notes of the survey shows
that the lode line, from the point of " discovery " bears N. 80 35' W.,
and intersects the southern boundary (side-line) of the " Chicago No. 2"
lot 44, and crosses said lot and also the " Trafalgar." lot 49, " Red Pine"
lot 69, enters the " Sacramento" lot 81, and terminates within the last
named claim.
These several lots lie contiguous so that the said lode line after enter-
ing the first named lot does not pass over any land not embraced by
these various claims all of which were located prior to the location of
the "Eighth of January" claim, and each of which is excepted from
this application.
The last sentence of first paragraph of circular of December 4, 1884,
3 L. D., 540, says:
His right to the lode claimed terminates when the lode in its onward course or
strike intersects the exterior boundary of such excluded ground and passes within it.
The first sentence of the second paragraph says:
The end-line of his survey should not, therefore, be established beyond such inter-
section, unless it should be necessary so to do for the purpose of including ground
held and claimed under a location which was made upon public land and valid at
the time it was made.
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In the case at bar, we have seen that there was no ground that could
be held and claimed under this location, lying between the point where
the lode intersected the south line of the " Chicago No. 2 " and passed
within the boundary of the excluded ground and the point of terminus
of said lode line.
The case is similar to that of the Engineer Mining and Developement
Company (8 L. D., 361), in which case the survey over-lapped on its
southerly end the " B. F. Requa" lode claim which had been previously
located. After discussing the case and section 2336 R. S., the Secretary
'said:
In the case at bar the survey over-laps bet does not cross or intersect the prior
location. It can not therefore be held to come with in the purview of section 2336.
... . . . . . . From the survey as it now stands the lode appears to strike
the exterior line of the " B. F. Requa" lode claim at a point north of the line sur-
Teyed as the southerly end-line of the "Eldorado." The appellant's right does not
extend beyond a southerly eud-line (parallel with the north line) through the point
where the lode intersects the exterior line of the said senior location.
In following this ruling I may say the appellant's right does Dot ex-
tend beyond a northerly end-line (parallel to the south line) through
the pointR where the lode intersects the exterior line of the. said senior
location ( Chicago No. 2 "). It was therefore proper to require the
end-lines of the survey to be re-adjusted, so as to accord with the
requirements of the law and regulations.
Your decision is affirmed, and a new survey required accordingly.
CONTEST-PREFERENCE RIGHT OF ENTRY-RELINQUTSHMENT.
COMLEY V. MILLS.
In a hearing ordered between two settlers to test a question of alleged priority a.
"preference right of entry " is not acquired as under a contest.
Where the entryman, during the pendency of such litigation, files a relinquishment
the question at issue abates; and such entryman has thereafter no interest in
the case nor right of appeal.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 8, 1890.
Your office by letter of July 25, 1889, transmitted to this Department
the papers in the case of A. M. Comley v. R. S. Mills, upon the appeal
of the latter from your decision of March 30, 1889 " awarding the pref-
erence right of entry to the former, for the NW. i of Sec. 29, T. 107 N.,
R. 57 W., Mitchell, South Dakota, land district.
The record shows that Mills on November 20, 1886, made homestead
entry for this land in lieu of his pre-emption filing of October 21, of
same year.
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On February 16, 1887, Comley made application to file pre-emption
declaratory statement for the same tract, alleging settlement November
20, 1886, this being the day on Which Mills had made homestead entry,
the register and receiver ordered a hearing to determine which of the
parties had the prior right thereto, and upon considering the testimony
in the case they decided, on May 19, 1887, that Mills had such right,
and rejected the application of Comley.
From this decision he appealed, and on March 30, 1889, your office,
passing upon the case, found that Comley made settlement November
20, 1886; and made valuable improvements upon the land, and gave
him the preference right.
In your decision, referring to the record in the case, you say, that on
December 2, 1837, Mills' homestead entry was canceled on relinquish-
ment, and that on same day one Delano made homestead entry for the
tract and that said cancellation had been noted in your office on De-
cember 16, 1887, and you say:
I believe further that his settlement and contest directly brought about the afore-
said cancellation in your office, hence, I award to A. M. Comley, contestant, the pref--
erence right of entry to this tract and close the case.
There had been no contest initiated by Comley against any entry and
there was no question of " preference right of entry" in the case, but
only the question of priority between the settlement of Comley and the
homestead right of Mills, hence, when Mills relinquished his rights and
his entry was canceled, there was nothing left for you to try or deter-
mine. These parties must stand on their settlement rights, and Mills,
having relinquished his claim under his entry, ceased to have any inter-
est in the case and, therefore, has no right of appeal.
The attempted appeal is dismissed.
TIMBER CULTURE ONTEST-INFANT HEIR-NOTICE.
FANSEY v. ToRGERsEN.
If good faith is apparent, failure to fully comply with the requirements of the timber
culture law may be excused, where such failure is the result of mistake, and an
effort is made to cure the default prior to the initiation of the contest.
In a contest against the claim of a deceased entryman it must clearly and affirma-
tively appear that the proceedings are regular, and that the entryman or his
legal representatives have failed to comply with the requirements of the law.
Notice of the proceedings in such a case should be given the infant (sole) heir, and
the guardian be made a party thereto in accordance with local procedure.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the ommnissioner of the General Land
Office, September 8, 1890.
I have considered the case of Louis M. Fansey v. Caroline Torgersen,
sole heir at law of Christ Torgersen, deceased, as presented by the ap-
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peal, filed by "A. S. Baldwin, attorney for the claimant," from the de-
cision of your office, dated October 22, 1885, holding for cancellation
timber culture entry No. 1559 of the NW. i of Sec. 9, T. 14 N., R. 22
W., made by Christ Torgersen on Way 29, 1880, at the North Platte
land office, in the State of Nebraska.
The record shows that said Fansey, on October 22, 1884, filed in said
local land office his contest affidavit, alleging that he was well ac-
quainted with said entry, and knew the present condition of the land
covered thereby; "'that the said Christ Torgersen died February, 1882,
and left, surviving him, one child, whose name is Caroline Torgersen.
and who is his sole heir; that said Christ Torgersen failed to break five
acres of said tract in 1881; that said heir has failed to break or cause to
be broken ten acres of said tract, and has failed to plant to trees, seeds,
nuts, or cuttings, ten acres of said tract or cause the same to be done;
that said heir has failedjto cultivate ten acres of said tract in 1883 and
1884. Notice issued on the same day, summoning the contestant and
said heir to appear at said local office on December 18, 1884, at nine
A. M., and also that ' Depositions in said cause will be taken before R.
B. Pierce, county judge of Dawson county, at his office in Plum Creek,
on the 11th day of December, 1884."' The depositions were taken as
directed and filed in the local office on December 17, 1884, and the hear-
ing was had before the local officers on December 18, same year. It
nowhere appears that notice was served upon said heir, but it is shown
that witnesses were examined by said county judge in support of said
entry.
The local officers found, and so state in their decision, "that the
requisite amount of breaking was done, but, by mistake, a portion of
the same was done upon an adjoining quarter section; the mistake was
learned in April, 1884, there being at least two and a half acres of the
same;" that "the entryman should not suffer for this honest error.
But, upon learning said mistake, there seems to have been no effort
made on the part of the entryman or his (her) representatives to cure
said defect;" that the testimony showed that there had been only
seven acres planted in trees, including that part which was planted by
mistake on another adjoining tract; that the law requires strict com-
pliance, which was not shown in the case at bar, and the local officers,
therefore, recommended the cancellation of said entry.
From this decision an appeal was taken in the name of said heir.
Your office, on October 22, 1885, found that the entryman died in the
month of February, 1882; that prior to his death he broke ten acres,
of which only six or seven acres were upon the land covered by his
said entry; that since the discovery of said defect "no effort has been
made to cure the same."?
The grounds alleged in the appeal, taken in the name of said minor
heir, are, that the decision is contrary to the law and the evidence, and
that the heir, who was a young child, was helpless, until a guardian
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had been appointed; that her guardian " did all in his power to remedy
the default, if any existed, before suit brought, and thereafter."
The evidence in the case shows, that the entryman in his lifetime
broke the required amount on what he supposed was the tract entered
by him, but by mistake a part of the breaking was on an adjoining
tract; that said entryman died in February, 1882, and that H. J. Kolbo,
on November 12, 1884, was duly appointed guardian of Caroline Tor-
gersen, who was the sole heir of said deceased entryman; that said
contest affidavit was filed and notice issued to said'heir on October 22,
1884. Oe of the witnesses for the contestant, Vanantwerp, testified
that it was not discovered until April, 1884, that the breaking was not
all upon the right claim; that the first five acres were planted in tim-
ber in 1883, but about two and a half acres of the planting were on the
adjoining claim; that the trees on the adjoining claim were transplanted
upon the tract in question in the spring of 1884, after the discovery of
the mistake, and some cuttings set out, making between five and six
acres altogether, and only seven acres of breaking then upon the tract,
without the fireguards.
Another witness, Shelden,-states (Evidence, p. 15), that he assisted
in making a survey of he land broken on the tract in question, about
a week before giving his evidence, and there were " between nine and
'ten acres "; that there were planted between five and six acres on said
tract in seeds, trees, nuts, or cuttings, prior to October 22, 1884; that
about an acre and a half weie broken " the pst summer" on the south
side of the tract; that during the summer of 1884 and prior to the
initiation of said contest there were planted upon said tract between
" three and four acres; " that, including the two and a half acres planted
on the adjoining claim, there were planted between seven and eight
acres." On the part of the claimant, witness Bainbridge (Evidence, p.
19) testified that five acres, supposed to be on the claim, were planted
in trees in 1883; that four thousand trees were planted in 1884,
" and the balance of it was planted to box elder seeds ' about three
acres in the opinion of the witness, although he did not measure it;
that in the spring of 1884 a little over six acres were marked off for the
purpose of planting to trees, but this piece was not planted, because of
the division of the section which cut off said piece from the land en-
tered; that% portion of the fireguard, about forty-four rods, was planted
by witness in box elder seeds; that witness planted all of the old ground
found by the survey to be on the tract entered and the balance of the
fireguards not then planted. On cross examination witness testified,
that he was the stepfather of the claimant; that he replanted some of
thetrees from the adjoining tract to the land in question; that the
ground for the second planting was plowed between the 10th and 1th
of April, 1884, and marked off the second day afterwards; that there
were one acre and sixteen rods of new breaking done upon the tract in
1884; that the reason more land was not broken was because of the
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severe drouth, which caused the land to become so dry that witness
could not break any more; that the claimant was only ten years old the
November preceding; that said breaking in 1881 was done in the month
of September.
The testimony of said witness i corroborated by the uncle of claim-
ant, whoalso testified that the entryman died on February 15, 1882,
that there has been no administrator of his estate; that his widow re-
married in the spring of 1883, and that about a month prior to the date
of taking said evidence, lans J. Kolbo was appointed guardian of said
heir. Said Kolbo also testified in behalf of the claimant, corroborating
her other witnesses, relative to the breaking and planting of trees upon
the said tract. He also testified that he was appointed guardian of said
claimant on November 12, 1884; that prior to said date no guardian
had been appointed. On crossexamination, witness stated that prior to
May 1, 1884, the season was suph that the ground could be properly
prepared for planting to trees; that the trees on the adjoining claim were
transplanted about May 1st to the-tract in question; that the applica-
tion to have witness appointed guardian of said heir was filed in Sep-
tember 1884, and that as her guardian he. ' intends to do what the law.
requires .... about the tract;" that-he knew he would be
appointed guardian of said heir prior to the issuance of letters, from'
a letter received from the judge of said court.
From the foregoing it is apparent that said entry ought not to be
canceled. The local officers did not have the witnesses before them,
and their statement, concurred in by your office, that " no effort has
been made by the entryman or his representatives to cure the de-
feet "7 in the breaking and planting since the discovery of the mistake
of the entryman in his plowing and planting is not sustained by the
weight of evidence submitted in the case.
It is clear that the requisite amount of land would have been duly
planted in 1883 had it not been for the mistake of the entryman, con-
ceded to have been honestly made, and some effort was made to remedy
the defect prior to the filing of said contest affidavit.
The circumstances of this case are such, in my judgment, that they
furnish a sufficient excuse for the default, and there is an entire want of
evidence of any bad faith on the part of the entryman in his lifetime,
and, certainly, none can be imputed to a minor child only ten years of
age. So that upon the merits of the case there has been no sufficient
showing made of failure to comply with the requirements of the timber
culture act.
But, independently of the foregoing, said contest could be dismissed
because the suit is not brought and continued against the proper parties.
The code of civil procedure for the State of Nebraska (Ed. 1867, p.
307, Sec. 38), provides that " the defense of an infant must be by a
guardian for the suit, who may be appointed by the court in which the
action is prosecuted, or by the judge thereof, or by the probate judge."
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Said, code also provides that" When the defendant is a minor under the
age of fourteen years, the service must be made upon him, and upon
his guardian or father, or, if neither o these can be found, then upon
his mother, or the person having the care or control of the infant, or
with whom he lives." (Id., p. 404-5,-Sec. 76.)
The record does not affirmatively show that said notice was served
upon said infant, or upon her parent or guardian as required by law,
and her guardian was not at any time made a party to the proceedings.
While it is true that, as a general rule, a strict compliance with the
requirements of the timber culture law must be shown by claimants,
especially when making final proof in support of their claims, yet, it is
also essential that, in a case like this, when the contestant seeks to
cancel an entry which will deprive a sole heir, only ten years of age, of
her inheritance, it must be clearly and affirmatively shown that the
proceedings have been regular, and that the entryman or his legal rep-
resentatives, in case of his decease, have failed to comply with the re-
quirements of the law; and, when a reasonable excuse is given for any
apparent omission, the entry will not be canceled.
The decision of your office must be, and it is hereby, reversed.
FINAL PROOF PROCEEDINGS.-OSAGE FILING.
WILLS V. BACHMAN.
Final proof should not be submitted during the pendency of adverse proceedings
instituted by another to secure title to the laud involved. v
The time within which an Osage filing is required to be made will not run where the
local office is closed, and the Commissioner directs that during such period time
will not run as against applicants for public land.
During the pendency of a contest the entryman must continue to comply with the
requirements of the law.
Acting-Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
September 8, 1890.
I have considered the case of Henry Wills v. Abraham L. Bachman,
as presented by the appeal of the latter from the decision of your office,
dated February 17, 1887, rejecting his proof and holding for cancellation
his Osage declaratory statement No. 9191, filed in the Larned, Kansas,
land office on October 1,1885, for the SW. of Sec. 21, T. 34 S., R. 18
W., alleging settlement thereon March 1, same year, and awarding said
land to said Wills.
The record shows that said Wills filed his Osage declatory statement
for said tract on October 12, 1885, alleging settlement the day previous;
that Bachman, after due notice, made final proof in support of his claim,
and upon a protest of said Wills alleging a valid adverse claim, a hear-
ing was duly ordered on March 13, 1886, and had on April 19, same
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year, to determine the rights of said parties to said tracts; that said
hearing was continued from day to day until April 21, 1886, when the
case was continued until August 26, same year, to enable parties
to take depositions, and the case was closed on August 27, 1886;
and that on April 19, 1886, Wills made fnal proof before the register
of said office. The local officers found that Bachman was first seen
upon the tract in question on the last of February or first of March,
1885, when he commenced to build a dug-out eight by twelve feet, with
a dirt roof; that he had fourteen acres of breaking, a well eighteen feet
deep, without any water, but had cultivated no crop on said land prior
to his final proof; that Wills settled on said land about August 11,
1885, and that Bachman's improvements then consisted of said dug-out,
and one-third of an acre plowed; that no one was then living in said
dug-out, and it looked from its general appearance as if the tract had
been abandoned; that Bachman only lived. in his dugout about ten
days, while his brother's family lived with him until they were driven
out by a heavy rain; that Wills resided upon said tract from August
13, 1885, and up to the time of said hearing he was not absent more
than ten days; that after submitting a part of his testimony in the case,
he abandoned said tract and went back to the State of Missouri; which
indicates bad faith. The local officers therefore held for rejection the
final proof of each of said parties.
On appeal, your office found that they were qualified pre-emptors and
were actual settlers upon said tract at the dates their respective proofs
were made; that by the failure of Bachman, who was the prior settler,
to file his declaratory statement within the period required by law, and
before the intervention of the valid adverse right of Wills, he lost the
benefit of his prior settlement and his entry was barred by the statute;
that at the date Wills made his final proof he was an actual settler upon
the land in question and had resided thereon for more than six months
next preceding said date, and the land must be awarded to him.
On May 10,1887, the local office transmitted an application by Bach-
man's attorney for a modification of said decision, or for a new trial,
service of which upon the attorneys of Wills, without objection as to
time, was acknowledged on April 28, same year. The grounds of said
application are that the decision of your office overlooked the fact ap-
parent in the record, that said Wills was not an actual resident of said
tract at the date of his proof and entry, but was more than one hun-
dred miles distant, on his way to Missouri, and that said Bachman was
there and had been ever since his settlement, actually residing on said
land; that if said facts are not shown by the record, said Bachman, by his
attorney, N. B. Freeland, asks that time be given to show the same by
affidavits. Said application concludes with a statement made under
oath by said Freeland that he had that day received a letter from said
Bachman stating that his former counsel in said case had removed to
(J6lorado; also that said Freeland was informed and believed that the
2497-No. 11--17
258 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
allegations in said application were true; that the time for appeal had
so nearly expired that there was not time to have said application veri-
fied by the defendant, which was the only reason why said counsel veri-
fied said application.
)n August 1, 1887, the local office transmitted another application of
said Bachman, by his said attorney, asking that your said office decision
be reversed, because the same was an oversight for the reason that said
land office was closed on account of fire from May 27, 1885, until (Octo-
ber 1, same year, and hence Bachman could not have filed for said land
during the time the office was closed.
Your office, on October 8, 1887, refused to modify said decision be-
cause said motion was not filed in time, it appearing that the parties
were duly notified of your office decision on February 23, 1887, and the
application did not allege any newly-discovered evidence. Notice of
said decision of your office was duly given to the attorney of said Bach-
man, and on October 31, 1887, the local officers transmitted the appeal
from said decision of February 17, 1887, filed in their office on October
15, same year, which was transmitted by your office to the Department
on November 29, following.
The errors alleged are that your office rejected appellant's claim be-
cause he did not file in time, when the fact was that the delay in filing
was caused by the closing of said local office from May 27, to October
1, 1885, on account of the destruction of its records by fire; and he in-
sists that your office should have corrected the decision as soon as the
error was indicated. It is also alleged that the attorney of record for
said Bachman at said hearing had removed to Colorado prior to said
decision of February 17, 1887, and had abandoned all practice before
said local office, and, in consequence thereof, said appellant's attorney
received no notice of said decision until a very few days prior to the
filing of said application for said reconsideration, which was made within
thirty days from the. time the same was received either by appellant or
his present counsel who was his counsel at that time. With said appeal
is filed a duly certified copy of a letter from your office dated June 13,
1885, to the register and receiver of said office instructing them to " ad-
vise settlers, desiring to place their claims of record, that the time
during which the office is closed for general business will not run against
them."
On the part of Wills, it is insisted that said application for review
came too late, and that the decision of your office has become final, and
has passed in rem judicatam.
The record shows many irregularities. In the first place, Wills
should not have been permitted to make final proof while the right of
Bachman to said tract was still pending. Wills had protested against
the allowance of Bachman's proof, alleging his own adverse claim to the
land, and until the right of Bachman to the tract was finally determined,
no further action could be taken by the local officers or the land depart-
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ment. Rules of Practice, No. 53 (4 L. D.,' 43); Chicago, Rock Island &
Pac. R. R. v. Easton (id., 265); Stroud v. De Wolf (id., 394); Bailey v.
Townsend (5 L. D., 176); Wade . Sweeney (6 L. D., 234); Lewis Peter-
son (8 L. D., 121); Laffoon v Artis (9 L. D., 279).
The decision of your office adverse to Bachman is based upon his
failure to file within the time required by law. If the allegations of the
appellant be true, then it is apparent that he did file in time, for,by the
express direction of your office, the time did not run while the local
office was closed, which the attorney for appellant swears was until
October 1, 1885. Moreover, the attorney for Bachman also swears that
the counsel of record for appellant at the (late of said hearing had re-
moved to Colorado prior to said decision of February 17, 1885, and that
the application for modification was filed in due time after the appellant
or the attorney who filed said application had received notice of said
decision. But, conceding that upon a strict construction of the rules of
practice said motion was not filed within the time required, yet, since
your office has allowed the appeal, and it' is alleged that said Wills
abandoned said tract pending said contest, I am of the opinion that the
case should be considered by this Department.
It is well settled that, pending a contest, the entryman must continue
to comply with the requirements of the law. Byrne v. Dorward (5 L
D., 104); Taschi v. Lester (6 L. D., 27).
The tract in question is a part of the Osage Indian trust and dimin-
ished reserve lands, and is disposed of under the provisions of the act
of Congress approved May 28, 1880 (21 Stats., 143), which require the
applicant to purchase to become an actual settler at the date of the en-
try. United States v. Atterbery et al. (8 L. D., 173); Hessong v. Bur-
gan, (9 L. D., 353); United States v. Jones (10 L. D., 23).
In view of the allegations made by the appellant relative to the clos
ing of said office, the abandonment of said tract by Wills prior to the
final determination of said contest, and his own continued esidence
upon said land, I am of the opinion that the case should be remanded
to the local office for further proceedings after due notice to said par-
ties of the time and place thereof, at which appellant will have an op-
portunity to submit testimony relative to the closing of said land 6ffice,
the absence of said Wills from said tract, and any other facts tending
to show his good faith in the premises. Wills should also be allowed to
controvert the testimony submitted by Bachman, and furnish any addi-
tional testimony he may choose tending to show his superior right to
the land.
The decision of your office is modified accordingly.
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PRACTICE-APPEAL-REHEARING-CERTIORARI.
WITTER V. OSTR6SKI
An appeal should be taken from the original decision, and not from the refusal to
grant a rehearing.
The Commissioner's discretion in the matter of ordering a rehearing will not be con-
trolled by the Department in the absence of any apparent abuse of such discre-
tionary authority.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
September 9, 1890.
By letter of April 12, 1890, you transmitted the petition for certio-
rari filed by the attorney of-George F. Witter Jr., in the case of said
Witter v. John Ostroski, involving the latter's homestead entry for
the N. of SE. of Sec. 8 T. 22 N.. R. 5 E., Wausau, Wisconsin, land
district.
It seems from said petition and the copy of your office decision made
a part thereof, that Ostroski's homestead entry was attacked by Witter
on the charge that it was fraudulently and illegally made; that the
local officers decided in favor of the contestant and overruled a motion
for a rehearing; that the entryman appealed to your office; and that you
by decision of March 2,1890 dismissed said appeal, upon motion of the
contestant, for the reason that it contained no specifications of error, but
then proceeded to take jurisdiction of the case under rule 48 of rules of
practice without specifying under which subdivision of said rule said
action was warranted, decided that a motion for a rehearing should
have been granted, and remanded the case for a new trial.
Thereupon the motion now under consideration was filed.
Counsel for Witter seem to be at a loss to know what became of the
appeal 'from the refusal to grant a rehearing. There was really but
one appeal. and that from the decision of the case. See John R. Nickel
(9 L. D., 388).
Your dismissal of the appeal seems to have been proper, but I do not
find anything in the record before me that brings the case within either
of the four subdivisions of rule 48 of rules of practice.
Counsel for the pplicant has discussed rule 48 very fully, but he
seems to have overlooked the fact that rule 83 on which he bases his
application for a writ, provides for certiorari when the Commissioner
"l shall formally decide that a party has no right of appeal to the
Secretary."
In the case at bar no appeal was taken and no decision formal or
otherwise was rendered denying the same. It may be said that the
decision was merely an interlocutory order and as no appeal would lie
from it, none need be offered. The Department will not review on cer-
tiorari an interlocutory order of the Commissioner, unless good cause is
shown for such action. Olney v. Shyrock (9 L. D., 633).
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The case is similar to that of Gibson v. Van Gilder (9 L. D., 626), in
which it was said:-
Under this rule (72) the Commissioner may grant a rehearing . . . . and he
may also in the exercise of his discretion order a frther investigation or hearing
when necessary to enable him to render an intelligent decision in the case, although
no motion for a rehearing is filed, and the Department will not control the Commis-
sioner in the exercise of this discretion unless there is an apparent abuse of it . .
The remanding of this case for further hearing does not violate rule 48 because that
rule must be considered in connection with rule 72, which allows the Commissioner
in his discretion to make fnrther investigation and to have additional testimony before
him, before passing upon the merits of the case, or passing upon the decision of the
local officers.
I do not find in the case at bar any abuse of discretion, nor do I find
thatithe petitioner will suffer any material injury by the order made.
The application is therefore refused.
NOTICE-PUBLICATION-ACT OF JUNE 15, 1880.
JONES v. DE HAAN.
Notice of a decision given by unregistered letter is not sufficient evidence of service;
nor do the rules of practice provide for verbal notice in such a case.
In an affidavit, filed as the basis for au order of publication, which sets forth that the
defendant is not a resident of the State, and personal service can not be made, it
is not necessary to show what efforts have been made to secure personal service
on the defendant.
The initiation of a contest suspends the right of purchase under the act of June 15,
1880.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 9, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Adam De Haan from your office de-
cision of October 3, 1888, in which the record shows that De Eaan made
homestead entry No. 2936 February 28, 1879, of the E. of the NE. i,
Sec. 4, T. 11, R. 30 W., Wa Keeney, Kansas, and additional home-
stead entry No. 2992, under the act of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat., 472), of
the west half of the same quarter section.
May 19, 1885, John . Jones initiated contest, charging abandon-
ment of both said entries. Notice of contest was made by publication
on the affidavit of Jones that defendant, De Haan, was not a resident
of the State of Kansas, and that personal service can not be obtained.
At the hearing, July 7, 1885, defendant made default, and plaintiff ap-
peared and submitted testimony in support of his charge of abandon-
ment.
September 23, 1885, before a decision was rendered on the contest,
defendant applied to purchase said tracts under the act of June 15,
1880 (21 Stat., 237), which application was granted by the register and
receiver, and he was permitted to make cash entry No. 1122, and the
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contest was dismissed. Jones did not appeal from the action of the
register and receiver in dismissing his contest until December 8, 1886.
The reasons for such delay are set forth in your office decision (letter
H E1 to register and receiver), and are as follows
The case was first broifght to the notice of this office by plaintiff's letter, dated
February 8, 1886, inquiring as to the status of the same. As the result of such let-
ter, and in reply to office letter of August 16, 1886, you transmitted the record in
the case August 19, 1886, with report that though notified of your decision dismiss-
ing the contest, plaintiff took no further action in the premises. October 18, 1886,
you reported, in response to office letter of October 4, 1886, that, although you had
no evidence in your office showing that plaintiff received notice of your several ac-
tions in dismissing his contest and allowing defendant to purchase land, yet such
notice was evidently sent to him at his post office address, Grinneil, Kansas, inas-
much as it was the invariable custom of your office to so notify contestants. Upon
this you were directed by office letter of October 30, 1886, to notify plaintiff that if he
could show by his own affidavit and that of his attorney of record that he never
received official notice of your decision, he would be entitled to file an appeal there-
from. October 28, 1887, you transmitted said affidavits, together with the appeal of
plaintiff, and the counter affidavits submitted by defendant in support of his motion
for the dismissal of the appeal. In plaintiff's affidavit and the affidavit of his at-
torney it is set forth by each that he never received any notice from your office of
the dismissal of the contest. In the affidavits submitted by defendants two show
that it was the invariable custom of your office to notify contestants of the dismissal
of their contests on purchases like the one in question, and two set forth that im-
mediately after the dismissal and purchase herein, the plaintiff was personally and
verbally advised by one McGraw and the local officers of the said decision of your
office. uch a notice both he and his attorney swear as aforesaid they never received,
and as before shown there is nothing in the record disproving their claim.
Upon this evidence you held that the appeal was properly before you.
You also held that the proof of abandonment was sufficiently shown,
and canceled both homestead entries and held defendant's cash entry
subject to contestant's preference right.
From this decision Catherine L. V. Davis; third transferee from the
original entryman, now appeals to this Department.
Comparing the statement of facts as set forth in your office decision
with the record before me, I find it is substantially correct, with this
exception: instead of two affidavits setting forth personal and verbal
notice to plaintiff, I find but one, and that was made by E. A. Mc ath
(instead of McGraw), and stated in substance: " That iontestant, shortly
after the dismissal of his contest, had told affiant that he had been in-
formed by his attorney that his contest had been dismissed, and that he
had then gone to the local office, and the receiver had also informed
him of this fact; afflant also states that on the day the cash entry was
allowed, he, affiant, informed contestant's attorney of the dism ssal of
the contest and allowance of the entry."
From this it satisfactorily appears that no notice of the dismissal of
his contest was ever properly served upon him. Practice Rule 44 re-
quires such notice to be in writing, and to be served personally or by
registered letter through the mail. Notice sent by unregistered letter
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is insufficient evidence of service. (Johnson v. Miller, 8 L. D., 477;
English v. Noteboom, 7 L. D., 335). The case cited by appellant (New
Orleans Canal and Banking Co. v. State, 5 L. D., 479) is not in point.
In that case notice was sent by unregistered letter to the counsel of the
bank, and it was held to be sufficient, for the reason that he admitted
that he received it. There is no such admission in this case; on the
contrary, both contestant and his attorney deny ever receiving any
kind of notice, and the only evidence tending to show that notice was
sent to contestant is the affidavits referred to, showing that it was the
invariable custom of the office to send such notice through the mail, by
unregistered letter. Notice verbally given, as testified to by McaMth,
can not be held sufficient, as the Practice Rules nowhere provide for
verbal notice, nor should they. The appeal was therefore properly be-
fore the Commissioner.
The next point insisted on by counsel for appellant is that-
No personal service of notice of contest was ever made, and no sufficient affidavit
was iniade for constructive service by publication, the affidavit, making n1o showing of
any effort to make personal service, as required by rule eleven (11).
This objection goes to the root of the whole matter, for if itis sustained,
the local office had no jurisdiction, in other words there was no contest
pending and the cash entry was properly allowed. That part of the
affidavit of contest which has relation to service is as follows: "That
said lie Haan is not a resident of the State of Kansas, that personal
service can not be obtained."
Counsel for appellant contends that this is insufficient to authorize
service by publication, because the affidavit does not show thereby that
he made any effort to procure personal service on the defendant, as
required by rule 11 (rule 12 then in force). This rule is as follows:
Notice may be given by publication alone only when it is shown by affidavit of
contestant and by such other evidence as the register and receiver may require, that
due diligence has been used, and that personal service can not be made. The party
will be required to state what effort has been made to get persona] service.
It is quite plain that this rule contemplates two classes of cases:
1st. Notice by publication to the entryman wheu he is a non-resident
of the State.
2nd. When the entryman is within the State but absconds, or so con-
ceals himself that personal service can not be made upon him. Under
this rule, in the latter case, before the contestant is justified in resort-
ing to service by publication, he must set out the facts showing .what
effort has been made to obtain personal service, so the register an(l
receiver may determine whether or not he has used due diligence in
such a degree as to justify them in allowing him to proceed to obtain
service by publication.
It will be observed that the " diligence " used, and the " effort " made,
which must be shown, are " to get personal service." If the party is
not a resident of the State, no diligence or effort can " get personal
service." The rules of practice pertaining to the same matter must,
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like different sections of the same statute, be construed together, so as
to give effect to all, if it is possible to do so.
Rule 9 (then rule 10) is as follows:
Personal service shall be made in all ases when possible, if the party to be served
is resident in tie State or Territory in which the land is situated, and shall consist in
the delivery of a copy of the notice to each person to be served.
From this rule it is equally plain that personal service is not required
to be made, if the party to be served is not a resident of the State or
Territory; why, then, should diligence be shown to make personal
service where such service is not required to be made.
I think these two rules can be reconciled to this construction. Rule
9 provides for personal service, when possible, on residents of the State
or erritory. Rule 10 provides for the execution of such notice.
Rule 11 provides for a different method of service when personal
service is impossible, i. e., by reason of non-residence or because the
party can not by diligence be found. [ts meaning will be readily
understood, if we prefix the following, to aid in its construction, to wit:
Though personal service is required hen possible on all persons resident
of the State or Territory, yet notice may he given by plblication, etc.
Numerous~decisions of this Department have been made in which it is
held, that an affidavit alleging that after diligent search the residence
or whereabouts of defendant can not be found or ascertained, or that
personal service can not be made upon the defendant, and many other
allegations to the same effect, are insufficient, that the plaintiff must
show, as required in rule 11, what efforts lie has made to get personal
service, but no decision has come under my observation, after careful
research, in which it is held, when the affidavit contained the positive
allegation, as in this case, that the defendant is not a resident of the
State, that plaintiff ust also set forth what effort he has made to obtain
personal service. Such a requirement would seem absurd, for, as said
before. whence the necessity to show an endeavor to do something not
required to be done. The allegation "that the defendant is not a resi-
dent of the State," is the statement of a fact, and the reasons why the
contestant knows it is so need not, in my judgment. be stated. It adds
nothing t the strength of the statement of fact. In Bone v. Dicker-
son's heirs (8 L. D., 452), the affidavit was that J. Frank Dickerson
has failed and his heirs or legal representatives have failed to plant or
cause to be planted five acres of trees, tree seeds, etc .. and
that the said Frank Dickerson has been dead for at least two years last
past. Upon this affidavit notice was issued by publication to the heirs
of J. Frank Dickerson. Ernest C. Dickerson, testamentary devisee,
appeared by counsel and moved the dismissal of the contest for want
of notice. The local officers overruled the motion, and found for con-
testant. On appeal to your office, their decision was affirmed on the
ground that the defendant being a non-resident, the notice was suf-
ficient.
On apeal to this Department the decision of your office was reversed,
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and one of the reasons stated in such reversal is, because the affidavit
did not show that due diligence had been used, and that personal
service could not be made."
It will be observed that the affidavit in this case does not, as in the
case at bar, state that " defendant is not a resident of the State," there-
fore, as it did not show that contestant had used due diligence to
make personal service, it was clearly not sufficient to authorize notice
by publication, and the fact as found by the Commissioner, that the
defendant was actually a non-resident, did not cure the error, for, as has
been repeatedly held by this Department, the affidavit must show on
its face all the facts necessary to authorize the service of notice by pub-
lication, or no jurisdiction will be conferred upon the local officers.
In Allen v. Lei-t (6 L. D., 669), cited in the foregoing case, the affidavit
alleged that "he had made due and diligent search for Dexter Leet
and that lie can not be found nor heard of, and that personal service of
notice of this contest can not be made on said defendant in the State of
Nebraska." All of which might be true and still the defendant be a res-
ident of the State of Nebraska, for he might have absconded or con-
cealed himself so that personal service could not be hail upon him.
This affidavit is therefore not equivalent to an allegation of non-resi-
dence, and it was properly held to be defective.
I find therefore that the affidavit in this case was a compliance with
the rule, and was sufficient to authorize publication of notice of contest.
The record also satisfactorily shows that contestant nailed a copy of
the notice by registered letter to the last known address of claimant at
least thirty days before the hearing, and that a like copy was posted in
a conspicuous place X n the land for at least two weeks prior to the day
set for hearing, anl as the provision requiring the same to be posted
in the register's office during the period of publication was not in force-
at the time the contest was initiated, all the requirements of the law
necessary to give jurisdiction to the register and receiver seem to have
been complied with. The contest, then, having been properly initiated
prior to the cash entry of De Haan, such entry was improperly allowed,
under the act of June 15, 1880 (21 Stat., 237).
As this case had not been finally adjudicated at the rendition of the
decision of the case of Friese v. iobson (4 L. D., 580), it falls within the
purview of that decision, which is again followed by Roberts v. Mahl,
6 L. D., 446, and Arnold v. Hildreth, 7 L. D., 500.
The evidence abundantly shows that at the time of the initiation of
the contest the defendant had abandoned his entry, and taken up his
permanent residence in Oregon, many hundred miles distant. The-
good faith of contestant is clearly shown by continued residence on
the land and improvements, amounting to more than fifteen hundred
dollars. The contest will therefore be sustained, and cash entry No.
1122 will be suspended to await final action on contestant's application
to exercise his preference right.
The decision of your office is affirmed.
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FINAL PROOF PROCEEDINGS-TRANSFEREE.
ELLIS M. BROWN ET AL.
When final proof is not taken before the officer designated, but is otherwise satis-
factory, and the entryman refusts to respond to further requirements, the trans-
feree uiay cure the defect by procuring a certificate both from the officer designated
to take the proof, and the one taking the same, that no protest was at any time
filed against the entry.
If such certificates can not be obtained, the proof may be accepted as made, after re-
publication and in the absence of protest.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the Generat
Land Office, September 9, 1890.
I have considered the case of Ellis M. Brown on appeal by the Security
Mortgage and Investmeut Company, mortgagee, from your decision of
February 15, 1889; requiring new final proof on the pre-emption cash
entry made by Brown for the NW. of Sec. 25, T. 115 N., R. 76 W.7
Huron, South Dakota, land district.
On February 28, 1884, Brown made settlement on said land, on March
1st following he filed a pre-emption declaratory statement therefor, and
made actual residence thereon on March 8th, same year.
On July 26, 1884, he gave notice by publication that he would make
final proof " before the clerk of the district court in and for Sully county,
at Clifton, Dakota Ter., on Saturday the 6th day of September 1884,'"
and on said day at the said town he made final proof before Merit
Sweny, probate judge of Sully county Dakota Territory, and the same
was accepted by the local officers, final certificate was issued September
16th following, and he paid to the receiver $200. taking his receipt
therefor.
On February 21, 1887, your office, by letter " G" of that date notified
the register and receiver at Huron D. T. that said claimant would be
required to make new publication and new proof, because the proof was
not taken as stated in the published notice.
It appears that Brown was notified of your said letter " GI' by regis-
tered letter, and that he gave it no attention and on June 14, 1888, by
your letter 'G" of that date the local officers were directed to notify
him that his entry was held for cancellation, subject to appeal.
It appears from the records and evidence that Brown, after receiving
said final certificate mortgaged said land to the Security Mortgage and
Investment Company, and sold the equity of redemption to one David-
son Steel. On February 15, 1889, you notified Steel by letter of that
date that the final proof in said case had been rejected by your office
that new proof had been required; that none having been made the
entry was held for cancellation and that the Department recognized the
right of the transferee to cure irregularities and show compliance with
law by the entryman where he could not be found or refused to comply
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with the requirements made. The Security Mortgage and Investment
Co. were also notified that new proof was required under new publica-
tion, thereupon said company appealed, and for grounds of error claim
that the proof was satisfactory as to residence and improvement, 
and
that all that should have been required was new publication and post-
ing and a certificate of no protest.
It also claims that it does not appear that any service of notice of' sus-
pension of the entry was ever made upon Brown. It files the affidavit
of its President, Win. P. Baird, setting forth that it is a corporation
duly organized under the laws of the Territory of Dakota, that it made
a loan of money to Brown and took a mortgage on the laud in contro-
versy ; that it has no other security; that Brown is insolvent and 
has
gone to parts to it unknown.
Davidson Steel files a statement (not under oath) that he purchased
said land subject to said mortgage and has been paying interest on
*$330 to said company; that Brown has left Dakota and now lives in
Illinois and is unable to bear the expense of making new proof, if 
he
desired to do so.
The testimony in final proof shows that Brown built a house eight by
twenty feet and moved, with his wife and child, into it on March 8,1884,
and that he lived there continuously until after making final proof.
During the spring he broke twenty acres of land and cultivated fifteen
acres to corn, potatoes and vegetables; during the summer he built 
a
crib and made some other slight improvements.
The entryman having mortgaged the land after receiving his final
certificate, and having sold the equity of redemption, seems to have
lost his interest in it, and if it is not patented these parties must of
course suffer. In the case of Eberhard Querbach (10 L. D., 142), it
was held that the sale of the tract after making final proof, which 
sat-
isfactorily showed full compliance with the law, did not afford ground
for cancellation of the entry.
In the case at bar the proof shows full compliance with the law, and
in view of this fact, and the fact that the entryman refuses to comply
with the requirements of your office as to furnishing new proof, 
the
grantee of the entryman will be allowed to furnish the official certifi-
cate of both the officer advertised to take such proof, and the officer
taking the same, that no protest was at any time filed before him
against said entry, as per rule 5-rules on final proof-approved July 17,
1889 ( 9 L. D., 123), and upon such certificates being furnished the final'
proof may be accepted.
If for anv reason such certificates can not be obtained, the said
grantee will cause new notice to be published for the submission of final
proof, and if no protest or objection is filed on the day fixed for hearing,
the proof heretofore made may be accepted as final, otherwise the final
proof will be re-taken.
The decision is modified accordingly
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OSAGE LAND-SETTLEMENT RIGHTS.
R. H. SMITH.
Settlenent and occupancy of Osage land do not secure the right of purchase, if it
appears that such occupancy was not with the intention of taking the land for
a home.
Eirst Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the GeneralLand Office, September 9, 1890.
On February 3, 1883, R. H. Smith made Osage cash entry of the N.4 of SW. t, SE. 1 of SW.J and SW. of SE. , See. 22, T., 30 S., R.1.3 W., Larned, Kansas.
On Alarch 28, 1883, a special agent reported that said entry was madefor grazing purposes, but without recommendation. A hearing washowever had thereon, and at said hearing the defendant asked that thegovernment be required to open the case, which was refused by thelocal officers, and the defendant having excepted to said ruling, then
submitted his testimony. The local officers found that the defendant
did not make a bone fide settlement on the tract, and held his entry for
cancellation, which decision was affirmed by your office. From this
decision defendant appealed, alleging, substantially as error, (1) Il
holding that the overruling of defendant's motion to require the gov-
ernment to open the case, which was excepted to at the time, was not
sufficient to reverse the decision of the local officers; (2) In holding that
the settlement of defendant was not bona fide,.or to make a home, but
to get the land for grazing-the land only being suitable for grazing-
and in not holding that the defendant was an actual settler having the
qualifications of a pre-emptor at the date of tendering final proof,
which are the only requirements to entitle him to the land.
The motion to require the goveriment to open the case was improp-
erly overruled, and the defendant could have refused to submit testi-
mony, and might have relied upon having the error corrected on appeal;
but having offered himself as a witness, and it being sbwn from his
own testimony that he had failed to comply with the law, a correction
of the error could not avail him. While the overruling of the defend-
ant's motion denied to him a right, yet by reason of his own action in the
conduct of the case, it can not now be repaired by a reversal of that
decision.
The testimony of the claimant shows that he owned a farm adjoining
the tract in controversy, upon which he resided with his family prior to
his alleged settlement; that the tract is composed of canons, bluffs,
breaks and ravines, and is not fit for agricultural purposes, bat only
for grazing; that the land is of no value to any one not owning adjoin-
ing land, and that because he owned the adjoining farm he wanted itfor grazing purposes. He states that when he bought the adjoining
farm, he also bought the house on the tract in controversy from the
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same person-; that his wife resided with him on said tract for about a
month and a half, and then returned to the house on the adjoining farm,
which was from twenty-three to thirty rods from the other house, but
that he and his son remained on the place until he proved up, which
was exactly six months from date of filing, when he returned to the
house on the adjoining tract, and afterwards used the house on the land
in controversy for a stable. He states that when he moved with his fam-
ily from Illinois to Kansas, they divided their household goods and put
part on the tract in controversy and part on the adjoining land; that
hiswife came to the claim at times to cook their meals, and when she
did not, he and his son went to the house on the adjoining tract to eat;
that he filed for the land to make it a home in connection with his
other land adjoining.
While the testimony shows that the claimant occupied the tract with
his son for six months, yet considering all the facts and circumstances
as detailed by his own testimony, I am satisfied that such occupancy
did not constitute him an actual settler upon the land within the mean-
ingof that term, as defined by the decision of theDepartment in the cases
of United States v. Jones, 10 L. D., 23, and United States v. Atterberry,
id., 36, in which it is held that the proof required to establish the fact
of an actual settlement on Osage lands, is no less in degree than the
proof required under the pre-emption law. While it is true the claim-
ant settled upon and occupied the land for six months, yet it is shown
by the proof that he did not occupy it for the purpose of making it his
home, but solely to add to his adjoining land, which was in fact his
home, and to which he removed as soon as he made proof.
Your decision is affirmed, and the papers are herewith returned.
PRACTICE-NOTICE OF CONTEST-OFFICIAL SIGNATURE.
LLuNDQUIST v. FENTON.
The mere omission of the register to affix to his signature, on a notice of contest, his
official designation does not invalidate the process; nor can a defendant who
admits the service of sach notice, and appears generally, without allegation of
prejudice, take advantage of such defect.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 9, 1890.
On June 2, 1885, Eusibus M. Fenton made homestead entry upon the
NW. I, Sec. 14, T. 127 N., R. 46 W., Fergus Falls, Minnesota.
On May 18, 1886, Erik A. Lundquist filed his affidavit of contest
against said entry, charging abandonment, change of residence, and no
cultivation of the tract.
The hearing was set for July 9, 1886, at nine A. M. Near the hour
fixed for the hearing, the register, T. F. Cowing, received a telegram
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from the defendant, dated at Burnesville, Minnesota, which reads as
follows:
" Please hold open my contest until 10:15 to-day."
The case was called a few minutes after ten o'clock, both parties
being present with counsel, when Fenton objected to the service of
notice of contest, on the grounds that neither the notice nor the copy
thereof left with him had the word " register " written after the signa-
ture of the person issuing such notice. The local officers overruled this
objection; whereupon Fenton, with his counsel, withdrew from the
trial. The evidence was then heard, and the register and receiver
recommended the cancellation of the entry.
On appeal by your office letter of December 19, 1883, you vacate that
judgment and reverse the action of the local office, sustaining Fenton's
objection to service, and direct that a new notice be issued to the par-
ties in interest, fixing a day for a bearing anew the charges in contest-
ant's affidavit.
From this action Lundquist brings this appeal, alleging the following
grounds of error:
L. In holding that plaintiff had not made due and legal service upon defendant to
the trial had in the local land office.
2. In directing the local land office to order a new hearing.
There is no question as to the defendant's being served with a notice
of this hearing this was done both by a copy and by a notice sent
through the mail. The latter notice he acknowledged receiving, when
served with a copy of the original notice. Moreover, his telegram to
the register, above set out, showed he had notice of the hearing.
The sole question is, whether the defendant can take advantage of
the absence of the word " register " on the notice to respond and furnish
testimony concerning an alleged failure to comply with the law, after
he has acknowledged, both verbally and by telegram, that he has been
notified of such hearing.
The notice which defendant received on June 4,1886, thirty-five days
before the hearing, was dated at " U. S. Land Office, Fergus Falls, Minn.,
May 18, 1886."
The notice bore on its face the name of the office whence it came.
The register and receiver (or one of them) are the only persons a.
thorized by law to sign such notice; the name of the register was duly
signed to the same, and the mere omission of the official designation
in the term " register" did not invalidate the process.
Rule 8 of the Rules of Practice of this Department requires that the
notice of contest be signed by the "register and receiver, or by both Of
them."
As a matter of fact the register did sign both the notice and the copy
thereof, and it would have been better practice had he designated his
official character, by writing the same after his name, on both notice.
and copy. But the absence of such designation can not excuse de-
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fendant after he has appeared generally and asked that his "contest"
be held open until he could reach the place of trial. A technical ornis-
sion in the process, under such circumstances, and upon such an appear-
ance can not be taken advantage of by him. In this case the entry-
man had thirty-five days to prepare for this hearing. He voluntarily
refused to respond to the charges against his entry, or to furnish testi-
mony to establish his good faith. He does not clairl that he was mis-
lead or in any way prejudiced by the failure of the register to designate
his official character in the process.
Your order vacating the judgment of the local office is reversed; and
I herewith return the papers, with directions that you pass upon the
merits of the case as disclosed by record.
RAILROAD GRANT-SELECTIO N-SETTLEME:NT RIGHT.
IOWA RAILROAD LAND CO. V. NOURSE.
The right of the railroad company, under the act of June 2, 1864, to even sections
within the six mile limits of the grant of 1856, does not attach until selection, and
the right of selection cannot be exercised until after definite location of the mod -
ified line of road.
The right of selection under said act of 1864, can not be exercised if at the date of
selection a right of homestead settlement covers the tract involved.
The failure of a homestead settler to make entry within three months after settle-
ment does not operate to the advantage of the railroad company.
The consent of the company to a judicial decree recognizing the validity of an entry
under which settlement rights are alleged, is an abandonment of the company's
pending selection so far as the right of the settler is concerned.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, September 9, 1890.
This appeal is filed by the Iowa Railroad Land Company, successors
in interest to the Cedar Rapids and Missouri River Railroad Company,
from the decision of your office holding for cancellation the selection
made by said company of the NW. 1 of Sec. 2, T. 85 N., R. 43 W., Des
Moines, Iowa, and allowing Horace D. Nourse to make homestead entry
of the same. /
The tract in controversy is an even numbered section, lying within
the six miie limits of the line of the Iowa Air Line, now Cedar Rapids
and Missouri River Railroad Company, as originally located under the
act of May 15, 1856 (11 Stat., 9), and was selected by the company De-
cember 31. 1884, under the act of June 2, 1864, (13 Stat., 95).
The right of the company to the even sections within said limits
attaches only from the date of selection, and no right of selection could
be exercised until the modified line was definitely located. See Iowa
Railroad Land Company v. Ertel, 10 L. D., 176.
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The records of your office show that Simeon Lightfoot made home-
stead entry of this tract October 31, 1870, which was canceled July 25,
1884, for failure to make proof within seven years from date of entry.
Prior to the cancellation of the entry, the railroad company brought
suit against Lightfoot to determine the right of possession and the
validity of his entry, and in this sit Nourse was joined as a co-defend-
ant. The suit was pending at the date of the cancellation of the entry
of Lightfoot, and also at the (late when the company selected the tract.
After the decision of the supreme court of the United States, in the
case of Cedar Rapids, etc., Railroad Company v. Herring et a. (110
U. S., 27), which held that the right of the company to the even sec-
tions within said limits attached only from date of selection, and after
the company had made selection of the tract, it allowed the following
consent decree to be entered up in the suit against Lightfoot and
Nourse:
It is ordered, adjudged and decreed as upon a full hearing upon the merits that the
entry under which defendants claim is legal and valid, and that the petition of
plaintiffs be dismissed for want of equity.
Your office held that this act of the company disposed of its claim
to the land, while the company, in its appeal from said ruling, contends
that the only question settled by said decree was that Lightfoot's entry
was valid and legal, and that so long as that entry remained of record,
rights acquired under and by force of it could not be called in question
by the company. But at the date of said decree, the entry of Light-
foot had been canceled, and the company had made selection of the
tract. Nourse was then the only defendant claiming the land. While
the decree did not so dispose of the claim of the company, as to prevent
it from afterwards asserting its right to select the tract, if it should be
found free from any other claim, it was such a recognition of the settle-
ment right of Nourse then existing as to estop them from afterwards
asserting any claim under its selection of December 31, 1884, as against
the validity of his claim. The recognition of the claim of Nourse was
practically an abandonment of its selection, so far as it conflicted with
his settlement right. But, independently of this, the tract was not
subject to selection, if, at the date o selection, a right of homestead
settlement had attached thereto.
The act of July 2, 1864, supra, provides that-
The Secretary of the Interior shall reserve and cause to be certified and conveyed
to said company from time to time, as the work progresses on the main line, ot of
any public lands now belonging to theUnited States, not sold, reserved, or otherwise
disposed of; or to which a pre-ellption right or right of homestead settlement has not at-
tached, and on which a bona fide settlement and improvement has not been made
under color of title derived from the United States or from the State of owa.
Nourse's right to make homestead entry of this tract as against the
right of the company is therefore not dependent upon the decree, if he
is a qualified homesteader, and was at the date of selection a settler
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upon the tract, occupying and improving it, with the intention of enter-
ing it under the homestead law.
It appears from the record that on July 23, 1887, Nourse applied to
make final proof on the entry of Lightfoot, or to make entry of the land
under the homestead law, which was rejected by the local officers. On
August 27, 1887, he again applied to enter the land under the home-
stead law, which was also refused, because of conflict with the company,
and from both refusals he appealed. With his first application he filed
a corroborated affidavit, in which he states that in 1873 he purchased
the relinquishment of Lightfoot, and went into possession of the tract
and has been living on it continuously ever since; that he had culti-
vated the land, built a dwelling house, and made other permanent and
valuable improvements, valued at about $1,000, and has occupied it for
the purpose of making a home thereon under the homestead law. While
he could claim no right whatever under the entry of Lightfoot, or under
his purchase of the relinquishment, as against the government, yet he
was a settler upon the land at the date of selection, occupying and cul-
tivating it with the intention of acquiring title to it as a home under the
homestead laws; and these allegations are not denied by the company.
At that time he could initiate a claim to the land under the homestead
laws by mere settlement, and his failure to make entry within three
months of his settlement could not be taken advantage of by the rail-
road company, but only as in settlements under the pre-emption laws
by the next settler who perfected his claim in time.
The decision of your office is therefore affirmed, and the application
of Nourse to make homestead entry of the tract will be allowed.
FINAL PROOF PROCEEDINGS-PROTEST-HEARING.
WILDER V. PARKER.
The Department will not interfere with the Commissioner's discretion, in refusing to
order a hearing on a protest filed against final proof, unless there is such an abuse
thereof as to work an injustice, or the inequitable denial of a legal right.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, September 9, 1890.
I have considered the case of John Wilder v. Moses I. Parker on
appeal of the former from your decision of May 27, 1889, dismissing his
protest against the final proof of the latter on his pre-emption cash
entry for the NW. i of Sec. 18, T. 6 S., R. 65 W., Denver, Colorado land
district.
On August 27, 1888, Parker made pre-emption proof and on same day
Wilder filed protest against the same averring in his affidavit that he
had made some discoveries of gold in the land and that it was valuable
as a placer mine. This affidavit was written by the officer taking the
final proof, and with it was also taken the affidavit of Parker corrobo-
2497-No. 11-18
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rated by five witnesses who say they know the land and the parties;
they contradict the statements of Wilder as to the character of the land,
determining its character to be agricultural rather than mineral. These
affidavits were returned to the local office with the final proof.
On considering the testimony the local officers accepted the final proof
and rejected the protest, from which decision Wilder appealed. Pend.
ing said appeal, he filed an additional affidavit, repeating many of the
statements of the former, and adding the charge that Parker had made
final proof on homestead entry for a tract of land in the same section
and had resided upon it and that he believed he owned it when he made
settlement on the tract in controversy. This affidavit was corroborated
by two witnesses. A opy of it was served on Parker and he filedcoun-
ter affidavits, one by himself, denying specifically and positively the
charge that he had moved off of land owned by him, and denying that
he owned anyland when he made settlement. Another by Mr. Rowley
relating to the character of the land, and this affidavit corroborated by
three witnesses contradicted the statements of Wilder as to the min-
eral character of the land. He also filed in addition to these, the joint
affidavit of seven witnesses, who say that they are familiar with the land
in controversy and with the efforts of prospectors to find gold in pay-
ing quantities on it; that Wilder has lived on said land and in its im-
mediate vicinity since 1882, and has been engaged in working at car-
pentering and in the poultry business and working for others by the
day; that in 1883 he did some prospecting on the tract, and since that
has done no mining or prospecting on it except to dig well on the
land; that said land is of no value as mineral land, but is valuable for
agricultural and grazing purposes.
After considering the case as presented by the final proof and these
several affidavits, you declined to order an investigation and Wilder
appealed to this Department.
A careful examination of the entire record. the testimony and said
affidavits satisfies me that your conclusion should not be disturbed.
Wilder had known this land, and claimant Parker) many years, and
in his protest filed on August 28, 1888, which covers nine large pages
of closely written matter, he did not mention the matter of Parker
moving off of land that he owned when he settled on the tract in con-
troversy, and when he does mention it later, he alleges it as his belief
only.
It will be observed that so far as the character of the land is con-
cerned, Wilder nowhere states that it is more valuable for mineral than
for agricultural purposes. The allegations in this affidavit are too gen-
eral and vague to justify this Department in interfering with your dis-
cretion in declining to order a hearing. Unless there is such an abuse
thereof as to work fijustice or the inequitable denial of a legal right,
this Department will not interfere with you in the exercise of your dis-
cretionary authority. There is nothing in the record in this case which
will justity its being prolonged. Your decision is accordingly affirmed.
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OSAGE LAND-FILING-FINAL PROOF.
Ricisi V. CURTIS.
Where two claimants for Osage land are both in default, either as to filing, or mak-
ing final proof and payment within the prescribed period, the superior right must
be accorded to the one who first submits final proof thereafter.
The right to purchase Osage land cannot be exercised by one who is not an actual
settler thereon.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to te Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 11, 1890.
Wilbur F. Curtis filed Osage declaratory statement for the SW. I
Sec. 33, T. 28 S., R. 15 W., Larned, Kansas, April 24, 1884, alleging
settlement April 22, 1884, and made final proof May 23, 1885.
James Ricks filed declaratory statement for said tract May 3, 1885;
alleging settlement November 22, 1884, and made final proof July 1,
1885.
A hearing was ordered and upon the testimony submitted the local
officers found in favor of Curtis and recommended the cancellation of
1hick's filing, which was affirmed by your office. From this decision'
Ricks appealed.
Both parties were in default, Curtis by failing to make final proof
within six months after filing, and RTcks by failing to file within three
months after settlement, and his final proof was submitted less than
three months after filing. Conceding that both parties had complied
with the law as to settlement and residence, the claim of Curtis must
prevail, for the reason that where both parties are in default, either as
to filing or making final proof and payment within the prescribed period,
the superior right must be accorded to the one who first submits final
proof thereafter. Boyd v. Smith (11 L. D., 62); Hessong v.'B urgan (9
L. D., 353), and cases therein cited.
But another question presented in this case is, whether Curtis ever
made a bona fide settlement and residence on the land, and, if so,
whether such residence was maintained as required by law.
It appears from the testimony that Curtis, a few days after his alleged-
settlement left the tract in controversy and went to Ottawa county, 160
miles from the claim, and lived with his mother, attending to some hogs
and also to the care and harvesting of crops in which he had a joint in-
terest with his brother, and remained there until December 1884. The
testimony shows that he came to the tract in controversy about Novem-
ber 34th, with a wagon and horse belonging to himself, but this was a
mere visit, as he only remained about a day and two nights and then
returned to Ottawa county with his team.
It is shown by the testimony of defendant and his witnesses that he
was a joint owner with his brother and father of a house twelve by
twenty-two feet which was placed in the center of the section so as to
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cover the three quarter sections claimed by them respectively, and which
was used by all of them in proving up their respective claims, but it is
admitted that there was no door to that part of the house covering the
claim of the defendant; that he did not assist in building the house,
and it is very uncertain from the testimony whether any part of said
house was on his claim.
It is also shown by the testimony that S. Y. Curtis, the father of de-
fendant, claimed all of said house as being on his tract in making his
final proof, which was made after the time that defendant says the
house was moved on the tract claimed by him. The cultivation of the
land was done by his father and brother. The defendant himself testi-
fies that he did not do the cultivating. He explains his absence by
reason of an injury received within two weeks after he went to Ottawa,
which caused him to remain there several months under the care of a
physician, but there is abundant evidence to show that during this time
he was at work in the harvest field, and through the greater period of
his absence, at least, he was able to work and did Work on the place he
was then living upon.
Furthermore, while he was on the stand, counsel for Ricks offered in
evidence a certificate from the county clerk of Ottawa county, certify-
ing that W. F. Curtis is registered as one of the voters at a general
election, held in Culver township in Ottawa county, November 4, 1884,
and when asked if he voted at such time and place, as set forth in said
certificate, he answered, " I don't recollect whether I voted or not."
Another significant fact-as testified to by Ludderu, one of defend-
ant's witness-is that witness George Curtis and Fremont Curtis were
going across the claim, about November 22,1884, and passed Ricks, who
was on the land, and shortly afterward George Curtis came up to where
they were at work, and said: " Wilbur Curtis' claim was jumped" and
the defendant in his testimony admits that after he returned to Ottawa
county, in November, 1884, he received a letter from his brother that
Ricks had gone on the land, and he came right back.
Taking into consideration all the testimony, I am satisfied that Curtis
was not an "aictual settler " on the laud, as contemplated by law, and
the evidence tends strongly to show that he was induced to return to
the tract from the fact that Ricks had made settlement upon it, after
the time had expired in which by law he was required to submit final
proof, and his entry should therefore be canceled.
It is shown by all the witnesses that Ricks has resided continuously
on the tract with his family from November 22, 1884, to November 5,
1885, the date of hearing, and has improved the tract and fulfilled all
the requirements of the law. At the date of his settlement the land
was subject to settlement by any qualified settler, his entry should
therefore be allowed.
Your decision is reversed.
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BICKEL ET AL. V. IRVINE.
Motion for review of departmental decision rendered February 20,
1890, 10 L. D., 205, denied by Acting Secretary Chandler, September
11, 1890.
DESERT LAND ENTRY-NON-I11RIGABLE LAND.
WILLIAME CRUSEN.
A desert land entry will not be defeated or disturbed for the sole reason that the
larger portion of each smallest sub-division is not susceptible of irrigation, if the
proof of reclamation is otherwise satisfactory, the good faith of the entrymaw
apparent, and no question as to the desert character of the land embraced in the
entry.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 11, 1890.
The appeal of William Ciusen from your decision of May 13, 1889, is
before me, and from the record it appears that September 11, 1884, the
claimant made desert land entry No. 63 for the SE. i of the NE. - and
the NE. 1 of the SE. of Sec. 19, T. 1 S., R. 19 E., Boise meridian,
Hailey, Idaho. Final proof and payment were made and final certifi-
cate issued April 19, 1887.
On presentation of the record at your office, you held said entry for
cancellation, for the reason that the final proof showed that " only some
ten (10) acres of the 80 have been or can be irrigated; the balance of
the tract being waste, hilly and impossible to get water upon it."
From an examination of the final proof it appears that only ten acres,
five acres in each legal subdivision, are susceptible of irrigation; the
remaining portion of the land is described by both claimant's wit-
nesses as " waste, hilly and impossible to get water upon." Both wit-
nesses also state that " all the land is fenced." The evidence as to sup-
ply of water, character of ditches, and all other requirements pertain-
ing to the reclamation of the ten acres appears to be satisfactory.
The ruling of this Department, as appears from the later decisions,
notably David Gilchrist, 8 L. D., 48, Andrew Leslie, 9 L. D., 204, and
Martha W. Fisher, 9 L. D., 430, is to the effect that a desert land entry
will not be defeated or disturbed for the sole reason that the larger
portion of each smallest subdivision of the entry is not susceptible of
irrigation, if the proof. of reclamation is otherwise satisfactory and the
good faith of the entryman is made apparent, and there is no question
as to the desert character of the land embraced in the entry.
While none of the cases that have heretofore come before the De-
partment have embraced so large a proportion of non-irrigable land as
the one under consideration, no reason is perceived why an entryman
should not be allowed to pay for a legal subdivision of desert land, if
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he chooses to do so in good faith, in order that he may utilize a part
of it.
The fact, however, in itself that the claimant i this case knowingly
made entry and paid for eighty acres, only ten of which can be made pro-
ductive, is to some extent suggestive of bad faith, and the suggestion
is strengthened by the further fact that while it appears from the evi-
dence submitted in the final proof that but ten acres are in use or can
be used for any purpose, yet the whole tract isfenced.
The question very naturally arises, why should the claimant go to
the expense of fencing seventy, acres of waste and worthless land?
In view of all the circumstances attending this entry, I am of the
opinion that an investigation should be had of the character of the land
embraced in this entry, and therefore direct that an examination be
made by a special agent of your office and that he be instructed to
make a full and careful investigation as to the character of the land
entered, whether the same is desert, and how much is susceptible of ir-
rigation, and whether the same has been fully reclaimed, and whether
the reclaimed land is on one forty acre tract, with notice to the claim-
ant, and that he make a report in writing to your office clearly setting
forth the facts so found by him. That on examination of such report, you
will take such action in the premises as to you shall seem proper, order-
ing a hearing with notice, if the report should be adverse to the entry.
Your decision is accordingly modified.
CONTEST-PREFERENCE RIGHT-PROCEEDINGS ON REPORT OF SPECIAL
AGENT.
JOHNSON V. WALTON.
One who files an affidavit of contest against an entry, and pays or deposits the requi-
site fees, acquires under the act of May 14, 1880, a right that can not be defeated
by subsequent proceedings instituted against such entry on behalf of the gov-
ernment.
An order of cancellation based on the report of a special agent cannot be treated as
final, if the record fails to show ntice of such action duly served on the entryman
in accordance with the circular provisions of July 31, 1885.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 12, 1890.
I have considered the case of John S. Johnson v. Richard Walton
and Charles H. Cowan on appeal by Johnson from your office decision
of May 6, 1889, rejecting his application to make homestead entry for
the E.4 of the NW. and theW. of the NE.1 of Sec. 21, T. 8 S., R. 3
W., New Orleans, Louisiana land district.
On December 18, 1884, Walton made homestead etry for said land,
and on June 23, 1886, Johnson filed affidavit of contest against the
same, alleging that Walton never resided on said land or cultivated or
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improved the same. It was farther alleged *' affiant has made personal.
inquiry and caused inquiry to be made at Jennings, entryman's last
known place of residence in this State, and after due diligence personal
service can not be had within this State where the tract of land is sit-
uated." Johnson at the same time deposited the fees required of con!
testants.
A hearing was ordered and set for September 2, 1886, and a notice
issued bearing date July 19, 1886. This notice was subsequently (date
not shown) returned to the land office with the following endorsement
thereon:
Riehard Walton is not to be found in tue county. Don't reside on said land.
A. D. McFARLAIN,
Deputy Sheriff.
Afterwards by virtue of a commission issued by the local officers on
July 2 , 1886, the statements of two witnesses were taken and forwarded
to the local office, and filed there August 9. No further steps seem ever
to'have been taken in the matter of this contest. Pending these pro-
ceedings the attorney for the contestant called the attention of a special
agent of the government to the condition of this entry and afterwards
accompanied him to the land. This attorney statos in an affidavit sub-
sequently filed that believing that his client would, in the event of the
cancellation of said entry as a result of the investigation by the special
agent, be entitled, under the rulings of your office in a letter of Decem-
ber 5, 1885, to James W. Cone, Kirkwood, Dakota (12 C. L. 0. 238), to
a preference right of entry, left the contest in abeyance pending such
investigation. The local officers it seems took no further steps in the
contest upon the theory as expressed in the receiver's letter of April 5,
1889, '- that the action of the government, through special agent Wag-
gaman was paramount to the contest of an individual " and advised the
contestant not to prosecute his claim further.
]Under date of November 5, 1886, special agent Waggaman made his
report upon said entry showing the land to be entirely abandoned and
that Walton had never resided upon it. Your office on February 2,
1887, held the entry for cancellation and directed that the entryinan be
notified thereof in accordance with the provisions of circular of July
31, 1885 (4 L. D., 503).
There is nothing in the papers now before me to show that such no-
tice was ever given. On February 25, 1889, Walton's entry was finally
canceled by your office.
On March 2, 1889, Cowan applied to make homestead entry for said
land which application was rejected by the local officers on the ground
that Johnson was entitled to a preference right of entry.
On March 7, 1889, the local officers gave notice of the cancellation of
Walton's entry to Johnson who on March 26th applied to make home-
stead entry for said land. Cowan having in the meantime appealed
from the rejection of his application, all the papers were transmitted to
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your office where it was held that Johnson was not entitled to a prefer-
ence right of entry and the local officers were directed to accept Cowan's
application.
While it is true that one by simply furnishing to the government
information upon which an entry is subsequently canceled, does not
thereby become entitled to a preference right of entry, yet it is equally
true that one who has filed an affidavit of contest and paid or deposited the
fees as required by the act of May 14, 1880, can not be deprived of the
benefits conferred by that act by the institution on behalf of the gov-
ernment of an investigation of such entry.
Johnson has evidently acted in entire good faith throughout this
transaction, and he should not be made to suffer by reason of the
erroneous advice of the local officers, especially in view of the fact that
such advice was fully justified by the instructions of your office con-
tained in the letter referred to.
If it appears from the records of your office or those of the local office
that notice of the action of your office holding Walton's entry for can-
cellation was duly given in accordance with the regulations governing
such matters, then it would seem unnecessary to interfere with the
order of cancellation heretofore made, but Johnson's application should
be allowed. If no notice ever issued in accordance with the provisions
of the circular of July 31, 1885, then the cancellation heretofore made
should be set aside and the case should be returned to the local office
with instructions to allow Johnson to proceed with his contest after
securing service upon the entryinan by publication or otherwise, as may
be necessary.
The decision of your office is modified in accordance with the views
herein expressed.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-EMPLOYIE OF THE LOCAL OFFICE.
UNITED STATES V. ROSE.
& homestead entry made by one who has accepted an appointment in the local office,
but has not yet entered upon the duties of the position, is in violation of the
spirit of the law which prohibits employds of the land office from becoming
interested in the purchase of any of the public lands.
One who enters land knowing that his official employment will prevent his residence
thereon, cannot plead such employment as an excuse for failure to comply with
the law in the matter of residence.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Uommissioner of the General
Land Office, September 12, 1890.
I have considered the case of United States v. David E. Rose on
appeal by the latter from your decision of May 13, 1889, rejecting his
final proof on homestead entry, commuted to cash entry, for the NW.
i Sec. 21, T. 125 N., R. 65 W., Aberdeen, South Dakota, land district.
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The record shows that: he made homestead entry for this tract on
Novqmber 29, 1882, and on March lst,-1884, made commutation final
proof which was accepted by the register and receiver he paying $20()
and taking receipt therefor. January 22, 1885, your office rejected said
proof for non-compliance with law in regard to residence. March 2nd,
following he filed his affidavit and application for a review and a
reversal of said decision and on the 9th of said month your office found
that-" the reason for rejectinghis final proof no longerexists," and said,
" my letter of January 22, 1885, is modified accordingly. You willnotify
the claimant of the fact, and that his entry will be approved for patent."
On November 3rd, 1885, Special Agent Augustus High was directed
by your office to investigate this entry and to report to your office,
which he did on the 23rd of same month, giving in detail the facts in
the case bit making no recommendation. This report was accompanied
by a statement from Rose which was made a part thereof. Upon re-
ceiving this, your office on March 17, 1886, held the entry for cancella-
tion subject to appeal or a hearing if Rose should apply for a hearing
within sixty days.
On June 8th, Rose, by his attorney W. J. Johnson appealed from
said decision, and on September 3rd, 1886, he made application to the
Secretary for a certification of the papers to this Department and on
the 15th of said month your office was directed to transmit the papers
to this Department, which was accordingly done and on February 15,
1887, the same came on for consideration and the Secretary thereupon
ordered that a hearing be had " to the end that a thorough investiga-
tion may be had as to all the facts connected with the case from the
beginning to-the end and especially whether said Rose was not under
engagement to enter the public service before he made entry for the
land in question." In pursuance of this direction a hearing was ordered
before the local office at Aberdeen to be held on December 1st, l887,
and on said day the same was continued to April 23, 1888. Special
Agent John W. Daniel was directed to appear on behalf of the gov-
ernment, and on the adjourned day of hearing he appeared and sub-
mitted the original proof and the statement of claimant and there being
no further testimony offered, the local officers found that the govern.
ment has failed -to make out a case, and recommended that the entry
remain intact.
On May 13, 1889, the entire matter came before you for consideration
and vou find that the entryman has failed to comply with the law in the
matter of residence and you find that his good faith, by reason of wrong
advice from the local officers saves his entry from forfeiture, and you
therefore follow the Thomas Nash case (5 L. D., 608), and reject the final
proof now under consideration and allow him upon proper compliance
with law, especially in the matter of residence to submit new proof dur-
ing the life of his homestead entry.
From this decision he appealed.
The testimony in tbe case consists principally of the statements of
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the claimant and his witnesses. On June 16, 1886, he in an affidavit
made in Michigan says: "I am a resident of Grand Haven, Michigan,
and have resided here since 1861; less two years and six months during
which time I lived at or near Aberdeen, Dakota."
He says he went to Dakota in August, 1882, to select some land, the.
land office being temporaiily closed he went home. In November Reg-
ister Duncombe wrote him soliciting him to accept a position as clerk
in his office, which position he accepted and went to Aberdeen Novem-
ber 26, 1882. On the 29th of November, on advice of Duncombe he
entered the NW. -21-125-65- as his homestead. He says:
"He (Duncombe) advised me that inasmuch as I was to be employed
in the U. S. land office the requirement as to residence upon my land
would not be required of me." On December 1st, following he entered
upon his duties as clerk in the land office, and remained until May 1st,
1883, when he resigned. During the summer he built a small house on
the land. had some breaking done and cultivated some of the land.
He put some household furniture in the house and slept there a few
nights but never established his residence on the land, but went back
to Michigan and stayed some time, when he returned and stayed at
Aberdeen, until September 12,1883, when he was re-appointed as clerk
in the land office and remained until March 23, 1885. He had a wife
and four children residing in Michigan-they never lived in Dakota.
Hie occasionally visited the land while in Aberdeen and had some
thirty acres cropped each year-he voted once or twice in the precinct
in which the land is situate.
This case is, as to the question of residence somewhat similar to that
of Henry W. Lord (11 L. D., 18), who, it was found made his settle-
ment in anticipation of his appointment as register. In the decision
it was said:
* If the settlement is made, as in this case, merely for the purpose of securing the
land as gratuity, without fulfilling the consideration of residence required by
statute, and knowing at the time that the duties of the office would prevent the
maintenance of residence on the land, such settlement is not bona fide within the
meaning of the statute, or of the character contemplated by it.
In the case at bar the claimant went to Dakota from Michigan, leav-
ing his family at his home in the latter State, to accept the office of
-clerk i a land office. He knew he could not make a homestead entry,
being an eploye in the land office, so he evaded the strict letter of
the law by making entry, first, and then, entering upon the duties of
the office to which he had been appointed. He knew he could not, and
did not intend to comply with the law in the matter of residence, his
family were in Michigan and intended to remain, and in fact have re-
mained there during all the time, never living in Dakota.
The entry is clearly in violation of the spirit of the law which pro-
hibits employees of the land office from becoming interested in the
purchase of any of the public lands.
Herbert McMicken et al., 10 L. D., 97.
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For this reason it is my judgment that the case of Thomas Nash,, 5
L. D., 608, has no bearing on the case at bar.
The final proof is rejected and the entry must be canceled. Your
decision is modified accordingly.
REPAYMENT-MORTGAGEE-ASSIGNEE.
ALONZO W. GRAVES.
A mortgagee, whose claim is merely a lien on the land, is not an assignee of the en-
tryman, and as such entited to repayment.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 13, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Alonzo W. Graves from your office
decision of May 31, 1-89, refusing the return of the purchase money to
him as the mortgagee of Joseph A. Patten, who made cash entry No.
13,661, commuted from homestead entry No. 1285, Mitchell land office,
Dakota.
It appears that final receipt for $200 was issued to Patten on Febru-
ary 28, 1885, in payment for the NE. I of Sec. 20, T. 103 N., IR. 55 W.,
Mitchell, Dakota, land office, and that on February 20, 1885, Patten
executed a mortgage on said land in favor of Graves for the sum of
$325.50. -
It is alleged that this money was used by Patten in payment of the
purchase price of the land. It nowhere appears, however, when the
debt became due, for which the mortgage was given. Patten's entry
was canceled upon his relinquishment, and subsequently Graves applied,
as mortgagee of Patten, for the purchase money of the tract.
Section 2362 of the Revised Statutes provides as follows:-
The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, upon proof being made to his satisfac-
tion that any tract of land has been erroneonsly sold by the United States, so that
from any cause the sale can not be confirmed, to repay to the prchaser or his legal
representatives or assigns the sum of money which was paid therefor, out of any
money in the treasury, not otherwise appropriated.
"Assignees within the meaningof the statute now under consideration
are purchasers who purchase the land after entry and take assignments
of the title under such entry. " General Circular, approved March 1,
1884, p. 39.
It is well settled in this Department thaet the giving of a mortgage td
secure the purchase money for government land is not a sale of the
land; nor is it an agreement or contract by which the title inures to the
benefit of another. Larson v.Weisbecker, I L. D., 409; Young v.Arnold,
5 I. D., 701; William H. Ray, 6 L. D., 340; Mudgett v. Dubuque &
Sioux City Railroad Company, 8 I. D., 243.
The Dakota Code of 1883 (Vol. 2, Sec. 1722,) defines a mortgage as
follows:
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"Mortgage is a contract by which specific property is hypothecated
for the performance of an act without the necessity of a change of posses-
sion."
The code further provides, that to entitle any party to make foreclos-
ure, " it shall be requisite that some default in a condition of such mort-
gage shall have accrued, by which the power to sell has become opera-
tive." Sec. 598, Vol. 1.
Section 607 provides, that the property sold may be redeemed within
one year from the day of sale, and section 609 provides that it shall be.
the duty of the officer making such sale to complete the same by exe-
cuting a deed of the premises so sold to the original purchaser, "if
such mortgaged premises be not redeemed."
So, that a mortgage in Dakota, prior to a decree and sale of the land
thereunder, is not an assignee within the meaning of the statute.
In this case, it appearing that Graves was only a mortgagee, his
mortgage being merely a lien on the land to secure a debt. he is not
in any sense an assignee of the purchaser, ad, therefore his applica-
tion for repayment was properly refused.
Your said decision is accordingly affirmed.
RESIDENCE-TENANT-SETTLEMENT RIGHTS.
HALL v. LEVY.
One who is residing on land as the tenant of another may, on the termination of
snch relation, acquire a valid settlement right to said land by remaining thereon,
cultivating and improving the same, with the intent to make it a permanent
home.
Settlement on land covered by an entry confers no right as against the record entry-
man, but as between subsequent claimants the settlement first in time is entitled
to the highest consideration on cancellation of the existing entry.
Residence is not acquired or maintained by occasional visits to the land.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, Sefftember 16, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of John W. Hall from the decision of
your offiec dated January 30, 1889, in the case of said Hall v. Louis
Levy, approving the latter's final commutation proof for lots 1 and 2 and
the S. I NE. Sec. 6, T. 37 N., R. 3 W., Lewiston land district, Idaho, and
holding for cancellation Hlall's pre-emption declaratory statement for
the said tract.
August 23, 1882, one Stephen A. Moon, made timber culture entry
for said tract, and on October 6, 1885, his entry was canceled for re-
linquishment and Lizzie>Levy made her entry for the tract under the
timber culture law, November 27, 1885, her entry was canceled for re-
linquishment and on the same day Louis Levy made his entry for the
tract under the homestead law.
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December 17,1885, John W. Hall, made application to file his pre-
emption declaratory statement for the tract alleging settlement and
residence thereon October 6, 1885; his application was rejected and
Hall appealed.
May 21, 1886, your office directed that Hall's declaratory statement
"should be received because of his alleged residence on the land," and
on June 17, 1886, his declaratory statement was filed in the local office.
January 20, 1887, Levy offered final commutation proof, and on the
same day Hall filed a protest against the acceptance of said proof.
Hearing was ordered and had, and on March 25, 1887, the local offi-
cers filed dissenting opinions and transmitted the case to your office
for decision thereon.
Both parties appealed.
January 30,1889, your office decided in favor of Levy's entry, and held
Hall's declaratory statement for cancellation, whereupon Hall appealed.
The evidence adduced shows that during the last week in September
1883, Stephen A. Moon, rented the tract in dispute to John W. Hall for
the term of one year, with the agreed understanding that Hall was to
prepare and crop all of the previously broken land, and as compensa-
tion for so doing he was to have two thirds of all such crop, and the
use 6f a dwelling house on the premises; and Moon was to receive as
rental one-third of the grain.
Shortly afterwards Moon farther agreed that if Hall broke any new
land he was to have the right to raise two crops on such new breaking
as compensation f6r his labor.
September 1884, Moon again rented the premises to Hall on the same
conditions for another year, and the second lease expired in September
1885, except as to the use of about twelve acres of the new breaking
from which Hall had not raised a second crop. During said period
Moon permitted Hall to erect certain out buildings and fences on the
land at Hals expense, with the right in Hall to remove the saie when-
ever he quit the premises. Moon frequently tried to sell the tract to
Hall, but wanted as payment for his relinquishment the sum of $2,000,
which amount Hall thought was too much, besides he had not the money
and declined to buy.
Hall testified that during the last week in September 1885 Mr. A.
Levy, a merchant of Genesee, and father of Louis Levy, came to his
house and told him that he
Had now had got Moon to agree to let him (Levy) have the improvements on this
timber culture entry, as settling the debt between him and Moon and now says he
you have been wanting this place for a home, and now is your time. Will
you take these improvements off my hands? I have jewed him down $600. On what
conditions, Mr. Levy, I says, will you let me have them? For fourteen hundred
dollars, he says, at ten per cent. and all the time you want. Says I, I will take them.
What security will you give me, he says. I told him I would give him a mortgage
on my two wagons and two teams. He says, all right, the place is yours. Though
one more thing, what right will you use on this land at Moon's relinquishment? I
replied, my pre-emption right. One thing, he says, do you know when you give me
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a mortgage on this property you cannot sell, or trade or dispose of it, and when you
prove up on this land and get the deed, will you renew the mortgage by giving me a
mortgage on it? I says, yes sir, I will. All right, all right, says be, the place is
yours. In ten days from today you, Mr. Moon and I will meet in Lewiston and fix
this matter all up.
Hall also testified that Mr. Levy told him that he and his son Louis
had rights but it would not suit either one of them to use it on this
land, and that he wanted some one to take it off his hands.
This was when I told him I would put my pre-emption on. On the ninthday I went
to Genesee to the store and asked him if everything was in readiness for tomorrow
concerning the trade He says, no, Ihave taken that place in myself. He did not
tell me his daughter Lizzie had a timber culture, I found it out by hearing several
saying she had.
Hall further testified that he was a widower with nine children, five
of whom lived with him on the land continuously since September 1883;
that on and prior to October 6, 1885, he owned and had on the land the
following improvements, viz: A wagon shed, a hog corral, a granary,
also another granary partly built, with material on the land to finish it,
about a quarter of a mile of fencing-postsand rails-twenty-five acres
of newly broken ground and about twenty-two acres plowed; that he
occupied Moon's house until the latter part of December 1885, when he -
removed into a new house which he had built on the land. In 1886, he
raised a crop of barley on twenty-five acres and a crop of wheat on
twenty-two acres, besides a supply of garden vegetables.
Louis Levy testified that on November 25, 1885, he purchased from
his sister the improvements on the tract,andprocaredarelinquishment
of her entry for which he agreed to pay her $1500; that he presented
her relinquishment-at the local office December 27th, and the same was
filed and her entry canceled. and he thereupon made his homestead
entry for the land.
December 3, 1885, I spoke to Mr. Hall and told him that I would like to have pos-
session of my house. I said I would'nt push him toward going out, that I would
give him two weeks and if required a few days over. I wonld'nt press him. He
said Louis, I am to have the use of twelve acres for another season, that is all the
claim I have against that land. He wanted to know whether I would'nt allow him
to live in the house with me. In reply I said I wanted to occupythe house alone and
furthermore I told him that I didn't want to see him lose a cent and that I would
pay forthe use of what he claimed that he had of this twelve acres. On or about the
22d or 23d of December 885, he gave up possession to my house, peaceably, after
which time Imoved in . . . . . . . . . . I think that is all the conversation
I had with him. I got a bill of sale of the improvements. (Bill of sale offered in
evidence marked exhibit "A".)
On his cross examination Levy testified that he had been a farmer a
little over six months and a half; he built a barn hauled hay, straw
and grain, and helped to thresh; he did not know how many days he
was occupied. He proved up on a pre-emption claim, and owned three
hundred and twenty-five acres besides the pre-empted tract; that when
he made his homestead entry he incurred a debt of five hundred dollars,
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and not having any means to pay the same, or make improvements on
his homestead, he continued in the employ of his father as a clerk in,
his store, as well as assisting him in his duties as postmaster; he did
so in order to earn money to pay the indebtedness and make improve-
ments on the homestead. He made actual settlement on the homestead
in the latter part of January or beginning qf February 1886, by putting
up a stove and bedstead and fixing up two seats and making a table.
From the date of his settlement up to July 14th he went to his claim
almost every Saturday evening, he usually remained during Sunday,
returning to Genesee Sunday evening.
About July 14, 1886, he quit his father's employ and went to work,
on his homestead and resided there continuously thereafter, his ab-'
sences not exceeding a few times, and then only on business.
Question. " What improvements have you placed on this land since November 27,
1885, other than the household effects you placed in the house? Answer.-A small
barn, a chicken house. I intended to improve the place more, but I had so much
money invested in-the purchase of the improvements that I concluded before making
other improvements to wait until the final decision.
He admitted that the material for the barn was already on the
ground at the time he purchased the improvements, and that the mate-
rial used in the construction of the chicken house was all that he had
taken to the claim. He had a considerable portion of the homestead.
tract prepared and cropped by one Lewis Clark in the season of 1886,
and a short time before this hearing he purchased a wagon, harrow and
plow to use on his claim.
On his redirect examination he testified that owing to his indebted-
ness it was necessary for him to work away from the homestead; that
he had no team, wagon harness or farming implements, and did not
wish to go in debt for them; that Hall built his house on the tract in dis.-
pute about December 22, 1883.
On his re-cross examination he admitted that he paid $2100 for three
quarter sections of land besides the amounts he paid for his pre-empted
tract and for the improvements on the homestead; that he had a dwelling
house and barn on his pre-empted land, the whole tract was fenced,
eighty-five acres were under cultivation; and the premises were leased
by him to a tenant.
Hall testified in -rebuttal that he denied Louis Levy's right to pos-
session December , 1885, and told him at the time that the land was
in his Hall's possession, and he thought that Levy knew it. He denied
that he was occupying the land October 6, 1885, as Moon's- tenant.
The record herein shows that at the time Levy's father called upon
Hall and agreed to sell him the improvements Moon had already sold
and disposed of his interests in said improvements, and had virtually
disposed of his interests in the land; and that when A. Levy agreed
with Hall to sell him the improvements, Hall's tenancy with Moon had
in fact ceased, and Hall with the best of good faith on his part and
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with the understanding and approval of A. Levy, and believing that
the improvements as well as the lan( belonged to him under said agree-
ment, made a valid legal settlement on the land as a pre-emptor by con-
tinuing to reside thereon, cultivating and improving the land; intend-
ing to make it a permanent home. Clark v. Martin (11 . D., 72).
It is a well established rule that as between a settler and a record
entryman no superior right can be acquired; but as between subsequent
claimants "i the settlement first madein point of time is entitled to the
highest consideration," as soon as the record entryman's claim is relin-
quished. Geer v. Farrington (4 L. D., 410).
As LHall offered to file for the ?and within the proper time after Moon's
relinquishment, and has honestly endeavored to comply with the require-
ments of the law since the date of his settlement, and as the evidence
shows that Levy failed to establish his actual residence on the tract in
dispute within six months from the date of his entry, to the exclusion
of one elsewhere, Swain v. Call (9 L. D., 22); Redding v. Riley (Ib.,
523), and as his Sunday visits to the land were made merely to keep up
the fiction of residence and can not constitute compliance with the law,
Henry St. George L. Hopkins (10 L. D., 472), his entry should be can-
celed and Hall's declaratory statement allowed to stand intact, subject
to future compliance with the requirements of the pre-emption law. -The
decision appealed from is accordingly reversed.
SOLDIERS' HOMESTEAD DECLARATORY STATEMENT.
W. H. H. KELLOGG.
If a soldier's declaratory statement is illegal because filed while the claimant is re-
siding on land claimed under the pre-emption law, such illegality may be con-
sidered as cured by subsequent entry under such filing, after the sabmission of
pre-emption final proof, and in the absence of any intervening right.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 16, 1890.
On June 1, 1887, W. E. H. Kellogg filed declaratory statement for
SW. I, Sec. 32, T. S., R. 53 W. Denver, Colorado, and made proof
and Cash entry for the same on January 12, 1888.
Meanwhile on August 1, 1887, he filed soldiers' declaratory statement
for SE. , Sec. 31, same township and range.
On January iG, 1888, he applied to make homestead entry for said
last described tract which was rejected by the local officers. On appeal
your office by letter of June 23, 1888, affirmed that action on the ground
that when claimant filed soldiers' declaratory statement " he was not
qualified to do so as he was living on the land embraced in his pre-
emption filing, it being a well recognized ruling that a pre-emption and
homestead claim cannot be held by the same party at the same time."
Claimant appealed.
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In the case of Robinson v. Packard (7 L. D., 225), it was held (sylla-
bus), that " If a soldier's declaratory statement is illegal because filed
when the claimant is residing on a tract claimed under the pre-emption
law, such illegality may be considered as cured by subsequent entry
under such filing, after the submission of pre-emption final proof, and in
absence of any intervening right."
That decision seems to rule the case at bar, as there is no adverse I
claim presented by the record.
The decision appealed from is accordingly reversed.
TIMBER CUITURE CONTEST-AGENT-PLANTING.
OLSEN V. WARFORD.
The default of the entryman's agent in performing the requisite acts in compliance
with law is the default of the entryman.
Sowing tree seeds when the ground is frozen, and partly covered with snow, can not
be accepted as compliance with law, especially where it appears that the entry-
man might have done the planting seasonably and in good order.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 16, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Franklin M. Warford from your
office decision of February 5, 1889, holding for cancellation his timber
culture entry, No. 6563, made March 9, 1882, for the NW. + of See. 28,
T. 148, R. 59 W., Fargo, Dakota.
On March 15, 1886, Hans H. Olsen filed his contest affidavit against
said entry, charging failure to plant five acres the third year, and also
to plant five acres the fourth year of entry.
Hearing was duly had, and the register and receiver recommended
the cancellation of the entry, and on appeal you affirm that judgment.
The facts are substantially set forth in your said office decision.
The fourth year of the entry expired March 9 1886. On the 6th and
7th days of March, of that year, four bushels of seed (box elder) were
dropped on top of the ground, in lines eight feet apart, crosswise of the
plowing. The ground was then frozen, and partly covered with snow.
Ten acres of the ground were thus planted, the five acres planted to
* seeds the third year having produced but few trees. It appears that
the work of planting the seeds was entrusted to an agent, who permitted
the planting season to pass without doing the necessary work; and when
he did plant or sow the seeds, it was confessedly done at the particular
time to avoid running beyond the limit of thefourth year, during which
the law required the planting to be done. His default is that of his
principal.
The government looks to the entryman only, and if the requirements of the law
are not complied with, the entry must be canceled, though such non-compliance
may be through the etryman's agent. Danford v. Ellsworth, 10 L. D., 341.
2497-No. 11--19
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Sowing seeds on the frozen ground, partly covered with snow, can not
be regarded as a compliance with law, especially when the evidence
shows that the entryman could have put the seeds or cuttings in the
ground in good order, and at a seasonable time.
It may be possible that the entryman acted in good faith, but it does
not seem probable or reasonable, especially so in the face of the con-
eurringopinions of the local and your office. Under such circumstances,
I do not feel justified in disturbing your judgment, hence, it must be
found that the charge that the entryman failed to plant to seeds or cut-
tings five acres the fourth year of entry is sustained by the evidence,
and your said office decision cancelling the entry is, therefore, affirmed.
PRE-EMPTION ENTRY-COMPLIANCE WITH LAW AFTER EINTRY.
ARTHuR H. LUPFER.
If the pre-emptor has failed to comply with the law in the matter of settlement and
residence prior to entry such default can not be cured by acts performed subse-
quently. Acts performed after entry are only considered for the purpose of de-
termining the good faith of the claimant during the period covered by his final
proof.
An entry made without the prerequisite acts in compliance with law is illegal; the
pre-emptor exhausts his right thereby, and cannot make a second entry on new
proof, though it may show compliance with law-after the period covered by the
first entry.
The requirements of the pre-emption law as to settlement, cultivation, residence, and
improvement are applicable to lands formerly embraced in the Fort Larned mili-
tary reservation and restored to entry by the act of August 4, 1882.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 16, 1890.
Arthur H. Lupfer filed his declaratory statement November 17, 1883,
for lots 9, 10, and 11, N. J of NE. 1, NE. I of NW. , Sec. 7, T. 22 S., R.
17 W., 6th P. M., Larned Kansas, alleging settlement November 14,
and submitted final proof therefor October 25, 1884. Payment and
cash entry were not made for said tract until March 2, 1885, when he
filed an affidavit, stating that at the date of maki ng final proof he was
unable to raise the money to pay for the lands; that he has not been
able to procure it until the present time, and that his residence upon
the tract had been continuous up to that date. In his final proof he
stated that his residence upon the tract had been continuous from the
date he first made settlement in December, 1883.
The final proof also showed that the improvements consisted of a sod
house, eight by ten feet, a well, about three or four acres of breaking,
some sorghum planted, and that the land was used principally for
grazing.
The entry was held for cancellation April 13, 1885, upon the report
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of a special agent, and from the testimony taken at the hearing, had
December 24, 1886, it was shown that the improvements on the land at
date of final proof consisted of a small dug-out, about seven by nine,
in which claimant put a narrow bed, bedding, stove, coffee pot, and
some dishes; he also had a well, and plowed some ground which was
planted in sorghum. In the winter of 1883 and 1884, the claimant
taught school, in a school house situated about two and a half miles
from the dug-out on his claim, but from December, 1883, until about
September 23, 1886, he lived with his father, and for the period covered
by his final proof it is shown from his own testimony that he only vis
ited the claim about once in thirty days. He stated that he first estab-
lished residence December 3,1883, and was again on the land the nights.
of December 14, and 15. In response to the question: "About how long
after that was it that you stayed there again " he answered, " I do not
know. I made it a point to bethere at least once in every thirty days.
Some months I was there more and others I was not. I candidly
thought a single man's continuous residence permitted him more free-
dom than a married' man." He states that he can not recall the fact
that he ever stayed on the land more than two nights in succession
prior to March, 1885.
The testimony offered by the government shows that for the time
covered by claimant's final proof there were no indications of any one
residing on the tract, and one of his witnesses testified that claimant
cultivated some wheat on his father's land not far from the tract in dis-
pute. But it is also shown by the testimony that during the year 1886
claimant made substantial improvements on the land, and commenced
to reside thereon with his family, having married in 18S4, and has since
September 23, 1886, maintained a continuous residence thereon. The
claimant says that the last improvements were commenced in the spring
of 1886, while some of his witnesses state that they were commenced in
the fall, but there seems to be no controversy about the fact that his
continuous residence on the tract did not commence until September,
1886. One of his own witnesses testified that claimant did not estab-
lish actual residence on the tract until the last of September, 1886. This
-was eighteen months ater the final proof and seventeen months after
his entry had been held for cancellation upon the report of a special
agent that he had never made an actual residence on the claim.
The hearing had December 24, 188 i, was ordered upon the applica-
tion of claimant, and from the testimony taken at said hearg; the
local officers decided that under the law the entry was illegal. and must
be held for cancellation; but, in view of his now being an actual settler
on the land, they recommended that he be allowed to make new proof
and entry.
Before your office took action upon this decision, Lupfer submitted
new final proof, made November 2, 1888, showing that he had made
substantial improvements upon the tract, and had resided thereon with
his family continuously from September 23, 1886.
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In considering the testimony taken at said hearing of December 24,
1886, your office held that Lupfer failed to comply with the law as to
residence, and that his proof was false, and showed that he did not act
in good faith. His entry was therefore held for cancellation. Ivrom
this decision he appealed.
It is clear from the testimony taken at the hearing that, at the date
of claimant's entry, on March 2, 1885, he had Vot complied with the law
as to residence, and it was shown that he never established an actual
bonafide residence on the tract, or showed any reason for failure to do
so. During the period covered by his entry he was for most of the time
a single man, teaching school near the tract, and yet resided during all
that period with his father, about a mile and a half from his claim, upon
whose land he was farming, and making occasional visits to the tract
of about once in every thirty days, acting as he states upon the theory
that a single man was not required to stay upon his claim. Yethe mar-
ried in 1884, and seems to have made no effort to improve the tract and
move his family thereon, until September 23, 1886, eighteen months
after making entry, and when his entry had been held br cancellation,
because of his failure to establish a residence thereon.
If a claimant has failed to comply with the law, by making a bona
fide settlement and residing thereon, prior to entry, that default can not
be cured by an attempt to subsequently comply with the law by estab-
lishing residence, and while the Department will always consider the
subsequent acts and conduct of the entryman, they can only be con-
sidered for the purpose of determining the question of his good faith,
as to his acts and intention during the period covered by his entry.
In this case the record fails to show that his residence upon the tract,
established and maintained sbsequent to entry, was the continuation
of a purpose honestly began with his entry, but, on the contrary, shows
that he was evidently moved to it by the action of the land office in
canceling his entry, by reason of his failure to establish residence on
the tract prior to entry. In his final proof he states, without qualifica-
tion! that his residence was continuous upon the tract from December,
1883, when he claimed to have made his settlement, up to March 2, 1885,
the date of his entry; and yet the proof taken at the hearing shows
that this residence consisted of periodical visits to the land once a
month; that he was teaching school in the neighborhood of the tract,
and during this whole period was residing with his father.
The pre-ernption entry of Lupfer was illegal, and he having thereby
exhausted his right under the pre-emption law, a second pre-emptioti
entry can not be made under the new proof, although it may show that
he has continuously resided on the land in good faith since September
23, 1886.
It is also claimed by Lupfer in his appeal thattthe decision is not sus-
tained by the law governing the disposition of the lands embraced in
the Fort Larned military reservation, of which the tract in controversy
is a part.
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The act of August 4, 1882 (22 Stat., 217), restored the lands within
said reservation to the public domain, and provided that said lands shall
be surveyed and appraised, and after such appraisal, which shall be
approved by the Secretary of the Interior, " the land shall be sold to
actual settlers only, at the apraised price, anl as nearly as may be
in conformity to the provisions of the pre emption laws of the United
States."
The requirements of the pre-emption laws as to settlement, cultivation,
residence and improvement are applicable to lands restored to the public
domain by the act aforesaid, and the entryman must show full compli-
ance with the pre-emption law in that respect to entitle him to te land.
The decision of your office is affirmed.
AFIDAVIT OF CONTEST-ADDITIONS THERETO BY ATTORNEY.
PETTICREW V. MCDONALD.
An affidavit of contest is not invalidated by the attorney of the contestant adding
thereto, at the request of the contestant, letters and figures that do not enlarge
or modify the charge, bt merely show matters of official record which it is the
duty of the local office to embody in the notice issued.
The practice of attorneys making additions to affidavits of contest that have passed
from the control and inspection of affiants, is disconntenanced by the Depart-
ment', and should not be allowed.
First Assistant Seeretaryi Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 16, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Frank Petticrew from your decision
of March 28, 1887, dismissing his contest against the timber culture
entry of Donald McDonald, for the SE of Sec. 3, T. 102, R. 7 W.,
Mitchell, South Dakota.
Said entry was made March 4, 1882.
On April 9, 1886, the contestant, Petticrew, filed an affidavit (sworn
to April 8th) alleging that the claimant had wholly abandoned said
tract, that lie had failed to plant the second five acres the fourth year
after entry, that he had failed to replant the first five acres after the
failure of the first planting to grow, that the claimant had used the
entire ten acres for agricultural purposes and not for the purpose of
growing trees, and that said failure still existed, and that there were
no trees growing at date of said affidavit. Notice issued and hearing
was set for June 7, 18s6, and on the morning of said day the contestant
appeared in person and with A. B. Hager, attorney, and the claimant
appeared by Mr. Hardesty of the firm of Warren and Hardesty, before
the register, and Eardesty moved to dismiss the contest on the ground
that the affidavit of contest " was sworn to in blank as to the date and
number of entry and full hristian name of the contestee and said
blanks were afterwards flled in by one D. A. Mizener, the attorney
for said contestant, and by him filed in the said land office."
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In this connection it is proper to state that no denial is made of the
fact that said Mizener did write the letters "onald" after the letter D
in the Christian name of the claimant also the letters and figures " 77887"
and " 4th " and 11 March."
The contestant has filed an affidavit in which he states that he knew
that the Christian name of the claimant commenced with the letter D
but he did not know whether the name was Donald or Daniel, that he
knew the entry was made in the year 1882 the early part of February
or March, but did not know the day, and that he requested W. B. Hus-
sey to write to Mizener and request him to insert in the affidavit the
proper figures and words.
At the time Hardesty filed his motion to dismiss, Mr. Hager, who ap-
peared for the contestant, stated that notice of contest with the return
of service was in the safe of Mr. Mizener, who was out of town, but who
would return at noon, when the same would be produced. Without
taking action on the motion to dismiss, the register adjourned the case
to one o'clock and at 12 o'clock, left the city on a leave of absence.
At one o'clock the contestant with his attorney Mizener and the
claimant by Mr. Hardesty, appeared before the receiver and Mizener
filed an affidavit made by the contestant stating in substance that the
notice with the return of service had by mistake been sent to W. B.
Hussey at White Lake, instead of to the land office, and asked a con-
tinuance to the next day in order to obtain the same. This application
was granted.
Oil the next day, June 8, the parties appeared before the receiver and
the contestant filed an affidavit stating in substance, that the notice
had been served on the claimant at Sioux City, Iowa, by James F.
Shanley, city marshal, more than thirty days previously, but that Sban-
ley did not swear to his return or service but acknowledged it as his
voluntary act and deed, also that in his return the marshal stated
that he served the notice on D. McDonald instead of Donald McDonald
and asked that thirty days be allowed in order to obtain the correct
proof of service. Instead of granting this motion the receiver issued an
order dismissing the motion filed by claimant's counsel June 7, to dis-
miss the contest, and allowed forty days for the contestant to amend
his affidavit of contest to cover the defects specified in the motion to
dismiss " in accordance with Rule 15 of the Rules of Practice the return
to present service being held to be insufficient."
So far as the record shows both parties appear to have acquiesced in
this order.
On his return, the register reviewed the case, and on July 6, 1886,
rendered an opinion holding that the affidavit was sufficient and that
trial should have taken place on the same.
Owing to this difference of opinion between the register and receiver
no further action was taken in the case, but by letter of August 3, 18867
the papers were transmitted to your office. Among said papers is the
statement or opinion of the receiver, dated August 2, 1886, in which he
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charges D. A. Mizener, attorney, for contestant, with dishonorable and
unprofessional conduct, alleging that he abstracted a paper from the
record and changed the same etc.
I am satisfied from the evidence before me that this charge is not true0
That as a matter of fact, the paper in question was presented to the re-
ceiver for his inspection and was retained by Mizener to be sent to the
officer serving the notice in order that he might make the proper return
of service, and when this was done the document was filed with the
other papers in the case.
In the decision above referred to the receiver states that in his opinion
the action of Mr. Hager in stating that the notice of contest was locked
up-in the safe of Mizener was an offense that should not be "condoned
or lightly passed over."
From the evidence I am satisfied that Mr. Hager made such state-
ment upon mistaken information given by those whom he had a right
to rely upon for information, and that he had no intention of making a
a misstatement. In fact under date of April 11, 1887, the receiver ree-
'ommended that Hager be exonerated from the charge made.
Out of this difference of opinion between the register and receiver
and the charges made against the attorneys, bitter charges, and counter
charges, have arisen, of official, personal and professional misconduct
on the part of the officers named, and the attorneys. In view of the
fact, however, that neither the then register nor receiver are now in
office, I do not deem it essential to refer to this feature of the case fur-
ther than I have, as above.
On March 28, 1887, your office, after reciting the facts in the case, and
without further investigation, accepted, as true, the charges made by
the receiver against the attorneys Mizener and Hager, and summarily
dismissed the contest.
In my opinion this action can not be sustained upon the ground of
either reason or justice. No charge of bad faith or misconduct, is made
against the contestant, and even admitting that the attorneys were
guilty of misconduct, it does not follow that the contestant,,acting in
good faith should be deprived of his rights.
The question now arises, was the affidavit of contest filed in the local
office, April 9, 1886, sufficient to justify the issue of notice, and to con-
fer upon the local officers jurisdiction to determine the questions at
issue ? It must be so held unless the additions made by the attorney
vitiated and annulled said affidavit, as the charges made were definite
and specific and justified a hearing.
These additions were made at the written request of the party who
sent the affidavit to Mizener to file, and as is shown by the subsequent
affidavit of the contestant above referred to, were made at his request.
They did not in any manner enlarge or modify the charges made, and
only stated matters of official record which it was the duty of the local
officers to embody in the notice issue(.
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In my opinion the affidavit was sufficient to justify the issue of the
notice and a hearing. The record shows that due notice was served
upon the claimant more than thirty days prior to the date set for tial.
Said affidavit is herewith returned with instructions to transmit the
same to the local office with directions to proceed with the hearing,
after due notice to all parties.
This case brings to the attention of the Department a practice which
prevailed to a greater or less extent among attorneys in practice be-
fore the local officers, viz: that of inserting in affidavits of contest, after
the same have been sworn to, certain facts or statements, such as the
number and date of the entry and sometimes other statements. In my
opinion this is bad practice, and should not be allowed.,
If the items inserted are immaterial, and are mere facts that the local
officers are required to ascertain from their records and embody in the
notice, it is not absolutely necessary that they should appear in the
affidavit. If what is inserted is material to the charge, no one has any
right or authority to make such additions after the affidavit has been
sworn to and has passed from the control and inspection of the arty
making the same. It is the duty of the contestant to ascertain all the
material facts necessary to base the complaint upon, before the same is
sworn to.
ARID ANDS-CIRCULAR.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
Washington, D. C., September 5, 1890.
Registers and Receivers, United States Land Offices.
GENTLEMEN: I am directed by the Honorable Secretary of the Inte-
rior, by letter of September 4, 189(, to call your attention to the at-
tached copy of that portion of the act of Congress, approved August 30,
1890, which repeals so much of the act of October 2, 1888 (25 Stat., 526),
as withdraws the lands in the arid region of the nited States from
entry, occupation, and settlement, with the exception that reservoir
sites heretofore located or selected shall remain segregated and re-
served from entry or settlement until otherwise provided by law, and
reservoir sites hereafter located or selected on public lands shall in like
manner e reserved from the date of the location or selection. The ir-
eulars of this office of August 5, 1889, 9 L D., 282, and August 9, 1890,
11 . D., 220, are hereby rescinded.
Entries validated by this act will be acted upon in regular order, and
all patents issued on entries made subsequent to this act and on entries
so validated, west of the one hundredth meridian, will contain a clause
reserving the right of way for ditches and canals constructed by author-
ity of the United States.
Your particular attention is called to that portion of the law which
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restricts the acquirement of title under the land laws to three hundred
and twenty acres in the aggregate.
You will require from all applicants to file or enter under any of the
land laws of the United States, an affidavit showing that since August
30, 1890, they had not filed upon or entered, under said laws, a quan-
tity of land which would make, with the tracts applied for, more than
th'ee hundred and twenty acres. Or, provided the party should elaim
by virtue of the exception as to settlers prior to the act of August 30,
1890, you will require an affidavit establishing the fact.
As soon as practicable a blank form of affidavit will be furnished you.
Very respectfully,
LEWIS A. GROFF,
Commissioner.
For topographic surveys in various portions of the United States, three hundred
and twenty-five thousand dollars, one-half of which sum shall be expended west of
the one hundredth meridian; and so much of the act of October second, eighteen
hundred and eighty-eight, entitled "An act making appropriations for sundry civil
expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hun-
dred and eighty-nine, and for other purposes," as provides for the withdrawal of the
public lands from entry, occupation and settlement, is hereby repealed, and all entries
niade or claims initiated in good faith and valid bnt for said act, shall be recognized
and may be perfected in the same manner as if said law had not been enacted, except
that reservoir sites heretofore located or selected shall remain segregated and re-
served from entry or settlement as provided by said act, until otherwise provided by
law, andreservoir sites hereafter located or selected on public lands shall in like man-
ner be reserved from the date of the location or selection thereof.
No person who shall, after the passage of this act, enter upon ,any of the public
lands with a view to occupation, entry, or settlement under any of the land laws shall
be permitted to acquire title to more than three hundred and twenty acres in the aggre-
gate, under all of said laws, but this limitation shall not operate to curtail the right
of any person vho has heretofore made entry or settlement on the public lands, or
whose occupation, entry, or settlement, is validated by this act: Provided, That in
all patents for lands hereafter taken op under any of the laud laws of the United
States or on entries or claims validated by this act, west of the one hundredth inerid-
ian it shall be expressed that there is reserved from the lands in said patent described,
a right of way thereon for ditches or canals constructed by the authority of theUnited
States.
CIRCULAR-RENDITION OF ACCOUNTS.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND QFFIPE,
Washington, D. C., September 12, 1890.
To Receivers and Disbursing Agents.
GENTLIIMEN: The circular of this office dated June 10, 1890, in rela-
tion to the rendition of accounts by receivers and disbursing agents, is
hereby revoked; and from and after this date the accounts of receivers
and disbursing agents will be rendered quarterly as heretofore. (See
circular (" M " dated December 4, 1889, 9 L. D., 655.)
You will render to this office a quarterly account of detail cash sales
on Form 4-106, and condensed quarterly account current on Form
4-104, and recapitulation of cash receipts, Form 4-157, and quarterly
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disbursing accounts, Forn 4-103. You will also render to this office a
monthly account current, Form 4-105, and monthly fee statement,
Form 4-119, and a monthly detailed account of fees received for reduc-
ing testimony to writing, Form 4-146, as required by sections 11 and
13 of circular " M," of December 4, 1889. The instructions contained
in sections 13, 14,15, 16, 18, 19, 20, and 21 of circular "M" dated
December 4, 1889, relative to the preparation and transmission to this
offlee of the accounts, will be observed in transmitting the above named
accounts. All other abstracts and accounts formerly rendered in con-
nection with your quarterly returns, viz: Detailed quarterly state-
ments of original and final homestead and original and final timber
culture receipts will be discontinued from and after the date of this cir-
cular.
Receivers will use great care i the preparation of their accounts.
The monthly account current, Form 4-105, is practically a balance
sheet, and receivers should balance their accounts at the close of each
month. Any moneys on hand that have been shipped may be charged
as in transitu. It is hoped that receivers and disbursing agents will
have their returns in such a condition that they may be able to send
them to this office, within three days after the close of the month, that
the adjustment of their accounts may not be delayed.
Surveyors General, acting as disbursing agents, will render their
"salaries," "4contingent expenses," and a'deposit by individual" accounts
to this office quarterly as heretofore.
Forms 4-103, 4-104, 4-106, and 4-157, of receivers acting as disburs-
ing agents, will be sent to tis office in a separate package with a special
letter of tansmission. Advances to disbursing agents will be made as
heretofore.
Receivers and disbursing agents will prepare and forward to this office
at the close of the quarter ending September 30, 1890, new accounts as
required above, for the entire quarter.
Monthly accounts (Forms 4-103, 4-104, 4-106, and 4-157), heretofore
forwarded to this office by you for the mouths of July and August, will
be destroyed by this office upon receipt of your quarterly returns.
This change is made to conform to " An act making appropriations
for sundry civil expenses of the government for the fiscal year ending
June 30,1891, and for other purposes," which provides as follows:
That hereafter all disbursing officers of the United States shall render their acco uts
quarterly, and the Secretary of the Senate shall render his accounts as heretofore;
but the Secretary of the Treasury may direct any or all such accounts to be rendered
more frequently when in his judgment the public interests may require.
Please acknowledge receipt of this circular.
Respectfully,
LEWIS A. GROFF,
Approved September 16, 1890. Commissioner.
GEo. CHANDLEPb
Acting Secretary.
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X
FINWAL PROOF PROCERDINGS-EQUITABLE ADJUDICATION.
MILTON B. DESHONG.
An entry allowed on final. proof ia which the testimony of the witnesses is taken be-
fore an officer not authorized by statute to take such proof, may be referred to
the board of equitable adjudication, if the proof is otherwise regular and shows
due compliance with law.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 16, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Milton B. DeShong from your de-
cision of September 1, 1888, suspending his final certificate and direct-
ing that new advertisement and new proof be made on his homestead
entry for the NW. 1 Sec. 15 T. 128 N., R. 58 W.,Watertown, South Da-
kota land district.
The entry was made November 23, 1883, and final proof submitted
November 20, 1884.
His proof shows that he made settlement and residence July 6, 1883,
and maintained continuous residence during one year four months and
fourteen days, and that he is entitled to credit for military service for
three years and nine months as you state. is improvements are en-
tirely satisfactory. The final proof was made before the officer desig-
nated by the register, and at the time and place advertised, and the
same was accepted by the local officers. Youroffice rejected it because
it was not properly taken. It appears that the testimony of the two
corroborating witnesses was taken before a notary public, the claimant
having appeared in person before the register and receiver. It was the
fault'of the register that the testimony of the corroborating witnesses
was taken before an officer not designated by law as an officer before
whom final proof could be made. In the case of Sylvester Gardner (8
L. D., 483), a similar mistake was made,-tbat case-came before the
Department as this case has, and it was there held, that as the final
proof showed a compliance with the law, and had been taken at the
time and place and before the officer named in the advertisement, and
the local officers having accepted the same, and there being no iridica-
tions of bad faith on the part of the claimant, new proof should not be
required, but the entry should be submitted to the board of equitable
adjudication for consideration.
The proof in the case at bar fulfills all the above conditions and will
be referred in like manner.
Your decision is reversed.
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PRACTICE 24APPEAL.-TIMBER CULTURE ENTRY.
FARRIS V. MITCHELL.
In the absence of an appeal a decision of the local office is final as to the facts, and
will not be disturbed by the Commissioner except under the provisions of rule 48
of practice.
The occupancy and possession of land by one who asserts no record claim thereto
within the period provided by law does not exclude such land from. entry under
the timber culture law.
The case of Bender v. Voss cited and distinguished.
First Assistant Secretary handler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 16, 1890.
I have considered the case of John M. Farris v. John D. Mitchell, as
presented by the appeal of the latter from the decision of your office
holding for cancellation his timber culture entry, No. 142, of the S. ofthe NE. , the NW. of the NE. and the SE. of the NW. of Sec.
20, T. 20 S., R. 35 E., Lakeview, Oregon, made May 23, 1884.
The record shows that said Farris filed his affidavit of contest against
said entry on July 16, 1886, alleging that said tract was not devoid of
timber at the date of said entry, and contained at the date of said affi-
davit more than ten acres of timber; that said Mitchell had not broken
five acres on said land, as required by law, and that he did not make
said entry in good faith.
A hearing was duly had before the local office, on October 1l, 1886,
both parties appearing in person and were represented by counsel.
From the testimony submitted the local officers found, that said tract
was devoid of timber; that the claimant had cultivated the land as re-
quired by law, and that said entry should not be canceled.
On appeal, your office found from the testimony that one ourtwright
had settled upon said tract prior to the date of said entry, and erected
a house thereon,. twelve by fourteen feet, in which he was living at the
date of said entry; that after Mitchell made said entry, said Farris on
December 7, 1885, purchased Courtwright's improvements, and offered
to make homestead entry of said tract, which being rejected by the
local office, the contestant, on July 16, 1886, instituted said contest, as
aforesaid. Your office also found that said land was devoid of timber,
under the rulings of the Department then in force, that the claimant
had conplied with the requirements of the timber culture law as to
breaking and cultivation, but that it appearing from the admission of
Mitchell that said tract was in the occupancy and possession of Court.
'wright at the~date of said ntry, the land was not subject to timber cult-
ure entry, upon the authority of Bender v. Voss, 2 L. D., 269; that Far-
ris having failed to appeal from the action of the local office rejecting
his homestead application, he had waived his rights thereunder and
must stand upon his rights as a contestant.
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 301
The appellant insists that your office erred, (1) in finding that the
contestant appealed from the decision of the local office on November
19, 1886, or at any other time; (2) in reversing the decision of the local
office, in the absence of bad faith apparent in the record; (3) in decid-
ing the case upon points not raised in the record; (4) in pot construing
said admission of Mitchell to be in harmony with the preponderance of
the testimony; and (5) in not confirming the decision of the local
officers.
The record shows that y'our office and the local office were correct in
finding that said tract was devoid of timber, and that said Mitchell
had complied with the requirements of the timber culture law, as to
breaking and cultivation. It, however, fails to show any proof of serv-
ice of the so-called appeal from the decision of the local office, filed
November 19, 1886, as required by Rule of Practice No. 46 (4 L. D., 42).
But, in the absence of an appeal, the decision of the local office becomes
final oulv as to the facts, and will be disturbed by your office only in
accordance with the provisions of Rule of Practice No. 48 (idem., 42
and 43). It would, therefore, be the duty of your office to hold sai
entry for cancellation, if the record showed that the same was illegal.
But it fails to show that said entry was illegal.
The occupancy of the tract by Courtwright, who had failed to file fbr
or enter said land in due time after settlement, rendered the land sub-
ject to the entry of any other qualified claimant.
I am aware that the Department used the expression, in Bender v.
Voss (supra), that " timber culture entries should be made upon vacantt
unimproved land, not upon cultivated land covered by the valuable
improvements of another and in the possession of another," citing as
authority for said statement Shaddtuck v. Horner (6 C. L. O., 113). In
the latter case the decision was based upon the authority of the supreme
court in Atherton v. Fowler (6 Otto, 513), and the Department found
that Shadduck did not make his timber culture entry in good faith, and
Horner had valuable improvements on the tract, which he claimed as
his home. In both of said cases the timber ulture entries were con-
tested by claimants, who were in possession of thetracts, with valuable
improvements thereon, and occupied the same as their homes, while in
the case at bar the contestant is claiming rights by reason of the pur-
chase of improvements of a prior occupant, after said entry, and who
had failed to assert a claim of record in due tine prior to said entry.
The occupancy of land by a pre-emptor, either with or without a fil-
ing, does not segregate the land. The entryman's right is subject to
the claim of the prior pre-emptor. If he fails to file or prove up, for
the land in due time, the subsequent entryman has the better right
thereto. This has been the uniform ruling of the Department for a
long time, and applies to timber culture entries as well as homestead.
In Lunney v. Darnell (2 L. D., 593), the Department expressly ruled
that a pre-emptor who fails to make final proof within due time loses
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his right to do so, after a valid adverse timber culture claim has at-
tached. See also Hunt v. Lavin (3 L. D., 499); Turi 0. Simle (5 L. D.,
173).
In Moss v. Quincey (7 L. D., 373), it was held that, although land had
been broken, yet, if it were devoid of timber, it could be entered under
the timber culture act.
So in Mayfield v. Lee (S L, D., 461), Secretary Noble decided that a
timber culture entry, held for cancellation on account of conflict with
the prior settlement right of another, might be allowed to remain intact
on the subsequent abandonment of the settlement claim.
In Waller v. D.vis (9 L. D., 262), it is decided that a settlement and
filing are no bar to a timber culture entry of the land, but operated
only as a notice of the pre-emptox's claim and preference right of pur-
chase, iting and distinguishing said cases of Shadduck v. Horner and
Bender v. Voss, and held that properly considered they were not in
conflict with the correct rule as laid down by your office in the case of
John A. Adamson (3 L. D., 152), namely, that-
If there is a prior claim of record to the land applied for of a nature not to be a bar
to an entry, and a timber culture entry is made of that land, the entryman takes his
risk of final adjudication . . . . . If be makes entry of a tract of land upon
which some other person is living and has improvements, although not having a claim
of record, the fact of such occupation and improvement is notice, and the entry is
made at the same risk as in case of a claim of record.
From the foregoing it is clear that the land in question was subject
to entry at the date thereof, that the ejitryman has complied with the
requirements of the timber culture law (20 Stat., 113), and, since said
alleged pre-emptor failed to file for or make proof in support of any
claim which he could have asserted to said tract, and has sold out to
the contestant and abandoned the land, it is apparent that said entry is
erroneously held for cancellation.
The decision of your office must be and it is hereby reversed.
OSAGE LAND-RESIDENCE.
DiJEmER v. TILTON.
The requirement of showing a continuous residence of six months prior to final proof,
is not applied with the same rigor to a settler on Osage land as to a pre-emptor
of other land, but the settlement, residence, and other acts of said settler must
be-such as to clearly show an intention of making the land his home.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 17, 1890.
I have considered the case of John Deemer v. Carrie H. Tilton on
appeal of the latter from your office decision of March 2, 1889.
The record shows that on February 16, 1885, Carrie H. Tilton made
Osage declaratory statement No. 1039 for the SE. j of Sec. 4, T. 27 S.,
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B. 23 W., Garden City, Kansas, claiming settlement December 5, 1884.
July 11, 1885, John Deemer filed on the same tract alleging settlement
June 20 of the same year.
October 19, 1885, Tilton offered her final proof before the clerk of the
district court at Dodge City, Kansas, when Deemer appeared and pro-
tested against the allowance of the same, claiming that she had not
complied with the law as to residence and improvements and at the same
time asserting his own right to the land.
After the defendant had submitted her proof, plaintiff Deemer was
allowed to cross-examine her and the subscribing witnesses, and to offer
testimony impeaching her residence and good faith.' Evidence in re.
buttal of that so offered by Deemer was introduced by the defendant.
April 13, 1887, Deemer submitted his final proof for the same tract be-
fore the register and receiver of the land office at Garden City, Kansas.
March 31, 1887, the register and receiver recommended the allowance
of Tilton's proof, finding that " she was an actual settler on the tract in
dispute at the time of making final proof." Deemer appealed, and on
examination of the record your office reversed the decision of the local\
officers and held the filing of Tilton for cancellation, and she now ap-
peals to this Department.
The evidence submitted with the appeal warrants the decision of your
office. The house in which Tilton claimed to have resided until three
days before offering final proof, was a sod house'and never habitable,
the evidence on the part of plaintiff showing that all through the sum-
mer the floor was covered with water a "foot deep" and the defendant
herself admits that the water came in "naturally " when the rain was
from the north, and while she testifies to staying in it a few days and
nights during each month of the summer prior to her making proof in
October, 1885, it clearly appears that her actual residence during all
that time was with her sons on an adjoining claim, and that she resorted
to her sod house only as a pretense of residence. October 16, 1885, she
moved a frame house from her sons' claim to the tract in question, which
is the house described in her final proof. Her cultivation of the land
was on a par with her residence. She planted about four acres of sor-
ghum in a pasture to which her own and other cattle had free access,
and in consequence the crop was entirely destroyed.
Counsel for defendant insist that she is entitled to the land because
under the act of May 28, 1880 (21 'Stats., 143), in relation to the pur-
chase of Osage lands as construed in the case of the United States v.
Woodbury et al (5 L. D., 303) " the only prerequisite to an entry of
those lands is that the purchaser shall be an actual settler on the lands
at the date of entry, with the qualifications of a pre-enmptor," that under
the statute as construed, by said case, it is not necessary that the pre-
emptor should intend to use the land for purposes of a home or resi-
dence, but that the settler need only show at the time of submitting
final proof that he has made permanent improvements on the land
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" coupled with an intention of said party to purchase the land from the
government, that such settlement and purchase may be made for the
purpose of a home or for the purpose of selling it to another or for the
purpose of using itfor cultivation orsonze (meaning any) other purpose."
This is not the construction placed upon the act by this Department.
Since the rendition of the case of the United States v. Woodbury
(supra) this Department has in several cases defined " actual settler"
as used in said act to be " one who goes upon the land specified by said
act (Usage lands) with the intention of making it his home under the
settlement laws." (United States v. Atterbery et al. 8 L. D., 173; same
case on review 10 L. D., 36; United States v. Jones, 0 L. D., 23;
United States v. Sweeney, 11 L. D., 216).
While the settler on Osage lands is not held to the same rigor as a
pre-emptor of other land, in showing continual residence for six
months prior to proof, yet his settlement, residence and other acts must
-be such as to clearly show his intention of making the land his home,
and a pretended or colorable residence, as in this case, evidently made
for the purpose of securing title to the land, will not satisfy the re-
quirements of the law as construed in the cases above cited.
The evidence on the part of Deemer shows that he settled upon the
tract June 20, 1885, erected a comfortable frame house and had been
living there and cultivating the land continuously from the date of his
settlement to the time of offering his final proof, and I have no doubt
from the evidence that his settlement, residence and cultivation were
made in good faith and for the prpose of making his home on the
claim.
- The Osage declaratory statement No. 1039 of Carrie H. Tilton is
therefore canceled, and Deemer will be allowed to make payment for
the land.
The decision of your office is accordingly affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT-INDIAN HOMESTEAD-ACT OF JULY 4, 1884.
NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co. v. TEQUDA.
The occupancy of public land by an Indian who has not abandoned the tribal rela-
tion confers no homestead right under the act of July 4, 1884, as against a rail-
road grant that becomes effective prior to the passage of said act.
-Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
September 17, 1890.
The Northern Pacific Railroad Company appeals from your office de-
cision of November 18, 1886, directing the allowance of the application
of Peter TeQuda (an Indian) to make homestead entry for kt 10, Sec.
1, T. 20 N., R. E., Olympia land district, in the State (then Territory)
of Washington.
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 305
The tract in question contains 38.10 acres, and is within the primary
limits of the grant to said company under the act of July 2, 1864 (13
Stats., 365), and the joint resolution of May 31, 1870 (16 Stats., 370), as
shown by the map of general route of the branch line of its road, filed
August 20, 1873, and by the map of definite location of said branch
line, filed March 26, 1884. The record does not show any entry'or filing
therefor.
On March 31, 1886, TeQuda applied to make homestead entry for the
tract under the act of July 4, 1884 (23 Stats., 96), and submitted in sup-
port of his application a certificate by the United States agent for the
Muckleshoot tribe of Indiaus to which applicant belonged (as required
by departmental circular of August 23 1884, 3 L. D., 91), showing that
he is an Indian of the age of twenty-one years, the head of a family,
and not the subject of any foreign country; also his own affidavit, stat-
ing, among other things, that he has "improved and cultivated six
acres of said tract for twenty-one years last past."
The local officers notified the company of the pendency of such appli-
cation, and allowed it a specified time within which to appear and file
objections thereto.
On May 11, 1886, the company appeared by its attorneys and filed
objections to the allowance of the entry, whereupon the local officers
transmitted all the papers in the case to your office for consideration.
Upon examination of the papers, your office held that " the affidavit
of TeQuda, prima facie, shows the land applied for to be excepted from
the grant to said company," and directed that he be allowed to make
entry therefor. It was further stated that "the company will be
required to take notice of his published intention to make final proof,
and if it has, or claims to have any right thereto, to appear and assert
the same."
It is provided by said act of July 4, 1884:
That such Indians as may now be located on public lands, oe a, may, under the
direction of the Secretary of the Interior, or otherwise, hereafter do locate, may avail
themselves of the provisions of the homestead laws as fully and to the same extent
as may now be done by citizens of the United States.
I think it is questionable whether the applicant has shown himself
entitled to make entry under the provisions of said act. e does not
in express terms claim to be " located" on the laud, but simply alleges
improvement and cultivation of a small portion thereof, which does not
necessarily imply that he is "located" thereon. Aside from this ques-
tion, however, I am unable to concur in the conclusion of your office that
the record prima facie shows the land to have been excepted from the
company's grant. The maps of general route and definite location,
respectively, of the company's road, were filed, the former over ten
year's and the latter over three months prior to the passage of said act
of July 4, 1884. The company's rights finally attached on definite loca-
tion, and at that date no provision had been made by which an Indian,
2497-No. 11_-20
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still retaining his tribal relations, could acquire any rights to the pub-
lic lands, either by settling thereon, or by occupying the same for pur
poses of cultivation. It is true that by departmental regulation of Feb-
ruary 11, 1870 (1 . L. L., 283), and by the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stats.,
420), certain homestead privileges were extended to Indians. These
privileges were allowed, however, only to such Indians as had wholly
dissolved, or abandoned, their tribal relations, of which fact satisfac-
tory proof was required. The Indian, TeQuda, had not abandoned
his tribal relations, but still retained the same at the date when the
company's right attached, and at the date of his application. He can-
not, therefore, be held to have acquired any right to the land in ques-
tion as against the company, by his improvement and cultivation of a
portion thereof, as claimed. Whether such long continued improve-
ment and cultivation, if by a citizen of the United States, would serve
to except the land from the grant to the railroad company need not
be here decided. It is sufficient for the purpose of this opinion to state
that the facts alleged by TeQuda do not, for the reasons aforesaid, con-
stitute such a claim to the land as served to except it from the grant,
and it must be held, therefore, to have passed to the company there-
under.
Your office decision is accordingly reversed, and the application of
TeQuda will be rejected.
PRACTICE-DEATH OF PASTY-NOTICE.
ALLPHIN V. WADE.
Where a claimant dies during the pen dency of adverse proceedings in the local office,
such proceedings should be discontinued, and the-heirs at law and successors in
interest of the decedent duly notified of their right to appear and be heard in the
premises.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 17, 1890.
The record in the case of Hattie Allphin v. John H. Wade is before
me on appeal of the latter, and shows that on July 30, 1884, said Wade
filed an Osage declaratory statement No. 4686 for the SW. Sec. 28, T.
28 S., IR. 18 W., Larned, Kansas, alleging settlement May 27th of the
same year.
September 2, 1884, said Allphin also filed declaratory statement No.
5154 for the same land, alleging settlement July 22d of the same year.
Final proof was offered by Wade December 15, 1884, and by Allphin
March 5, 1885. Each claimant protested against the proof of the other,
and after several continuances and other dilatory motions, the first tes-
timony was taken July 18, 1885, when the hearing was continued by
consent until September 14, same year, for the purpose of taking depo-
r
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sitions and submitting other oral testimony. On said date the case was
closed without additional testimony, for the reason that the defendant
Wade failed to appear with his witnesses. November 24th 1885, the
defendant moved to re-open the case which motion, as shown from the
report of the register and receiver, was at first allowed and subse-
quently overruled, and on August 15, 1886, the local officers decided in
favor of the plaintiff Allphin, holding that her settlement was prior to
that of Wade. September 10, 1886, he filed an application for a rehear-
ing, which was granted, and after several motions and continuances the
rehearing was had March 10, and 11, 1887.
The evidence discloses that prior to the testimony taken March 10
and 11, 1887, on the re-opening of the case, to wit, September 17, 1886,
Hattie Allphin died. Further proceedings should have been discon-
tinued on her death and her heirs at law and successors in interest no-
tified to appear and conduct her contest to a conclusion, if they so de-
sired.
This was not done and so all proceedings subsequent to her death are
irregular and erroneous. Arnold v. Hildreth (6 L.D., 779); Rohrbough
v. Diggins (9 L. D., 308).
All procedings that occurred subsequent to September 17, 1886, are
hereby set aside and the case remanded with directions to the register
and receiver to proceed as above directed.
The decision of your office is modified accordingly.
PRE-EMPTION-ACT OF FEBRUARY 12, 1889-RESIDENCE-PROTEST.
DAYTON v. DAYTON.
The pre-emption law, in the States admitted into the Union under the provisions of
the act of February 22, 1890, is not repealed by section 17 of said act.
An absence from the land, occurring after settlement, does not effect the right of
the pre-emptor, where he returns to the land prior to the intervention of any ad-
verse claim, and resides thereon in due compliance with the rules and regula-
tions.
The refusal of the Commissioner to order a hearing on a protest filed against final
proof will not be disturbed, where such action does not amount to the denial of
a right.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
September 18, 1890.
I have considered the case of Lyman C. Dayton v. James R. Dayton
on appeal by the former from your decision of March 21, 1890, dismiss-
ing his protest against James R. Dayton's final pre-emption proof for
the NE. j of Sec. 23 T. 12. N., R. 64 W., Aberdeen, South Dakota land
district.
This tract of land has been in dispute between these parties for a
number of years, the validity of James B. Dayton's timber culture
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entry haying been finally affirmed by departmental decision of August
1, 1889 (9 L. D., 193). The former decisions in this matter are to be
found in 4 L. D., 263 and 7 L. D., 542.
It appears now that after the decision of August 1, 1889, James R.
Dayton on October 6, 1889, relinquished his rights under said timber
culture entry and at the same time filed pre-emption declaratory state-
ment for the same land alleging settlement thereon June 20, 1888. e
afterwards gave notice that he would on November 19,18'i9 submit
final proof in support of his said pre-emption filing. On the day adver-
tised the pre-emptor appeared with his witnesses and presented final
proof. On the same day Lyman C. Dayton filed a protest against the
acceptance of said final proof upon the following grounds:
First: Because the act admitting South Dakota to the Union, contains clanses
which repeal the pre-emption law of the United States as far as the same affects the
government land in the said State and no land can be taken under the provisions of
the said pre-emption law since the passage of the said act by the Congress of the
United States when the pre-emption proof of the claimant has not been made.
Second: Because the said re-emption is speculative on the part of said J. R.
Dayton. The whole of said tract has been surveyed into blocks, streets and alleys
and platted by the said James R. Dayton for the purposes of sale, and not for a farm
and home; that trees have been planted at the corners of each block and.upon the
line of the streets to indicate the same upon the whole tract and it is claimed that
the blocks are subdivided into lots.
Third: Because after the filing of the pre-emption declaratory statement of the
said J. R. Dayton he rented his house to Judge Crofoot until about May , 1889, and
went to Washington D. C. while his wife boarded in the city of Aberdeen, S. D.,
away from the said tract.
Fourth: Because the said tract was entered under the timber culture laws of the
United States, and the city limits of the city of Aberdeen South Dakota included the
east eighty acres of the same; that an attempt was made to withdraw the said
limits by a legislative enactment of the legislature of the Territory of Dakota, and
by a resolution of the city council of the city of Aberdeen, S. D., so that the said J R.
Dayton could make entry of the tract under the pre-emption law; that the said act
of the Legislature of the Territory of Dakota and the resolution of the said city
council of the city of Aberdeen were each invalid and void, so that eighty acres of
said tract are within the city limits of the city of Aberdeen, South Dakota, and can
not be entered under the pre-emption laws of the United States.
Fifth: Because of the surrender of James R. Dayton of his rights under the timber
culture laws of the United States, and his relinquishment of the said tract to the gov-
ernment of the United States, the rights of the said Lyman C. Dayton attached to
the said tract pribr to the pre-emption rights of the said James R. Dayton which
were subject thereto.
Sixth: That the said Lyman C. Dayton has a homestead right which he can use
upon the said tract and enter the same as a homestead under the homestead laws of
the United States.
Seventh: That the said Lyman C. Dayton asks leave to file a homestead applica-
tion for the said tract, in the event that the cancellation of his entry as a homestead
of the SE. of section 14, Township 123 North of Range 64 West in Brown County,
Aberdeen U. S. land district S. D-, is not set aside.
The local officers after considering this protest held that there was
not a sufficient showing to justify them in ordering a hearing and that
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James R. Dayton's final proof ought to be accepted. Upon appeal that
decision was affirmed by you. In support of his appeal from your de-
cision Lyman C. Dayton reiterates in substance the statements made
in the protest hereinbefore quoted, urges that it was error in your
office not to consider the matters presented by the second, fourth and
fifth paragraphs of said protest, and asks a ruling on the question of
law stated in the first allegation.
The question as to the effect of the act of February 22, 1889 (25 Stat.,
681), upon the pre-emption law was heretofore presented to this De-
partment and referred to the Assistant Attorney General for his opin-
ion. The opinion rendered by him (Asst. Atty. Gen's. Op., brook D, p.
125,) holding that said act did not repeal the pre-emption law as to those
States whose admission into the Union was in said act provided for,
the language of section 17 of the act of 1889 being held to refer to and
effect only that part of the act of 1841 making a grant to the States for
purposes of internal improvements, was adopted by this Department
and transmitted to your office for its guidance. A further examination
of the subject still frther convinces me of the correctness of the views
then adopted and expressed.
The allegation that this land had been laid out in town lots was made
when the timber culture entry of James R. Dayton was under con-
sideration and in the departmental decision of November 28, 1885 (4L.
D., 263), it was directed that this matter among others should be in-
quired into at the hearing therein ordered. As a result of that investi-
gation it was decided that the allegation had not been sustained (7 L.
D., 542).
The allegations now made and the history of the matter as set forth
in the reply filed to James R. Dayton's answer totheappeal herein show
that reference is had in this protest to the same transaction and alleged
survey as was investigated by express instruction from this Department
when James R. Dayton's timber culture entry was under consideration.
No such new facts connected with the alleged survey as would demand
a further investigation have been set forth or alleged to exist. Again
this transaction occurred some time prior to the filing by James R. Day-
ton of his pre-emption declaratory statement or the date of his settle-
ment as alleged therein and no allegation is made that he has taken any
steps or action since that settlement, evincing an intention to make use
of such survey or platting, if they had been made as alleged. This
charge does not in view of the history of the controversy between these
parties present such facts as demand investigation.
The third allegation in this protest does not present any fact necessar-
ily derogatory to the pre-emptor's good faith and in fact simply sets up a
fact as to his absence from the land thatis stated in the final proof. The
pre-emptor had not filed his declaratory statement at the time this absence
occurred and did not file it until October 5, after his return to the laud
on May 1, 1889. While in his declaratory statement he alleges settle-
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ment June 20, 1888, yet in his final proof he admits he was absent from
the land from September 15, 1888, until May , 1889, his house dring
that time being occupied by a tenant. The final proof however shows
the continuous actual presence of the pre-emptor upon the land for a
period of more than six months next preceding the date of said proof,
and this statement is not denied or tranversed by the protestant.
I must concur with you that his return to the lan d prior to the inter-
vention of any adverse claim and subsequent actual, continuous resi-
dence thereon for a period exceeding that required in such cases by the
rules and regulations, cured the default, if any existed.
It is difficult to determine just what is meant by the fourth ground of
protest. The fact that a tract of land was once embraced in a timber
culture entry, would not prevent its appropriation under the pre-emption
law after such entry had been canceled. No application for this tract
under the townsite law has been presented, nor is it alleged to have
been occupied for the purposes of trade and business. Even if a part
of this land were atone time included within the city limits of Aber-
deen, it is clear, as appears from this protest itself, that it has been
since excluded from those limits, and that no claim thereto is now being
asserted by said city. This allegation presents no sufficient ground for
a hearingc.
It is claimed in the fifth allegation that upon the cancellation of
James R. Dayton's timber culture entry the rights of Lyman C. Day-
ton attached, but it is not stated what those rights were. He had no
application pending. Even if it were true that he has not exhausted
his homestead right that would not affect this land unless he had in due
time applied to make entry therefor.
In his seventh allegation, however, he shows that he then had a
homestead entry on other land, and the records of this Department
disclose the fact that the validity of such entry was not at the date of
the cancellation of James R. Dayton's timber culture entry, and is not
yet finally determined, the case being now pending in this Department.
Said Lyman C. Dayton was not at the time this land was relieved of
James R. Dayton's timber culture entry, and has not been at any time
since then, in a position to assert a claim thereto under the homestead
law.
Upon account of the importance of this case and the long continued and
bitter controversy between these parties, the matters here presented
have received an especially close and careful examination. As a result
of such examination I have become satisfied that there is no occasion for
interfering with the decision appealed from refusing to order a hearing
and dismissing the protest, and the same i therefore affirmed.
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PRACTICE-REETEARINGPROCEDS ON REPORT OF SPECIAL
AGENT.
UNITED STATES V. STINSON ET AL.
In proceedings by the government against an entry held by a transferee, where the
entryman appears as a witness for the government, and sets up no rights under
said entry, he is not entitled to a rehearing on the ground that he was not
served with notice of such proceedings or the various orders made thereunder.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
September 19, 1890.
By letter of May 2, 1890, your office transmitted the applications of
George C. Curtis, Van W. Chipman, Niels L. Weiberg and Charles M.
Park, for review and rehearing in the case of United States v. Thomas
D. Stinson and Hugh Park, transferees of Geo. W. Smith et al., decided
March 2, 1889.
These applicants are four of the original pre-emption entrymen whose
claims were transferred to said Stinson and Park. The entries were
made in the land office at Seattle, Washington Territory and are fully
described in said decision to which reference is made.
The entries with others were held for cancellation by your office on
May 19, 1886, on report of a special agent who alleged that all of said
entries were made in the interest of said Stinson and Park, and that
the claimants had failed to comply with the law. Notice of this action
was sent to the entryman and transferees. On the application of the
transferees a hearing under the circular of July 31, 1885 (4 L. D., 503),
"to show cause why the entries should be sustained," was ordered and
the cases were consolidated.
After a full hearing, at which these four applicants appeared and gave
testimony, on the part of the government, the local officers found that
the charges had been fully sustained, that claimants had failed to com-
ply with the law, that the entries were made in the interest of said
Stinson and Park, and recommended the cancellation of the same.
Your office by letter of April 21, 1888, affirmed the action of the local
office, and that action was affirmed by the Department in the decision
now complained of.
Each cf the applicants states on oath that he has never received offi-
cial notice by registered letter or otherwise of the suspension of his said
cash entry, or of his right to petition for a hearing; that he has never
received official ntice of the decision of the local officers, of your office,
or of the Department. The applicants therefore ask that a hearing
de novo be granted them, or that they be now daly notified of the de-
cision of the local officers, and of their right of appeal from the same.
They allege that they transferred their respective claims to said Stinson
and Park by warranty deed, and claim to have an interest in the case
to the extent of such warranty.
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It appears from the records that notices were sent to said claimants
of the action taken by your office on the special agent's report, but it
is not shown that these notices reached them. Nordoes it appear that
any notice was sent them of the decision of the local office, of your office,
or of the Department.
The real parties defendant in this case were said Stinson and Park.
The present applicants appeared merely as witnesses for the govern-
ment. At the time of the hearing they had transferred the lands by
deed. If they desired to be made defendants and to contest the charges,
it was incumbent on them to ask to be made parties. This they failed
to do and stood by while cases in which they now claim to have been
interested were tried and decided adversely to them. Having thus
allowed their day in court to pass without intervention on their part,
they are in no position to ask that these cases be tried de novo.
Said applications are accordingly dismissed.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-COMMUTATION-SUPPLEMENTAL PROOF.
GRovE H. COWLES.
If non-compliance with law defeats the right of a homesteader to make final entry
under section 2291 R. S., it also defeats his right of commutation.
Permission to submit supplemental proof in the matter of residence may be accorded,
where the final proof is otherwise satisfactory, and no adverse claim exists.
First Assistant Seeretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 20, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Grove H. Cowles from your decision
of April 28, 1889, rejecting his final proof on homestead entry for the
S. E. Sec. 20, T. 137 N. R. 61 W., Fargo, North Dakota land district,
dismissing his appeal and allowing him ninety days in which to com-
mute entry in accordance with the rule in case of Peter Weber (7 L. D.,
476).
Your opinion states the record and testimony fully and fairly, and it
does not appear to me, upon careful review of the entire record includ-
ing the supplemental affidavits that the final proof, as it stands, can
under the law and departmental regulations be approved.
It is true the claimant has made very good improvements on the land,
and the testinonyshows that he has not neglected to cultivate portions of
it each year, but continuous residence has not been satisfactorily shown.
He has had household furniture in his house and has lived there at
intervals during the entire time since his entry, which (counting his
military service) makes over five years. e evidently thought, under
the advice of lawyers, that he was complying with the law, and it is
his misfortune that the advice was wrong.
You were in error in dismissing his appeal, it was properly taken.
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Since your decision, (April 29, 1889, the departmental decision relied
upon by you was, upon motion for review, revoked, (See Peter Weber,
on review, 9 L. D., 150), and it was decided that the right of commuta-
tion dependsupon prior compliance with the homestead law up to the
date of commutation.
The proof is not satisfactory and can not be accepted as it stands,
but in view of his improvements and cultivation of the land and the
fact that there is no adverse claim or protest against his entr3, he will
be allowed to submit supplemental proof, within ninety days from notice
of this decision, setting forth the facts as to his connection with the
land since the date of his final proof and he will give such explanation
as be may have of the conflicting statements in his final proof and his
affidavit filed January 17, 1889, and upon his compliance herewith you
will take such action in the case as shall be deemed proper.
Your decision is modified accordingly.
REPAYMENT-DESERT LAND ENTRY.
SPENCER V. RAYMOND.
Repayment can not be allowed where a desert entry is canceled because made for
speculative purposes and for land not desert in character.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Offic, September 20, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Spencer V. Raymond from the de-
cision of your office rejecting his application for the repayment of pur-
chase money paid upon desert laud entry made by the said Raymond
for Sec. 33, T. 5 N., R. 38, Blackfoot, Idaho.
This tract was entered by Raymond on January 6, 1883, under the
desert land act and in making said entry he swore that the land was
desert land within the meaning of the act of March 3, 1887, by personal
observation and frequently passing over the same. It was subsequently
determined that the land was not desert land and it had been laid off
by claimant as a towusite. The entry was held for cancellation upon
the report of a special agent, and claimant was allowed sixty days to
show cause why his entry should not be canceled upon the ground that
it was agricultural and timber land, and that the entry was not made
in good faith but for speculative purposes. No cause was shown and
the entry was canceled.
In his application for repayment claimant states that he with others
desired to secure the land as a townsite and was advised by the local
officers at Oxford, Idaho, that the only manner in which they could pro-
ceed would be for one of them to enter the tract under the desert land
act, and that claimant was selected for that purpose and that the pay-
ment was divided pro rata among the several residents; that when he
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was informed that the proceedings were irregular and several lots had
been sold, again acting upon the adyice of the local officers, relinquished
the land. He states that the money was expended in good faith upon
the advice of those whom they naturally depended for information.
This statement however lacks confirmation by the officers whom he
alleges gave him this advice.
When claimant made his entry he swore that the land was desert in
character and that the entry was not made for the purpose of obtain-
ing title to mineral land, timber land or agricultural land; but for the
purpose of faithfully reclaiming the land by conducting water thereon.
I cannot from all the facts before me conclude that Raymond acted
in good faith in making this entry, notwithstanding the advice that he
claims to have acted upon. He admits that he entered the land for a
townsite and for the purpose of sale and speculation, and yet he delib-
erately made an affidavit that it was entered for the purpose of faith.
fully reclaiming the land by conducting water thereon. Under such
circumstances the money can not be repaid.
The decision of your office is affirmed.
PRACTICE-RE-REVIEWHOMESTEAD ENTRY.
FRANCEWAY ET AL. v. GRIFFITHS (ON REVIEW).
A petition for re-review will not be entertained unless it presents new matter for con-
sideration.
The validity of a homestead entry is determined by the facts existing at the date
thereof. I
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Of-
fiee, September 20, 1890.
I am in receipt of a letter from Messrs. Britton and Gray, attorneys
for the Granite Powder Company, asking that departmental decision of
June 27, 1890, in the case of Ellen Frauceway et al. v. Richard Griffiths,
involving the latter's soldiers' additional homestead entry for lot 3, of
Sec. 19, T. 2 N., PR. 4 W., M. D. M., San Francisco land district, Cali-
fornia, be recalled and that Griffiths' entry be confirmed and passed to
patent.
The decision of June 27, 1890 (10 L. D., 691), having been rendered
upon a motion for review, the present letter must be considered as a
petition for re'review. The paper here presented does not come up to
the requirements laid down by the decisions of this Department for
such petitions. It is claimed that the ruling laid down in the decision
on the motion for review is in opposition to the rule laid down by the
supreme court in Durand v. Martin (120 U. S., 366). Thus the Depart-
ment is asked to reconsider and again go over the same question that
was presented and fully discussed upon the motion for review. This
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alone would be sufficient grounds for refusing to consider this petition.
The case cited, however, is not parallel with this and does not there-
fore control. The court there held that the right of a State under a
school land indemnity selection is to be determined by the condition of
the land at the time the selection is presented to the proper officer for
certification. This does not affect the long and well established rule
that the validity of an entry is to be determined by the facts existing
at the date thereof.
The decision complained of follows the ruling in Fouts v. Thompson,
on review (10 L. D., 649) and is adhered to.
The petition under consideration is denied.
PRIACTICE-NOTICE-PUBLICATION-SECOND CONTEST.
LUDWIG V. FAULKNER ET AL.
Publication of notice without an affidavit as the basis fo such service confers no
jurisdiction upon the local office.
Where a pending contest is attacked on the ground of fraud by one who makes
application to contest the entry in question, notice should not issue on such ap-
plication, but the case should be held for the final disposition of the prior contest.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 20, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Ralph N. Wood from your office de-
cision of April 26,1889, holding that the local officers erred in ordering
a hearing upon charges preferred in a contest affidavit filed by said
Wood and ordering a re-hearing before the local officers on a contest
initiated by Robert Ludwig v. Christopher Faulkner against timber-cult-
ure entry of said Faulkner, for the SE. I of Sec. 1, T. 32 S., R. 42 W.,
Garden City, Kansas, land district.
The record shows that on July 3, 1885, Christopher Faulkner made
timber cultureentryof said land. On the 27th day of November, 1886,
Robert Ludwig filed in the local office his affidavit of contest, alleging
that said Faulkner, " Has wholly failed to break, plow or stir, five acres
of said land during the first year of said entry and up to the date of this
contest, but the same remains wild, unbroken prairie land void of tim-
ber or cultivation.
On December 1, 1886, said Ludwig filed his homestead application to
enter said land and on the same day presented the statutory affidavit
showing proper qualifications to make the entry.
A hearing was ordered on Ludwig's contest and on the 9th day of
December, 188%, notice thereof was published in a newspaper fixing
June 3, 1887, as the time set for the hearing. No affidavit or other
evidence was filed showing that personal service of notice could not be
made upon Faulkner and no evidence of personal service of the notice
upon him was presented.
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On the 12th day of February 1887, Ralph N. Wood filed in the local
office his affidavit of contest against the entry of Faulkner, alleging
that said " Faulkner has executed and sold a relinquishment to the
United States of his said entry, to a party other than this afflaut; that
said Faulkner's entry was fraudulent and speculative at its inception."
At the time set for hearing June 3, 1887, Ludwig appeared and offered
his evidence. Faulkner did not appear. On the same day but after
Ludwig's testimony was taken Wood appeared before the local officers
and filed his affidavit, stating
That at the date of the initiation of said Ludwig's contest there were more thanfive acres broken on said tract of land; that for this reason afflant filed his complaint
against said defendant entryman, alleging speculation and bad faith on the part of
the said defendant. . . . That the allegations as contained in the complaint of
the said Robert Ludwig are entirely false and untrue. . . . That he firmly be-lieves said Ludwig's contest is speculative and fraudulent and is not being prose-
cuted in good faith.
Thereupon the local officers suspended any further action on Lud-
wig's contest, and ordered a hearing on the charges contained in Wood's
complaint as against Ludwig's contest, which was before the local offi-
cers and on the 22nd day of June, they rendered their decision sus-
taining Ludwig's contest and allowing him the preference right to enter
said land and dismissed Wood's contest, and recommended Faulkner's
entry for cancellation. From this decision Wood appealed to your
office.
On the 26th day of April, 1889, your office held that the local officers
erred in directing a hearing on Wood's contest, and ordered a re-hear-
ing between Ludwig and Faulkner on Ludwig's contest, (as the notice
for publication was defective) and, upon the proper affidavit being filed,
the local officers were directed to give notice by publication of the day
fixed for hearing.
From your said decision Wood appeals.
Your office decision remanding the case and ordering a re-hearing is
correct. Rule 9 of the Rules of Practice requires personal service of
notice in all cases when possible and prescribes how such service shall
be made. Rule 11 provides: "Notice may be given by publication
alone only when it is shown by affidavit of the contestant, and by such
other evidence as the register and receiver may require, that due dili-
gence has been used and that personal service can not be made. The
party will be required to state what effort has been made to get per-
sonal service."
The service of notice is required before the local officers obtain juris-
diction to proceed with the hearing. In order to serve by publication
the rule requires a showing to be made that personal service can not be
m4de. This showing is the primary foundation upon which the publi-
cation is based and where.a service of notice by publication is substi-
tuted for personal service. a strict compliance with Rule 11, is requisite
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to confer jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Burgess v.
Pope's iHeirs (9 L. D., 218); Allen v. Leet (6 IL. D., 669).
As there was no showing at all made as a basis for serving the notice
by publication it follows that the local officers had no jurisdiction to
hear-and determine the contest, or to act upon the subject matters in
controversy in such a manner as to bind Faulkner the entryrnan.
Without passing upon the sufficiency' of the allegations of Wood's
affidavit, I am clear that the local officers erred in ordering a hearing
upon Wood's contest. Where a pending contest is attacked on the
ground of fraud by one who makes due application to contest the entry
in question, notice will not issue on such application, but the case will
be held for the final disposition of the prior contest. Melcher v. Clark
(4 L. D., 504); Eddy v. England (6 L. D., 530); Davisson v. Gabus et al.
(10 IL. D., 114).
The decision appealed from is affirmed.
PRE-MPTION-SECOND FILING.
MALONEY V. CHARLES.
A filing made in good faith by a minor, but abandoned when the fact of minority is.
discovered, is no bar to a second filing.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 22, 1890.
On November 27, 18 85, William F. Charles filed his declaratory state-
ment, No. 2742, upon the W. J of the NW. i of Sec. 7, T. 2 N., R. 34.,
W., McCook, Nebraska, alleging settlement November 25, 885. He
gave notice of his intention to make final proof before the register and
receiver, and that such proof would be made on May 30, 1887. This
notice was duly published.
On November 2, 1886, James B. Maloney made homestead entry, No.
3983, upon said tract, and on April 25, 1887, he filed a protest against
the allowance of Charles' final proof, charging failure to comply with
the requirements of law as to residence, cultivation and improvements,
and asked for a hearing.
On the day set for taking Charles' final proof; both parties, with
their attorneys, appeared betore the register and receiver, and Maloney
filed an amendment to his former protest, charging that Charles was not
a qualified pre-emptor, for the reason that he had theretofore exhausted
his pre-emption right by filing a declaratory statement upon another
tract, and that the filing upon which he proposed to make final proof
was without authority of law.
Charles' final proof was made and the subscribing witnesses thereto
were cross-examined, and other witnesses were called and examined.
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At the conclusion of the hearing the register and receiver concurred
in the following finding: "1 We are of the opinion that receiver's receipt
should issue to said William F. Charles," and, on appeal, you affirm
that judgment. Maloney brings this appeal.
The testimony at the hearing was mainly directed to the issue as to
claimant's residence on the tract.
Charles admits, and so states in his notice of intention to submit final
proof, that he had on February 4, 1884, made a declaratory statement
for another tract of land in section 5, same town and range, believing
at the time he was twenty-one years old, but that soon after making
such filing he learned he ws under twenty-one years of age. He
had lived with one Nelson, his grandfather, from boyhood. Nelson
swears that he told Charles prior to the first filing that he was twenty-
one years old; that he arrived at this understanding from certain busi-
ness transactions that took place at about the date claimant was born.
After this filing was made, they again got to talking about claimant's
age, and to be certain about it Nelson sent to Mount Vernon, Colorado,
and obtained the Bible containing the record of Charles' birth. This
record was made the day Charles was born, and showed that he was
only twenty years old; thereupon he abandoned his claim, and when
he became twenty-one filed on the land in controversy.
The premises considered, I do not think Charles was barred by sec-
tion 2261 of the Revised Statutes from making a filing on the tract in
controversy. His conduct was open and honest. Had he falsely and
fraudulently stated that he was twenty-one years old, and thus sought
to obtain the land, his pre-emptive right would have been exhausted
and a second filing would not be permitted. Allen v. Baird (6 I. D.,
298).
But, in view of his honest mistake, and his voluntary abandonment
of his claim under the first filing, when he found he was not personally
qualified to make it, I think he should again be permitted to exercise
his pre-emption right. Ross v. Poole (4 L. D., 116); Arnold v. Langley
(1 L. D., 439).
As to the question of residence and improvements, I do not deem it
necessary to rehearse the testimony; the same is substantially set forth
in your said office decision. It abundantly shows that the entryman
has complied with the law and acted in good faith; his proof should
be accepted and the entry allowed.
Your said office decision is affirmed.
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PRACTICE-REHEARING-OSAGE LAND.
FINAN V. MEEKER.
When an order for rehearing is made the case is generally tried de novo, and the peti-
tioner for rehearing cannot in sucli a case be heard to complain of former pro-
ceedings therein however defective they may be.
The right to purchase Osage land under the act of May 28, 1880, can only be exercised
by one who has the qualifications of a pre-emptor and makes actual settlement
on the land with the intention of making it a home.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 23, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Elliott E. Meeker from your office
decision of December 20, 1888, in which you hold for cancellation his
Osage cash entry, made May 13, 1881, for the NW. 4 NE. -1, NE. 
NW. 4, Sec. 28, and S. J SE. 4 of See. 21, T. 27 S., R. 12 W., Larned,
Kansas.
He filed Osage declaratory statement No. 2373 October 30, 1883, for
said tract, alleging settlement October 23, 1883. He made his final
proof on May 10, 1884, before the clerk of the district court of Pratt
county, Kansas.
The proof appears regular in form; it showed continuous residence;
also that the land was used for a farm; six acres broken; frame house
fourteen by sixteen feet, and a well dug; improvements valued at $150.
The full payment was made for the land and final certificate, No. 2,221,
issued November 14, 1885.
Catherine E. Finan filed Osage declaratory statement No. 3584 for
the SE. 4, Sec. 21, T. 27 S., R. 12 W., Larned, Kansas, on May 2, 1884,
alleging settlement February 15, 1884, being in conflict with Meeker's
entry as to the S. i SE. 4 of said section. She made final proof October
24, 1881, and on January 27, 1885, filed her affidavit of contest against
Meeker's entry, alleging the same to be fraudulent, and that she had a
superior right to the land. She also filed an affidavit explaining why
she failed to protest at the time Meeker made his proof. This affidavit
was forwarded to your office, and by your letter " G," dated July 8, 1885,
a hearing was ordered, and all parties notified.
Orders and continuances were made from time to time, and case finally
set for April 28, 1886, when defendant made default. Plaintiff intro-
duced her testimony, and on October 23, 1886, the register and receiver
held Meeker's entry for cancellation, subject to appeal, and attorneys
were duly notified. On November 18, 1886, the defendant took an ap-
peal to your office and on January 15, 1887, the decision of the register
and receiver was affirmed by you. An application for rehearing was
made on April 14, 1887, and by your office letter "G ," dated April 23,
1887, the decision of January 15, 1887, was revoked, and the case re-
manded for rehearing, on the ground of defective notice.
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The case was again set for July 11, 1887, and the plaintiff appeared
and filed proof of personal service upon all parties in interest.
The. case was again continued until July 18, 1887, when both parties
appeared, and the testimony taken from day to day until the case was
-closed.
The register and receiver found in favor of Finan, and recommended
the cancellation of Meeker's entry, and by your office decision you affirm
that judgment.
The record in this case is very voluminous; there is much irrelevant
and conflicting testimony.
It is insisted that Finan has no standing in this case, and is Mbarred
by reason of her aches in not protesting against Meeker's final proof.
This is not well taken. Until patent issues for the public lands, you
have jurisdiction to hear and determine any properly supported charges
of bad faith against those seeking title to the public lands. Moreover,
when an application for rehearing is made, as in this case, and the same
is granted, the case will generally be tried de novo; and the petitioners
for rehearing can not then be heard to complain of the former notices
and proceedings, however defective they may be.
Besides it appears in this case that all the parties in interest-mort-
gagee, transferee and entryman-were duly served with notice of the
time and place of the rehearing.
I have carefully examined the testimony and find it substantially as
set forth in your said office decision.
The lands involved are a part of the Osage 11ndian trust and dimin-
ished reserve lands; and the rights of claimants thereto are determined
under the act of May 28, 1880 (21 Stat., 143). The second section of
that act provides:-
That all of the said Indian lands shall be subject to disposal to actual settlers
only, having the qualification of pre-emptors- not exceeding one quarter section
each.
The entryman under this statute must be an actual settler on the
land, and must have the qualification of a pre-emptor.
The principal inquiry, and the only one in this case, is, whether Meeker
was an actual settler within the meaning of said act.
An actual settler under the pblic land laws is one who in his own proper person
goes upon a tract of the public land with the intention of remaining there and of ac-
quiring title thereto, or, in other words, of making it his home. United States v.
Atterbery et l., 10 L. D. 36.
Meeker did not personally make any of the improvements on the
laud. The building put up on the land was moved off soon after proof
was made, and used as a granary by one John Waldock, father-in-law
of Meeker.
It appears that Meeker and his wife staid in the house one night,
while it was on the land. But all the facts andi circumstances set forth
in this case abundantly show that he was not an actual settler upon the
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land in the sense of the term as used by this Department. They fur-
ther show that John Waldock is the real party in interest.
Finan settled on the land after Meeker's house was built. Her im-
provements were of small value; but the evidence shows she was an
actual settler. Her house was torn down at the instigation of John
Waldock, and she was otherwise badly treated. She appears to have
built three different houses, and the proof shows they were all destroyed,
and she could not remain in peace upon the land, and was obliged to
leave it without any fault of her own.
Meeker's entry should be canceled. It is so ordered and your decis-
ion is affirmed.
PRACTICE-TRANSFEREE-OSAGE LAND.
FINAN v. PALMER ET AL.
It is not necessary that the heirs and legal representatives of a deceased entryman
should be made parties to a proceeding against an entry. where the entryman has
disposed of his interest in the land and the transferees are served with due notice
of such proceeding.
Concurring decisions of the local and general land offices as to questions of fact are
generally accepted as conclusive by the Department where the evidence is con-
flicting.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 23, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Eliza Woldock, transferee of William
A. Palmer, deceased, from your decision of December 20, 1888, wherein
you hold for cancellation said Palmer's Osage cash entry No. 1286, made
January 27, 1885, for the Si of the NE4, and the No of SE4 of Sec.
21, T. 27 S., R. 12, W., Larnel, Kansas.
Palmer's alleged settlement was made January 1, 1884. He made
final proof July 2, 1884, and first payment July 11, thereafter, he com-
pleted his payments January 27, 1885, and on that day obtained the
register's final certificate.
The final proof is regular in form; it shows continuous residence
from January 1, 1884, to date of final proof. The improvements con-
sist of a sod house, fourteen by sixteen feet, with board roof; six acres
broken, and the land used as'a farm, valued at $100.
Catherine Finan filed Osage declaratory statement No. 3584 on May
2, 1884, for the SE I of the same section, township and range, alleging
settlement February 15, 1884. She made final proof and first payment
October 24, 1884, and oil January 28, 1885, filed her affidavit of contest
against Palmer's entry, alleging that the same was fraudulent, and as-
serting her paramount right to the land as to the N I of the S1 -1.
By your letter "G" of January 29, 1886, a hearing was ordered.
On this hearing, a decision was rendered adverse to the entry. Upon
2497-No. 11--21
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appeal, you remanded the case for a rehearing, which was had July 12,
1887. The register and receiver again held that the entry of Palmer
should be canceled, and the land awarded to Finan, and by your said
office decision you affirm that judgment.
On August 13, 1881, Palmer conveyed the land by warranty deed to
Julia E. Meeker; Meeker conveyed it to Addison De Puy by warranty
deed, on July 18, 1885, and De Pay conveyed it by warranty deed to
Eliza Waldock, November 2, 1885. Palmer died about January 1, 1885
(exact date not given).
This appeal is based upon lack of jurisdiction, and other errors,
specifically set forth. t is insisted that no administrator of the estate
of William A. Palmer and no guardian of his heirs having been made
a party and served with notice, jurisdiction is not obtained.
At the time your office ordered a rehearing (January 21, 1887), Eliza
Waldock claimed the land by mesne conveyances by warranty deed
from the entryman, Palmer, who was dead; at the rehearing, therefore,
she and the mortgagee were the only parties defendant who had any
interest in the land, and they were both personally served with the
notice of the rehearing. The complaint that the legal representatives
and heirs of Palmer were not made parties to this proceeding has no
force.
The death of the entryman prior to the day fixed for the hearing is no ground for
the dismissal or suspension of proceedings against the entry, where said entryman
has disposed of his interest in the land, and the transferee is made a party defend-
ant and is present in court. Milum v. Johnson, 10 L. D., 624.
The facts in this case are substantially set forth in your said office
decision, which affirms the register and receiver in holding that Palmer's
entry was made for the use and benefit of one John Waldock, and not
for the entryman's own use and benefit; also that Finan endeavored in
good faith to comply with the law. Concurring decisions of the local
and general land offices as to the questions of fact are generally ac-
cepted as conclusive by the Department where the evidence is conflict-
ing, as in this case. (Conley v. Price, 9 L. D., 490.)
On a careful review of the testimony, I find no reason for disturbing
your action, which is hereby affirmed.
PRE- EMPTIVE RIGHT-SECOND FIIjING-TRANSTWTATION.
LENNIS V. SOUTHARD.
A pre-emption filing transmuted to a homestead entry, under which title is subse-
quently perfected, exhausts the pre-emptive right, notwithstanding the fact that
such filing is made prior to the adoption of the Revised Statutes.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 24, 1890.
I have considered the case of Walter M. Lennis v. Walter J. South-
ard, as presented by the appeal of the latter from the decision of your
office, dated April 24, 1889, rejecting his final proof in support of his
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pre-emption claim, for the SE. i of Sec. 18, T. 4 S., R. 22 W., Kirwin,
Kansas, and holding for cancellation his pre-emption declaratory state-
ment, No. 21,699, filed December 12, 1885, alleging settlement on said
tract the same day.
The record shows that on December 17, 1886, said Lennis made home-
stead entry, No. 22,372, of said land, and on January 19, 1887, filed a
protest against the allowance of Southard's final proof in support of
his pre-emption claim, advertised to be made before the probate judge
of Norton county, Kansas, on February 28, same year, alleging that said
pre-emption claim was illegal, because the pre-empftor had made a former
filing for another tract of land, which he subsequently transmuted to a
homestead entry, upon which he made final proof and received final
certificate therefor, and that he moved from land of his own in said
State to settle upon the land in question.
A hearing was duly had before the local officers on April 19, 1887,
and they rejected said proof and recommended the cancellation of said
filing, for the reason that the pre-emptor, on November 14, 1871, filed
his pre-emption declaratory statement for the SE. I of Sec. 31, T. 4, R.
15, in said State, upon which he resided until April 13, 1874, when he
filed his soldier's homestead declaratory statement thereon; that on
November 13, 1874, he made homestead entry thereof and made final
proof on June 11, 1881, showing continuous residence on his homestead
from October 27, 1871, to date of said final proof; that final certificate
issued for said homestead, and, while said Southard was the owner of
said homestead, he initiated a contest against a homestead entry cover-
ing the tract in question; that after the hearing of said contest, but
before the cancellation of the contested entry by the Department, he
and his wife conveyed their said homestead by warranty deed to the
sister of Mrs. Southard, with the understanding that it should be
reconveyed to Mrs. Southard when requested so to do by her husband;
that said conveyance did not relieve said pre-emptor from the inhibi.
tion of section 2261 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and
that he was disqualified from making a pre-emption entry, as well as
from making a second filing, because of his former filing.
On appeal, your office affirmed the decision of the local office, for the
reason that under the provisions of said section 2261, said Southard
exhausted his pre-emptive right when he filed his first pre-emption
declaratory statement, and that, since his second filing was illegal, it
was unnecessary to consider the second ground of obiecion to said
proof.
It is strenuously insisted by counsel for appellant that said second
filing having been made while the rules and regulations of the Depart-
ment allowed the same, the first filing having been made prior to the
adoption of the Revised Statutes of the United States, the rights of the
pre-emptor became vested, and his proof should be allowed by the De-
partment.
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In support of said contention, counsel refers in his brief, filed in your
office, in support of his appeal from the land office, and which has been
considered, at his request, on appeal, to your office letter dated June
29, 1874, to the register and receiver, at Humboldt, California (1 C. L.
O., 55), allowing a pre-emptor to make any number of filings for unof-
fered land, if he only makes proof in support of one claim; also the case
of Southern Pacific Railroad Company v. Wiggins and Kellar (4 C. L. O.,
123), and the case of California v. Pierce (1 L. D., 442), and insists that
the rule announced in said decisions was promulgated and continued
" up to a very recent date," when it was changed by the departmental
ruling in the case of Jonathan House (4 L. D., 189), decided by Mr. Sec-
retary Lamar, on October 10, 1885, which ruling, he alleges, was not
known in the land district where said land is situated, until January,
1886.
In the case of William L. Phelps (8 C. L. O., 139), decided November
17, 1881, Mr. Secretary Kirkwood held that, in the absence of adverse
rights, a party could file a second declaratory statement for the same
tract. This decision was expressly overruled in the case of J. B. Ray-
mond (2 L. D., 854), decided by Secretary Teller, on February 27,1884,
where the question was carefully and elaborately considered, and it was
held that, under section 2261 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States, a pre-emptor can file but one declaratory statement. In that
case the claimant asked to be allowed to file for the same or another
tract, and was refused. This decision, in effect, overruled the Pierce
case, supra, and this was nearly two years prior to the second filing of
Southard.
In the case of Jonathan House, decided October 10, 1885, more than
two months prior to said second filing, the Department held that it
made no difference that the first filing was made prior to the adoption
of the Revised Statutes; that fact would not avoid the inhibition of
said section 2261, citing Baldwin v. Stark (107 U. S., 403).
In the case of BywAter v. Hill (5 L. D., 15), decided July 22, 1886, the
Department held that a pre-emption claim, based on the settlement and
filing of one who had previously exhausted his pre-emption right. was
illegal, and the transmutation thereof to a homestead entry would not
exclude an intervening adverse claim. In this case the first filing was
made in Minnesota, in June, 1873, and the second, which was held to
be illegal, upon the authority of the Raymond case, in October, 1881.
In Ihe case of Jose Maria Solaiza (6 L. D., 20), A cting Secretary Mul-
drow said: The doctrine of the Pierce case, however, has been re-
peatedly overruled," citing the Raymond and House cases, supra. See
also Orrin C. Rashaw (id., 570); James F. Bright (id. 602); Bridges v.
Curran (7 L. D., 395); C. S. Curtis (10 L. D., 188).
It is clear that the second filing of Southard was illegal, and under
the well-settled rulings of the Department he can not be permitted to
enter the land in controversy.
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It will be quite unnecessary to consider the good faith of the convey-
ance of said homestead, for, under the provisions of section 2261 of the
U. S. Revised Statutes, which he is presumed to know, Southard is pro-
hibited from making pre-emption entry of the land.
The decision of your office must be, and it is hereby, affirmed.
AFFIDAVIT OF CONTEST-CORROBORATION.
REED v. ARNESON,
An affidavit filed as the basis of a contest does notjustify a hearing thereon unless it
sets forth clearly charges that will warrant cancellation if proven.
An affidavit of contest, if unceorroborated, may be properly rejected.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the ommnigsioner of the General
Land Office, September 24,1890.
I have considered the case of Isaiah W. Reed v. Olena Arneson, in-
volving the pre-emption cash entry made by the latter December 8,
1884, for the NE. 1 of Sec. 32, T. 15 N., R. 42 E., Walla Walla land dis-
'trict, Washington.
Said Reed, on July 5, 1888 filed application to contest said entry, ac-
companying the same with an affidavit alleging insufficient residence
and improvement. Your office, on November 3, 1888, denied the ap-
plication, and returned the affidavit for amendment, " to specifically
allege defect, if any, in residence and cultivation prior to date of mak-
ing proof." On December 18, 1888, Reed filed amended affidavit and
application. These also your office, by letter of January 12, 1880, re-
jected for the same reasons previously given. Thereupon Reed ap-
peals to the Department.
Your office is clearly correct in olding both the original and the
amended affidavit insufficient to justify a hearing. So much of the
amended affidavit as refers to the entrynan's failure to reside upon the
tract since making final proof has (under the circumstances) no bear-
ing upon the question. The list of improvements set forth does not in-
dicate bad faith. The allegation that " the residence of said Olena
Arneson on said tract prior to the date of proof thereon was not suffi-
cient under the law to show good faith," is but the expression of affiant's
opinion, the only fact stated in support thereof being that the contest-
ant "passed the land frequently, and never saw claimant on the place
at any time from the date of entry until proof was made." This nega-
tive statement might be true, and the testimony of the entryman and
her witnesses on final proof not be false.
Moreover, the contest affidavit is practically uncorroborated. At-
tached thereto is the joint affidavit of two other witnesses, who certify
to its correctness.
1. Excepting as to the contents thereof relative to the residence of said claimant
Olena Arneson, on said land prior to final proof made thereon, concerning which fact
of residence affiants were not in a position to know and therefore can not state.
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Rules 2 and 3 of Practice say:
2. In every case of application for a hearing, an affidavit must be filed by the con-
testant with the register and receiver, fully setting forth the facts which constitute
the grounds of contest.
3. Where an entry has been allowed and remains of record, the affidavit of the
contestant must be accompanied by the affidavits of one or more witnesses in support
of the allegations made.
In the case at bar, the only allegation made which has any bearing
upon the question at issue is unsupported by the affidavit of any one
except the contestant. (See Farmer v. Moreland et al., 8 L. D., 446).
Your office decisions denying the application for a hearing are af-
firmed.
APPLICATION TO MAKE ENTRY-AMENDMENT.
PATRIcI KELLEY.
An application to make timber culture entry received, noted of record, but returned
for amendment of the preliminary affidavit, effectually reserves the laud as
against a subsequent applicant therefor.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 25, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Patrick Kelley from the decision of
your office of April 12, 1889, rejecting his application to make timber
culture entry of the W. F of the SW. and the NE. of the SW. and
the SW. i of the NW. 4, See. 11, T. 149 N., R. 59 W., Grand Forks,
Dakota.
The following appears of record:'
March 27, 1882, George Hetherington made timber culture entry of
the said tract. April 6, 1886, John Fitzgerald filed an affidavit of con-
test against said entry, accompanied with an application to enter the
same.
Notice was issued, and June 8, 1886, set for hearing. On said day
Hetherington did not appear, but made default. Fitzgerald, the con-
testant, appeared and submitted his own testimony in support of his
affidavit of contest. No other witness was produced.
September 9, 1886, the register and receiver endered their decision,
as follows:
At the trial only one witness appeared, viz: the contestant himself, and we do not
think his unsupported evidence sufficient to justify a declaration of forfeiture. We
are therefore of the opinion that said contest should be dismissed.
No appeal was taken by Fitzgerald from this action of the local offi-
cers, but on January 7, 1889, (as appears from your office letter of April
12, 1889, now before me,) the entry of Hetherington was canceled by
your office, " upon the contest of John Fitzgerald."
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January 14, 1889, the cancellation was noted on the records of the
local office, and on the same day contestant's attorney was notified by
registered letter of such cancellation, but no action was taken thereon
by the contestant or his said attorney.
Some time prior to the cancellation of Hetherington's entry (the exact
date nowhere appearing of record), the local officers received by mail
the application of Betsey Halvorson to enter said tract, under the
timber culture law. Her entry papers were executed before a notary
public, and dated December 20, 1888.
(n receipt of this application, it was immediately returned to her,
with a statement from the register that the land was covered by the
entry of Hetherington. On the 2d of February, 1889, which was after
the cancellation of the lletherington entry, the same application was
again received at the local office. On the same day it was again re-
turned to the applicant, with the request that she make out new papers,
as forty-three days had elapsed since the applicant had made affidavit
to her qualifications to enter the land. This new application was not
received until February 15th, same year. Both sets of papers were
complete and regular in form and the necessary fee accompanied each
application.
On February 9, 1889, six days prior to the receipt of the new papers
of Hlalvorson, Kelley, the appellant herein, applied to make timber cult-
ure entry of the tract in question. This application was rejected by
the register, because of the prior rights of Halvorson, as above set
forth. From this ruling Kelley appealed to the Commissioner, who af-
firmed the judgment of the register, and he now appeals to this Depart-
ment, claiming that, under the proceedings above set forth, he is the
first legal applicant for the land, subsequent to the cancellation of the
entry of Hetherington.
The application of B alvorson, made priorto the cancellation of Heth-
erington's entry, was properly rejected, because the land was then
covered by an entry and her application was not accompanied with an
affidavit of contest against the same. Drummond v. Reeve, 11 L. D.,
179. Her application of February 2, 1889, was received when the land
was subject to entry, because prior thereto (January 14, 1889), the entry
of Hetherington had been canceled.
But it is insisted by counsel for appellant that this application should
have been rejected by the register and receiver, because the affidavit as
to character of the land and qualifications of the applicant was made
more than forty days prior to the date of her application.
Had the local officers rejected her application outright, and she had
appealed from such rejection, this question would then have been
properly before me for consideration. But such was not their action,
as presented by the record in this case. On receipt of her application
they, on the same day, returned the papers to her (for new affidavit) and
noted the same on the tract books. This was the status of the case
when appellant, a week later, applied to make timber culture entry.
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No rights of his were disturbed by such action of the local officers, for
at that time he had none to prejudice. Moreover, when he applied to
make entry, he was informed of the application of lalvorson and the
action of the register and receiver thereon, so that his application was
made with full knowledge of her equities.
It has been held by this Department that an "application to enter is
equivalent to actual entry, so far as the rights of the applicant are con-
cerned." Pfaff v. Williams, et at., 4 L. D., 455.
While the affidavit of Halvorson, accompanying her application, was
regarded by the local officers as defective as to the date when it was
made, they, notwithstanding this defect, made it of record, where it
remained at the time Kelley applied to enter.
While counsel for appellant complains of the laches of Halvorson,
they are not apparent in the record. It is true that thirteen days in-
tervened between the. return of her first papers and the receipt of the
new ones at the local office, but how far she resided from the notary
before whom she executed the papers, or how much time was needed
to comply with the directions of the register and receiver, does not ap-
pear, hence, I cannot find that she has been negligent.
Fitzgerald, who contested the entry of Hetherington, not having ap-
pealed from the decision of the register and receiver dismissing his con-
test, thereby forfeited his right of preference. Boos v. Whitcomb, 10
L. D., 584.
ilalvorson, being the first applicant to enter after the cancellation of
Hetherington's entry by the Commissioner, should be and is hereby
allowed to make entry of the land.
The decision of your office rejecting the application of Kelly is accord-
ingly affirmed.
SCRIP LOCATION-CONTIGUITY OF TRACTS-RETURN OF SCRIP.
JOHN BROWN.
Where an application to locate scrip covers non-contiguous tracts and is allowed for
one tract, and rejected as to the other on account of such non-contiguity, the en-
try allowed may he canceled, on request of the applicant, and the scrip returned,
if by such action the government sustains no loss.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land O e, September 25, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of John Brown from your decision of
February 19, 1889, declining to cancel the entry for lot No. 4 in Sec. 18,
T. 63N ., R. 9 W., Duluth, Minnesota land district, containing 33.75 acres,
and to return him his "i special certificate of location E. 3", Valentine
land scrip.
It appears from the record and testimony in the case that on September
8, 1887, he applied to locate said scrip on the land above described and
on lot No. 1 in Sec. 13, T. 63 N., R. 10 W. (same district) containing 9.75
DECISIONS RELATING TO TH-E PUBLIC LANDS. 329
acres and tendered the price of the excess above forty acres, the amount
said scrip called for.
The local officers required him to make two separate applications,
one for each tract which he did, and delivered the certificate of location
to them; they thereupon accepted the application for the tract first
described and endorsed the other application-" Refused forthe reason
that the land applied for covers more than one legal subdivision, this
being the second piece applied for-fees and excesstendered"-aid noti-
fied him that he could appeal from their action, which he did, and on
December 19, 1888, being advised that patent could not be issued for
two non-contiguous tracts upon one certificate of location, he filed ap-
plication for the return of his scrip, and on February 19, 1889, your
predecessor passed upon the case anal decided that as " there appears
no obstacle on the part of the government to the issuing of title to the
land in question, I must decline to cancel said location and return the
scrip."
In March following a motion for review and reversal of said decision
was made and the same was overruled, from which decision as well as
from the judgment of February 19th he appealed.
The attorney who advised him that he could locate on both tracts,
says in his brief that Brown chose this tract of land on being informed
that he could not have both tracts. This is denied however. Brown
in his affidavit says he made application for a location on both tracts
" and tendered the fees and commissions " etc. He says he was required
to make the two separate applications, one for each tract, and-
" My application was to enter both parcels of land with the said scrip
and in case I am not allowed to do so, I would respectfully ask the re-
turn of the said piece of scrip" etc.
The local officers say-,' Concerning the facts stated in his (Brown's)
petition we would say that to the best of our knowledge the facts as
stated by him are substantially true, and we recommend that his peti-
tion be allowed."
The proposition as made was an entirety and re-writing it on two pa-
pers, at the request of the local officers, did not change its legal effect.
The government's agent can not take this scrip and use it in paying
for part of the land for which it was offered. While there is no obstacle
in the way of a patent issuing for the tract first described, there is as
to the second, and Brown did not propose to take the one without the
other.
The testimony shows that he has not taken possession of the land nor
in any way injured or interfered with it. This being so the government
can be placed where it was when the entry was made, and as the local
officers have joined in recommending that his petition be granted, and
inasmuch as the government does jlot desire to drive hard bargains with
its citizens, the petition of Brown will be granted, the entry canceled
and his scrip No. E. 3. returned to him.
Your office decisions are reversed.
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OKLAHOMA LANDS-SETTLEMENT RIGHTS-TOWNSITE.
TOWNSITE OF KINGFISHER V. WOOD ET AL.
The provisions of the act of March 2, 1889, opening to settlement and entry the Ter-
ritory of Oklahoma, as limited by the third proviso of section 13 of said act, ex-
pressly prohibit any one from entering said Territory, prior to the hour fixed by
the President's proclamation, with the intention of settlement on any part
thereof.
No permission, or license to be within said Territory by virtue of special employment
therein, can be granted as against the express terms of the statute, or used to
defeat the equal operation thereof and the rights of others thereunder; and one
who is permissibly within said Territory prior to the opening thereof, and seeks
to take advantage of his presence therein has "entered and occupied " the same in
violation of the statute, and is accordingly disqualified to enter any of said lands,
or acquire any right thereto.
An actual settlement, followed by residence and improvement, confers a right oflhome-
stead that attaches from date of settlement, and sch right is not impaired by the
subsequent occupation of the land by townsite settlers on the day of sch settle-
ment.
A ettlement not made in good faith for homestead purposes, blnt with a view to speci-
lation, does not confer any rights under the homesttad law.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, October
1, 890.
The controversy in this case involves the title to the N. of Sec. 15,
T. 16 N., R. 7 W., Kingfisher, Oklahoma. The record shows that on
April 23, 1889, John H. Wood made homestead entry for the NE. and
William D. Fossett for the NW. of said section; and on May 4, 1889,
the occupants of the townsite of Kingfisher, by its mayor and others.
made application at the local office to enter said tract for townsite
purposes.
A hearing was ordered by your office to determine when said land
was actually selected and occupied as-a townsite.
The trial began July 2, 1889, was continued from time to time, and
completed August 17, following.
Upon the evidence submitted, the register and receiver recommended
the allowance of the townsite application, and the cancellation of the
entries of Fossett and Wood. From this judgment they prosecuted
separate appeals to your office, and, on March 6, 1890, the judgment
appealed from was reversed, the entries held intact and the townsite
application rejected.
The townsite applicants, in due time, filed a motion for review, which
upon due consideration, on May 5, 1890, you overruled. The townsite
applicants have appealed from your judgment to the Department.
Pending the appeal, the mayor of the city transmitted a petition to
your office, asking its dismissal; but protests against such dismissal
were also filed by parties claiming lots as occupants of said townsite.
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The appeal and protests being of record, each will receive considera-
tion.
There is practically little, if any, ground for controversy about the
facts, either as found by the local office, or by yourself. They may
fairly be resolved into the following statements:
First: Fossett, at the time of making his homestead entry, was a
legally qualified homesteader.
Second: He settled upon the said NW. i on April 22, 1889, and prior
to the time that a townsite was actually taken
Third: Wood was within the Territory of Oklahoma, in charge of the
military transportation train in the vicinity of the land in controversy
at the time the territory was opened for settlement by the President's
proclamation; but otherwise possessed the qualifications of a home-
steader.
Fourth: Wood settled upon the said NE. 1 April 22, 1889, and prior
to the time that the townsite was actually taken.
Fifth: Prior to the time entries were made at the land office, and on
the same day that Fossett and Wood settled upon these respective tracts,
both quarter sections were occupied by townsite applicants for pur.
poses of trade and commerce, and the lands surveyed into lots, blocks,
streets and alleys for townsite purposes.
Upon this state of facts there can be no doubt that these entrymen
would prevail over the townsite occupants, unless prohibited under the
act of Congress and the proclamation of the President opening the ter-
ritory. They were first on the ground, and this prior occupancy would
have been notice, other things being equal, that the land had been
legally appropriated and no longer subject to entry for townsite pur-
poses.
First as to the rights of Mr. Wood. Great stress is laid by his coun-
sel upon the fact that he was lawfully in the territory, in the govern-
ment service, at and prior to the time said lands were opened to settle-
ment, and that therefore no legal objection to his availing himself of
the benefits of the homestead law for the tract claimed by him existed.
In this connection, it is necessary to consider the act of Congress mak-
ing the " Territory of Oklahoma" a part of the public domain, and the
proclamation of the President opening the same for settlement.
Congress, by sections 12 and 13 of the act entitled, "An act making
appropriations for the current and contingent expenses of the Indian
Department, and for fulfilling treaty stipulations with the various In-
dian tribes," approved March 2, 1889 (25 Stats., 1001), provided for the
extinguishment of the SeminoleIndian title in and to certain lands ceded
by Article III of the treaty between the United States and said nation
of Indians, concluded June 14, 1866, and proclaimed August 16, same
year, and upon survey ascertained to contain 2,037,414.62 acres. Sec-
tion 13 provided, that " lands acquired by the United States under said
agreement shall be a part of the public domain, to be disposed of only
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as herein provided;" that of the lands sections 1t and 3 were reserved
for school purposes; that the remainder of the lands should be disposed
of to actual settlers under the homestead laws only, except as therein
otherwise provided, except that section two thousand, three hundred
and one of the Revised Statutes should not apply. This section, also,
after providing that entries should be substantially in square form, and
that no person should enter more than one quarter section, used the
following language: " But until said lands are opened for settlement
-by proclamation of the President, no person shall be permitted to enter
upon and occupy the same; and no person violating this provision shall
ever be permitted to enter any of said lands or acquire any right thereto."
The section also provided for entry of townsites.
The history of these lands and the circumstances under which the
act was passed should be considered in connection with the language
employed to arrive at a fair construction and a just determination of
the legislative will.
The land had been an Indian reservation and ceded by the Indians
under the treaty of 1866. Provision for the payment therefor by the
government was made in the legislation above quoted. As long as it
was an Indian reservation, it was not subject to the intrusion of white
men. Yet repeated attempts had been made to take possession of and
settle thereon. The military force of the United States had been re-
quired to protect the domain from illegal seizure. The whole tract was
from the beginning of these attempts obviously insufficient to meet the
demands of the great number of persons seeking to settle there, and
the quality of the soil varying greatly, each one was desirous to obtain
the best. To the ordinary desire for homes was added a fever of specu-
lation. Townsite locations were sought for with extraordinary avidity,
not only by those bent truly upon trade and commerce, but by many a
pretended cultivator of the soil. On the first day of July, 1884, Presi-
dent Arthur issued his proclamation, reciting that certain persons had
set on foot preparations for the organized and forcible possession of the
Oklahoma lands, which were recognized "as Indian country, and, as
such, subject to occupation by Indian tribes only." He recited that the
laws of the United States provided for the removal of persons residing
or found thereon without permission of the Indian Department, and
proceeded to admonish and warn all persons intending or preparing to
remove on said lands, or into said territory, against any attempt so to
do, and to notify any and all such persons who should so offend that
they would be speedily and immediately removed therefrom by the
proper officers of the Interior Department, and, if necessary, by the
aid and assistance of the military authorities of the United States.
The state of affairs described continued up to the passage of the act
of March 2, 1889. In accordance with the provisions of this law, the
President, on the 23rd day of March, 1889, issued his proclamation. It
mentioned the cession by the Indians, and recited in full said section
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13. It declared and made known that the lands (which were particu-
larly described)
will, at and after the hour of twelve o'clock, noon, of the twenty-second day of
April next, and not before, be opened for settlement under the terms of and subject
to all the conditions, limitations, and restrictions contained in said act of Congress
approved March second, eighteen hundred and eighty-nine, and the laws of the United
States appliable thereto;
and it further gave express warning,
that no person entering upon and occupying said lands before said hour of twelve
o'clock, noon, of the twenty-second day of April, A. D. one thousand eight hundred
and eighty-nine, hereinbefore fixed, will ever be permitted to enter any of said lands
or acquire any rights thereto, and the officers of the United States will be required to
strictly enforce the act of Congress to the above effect.
It will be observed that the proclamation quotes the law and that the
warning is given in the exact terms of the statute.
While the act was pending in Congress and in anticipation of its
passage, the excitement about Oklahoma greatly increased. Great
numbers of persons approached the territory on all sides, so as to be
ready to rush in at noon of the appointed (lay. The military force of
the United States had to be used as a patrol and guard on the borders
to hold back the pressing multitude. The firing of cannon at different
points was agreed upon as signal that the hour of legal entry had ar-
rived. Families in wagons, individuals on horseback, many a-foot, and
all in tense anticipation of the start, fringed long distances of the ter-
ritorial borders. Some arranged to enter by the railroads. Many fleet
horses were brought into requisition that their owners might outstrip
their fellows in the race for lands and lots. But in all this multitude,
coming from all quarters of our country, the north and south, east and
west, and composed of as strong characters and varied dispositions as
were ever before assembled, there was one marked and most estimable
trait displayed-an obedience to law and authority. In the camps, that
were formed awaiting the "opening," in the inclement weather, under
the strain of great excitement, and with a knowledge that the small
military force stretched out over tnese long lines might be easily evaded,
there was among these citizens a complete confidence in and reliance
upon the strength and fairness of the government to protect them from
imposition and fraud, if they, themselves, would do right.
liut there were others not so disposed. There were men there who,
upon one pretence and another-one necessity or another-had been
admitted within the border. The railroads required men to preserve
the track and to run the trains; the military wagons were handled by
civilians engaged for the purpose; there were the registers and receiv-
ers of the land offices, with their clerks, there were the United States
marshals and their deputies; and there were many others that had
evaded the troops and crept into the domain without pretence of right.
Many, in each of these classes, that were in the territory sooner than the
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law allowed for such designs of settlement, nevertheless intended to
take advantage of their situation and anticipate and defeat the multi-
tude on the borders. Their chief purpose was to get a quarter section
or a town lot, and if they had an apparently special occupation there,
the real cause of their presence was to get land. Many then, and more
since, have avowed their position. They argued " True, it may be, that
until said lands are opened to settlement by proclamation of the Presi-
dent, no person shall be permitted to enter and occupy the same; but
we do not intend to enter or occupy any land until then; we are here,
within the territory, but we are not entering and occupying any tract
in particular just now; one may be standing on the north-east quarter
of a section before noon, but, if he does not step upon the north-west
quarter until after the signal, this north-west quarter he may keep, be-
cause he will not have occupied and entered that, until after the ap-
pointed time; the words of the law are technical, and even if the claim-
ant is in the territory before noon, if he does not then claim the particu-
lar tract he has his eye on, and will seize immediately thereafter, he can
hold it." Those in by stealth maintained this position without qualifi-
cation; those in permissibly said, the point of entry being passed, they
could entertain what purposes as to settlement they chose, without
being affected by the statute. The citizens outside were deemed simply
unfortunate not to have been selected for special duty, or very cowardly
not to catch the nearest way.
The law was directly and forcibly construed to the contrary from the
beginning. The presence of the military guard, that by order of the
President appeared immediately after his proclamation; the advent of
the United States marshal, with numerous assistants, instructed to
keep the peace in connection with the military force; the very permits
to enter the territory, which so many ot these persons in the territory
solicited or accepted, and thereby acknowledged to be requisite; the
admirable obedience of the great mass of citizens, who good-humoredly
waited for the word of permission from the constituted authorities;-
these and many other acts of authority on the one hand, and self-denial
on the other, at the very time, gave a construction to the law that was
reasonable and just, and by which all persons equally were forbidden
to enter upon and occupy the territory described in the law and procla.
mation before the appointed hour, for the purpose in whole or in part
of claiming any part thereof for settlement.
The evident intention of Congress was to give to all persons desiring
homes in Oklahoma an equal chance to obtain them. The territory
was opened for homestead settlement to any qualified homesteader,
but under the same conditions. No partiality was intended to be shown
to any individual or class of individuals. Those who had been endeav-
oring for years to enter upon and occupy" Oklahoma" were confronted
by the authorty of government. The statute meant to lay a heavy
hand on any one who persisted in the unlawful purpose of entering
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upon or occupying this territory for settlement. The law was meant to
be superior to the spirit of agression so long prevalent:-the spirit that
had gathered those bands about this Indian reservation, whose avowed
purpose was to enter upon and occupy it, not under the land laws of
the United States, nor by any law, but that of the armed band, and to
conform to no statute or treaty until future necessity might compel.
The evil was apparent. The law was meant to meet it. It condemned
the purpose, and intended to render it fruitless.
The words "' enter upon and occupy"2 are used in their ordinary
acceptation. "Enter" means to come or go into; and "occupy" to
take in possession, or to fill up. The language carefully avoids the
technical expressions of the homestead laws, under which titles are to
be obtained. In them, to "enter lands, means to make that particular
declaration in writing at the land office that is called an " entry." It
is a formal proceeding and somewhat technical. In such connection,
the word "upon" is not used or appropriate. It is one thing to "enter"
a piece of land, and a wholly different act to " enter upon a great
domain like Oklahoma. Evidently the latter expression was used to
prevent the people from coming into the lands-the territory-and can-
not reasonably be restricted to a technical " entry " of a specific tract..
So also as to the word " occupy." These lands were formerly occupied
by Indians; yet the individuals of the tribe did not have staked off
separate holdings. One occupies a certain space when he excludes for
the time being another therefrom. It does not require that be should
continue in the same place to say he occupies a certain tract, whether a
quarter section or a territory. This depends upon his purpose and his
ability.
The language of the law was broad as it could be made, prohibiting
any one from entering upon the lands for the purpose of settling the
same. The end sought by the people was settlement. This it was that
would produce title; convert the public domain into private property.
The statute's chief purpose was to regulate settlement. Each act of
the individual was induced by his desire to make settlement of a par-
ticular piece of land, and the statute declared that for this p urpose no
one should enter upon or occupy these lands-this territory-u ntil they
are opened for such "settlement" by proclamation of the President. It
matters not whether it is read in the conjunctive or disjunctive; whether
it is to be read as saying " enter upon and occupy " or " enter upon or
occupy;" the evident purpose of the law was to prohibit one or another
entering the territory before the proclaimed hour, with a view andpur-
pose of settlement of any part thereof. No one could be there, legally
with such purpose, in whole or in part. Whether there before the time
by some permit or without it, the one who then entertained the inten-
tion of making a settlement and to use the advantage which his presence
gave, to the exclusion of others, was violating the spirit of the law, and
it destroyed his claim when attempted. If he had declared it before, he
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should have been expelled; if he exhibited such pre-conceived purpose
by his subsequent acts, he not nly could not lawfully claim any par-
ticular tract, but forfeited all right to future acquisition. Any special
license to be present must have been for another and entirely different
purpose. No license could be granted against the statute, and no one
could successfully pervert his license or special employment to defeat
the equal and just operation of the statute upon all alike. The permit
was exhausted in protecting its possessor; it could not be used as a
weapon against others. The moment the possessor of such special
privilege formed his purpose to take advantage of his position for the
selection and seizure of a tract of land, his license was valueless, and
he became a trespasser from that moment. To hold that the few with
permits, or especially engaged within the limits of these lands any more
than those there without license, could pick out their claims in advance
of the hour of opening, and pounce upon them at the very moment the
signal was given to the others to start on their long race, would be to
support pretension and favoritism and punish honorable obedience to
authority. It is neither the law nor the equity of the ease, and will not
be allowed. He, who, being within these lands by special authority as
deputy, train-hand, wagon-master, or other, had the purpose to jump
upon a particular tract, and who gave the evidence of his prior intent
by his conduct immediately thereafter, violated the statute. Such per-
sons had entered upon and occupied this territory for the purpose of
settlement-befoi e the hour fixed in the proclamation-whatever license
they may hold up or self-indulgent and self-deceiving pretext they may
now present. They were not licensed or employed thus to defeat the law
and injure their neighbors.
Both classes were prohibited from acquiring rights to these lands:
those who were in the territory at and before the hour designated in
the proclamation without pretense or special license; and those who
were there by special authority, or for a special purpose, but attempted
to pervert their presence to secure claims before others held on the bor-
ders could arrive, even from the most distant parts thereof.
On the other hand, I do not think it was the intention of Congress
that a man who happened to be legally in the territory, but did not use
his position to his own advantage, or to the disadvantage of his fellow-
citizens, should be forever prohibited from acquiring any rights in the
territory. Each case must be determined upon its own merits and evi-
dence: but it may be said generally, that the presence in the territory
before the opening, under the proclamation, and the actual settlement
and entry at the land office must be so widely and obviously separated
in every detail and circumstance as to render it impossible to reason-
ably conclude that the one was the result of the other, or in any wise
dependent upon it.
I think it clearly appears that Mr. Wood, though permissibly in the
territory, in charge of the military transportation train, took advantage
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of his position to seize upon the land in controversy, in anticipation of
the advent of those who had been held back. The Kingfisher land office
was already located on the north half of the section, the north-east
quarter of which Wood claims, and it was then generally recognized
that there would be a town located on this part of the section, as it
since has been. Mr. Wood had been in Oklahoma some years; his
home was near the military reservation, near Oklahoma City. He left
Oklahoma April 16th, in charge of military transportation, and arrived
at uthrie April 19th. He then started with the train to a point at or
near Kingfisher, and arrived on the evening of April 20th, and was
hauling wood and working there until noon April 22nd, a mile east
and( somewhat north of Kingfisher United States land office. He was
seen digging upon the quarter section he now claims in seven minutes
and a half after the signal for the opening. He was in advance of any-
one else. It was his previous presence undoubtedly that gained for
him the advantage he now rests his claim to title upon.
Under the construction of the law herein given, Mr. Wood cannot be
allowed to do this. He had entered upon and was occupying the terri-
tory for settlement. His engagement as wagoner, and his train, had
become mere instruments and means by which he intended to secure, in
an unjust way, a most valuable quarter section of land, before the others
arrived. This he was disqualified to do, and his entry must be canceled.
In considering the case of Fossett, as he was the first settler upon
ihe lanud, and his settlement was followed by residence and improve-
maent, whatever rights he may have acquired were properly held by
your office to have attached at the time of his actual settlement, and
not on the following day, when he made his claim of record at the local
office. His rights cannot, therefore, be impaired by the subsequent
occupation, on the same (lay, of the laud embraced in his entry by the
townsite settlers, and had not the integrity of his entry been impeached
by said protest, it is clear, that as found by your office, the same should
remain intact.
I find, however, among the papers before me, an affidavit made July
23d, 1890, by J. P. Barnard, one of the said protestants against the
withdrawal of the appeal here, which charges collusion between one
Jihlett (Fossett's attorney) the " said Fossett, and said mayor and
council, and a few of the occupants of said quarter-section," and
to which is annexed a paper purporting to be a certified copy of an
agreement, made May 5th, 1890, by Fossett's said attorney and the
4'townsite occupants and inhabitants," upon the said north-westquarter,
to the effect that the lots occupied by said parties would, upon the com-
pletion of Fossett's entry, for a specified price, be conveyed to him, "in
case no appeal is taken " from the action of your office.
This introduces a new element into the case, indicating that Fossett
did not make his settlement in good faith for homestead purposes, but
for speculation, which should, in my opinion, be made the subject of
2497 -No. 11--22
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inquiry, to the end that the validity of his entrylmay be properly deter-
mined. You will accordingly direct that a hearing be had, at which
testimony will be taken for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not
he has made or authorized anyfagreement for the sale of the lands, or
any part thereof, or whether he made the entry for speculative purposes
or in good faith as a homesteader. Should it be satisfactorily shown
that Fossett has made, or authorized any such agreement, or that his
entry was speculative, then his entry must be canceled, otherwise it
will stand subject to his compliance with the law.
You are further directed to give notice of this decision to the parties
and also to the trustees of the said townsite, who have been appointed
in pursuance of the act of May 14, 1890, in order that they may appear
as parties to this proceeding.
The said townsite application for said northwest quarter will, pending
the investigation so ordered, stand suspended. The decision appealed
from is modified accordingly.
The proof submitted June 12, 1890, by Fossett in commutation of his
entry, and which is forwarded by your office letter of July 30, 1890,
with the accompanying papers relating to the proceedings upon a pro-
test by the townsite occupants against said proof, wherein it is also
alleged, inter alia, that Fossett has agreed to sell a number of lots in
said northwest quarter upon the completion of his entry, is returned for
appropriate action by your office, after the hearing ordered is had and
the matter determined.
PRE-EMPTION FINAL PROOF-MINING CLAIM-MILL SITE.
SIERRA GRANDE MINING CO. V. CRAWFORD.
A pre-emptor who elects, in the presence of an adverse claim, to make final proof
must abide the result thereof, and submit to an order of cancellation in the event
that said proof fails to show compliance with law.
The use and occupancy of land for the maintenance of pumping works necessary to
this operation of a lode mine is such a use as will authorize entry of the land as
a mill site.
First Assistant Secretary to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
Septenber 18, 1890.
I have considlered the case of the Sierra Mining Company, claimant
for Sierra Grande Mill Site No. 2, lot No. 532 B against James Crawford
claimant under pre-emption declaratory statement No. 2102 on appeal
by the former from your decision of May 2, 1889, rejecting its applica-
tion for patent No. 272, embracing "1 Annie P." lode and the Sierra,
Grande mill site, and holding the same for cancellation to the extent
of said mill site portion, and allowing the pre-emption declaratory state-
ment of Crawford to stand, subject to his future compliance with the
law in the matter of residence and improvement.
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The facts are as follows: James Crawford filel preemption declara-
tory statement for the NE. 1 of NW. 4, N. t of NE. 1 of Sec. 14, and
SE. I of SE. 4 of Sec. 11 in T. 18 S., R. 7 W., N. M. M. Las Cruces N. M.
land district, on April 8, 1885 (not on March 8 as stated by you), al-
leging settlement March 1st of same year.
On March 24, 1885, the Sierra Gran'de Mining Company located the
said mill ste No. 2, containing 4.9 acres survey No. 532 A." situated
in the SE. of SE. Sec. It same town and range in connection with
the "Annie P"' lode claim, located lby said company in sections 20 and
29 same township and range. On July 3, 1885, said company filed ap-
plication for patent for the "Annie P" lode claim and said mill site
No. 2.
On September 1, 1885, James Crawford filed protest against said ap-
plication for patent alleging his prior settlement as to said mill site,
and asking that the issuance of patent be stayed until his right to the
SE. of SE. 4 of said section 11 shall have been determined. On the
15th of same month he gave notice that he would offer final proof' on his
declaratory statement on November 2d following, and on October 29th
the said mining company fihld protest against said declaratory state-
ment, accompanying the same by affidavits and exhibits, relating to its
mill site claim.
On November 2, 1885, final proof was offered by Crawford (on usual
blank forms) and the hearing of the said protest of said company
and the taking of further proof, and proof as to said mill site claim was
c ntinued until March 5, 1886, and on January 18th following said con-
tintiance, said company filed a contest against said declaratory state-
inent of Crawford, as to the several tracts covered thereby, and on
January 25th Crawford was served personally with notice thereof and
that the charge alleged in said contest was "fraud and non-compli-
ance with law."
On March 5, 1886, the parties appeared with witnesses and counsel
and testimony relating to the several matters in issue (and covering 650
pages) was taken, and the local officers upon consideration of the record
and testim'ony, found that the entryman, Crawford, had wholly failed
l)y acts of settlement, residence or improvement to comply with the
law, or manifest good faith and they recommend his entry for can-
cellation, and further that the mill site No. 2 be passed to patent, from
which said decision Crawford appealed to your office, and on May 2,
1889, yon passed upon said case and found from the testimony substan-
tially the laches referred to by the local officers, and that the facts
proven " are not such as entitle Crawford to make payment and entry,"7
but you do not think that fraud or bad faith is proven, and as Crawford
had been in this country only six months and had testified that he
thought he was making a sufficient compliance with law, you held his
filing subject to his future compliance with law in the matter or resi-
dence and improvement, and coining to the consideration of the claim
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of Sierra GrandeMining Company on its application for patent No. 272,
embracing the " Annie P." lode and the Sierra Grande Mill site No. 2,
you found that-" There appears no use or occupation of the mill site
tract as contemplated by the statutes, section 2337 R. S. The mill site
is used solely for the purpose of supplying water, through pipes to the
company's claims, the ' Annie P.' anwl others. This does not satisfy the
statutes. Case of Charles Lenning ( L. D., 190); Cyprus Mill Site (6
L. D., 706)" and rjected tile application for patent and held it for
cancellation to tlv extent of said mill site portion. From this decision
the slid company appealed to this Department.
The tract in controversy was inclded in the grant to the Texas Pacific
Railroad Company by act of March 3, 1871, but by act of February 28,
1885, the grant was forfeited and the land restored to the public domain,
subject to disposal under the general laws of the United States. Notice
of this restoration was given by publication on March 25, 1885.
I shall consider first the claim of Crawford:
The testimony in relation to his pre-elmption filing shows the follow.
ing state of facts: He hind been in this country about six months prior
to March 4, 1885, and had lived with his half brother, Thomas Inglis,
adjoining Sec. 14, and on said day he purchased of one Foster Cain his
interests in the E. A of NW. i and W. i of NE. i of Sec. 14 in said
township and range with the improvements thereon-paying $50 con-
sideration, and taking a quit claim deed therefor. The improvements
consisted of a box-house, a well, two acres of breaking and an uncer-
tain interest in some line fence. The house was twelve by fourteen feet.
It had a shingle roof, dirt floor, one door, but no window and no fire-
place or chimney; the well was sixteen feet deep; the breaking had
not been cultivated for several years, and the fence was in poor condi-
tion and claimed by Inglis. On March 5, (not March 1st as stated),
Cain gave possession of the premises; he left in the house an old wire
bed spring and some empty boxes, but carried away from the well the
windlass, rope and bucket. Crawford, on taking possession, by way of
repairs, leveled the dirt floor of the house a little, covered up the well
to keep his cattle and those of Inglis from fallinginto it, seta few posts
in the fence where they were down, straightened up the wires and drove
a few staples. These are substantially all the improvements that he
claims to have made on the land and constitute his acts of settlement.
In the matter of cultivation, he says that he re-plowed and sowed
corn on the broken ground, but never cultivated it, and gathered no
grain from it; it was uninclosed, and the cattle, that ran at large upon
it destroyed the crop as it came up. In the matter of residence, the
testimony as to his sleeping in the house is conflicting, but the pre-
ponderance shows that he only went to the house to sleep occasionally,
generally taking some one with him, who would be convenient as a
witness to testify that he had slept in the house. The carpenter who
worked at Inglis' house, making repairs during a large part of May and
DECISIONS RELATING O THE PUBLIC LANDS. .341
June 1885, says that Crawford lived there, sleeping, eating and con-
ducting himself as one of the family. rawford testifies that on some
Sundays he took milk from Inglis and cold provisions, and went to the
land and ate in the house, that he kept some canned meats, etc., there.
He says he built one fire in the house, soon after he took possession,
for the purpose of drying the floor and burning p the rubbish and
shavings that Cain had left, but this is the only time that he ever built
a fire in or about the house. e had no facilities for cooking, no stove
or cooking utensils, no table or dishes, in fact no appliances for house-
keeping. He claims to have kept his trunk anl clothing at this house,
but on April 2, when he wished to show his deed to the surveyor they
weut to Inglis' house andL he there took it out of his trunk. The neigh-
bors who visited Inglis' from time to time during the summer, testify
that Crawford worked, ate and slept there, and in fact the testimony
is overwhelming that he had no residence elsewhere.
Crawford and Inglis were partners in the, cattle business. Inglis
was to give him half the increase and furnish and keep him (" board
and washing ") and he was to have " a few dollars " as he wanted money,
this to be taken into account at annual settlement. Crawford says:
In November we started to brand the cattle and we sort o' disagreed in regard to
the money he had given me, so he told me he would give me so much a month for the
time I had worked and put in my board and washing into it, and I said all right.
They settled for the time from January 1885 on this basis, and Craw-
ford continued to live at Inglis' working by the month. He gives his
occupation as that of "cow-boy." Cain was a *'prospector'; be was
going away and wanted to sell his improvements on his tract. Iglis
and Crawford had been herding on it, and needed it as an annex to
Inglis' ranch, not as a home for Crawford. They bought the improve-
ments, evidently to keep the land open for grazing; they allowed Cain
to take away the fixtures to the well and they put timber and earth
over the top of it, because it was useless to them, and they made no
improvements on the house because it was not intended that Crawford
should live there This is one of the badges of fraud attaching to this
claim.
The testimony shows that this settlement, such as it was, was on the
E. e NW. I and W. W NE. I of Sec. 14, and not on the land in contro-
versy. When he had the survey made on April 2, 1885, he included
the SE. I of SE. I of Sce. I and NE. - of NE. i of Sec. 14, abandoning
the south half of the land he bought of Cain. The NE. i of NE. 4 of
Sec. 14, is very rough, stony, poor land, with the exception of a small
parcel of it; and Crawford hesitated about including it in the survey
until informed by the surveyor that the SE. 4 of the SE. 4 of Sec. 11
would not be considered contiguous to the NW. 4 of NE. -4 of Sec. 14,
and that to cover the tract on which the pumps were shituated, and
which he wanted, he would have to take in the rough " 40 acres "'; and
then it was that he concluded to include it in his declaratory statement
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so that he could cover the tract on which were the pumps and build-
ings of the.mining company.
After the land was restored and after the company had filed on the
mill site, Crawford filed on his tract alleging settlement March 1st and
it is very apparent that this was done to throw a cloud upon the mill-site
claim. Crawford told a witness that he intended to hold it cnd get
$20,000 from the company. nglis did not testify in the case, he had
evidently been using Crawford, as a mere tool to hold the Cain land for
grazing purposes, and the changing of the tracts after the land was re-
stored was a mere experiment, a matter of speculation purely, and this
is another badge of fraud which attaches to the Crawford claim.
The well settled rule that "' Ignorance of law will not excuse" can
not be set aside in this case, besides " A pre-emptor who in the presence
ot an adverse claim elects to make final proof must abide the result
thereof, and submit to an order of cancellation in the event that his
proof fails to show compliance with the law." Hults v. Leppin (7 L. D,
483.)
This brings me to the consideration of the application for patent for th e
millsiteand the protestof Crawford against the same. Crawfordl'sdeclar-
atory statement having been disposed of the question of priority is set-
tled, and it, oniy remains to be seen whether under the statute and
departmental regulations and rulings the Sierra Grande Miniing Com-
pany is entitled to patent for the 4.9 acres of land located, surveyed
and appropriated by it, as a mill site, in connection with the " Annie
P." lode claim. There is no question as to the said company ejoying
the use and occupation, for mining purposes, of a vein or lode, located,
surveyed and called the "Annie P." lode, and that it has taken steps
to obtain title thereto, ad that the 4.9 acres fulfills the conditions of a
mill site tract, if used as such in connection with said lode; but you
decide that it is not being sed as a mill site but " solely or the purpose
of supplying water through pipes," etc. The company procured a deed
from Dan Duncan for three acres of this land in 1881, and in that and
following years, at a cost of $50,000 it placed thereon an engine and
pump house, and placed a valuable engine and pumps therein, and
erected houses for its engineers and pumpmen to live in, and surrounded
the tract by a post and wire fence and from thence laid pipes to said
"Annie P." mine, to carry water to it. It is shown that the water thus
carried is absolutely necessary to the operation of said mine, being used
to operate its mill since 1882. When the land was declared forfeited
and restored to the public domain, its deed from Duncan was rendered
invalid, and it immediately proceeded under statutory provisions and
the departmental regulations to procure a title from the government to
the three acres and an additional 1.9 acre, and it substantially complied
with the requirements necessary to procure a patent, but the substance
of the matter is the use to which it applied the land.
The Charles Lennig case, supra, was fully discussed and followed by
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Acting Secretary MIuidrow in the Cyprus Mill site case supra. I quote
from the latter case-
In the case of Charles Lennig (supra) this Department held that said section 2337
contemplated the actual use or occupation by improvement or otherwise, for min-
ing or milling purposes of the land; that under the second clause of said act the
right to a patent of a mill-site depends upon the existence on the land of a quartz mill
or reduction works; that unaer the first clause of sai4t section ' it is not necessary
that the land be actually a mill-site; that the use or occupation of the land for mining
or milling purposes is the only pre-requisite to a patent; that the use of the land ' for
depositing tailings or storing ores, or for shops or houses for his wvorkmen, or for col-
lecting water to run his quartz mill . . . . . . . . . would be using it for
mining or milling purposes; ' that the occupation for mining or milling purposes as
distinguished from use, must be more than mere naked possession, and that such occu-
pation must be shown by ' outward and visible signs of the applicant's good faith ;'
also that where the applicant is not actually using the land he must show such
an occupation by improvements or otherwise as evidences an intended use of the tract
in good faith for mining or milling purposes.'
In the Lennig case it will be observed that Lenuig purchased " that
certain water right and water privilege " by which grant the water of a
certain sparing could be conducted by a ditch to land other than that of
the proprietor and there used. Lennig had no right to use or occupy
the land except to cut and maintain the ditch, he could not erect any
structure thereon, his right was a mere easement in the water and the
right to flow it off the land, and it was held that this was not patenta-
ble as a mill-site. In the Cyprus mill-site case the Frisco Mining and
Smelting Company took possession of a'spring that had formerly sup-
plied the inhabitants of the town of Bradshaw with water and dug it
out, encased it with masonry, furnished it with a " two hand " pump and
horse pump, and carried the water away to be used by its employes for
domestic purposes in houses, stables etc. It was held that this use of
the water " for mining purposes " was too remote, to entitle the com-
pany to a patent for the land as a mill-site. It is certainly very appar-
ent that in the case at bar the claimant presents an entirely different
state of facts than those presented in either of those cases. Here we
find actual occupation of the land, with lasting and valuable improve-
ments. It is true the company consumes only the water, but it occu-
pies and uses the land in connection with its lode mine, and such use is
necessary to the operating of the mine.
Having considered the record and testimony in the case, I conclude
that the terms and conditions of the first clause of section 2337 B. S.
are fully satisfied so far as the use to which this land is applied is in
issue, and in so holding I am supported by the cases above mentioned
as well as by the ruling in the case of Le Neve Mill Site (9 L. D., 460).
Your decision is accordingly reversed. The pre-emption filing of
Crawford is canceled and his protest against said mill-sitedismissed.
* * * * * * *P
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HOMESTEAD ENTRY-RELINQUISHMENT.
CLEVELAND . NORTH.
A relinquishment of an entry, framed in terms of absolute and unconditional srren.
der of all rights claimed thereunder, is not limited or modified in its operation
by the written statement therein that such rehlnquishment is made for the pur-
pose of making a new entry in lieu of the one relinquished.
Where the evidence is conflicting, concnrring decisions of the local and general land
offices, on questions of fact, are generally accepted as conclusive by the Depart-
ment.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the Generc
Land Office, September 26, 189U.
I have considered the case of Spencer I. Cleveland 'v. William North
upon appeal by both parties from your office decision of February 1,
1889, holding for cancellation the pre-emption declaratory statement of
said North, and denying the priority of said Cleveland's homestead
claim and refusing to re-instate said homestead claim for the NE. 4 of
the NE. and the S. of the NE. 1, and the SE. of the NW. ,of
Sec. 10. T. 10 S., R. 19 W., Wa Keeney, Kansas, land district.
The record shows that on the 15th day of September, 1831, William
North filed his pre emption declaratory statement for said land and on
the 20th day of October, 1884, Spencer I. Cleveland made homestead
entry of the same tract which, on the 30th of January, 1885, was can-
celed by relinquishment.
On the 3d day of February, 1885, said Cleveland filed his affidavit of
contest against said North's pre-emption claim, alleging as grounds:
I. That he, Cleveland, is in possession of and residing on said land and has vlluable
improvements thereon.
IT. That at the time of his alleged settlement on said lands, to wit, September 11,
1884, North was not a qualified pre emptor, that he was then residing on a tract, of
school lands as a settler underthe school lands of Kansas, and that he has since proved
up and acquired title to said school lands.
III. That he fraudulently obtained a relinquishment from complainant of his said
homestead No. 7078 which he avers is fraudulent and which was never delivered by
affiant to North.
IV. That claiming said land as a pre-emptor he, North, ha l then forcible posses-
sion of it in violation of law. That his Hd claim is prior and superior to that of
North's D. S., and asks permission to prove it.
This application was rejected by the local officers and upon the ap-
peal of North to your office, you, after considering the case directed the
local officers to order a hearing on said contest. This they did and set
the hearing for March 18, 1886, at which both parties appeared and in-
troduced their evidence. Considering the same the register and re-
ceiver found that North was not a qualified pre-emptor and that Cleve-
land's homestead right has been, forfeited; first, by failure on his part
to establish and maintain a residence on the land, second, by sale and
relinquishment.
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From their decision an appeal was taken to your office where on the
12th day of February, 1889, the decision appealed from was modified by
holding that said contest " should not be dismissed, because of the in-
terest of the government hearing." And your office further found that
while all of the allegations of the complaint have not been proven, a sufficient um-
ber have been to sustain it as against North. Cleveland is allowed no preference
right of entry, however, because he deliberately relinquished all the right he had in
said land. Yoir decision is, therefore, modified as above indicated. The declaratory
statement of William North is hereby held for cancellation, the priority and superior-
ity of Spencer 1. Cleveland's homestead claim denied, and its re-instatelnelt disal-
lowed.
From your office decision both parties appeal.
In view of the conclusion I reach in the case, after xatninito the
entire record, I do not deem it necessary to enter into a discussion of
the several errors assigned by the respective parties; however, there
is one which seems to require some discussion in order properly to meet
the claims urged. It is the second error assigned by the appellant
Cleveland, which is in effect: That your office erred in finding from the
evidence that plaintiff ever made an unconditional relinquishment or
ever delivered such relinquishment. All the witnesses agree that a re-
linqnishment was made, but it is claimed and strenuously insisted upon
by counsel for Cleveland, that it was conditional, and that the condition
was struck out without the knowledge or consent of the maker. Said
relinquishment was written upon the back of the receivers' duplicate
receipt for ()evelands entry and duly acknowledged. It was introduced
in evidence and read as follows:
1 hereby relinquish all my right, title, and interest in and to the within described
tract of land to the government of the United States.
Then follows the following words through which a pen with red ink
has been drawn: " For the purpose of making a new entry in lieu of
his said homestead No. 7078."
With these words considered as a part of the relinquishment it is hard
to conceive how it could have been framed in more absolute and uncoa-
ditional terms. The language preceding the words so stricken out,
clearly constitute an absolute and unconditional surrender of all right,
title, and interest in and to the land.
The words stricken out do not in any way modify, suspend, defeat,or
limit the relinquishtment. On the contrary, they simply express the
purpose, or iutention to do something in the future, to wit, to make a
new entry in lieu of the one relinquished. In no sense could the words
stricken out be held to attach a condition to the relinquishment pre-
ceding them.
It is claimed that the relinquishment was never delivered by Cleve-
land, and therefore, was not binding on him; on this point the evidence
is conflicting, the local officers and your office concurred in finding
against him, such.finding will be accepted as conclusive by the Depart-
ment. Chichester v. Allen (9 L. D., 302); Conley v. Price (9 L. D., 490).
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I have carefully examined all the evidence in the case, which is
quite voluminous, and I find the facts to be substantially as stated in
the decision appealed from and I find no reversible error in your con-
clusion, or reason for disturbing your judgment. It is, therefore, af-
firmed.
PRACTICE-CERTIORARI-AMENDMENT.
PETERSON v. FORT.
An application for certiorari, denied on account of its informality, can not be ane uded
but is no bar to a new application.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the Genera l
Land Office, September 30, 1890.
This Department is in receipt of a letter from Joh i. Hickox jr.,
transmitting an affidavit which he asks to have considered, nuno pro
tunc, in connection with the application for certiorari, in the case of
Catherine Peterson v. George W. Fort.
The decision of September 4, 1890 (11 L. D., 238), denying the appli-
cation is not a bar to a new application as the petition was not consid-
ered on its merits. There is nothing, however, before this Department,
whereof to make amendment. de will be allowed to file new applica-
tion, and pou the same being filed, with proof of notice to the adverse
party of the same, it will receive due consideration.
Please notify Mr. ickox hereof.
PRACTICE-AFFIDAVIT OF CONTEST-CONTINUANCE.
GEBHARD V. ONLON.
The dismissal of a contest is not warranted by the fact that the affidavit of contest is
not dated.
'The continuance of a case from day to day, with the knowledge anal consent of the
parties thereto, precludes sbsequent objection to such action.
first Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 30, 1890.
The record in the case of Henry D. Gebhard . James onlon shows
that on April 18, 1881, Conlon made homestead entry of the NE. 1, Sec.
2, T. 137, R. 55, Fargo, Dakota.
September 30, 1886, Gebhard initiated contest against the same,
alleging that Conlon had wholly abandoned said tract; had changed his
residence therefrom for more than six months since making the entry;
that said tract was not settled upon and cultivated as required by law
and that he had never established a bona ide residence on said land.
This affidavit of contestant is without date.
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The affidaviG of the corroborating witness thoreto is dated September
29,1886. The notice to laimaiit hears late September 30, 1886, and is
made returnable November 9th of the same year.
On said last late both parties appeared. attended by counsel, and
defendant's attorney moved to dismiss the contest because the affidavit
of Gebbard was not dated. This motion was overruled by the local
officers, and exceptions taken thereto.
The record shows no further action in the case until November 12th,
three days later, at which time the attorney for the defendant filed a
motion to dismiss the contest for want of prosecution. This motion
was overruled, and exceptions noted.
The testimony was then proceeded with, and, after plaintiff's wit-
nesses had been examined, counsel for defendant moved to dismiss the
contest, because the allegations thereof were not sustained by the tes-
timony offered on the part of the plaintiff: This motion was also over-
ruled, and exceptions duly taken by defendant.
The defendant's counsel chose to stand upon these three motions, and
io witnesses were introduced nor testimony submitted by him.
Some time later (the exact date not appearing), the register and
receiver recommended the cancellation of the entry. The parties in
interest were notified of this decision February 7, 1887, and Conlon duly
appealed, and your predecessor by his letter of February 13, 1889, re-
versud the action of the local officers andl dismissed the contest, and
now the plaintiff, Gebbard, appeals to this Department.
Your office decision is based upon the insufficiency of the testimony
to support the allegations of contest and sustains the action of the
register and receiver in overruling the first and second motions above
set forth.
This action of the local officers was right. The objection that the
affidavit of contest was not dated is purely technical and of no force.
The affidavit is in the nature of information to the register amid re-
ceiver that the law is not being complied with, and is the basis of notice
to the claimant in default. The notice is the warrant that " recites the
offense," and informs the claimant of the charges against him, and
gives jurisdiction to the local officers. Seitz v. Wallace, 6 L. D., 299.
This notice was properly dated.
The motion to dismiss for want of prosecution was based on the fol-
lowing facts, as appears from report of the register and receiver:
On the return day of the complaint (November , 1886,) all parties
herein appeared, with their counsel. The case of Henry Dratt v. John
J. Conlon was pending before the local officers, and was set for hearing
on the same day and at the same hour. For some reason, presumably
by consent, the case of Dratt v. Conlon was taken up, and'the trial oc-
cupied three days time, not being completed until the 12th of November.
The attorneys for the defendant herein were also the attorneys for John
J. Conlon, and were present in court attending to his interests in his
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said trial, during which the case at bar was of necessity held in abey-
ance, awaiting the determination of the case of Dratt v. Conlon, which
occupied the attention, not only of the officers, but of the lawyers as.
well, the same lawyers being employed in both cases. While the Dratt
and Conlon case was thus being tried, no entry was made on the docket
or trial record of the office in the case at bar, and because of the ab-
sence of an entry of continuance to a day fixed, or from day to day,
during the pendency as aforesaid of the other case, the attorneys for
Conloii in the Gebhard v. Conlon case, on the third day and during the
progress of the Dratt-onlon case, moved to dismiss the case at bar for
" want of prosecution," because, I presume, the case had been setfor the
9th of November, and the 12th of November had arrived and it had not
yet been taken up for trial. The motion, considered in connection with
the circumstances under which it was made was frivolous and did not
deserve to be entertained by the officers. The attorneys who filed it
had been in court during all the time the other case had been on trial,
participating therein, and had raised no objection to the disposition made
of the case at bar. No rights of the defendant were prejudiced thereby,
and if it were necessary, under the circumstances, to note on the trial
docket (which I do not hold it to be) such continuance from day to day,
the fact that this was not noted is not the fault of contestant, and such
continuance was had with thefull knowledge and consent of defendant's
attorneys, and they should not thereafter be heard to object. Smith v.
Johnson, 9 L. D., 255.
CIRCUTLAR-ENTRY BY EMPLOYE OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE.
DEPARTM.ENT OF '1 HE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
Washington, D. C., September 15, 1890.
To the Officers and Employis of the Land Department.
GENTLEMEN: Section 452 of the Revised Statutes provides that-
The officers, clerks, and eploy6s in the General Land Office are rohibited from
directly or indirectly purchasing or becoming interested in the purchase of any of the
public land; and any person who violates this section shall forthwith be reloved from
his office.
The Honorable Secretary of the Interior, in the case of Herbert
MeMicken et al. (10 L. D., 97; 11 L. D., 96), has decided that the dis-
qualification to enter public lands, contained in said section, extends to
officers, clerks, and employ6s in any of the branches of the public service
undr the control and supervision of the Commissioner of the General
Land Office in the discharge of his duties relating to the survey and
sale of the public lands.
In accordance with said decision, all officers, clerks, and employes in
the offices of the surveyors-general, the local land offices, and the Gen-
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eral Land Office, or any persons, wherever located, employed under the
supervision of the Commissioner of the General Land Office , are, during
such employment, prohibited from enteing, or becoming interested, di-
rectly or indirectly, in any of the public lands of the United States.
Very respectfuly,
LEWIS A. GEROFF,
Commissioner.
Approved:
GEO. CHANDLER,
Acting Secretary.
PRACTICE-PETITION FOR RE-REVIEW-APPLICATION FOR HEARING.
SPICER ET AL. v. NORTHERN PACIFIC R. . Co.
A petition for re-review should present facts or qoestions of law not previously con-
sidered or involved in the case.
An application for a hearing addressed to the Secretary of the Interior calls for the
exercise of his discretionary authority, and it is therefore just and proper that he
sitould, i such a case, be fully informed as to all facts 6ounected with the subject
matter, and determine, after a consideration of the whole subject, whether such
facts demand action.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, October
1, 1890.
The attorney for Spicer et al. has filed a motion for review of depart-
mental decision of July 17, 1890, in the case of R. E. Spicer et al. v.
Northern Pacific R. R. Co. (11 L. D., 50) involving the NE. 4 of Sec. 19,
T. 25 N., B. 43 E., Spokane Falls, Washington.
The decision thus complained of was rendered upon a motion for re.
view of departmental decision of April 12, 1890 (10 L. D., 440), and
hence the present motion is in the nature of a petition for a re review.
Service of notice of the filing of this motion was not properly shown
in accordance with the rules of practice requiring such service to be
made personally or by registered letter, but inasmuch as the attorneys
for the opposing parties have seen fit to oppose the granting of said mo-
tion on the ground that it is not authorized by the rules of practice, and
of its insufficiency, without objection to the service, they have placed
themselves within the jurisdiction of this Department, and waived the
question as to the sufficiency of the notice.
This motion does not come up to the requirements prescribed for pe-
titions for re-review as laid down in the case of Neff v. Cowhick (8 t.
D., 111) and re-affirmed in numerous decisions, among which are Cres-
well Mining Co. v. Johnson (8 L. D., 440), Dayton v. Dayton (9 L. D.,
93); Wenie et al. v. Frost (9 L. D., 588).
While this is true, yet in view of the peculiar circumstances in this
case I have thought best to waive those requirements and to consider
upon its merits the motion thus presented.
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In answer to the first and second reasons urged in support of this
motion it is sufficient .to say that the original petition was addressed to
the Secretary of the Interior and appealed to his discretionary power.
For this reason it was not only proper, bnt necessary to a right and just
exercise of that power that he should fully inform himself upon all
points and facts connected with or touching upon the subject matter.
In matters of this character it is the duty of this Department to deter-
mine after a careful consideration of the whole subject whether the facts
demand action.
Attention was necessarily called to the interest alleged by the inter-
venors in the land involved in this controversy. It was then decided
that they had such interest in the land as entitled them to be heard in
opposition to the petition then under consideration, and no sufficient
reason for a different conclusion is presented in the argument in sup-
port of the third reason in this motion. To set aside the title of those
through whom these intervenors claim would be to render their title
uncertain and depreciate their property. The action sought to be
brought about by these petitioners would result in the divesting of these
intervenors of the title now held by them and the substitution therefor
of an equitable title, based upon occupation alone. They are certainly
entitled to be heard in defense of the title now held by them.
The fourth reason alleged in support of this motion is based upon
the theory that the statement of Enoch, the Indian, to the effect that
he had not severed his tribal relations, was never properly executed
inasmuch as the person before whom it purports to have been sworn
to was not at that time qualified to administer oaths. It would be suffi-
cient in reply to this to say that noch supposed he was making an
affidavit before a proper officer, and that the effect of his statement
thus made upon his credibility is the same as if such officer had been
duily qualified. Besides this, however, the facts and circumstances
presented show so conclusively that Enoch had not abandoned his
tribal relations that his statements to the contrary woull be success-
fully overcome had he made no contrailictory statement.
In answer to the fifth allegation in this motion it is only necessary to
say that the question to be determined was as to whether under all the
facts the discretionary authority vested in the Secretary of the Interior
should be exercised in ordering a hearing and that all facts relating to
the matter in issue were properly to be considered. This answer ap-
plies also to the sixth and seventh allegations. All the papers men-
tioned in those allegations were necessarily considered in arriving at
a conclusion in this matter.
It is true that the affidavits presented by the intervenors as to
Enoch's tribal relations were not filed until on or about the day of the
ril argument herein. but the petitioners had ample time between that
late and the (late of the decision to present any affidavits or other
papers they desired and they (lid in fact on June 26th file with their
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brief an affidavit by Enoch upon the very point mentioned in paragraph
8 of this motion. This paragraph then presents no good grounds for
the action they now ask shall be had.
The oral argument was not restricted to the points mentioned in the
ninth allegation, but included all the points presented by the petition
of Spicer et al., as well as the right of Glover-et al., to intervene. If the
petitioners were taken by surprise by the matter presented in behalf
of the intervenors, an application for further time to prepare to meet
such matters should have been presented in due season. As a matter
of fact though, as hereinbefore stated, ampte time elapsed between the
date of the presentation of the motion to intervene and the date of the
rendition of the decision now complained of, to allow of the filing of
affidavits or other matter by the original petitioners and was in fact
utilized by them to the extent of filing the affidavit of Enoch. This
ninth allegation then presents no good reason for granting this motion.
The tenth, eleventh, and twelfth allegations have been answered in
effect in the discussion of the previous paragraphs. As hereinbefore
said, Glover et al., showed such interest in the question presented as
clearly entitled them to be heard. In order to properly decide upon
the original petition filed herein, it was necessary to take into consid-
eration all the facts touching upon the matters in dispute.
After a careful consideration of the matters presented by this motion,
each of which was fully presented by the papers and records in the case
and te oral argument upon the motion for review and necessarily con-
sidered in arriving at a conclusion thereon, I perceive no good and suffi-
cient reason for granting the prayer of this motion and the same is
therefore denied.
Un September 9th, the attorney for Spicer et al., filed in this office a
letter offering, in the event the decision complained of is revoked, to
amend their petition to make it applicable to the east half alone of the
tract in controversy thus relieving from all question the west half of
said tract, upon which it is said all the improvements of the intervenors
are situated. This action would not change the facts in the case or
affect the conclusion heretofore reached, and the proposition can not be
entertained.
COAL LAND DECLARATORY STATEMENT-SECOND FILING.
WALTER DEARDEN.
A second coal declaratory statement cannot be filed, in the absence of a valid reason
for failure to perfect title under the first.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, October 1. 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Walter Dearden from your decision
of July 18, 1889, rejecting his application to file coal declaratory state-
ment for the NE. 1 Sec. 35, T. 33 S., R. 66 W., Pueblo, Colorado, land
district.
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He made said application on January 22, 1889, and the same was
rejected by the local officers for the reason that he had made a previous
filing of like kind and had thereby exhausted his right of entry, from
which action he appealed. Your office sustained the action of the local
office, and he again appealed.
The record shows that on January 26, 1888, he filed a coal declara-
tory statement for the NE. I of Sec. 25, same township and range, and
that he relinquished the same January 14, 1889. He says he relin-
quished because unable to pay for the land.
This case is very similar to the case of Albert Eisemann (10 L. D.,
539), and the claims of the attorneys are in substance identical, towit:
that a mere declaration of intention to purchase which is not consum-
mated by actual entry should not, under the law of Congress, exhaust
the right of entry.
ill the case of Eisemann (supra), after discussing the question fully,
it is sai(l:-
Ei-ennaun does notpresent any excuse for not consummatinig his first filing, butbase
his elaiz to make a second filing.solely upon the ground . . . . that acoal land
-filing I unless completed and payment is made for the land embraced therein, does not
exhaust the rights of t.he applicant . . . As we have seen, the regulations limit
a party to one filing and this is not in conflict with the statute, but needful forcarry-
ing its provisions into effect.
Dearden gives no satisfactory excuse for not consummating his first
filing, he held it almost a year, and relinquishing it, asks to make an-
other filing, giving no assurance that he would not do the same with it,
and then apply for a third, thus keeping a tract perpetually under a
filing. As you say in your opinion it would be equivalent to giving an
option to the entryman for one year for $3.00 and then allowing him to
take another on another tract for a like sum, so on indefinitely. There
ean be no good reason for such a practice, it is certainly contrary to the
intention of Congress when it enacted the law, and is in violation of
the regulations relating to coal land entries.
Your decision is affirmed.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY- RELINQUISHMENT-PROTEST OF WIFE.
DODGE V. LoH\tEs.
The protest of the entryman's wife against the relinquishment of a homestead entry
can not defeat the legal operation of such instrument.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, October 1, 1890.
,aties M. Dodge made homestead entry for the Si of the NE1 and
S.o of the NW' of Sec. 35, T. 5 S., R. 20 W., Kirwin, Kansas, Ol Sep-
tember 97, 1882. He filed his relinquishment of the same in the local
office on July 16, 1885. he entry was canceled, and on that day John
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S. Liohnes made homestead entry for the same tract, having purchased
the improvements thereon from the entryman.
Prior to the filing of the relinquishment, and before Lohnes made his
entry, Emily E. Dodge made application at the local office to restrain
her husband from relinquishing his homestead entry, and that she be
allowed to retain the homestead in her own right and for the benefit of
herself and children. It was urged in support of the motion, that the
rights, equities anl interests of the applicant in the homestead are fully
recognized, guaranteed, and protected by section nine, Article fifteen,
of the Constitution of the State of Kansas.
Corroborating witnesses to this petition, which was regarded in the
nature of a contest, were not secured on that day. There is some con-
troversy as to when the petition duly corroborated was filed; but the
proof is clear that both Lohnes and the entryman, Dodge, knew that
Emily E. Dodge opposed the sale of the improvements and the relin-
quishment of the entry before Lohnes made his entry of the land, and
the latter made his entry with full knowledge of her disapproval.
Contestant's application was transmitted to your office on August 30,
1886, and you ordered a hearing to determine the matters alleged.
On February 26, 1887, the register and receiver dismissed the contest,
and by your office decision of May 4, 1889, you affirmed that judgment,
and contestant again appealed.
The evidence shows that contestant was married to James M. Dodge
on. November 12, 1875. She lived with him on the land from about the
date of entry until he relinquished the same and sold the improvements.
Both husband and wife expended means in improvements upon the land.
The evidence, however, further shows that James M. Dodge was a
drinking character, a gambler, profligate and given to raising disturb-
ances. ie was killed by one Frank Sims, a few days after making his
relinquishment.
The first section of the act of May 14, 1830 (2L Stats., 140), provides
that:
When a pre-emption, homestead or timber culture claimant shall file a written re-
linquishment of his claim in the local land office, the land covered by such claim shall
be held as open to settlement and entry without urthbr action on the part of the
Commissioner of the General Land Office.
When a relinquishment is filed in the local office, the entry should at
once be canceled, and the land thereafter held open to settlement.
(Sears v. Almy, 6 L. D., 1). An application to enter, accompanied by a
relinquishment, is immediately effective on the filing of the relinquish-
ment.
The constitutional provision invoked in behalf of contestant can have
no relation whatever to the present case; it provides that:
a homestead to the extent of one hundred and sixty acres of farming land, occupied
as a residence by the family of the owner, together with all the improvements oil the
same, shall be exempted from forced sale under any process of law, and shall not be
alienated without the joint consent of husband and wife when that relation exists.
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Had contestant been a deserted wife and dependent upon her own re-
sources for support, she would have been qualified to make homestead
entry. (Wilber v. Goode, 10 L. D., 527).
The act approved June 8, 1880 (1 Stats., 166), provides that any per-
son who may be legally authorized to act may make proof and payment
for one who has initiated a claim, and afterwards becomes insane. But
in this case, contestant was not a deserted wife; neither was her hus-
band insane; he executed a written relinquishment of his homestead
entrv when he had a mere inchoate right to the land-having lived
on his homestead less than three years. Prior to patent, the title to
the public domain remains in the United States. (Frisbie. Whitney,
9 Wall., 17). Hence the homesteader was not " the owner " when he
signe(d the relinquishment, and therefore, the constitutional provision
sought to be invoked has no relation to him nor to any one living on
land prior to patent.
When the homesteader in this case relinquished his right, it may be
conceded that his wife objected to it; also that Lohnes had notice of
this and that contestant wanted to enter the land. It may be conceded
that it worked a hardship upon her, but there is no law to prevent such
hardships, and one who has initiated a claim for the public lands may
relinquish that claim, and the land, ipso facto, is subject to entry by any
qualified person.
Your said office decision is accordingly affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT-SETTLEMENT RIGHT.. ALIEN.
CENTRAL PACIFIC R. R. Co. v. TAYLOR T AL.
The settlement of a alien who has not declared his intention to become a citizen,
existing at te date when a railroad grant becomes effective, does not except the
land covered thereby forn the operation of the grant; and the subsequent quali-
fication of the settler will not relate back so as to defeat the grant.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of te General Land Office, October
2, 1890.
I have considered the case of the Central Pacific Railroad Company
v. John A.. Taylor and James Wadman, on appeal by the former from
your office decision of April 22, 1887, rejecting its claim to the S. A- NE.
1 and lots 1 and 2, See. 3, T. 6 N., R. 2 W., Salt Lake City, Utah.
The tracts are within the limits of the grant for said company by act
of July 1, 1862 (12 Stats., 489), enlarged by act of July 2, 1864 (13 Stats.,
356), the rights of which attached on definite location October 20, 1868.
See Central Pacific R. R. Co. (5 L. D., 661). On said date there was
no claim of record adverse to that of the company.
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It appears that on May 8, 1869, one Harvey Murdock filed declaratory
statement for the tracts alleging settlement April 30, 1863, and that on
May 14,1869, James Wadman filed declaratory statement for the same,
alleging settlement.June 1,1863. Neither of these claims was perfected.
On application by the company to list the tracts a hearing was or-
dered to clear the record of said filings. At the hearing, on February 2,
1885, John A. Taylor appeared and offered homestead entry for the land,
alleging settlement in 1879. From the evidence taken it appears that
Wadman lived on said land with his family from 1867 to 1871 with the
intention of securing it under the public land laws, but that he did not
declare his intention to become a citizen until October 27, 1863, seven
days after the definite location. In 1871 Wadman sold his improve-
ments to other parties who in 1879 sold to Taylor the present claimant.
Taylor has maintained continuous residence on the tract with his family
since 1879. He has enclosed it, divided it byfences into four fields and
has a dwelling house and twenty-five acres in cultivation. His improve-
ments are valued at $1500.00.
Your office held that the claim of Wadman excepted the land from
the operation of the grant under the rule in the case of Marleyhan v.
California & Oregon iR.. Co. (2 C. L. L., 930). That case, decided by
Secretary Schurz on February 13, 1878, held that (syllabus), " naturali-
zation has a retroactive effect, and makes the claim of a pre-emptor as
valid as if he had been naturalized before settlement."
On May 13, 1881, in the case of McMurdie v. Central Pacific R. B. Co.
(8 C. L. O., 36), it was held the settlement of one who has not declared
his intention to become a citizen would not operate to except land from
the grant. In Titamore v. Southern Pacific (10 L. D., 463), it was held
that the settlement ot an alien would not prevent selection by the com-
pany of an indemnity tract, and that " his subsequent qualifications
could not relate back so as to defeat an intervening right," viz., the
company's.
As Wadman did not declare his intention to become a citizen until
after the rights of the road attached on definite location, I must hold, on
the authority of these later decisions, that his claim was not sufficient
to except said trust from the operation of the grant.
That decision appealed from is accordingly reversed.
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TIMBER CULTURE ENTRY-HOMESTEAD RIGHT.
INVILLE V. LEARWATERS ET AL. (ON REVIEW).
The allowance of a timber culture entry segregates the land covered thereby, even
though sch entry may not be made of record; and the failure of the local of-
fice to place the entry of record will not affect the rights of the entryman there-
tinder.
The subsequent homestead entry of another for such land, without actual notice of
the prior entry, or any claim thereunder, followed by due compliance with law,
constitutes a legal claim that will attach on the relinquishment of the prior entry,
and exclude the right of a contestant against said entry.
Secretary Noble to the Conmnissioner of the General Land Office, October
1, 1890.
This motion is filed by A. J. Linville for review of the decision of the
Department in the above case, re-instating the homestead entry of J.
W. Williams, for the NW. 1, Sec. 15, T. I N., R. 3 E., Tucson, Arizona.
(10 L. D., 59).
The material facts in this case as recited in said decision are as fol-
lows:
Clearwaters made timber culture entry of the tract in controversy
July 18, 1878, but the local officers neglected to enter it upon the tract
books of the office, and on April 25, 1883, Williams made homestead
entry of the land, established residence with his family, and made valu-
able improvements thereon. Clearwaters made no effort to break or
cultivate the land, and there'was nothing upon the land to indicate to
Williams that there was an adverse claim.
On September 22, 1885, you held Williams' entry for cancellation, be-
cause of conflict with the timber culture entry of Clearwaters, but the
local officers, instead of notifying J. W. Williams, sent the notice to J.
D. Williams, in consequence of which no appeal was taken, and on Jan-
uary 21, 1886, his entry was canceled.
On August 13, 1886, Williams applied to have his entry re-instated,
alleging that his family had resided on the land with him since his entry,
made April 25, 1883, and that he had made valuable improvements
thereon; that from 1877 to date of entry be had lived within one mile
of said land, and during that time neither Clearwaters, nor any one else,
had ever made any attempt to cultivate or plant timber on any part of
it, and that the first knowledge or intimation he had of any conflicting
claim was from the letter of the register of the local office, received
August 8, 1886.
This affidavit was corroborated by three persons, who lived near the
land.
On July 29, 1886, A. J. Linville filed a contest against the timber
culture entry of Clearwaters, and upon a hearing had thereon the local
officers recommended the cancellation of Clearwaters' entry, and allowed
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 357
Linville the preference right of entry, subject to whatever intervening
right Williams may have by reason of his application to re-instate his
homestead entry.
Your office denied the application of Williams to have his homestead
entry re-instated, but he was allowed thirty days in which to contest
Clearwaters' entry. Williams was notified of this December 16, 1887,
but he did not file contest affidavit until March 14, 1888, which was re-
jected by the local officers, because it was not filed in time. Upon appeal,
your office held that as Williams was allowed thirty days after the de-
cision of your office became final, he was allowed ninety days, at least,
in which to file contest.
Upon the appeal of Linville from this decision, the Department in the
decision now under review held that there was no rule or law of the
Department that would give to Williams the preference right of con-
test, but that the rights of Williams are superior to those of Linville,
for the reason that under the circumstances his entry was good against
all persons, except Clearwaters, from the first, as the land was not at
the time or his entry in reservation by reason of any act of Congress,
nor settled upon, improved, and in the possession of another; nor was
there upon the land any indication that any adverse claim existed.
Clearwaters relinquished his entry November l6, 1887.
A review of this decision is asked upon the following grounds
1. Because Williams had exhausted his right to make homestead
entry.
2. Because he had no right to settle upon the land, as it was at the
time occupied and improved by Walter Hastings.
3. Because Williams' affidavit, stating that he had no notice of any
convicting claims, is disproved by the affidavit of Aversch, showing
that at the time of his settlement thirty acres of the land were cultivated,
a well dug, and a house erected, which was in possession of Walter
Hastings, who claimed it as his home.
4. Because, while the entry of CUearwaters was not placed on the
tract books, the numberof said entry was marked upon the plat, which
was open to the inspection of every one.
As to the issues presented in the first, second, and third grounds set
forth in the motion for review, it is sufficient to say that they do not
materially affect the real issue in this case, and it is unnecessary to
consider them. If Williams is not qualified to make entry, or if there
are adverse claims to the land, they can be presented in a contest
against his entry.
The material question involved in this case is, whether Williams
could initiate such a claim or right by settlement and entry, notwith-
standing the land at the time was covered by a prior timber-culture
entry, as would defeat the preference right of a third party who sought
to contest the former entry. Upon this question the Department held
that " A homestead entry made on land covered by the prior timber
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culture entry of another not of record, and under which no right of
possession was asserted or acts in compliance with law performed, is
good as against every one except the timber culture entryman, and the
right of a third party to contest said timber culture entry is excluded
thereby."
It is contended, however, by contestant that the Department erred
in holding that the timber culture entry of Clearwaters was not of
record, because while it did not appear on the tract books, the number
of the entry was marked upon the plat, which was open to the ispec-
tion of every one. This may be true, but it was not such a record of
the entry as would charge Williams with notice in (letermining the
question whether he acted in good faith in making his entry without
first applying to contest the timber culture entry of Clearwaters.
The entry of Clearwaters having been allowed, segregated the land,
even though it may not have been entered of record, and the failure to
place it of record would not affect his rights; but from the fact that the
entry was not placed of record on the tract books, and that Williams
had no actual notice thereof, or notice of any assertion of claim by
Clearwaters, and he having been allowed to make homestead entry of
the land upon which he has resided continuously, with his family, and
made valuable improvements thereon, relying upon the validity of said
entry, it constituted a legal claim that would attach to the laud the in-
stant it became a part of the public domain. Pool v. Maloughiiy, 11 L.
D., 197. Nor could the application of a third party to contest the entry
of Clearwaters intervene to defeat this right. No one had a right to
complain of the allowance of the entry of Williams, except Clearwaters
and the government, and it was on this view that it was held that, " as
to all parties, except Clearwaters, the land was public land at the date
of Williams' entry."
The motion is denied.
RAILROAD GRANT-ACT OF MARCH 3, 1887.
HAWORTE V. ST. JOSEPH AND DENVER CITY R. R. Co.
The Department has jurisdictionto entertain an application for the re-instatement of
an entry under the act of March 3, 1887, if there has been no fbrmal adjustment
of the grant.
An applicant for the right of re-instatement under said act will not be heard to deny
that he voluntarily abandoned his homestead entry where he has sold and trans-
ferred for a valuable consideration " all his estate, title, and interest " in and to
the land covered thereby.
,Slecretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, October
2, 1890.
By letter of September 7, 1887, your office transmitted the applica-
cation of Ira Haworth for the re-instatement of his homestead entry for
the W. j of the SW. 1 and the SE. 1 of the NW. I of Sec. 19, T. 4 S., R. 4
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E., Concordia, Kansas land district, and recommended that the St.
Joseph and Denver City Railroad compfAny, for whose benefit the land
had been certified be called upon in accordance with the provisions of
the second section of the act approved March 3, 1887 (24 Stat., 556),
to relinquish or reconvey said land to the United States. By depart-
mental letter of March 2, 1888, the papers were returned to your office
with instructions to proceed as directed in departmental decision of
February 21, 1888 in the case of the Winona and St. Peter R. R. Co. (6
IL. D., 544).
By letter of June 19, 1890 you forwarded the papers in the case re-
porting that notice had been given to John B. Bloss, formerly attorney
for the railroad company and to Clay, Robinson and Co., the reputed
present owners of the land to show cause why proceedings under the
act of March 3, 1887, should not be instituted. With these papers was
a communication from .11r. Bloss stating, I ceased to be attorney of
said company on obtaining an adjustment of its land grant some years
before the passage of said act of March 3, 1887, and consequently I
herewith return your letter for service on whom it may concern." Mr.
Bloss, however, proceeded to set up certain facts coming to his knowl-
edge while acting as attorney for said company which as he claims,
show this Department has no jurisdiction of the matter. By letter of
June 30, 1890, you transmitted the reply of Clay, Robinson and Co.,
claiming to be the present owners of he land, the delay in the filing of
which was, it is claimed, occasioned b a mistake in the notice first
sent them, the land being described therein as in section nine instead
of nineteen.
It is contended that the action contemplated should not be taken for
various reasons in substance as follows:
1st. Because the grant to said company had been fully adjusted prior
to the passage of the act of March 3, 1887.
2d. Because Haworth applied in 1878 to have his entry reinstated
which application was rejected by which action his rights in the
premises were fully adjudicated.
3rd. Haworth has executed and filed a relinquishment of all rights
under his entry.
4th. Flaworth is estopped from asking this relief because the present
owners claim through him, he having entered into a contract to pur-
chase said land from the railroad company, which contract he after-
wards assigned and also executed a quit claim deell of his right in the
land.
5th. That this application does not conform in any particular with
the regulations of February 13, 1889 (8 L. D., 348), governing such ap-
plications.
This petition is not in conformity with the regulations prescribed,
but since it was filed before any regulations to govern proceedings
under the act in question had been formulated, consideration should
not be denied it on this ground.
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An inquiry at the railroad division of your office elicited the informa-
tion that while the claims of said company under its grant have been
virtually determined, yet there has been no formal adjustment of that
grant. I am not inclined under these circumstances to decline to con-
sider this petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in the Depart-
ment under the act of March 3, 1887.
If Haworth comes within the provisions of this act of March 3, 1887,
he can not be deprived of the benefits of such act by the fact that he had
been denied the same relief under the provisions of the act of April
21, 1876. The object of the later act was to afford relief to those whose
entries had been erroneously canceled, (Gale v. Northern Pacific R. R.
Co. 10 L. D., 307), and it might be properly added that said later act is
peculiarly applicable to those cases where relief is not afforded by any
former remedial law.
One is not necessarily estopped from claiming the benefit of the
provisions of this act by the fact that he has abandoned the land and
executed a relinquishment of his rights under the entry sought to be
re-instated, if such action was caused by a decision of the proper officers
that the land passed to the railroad company under its grant. Harris
v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. (10 L. D., 264); Gale v. Northern Pacific
B. R. Co. (10 L. D., 307).
In this case aworth's entry was canceled in 1873, but his relinquish-
iment was not executed until 1882, and then it was apparently made
in furtherance of his application for the repayment of the fees and
commission paid in making such entry, and upon the requirement
of your office. Haworth had, however, in the meantime, on Febru-
ary 27, 1880, contracted to purchase said land from the railroad com-
pany, receiving a bond for a deed, and had on June 14, 1880, sold
and conveyed by quit claim ded for the expressed consideration of
$460, all his interest in said land; and had on June 23, 1880, assigned
the bond for a deed. It is through the parties to whom Haworth thus
transferred his claim to this land that the parties now opposing this
petition for re-instatement of the homestead entry claim title. By this
recognition of the title of the railroad company, and apparent aban-
donment of his claim to said land under the homestead law, llaworth
induced these parties to invest their money in the purchase of this land,
and be can not now in good conscience be heard to say to the injury of
those parties that he did not voluntarily abandon his claim under the
homestead entry. What might have been his standing here had no
third parties been induced by him to invest money in this land, it is
not now necessary to determine. Haworth will not, after this sale and
transfer for a valuable consideration of "all his estate, title and in-
terest " in and to said land be heard to say that he did not voluntarily
abandon his clain thereto. Under the circumstances here presented I
must decline to direct or recommend any further proceedings in this
matter, and the petition under consideration is hereby denied.
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FINAL PROOF-ACT OF IAY 26, 1890.
EDWARD BOWEER.
The purpose of the act of May 26, 1890, authorizing final proofs to e taken before
"any commissioner of the United States circuit court " is to designate an addi-
tional or new officer before whom such proofs might be taken, and not to change
in any manner existing provisions defining the place for taking such proofs.
The circular of June 25, 1890, issued under said act, must be construed to mean that
said act does not authorize the making of the proofs and affidavits mentioned
therein before said commissioner outside the county and State or district and ter-
ritory in which the lands are situated, subject to the exception provided for in
case the lands are within an unorganized county.
Secretary Noble to the Commissionor of the General Land Office, October
2, 1890.
I am in receipt of a letter from the attorney of E. P. Wells claiming
as transferee of the NW. i Sec. 25, T. 139 N, R. 63 W., Fargo, Dakota,
by purchase from the entryman Edward Bowker, in which he states that
said Bowker is now residing in the State of Nebraska and asks that the
decision of the Department (10 IL. D., 548), directing that said Bowker
be allowed to submit final proof on his said homestead entry be so far
modified as to allow said proof to be made in Nebraska.
The only question involved in this case is, the construction to be
placed upon the act of May. 26, 1890; that portion of which it is neces-
sary to consider reads as follows:
That the proof of settlement, residence, occupation, cultivation, irrigation, or re-
clamatiou, the affidavit of non-alienation, the oath of allegiance, and all other affi-
davits required to be made under the homestead, pre-emption, timber culture and
desert land laws, may be made before any commissioner of the United States cir-
cuit court, or before the judge or clerk of any court of record of the county or
parish in which the lands are situated; and the proof, affidavit, and oath, when
so made and duly subscribed, shall have the same force and effect as if made be-
fore the register and receiver when transmitted to them, and with the fee and
commissions allowed and required by law.
Was it the intent of Congress by this act to so far remove the sub-
mission of the final proof from the land desired to be entered as to
allow it to be " made before any commissioner of the United States cir-
cuit court," in the United States no matter how remote he might re-
side from the land, or was it only the intent to provide an additional
officer before whom proof might be submitted? It is not questioned
that prior to the passage of this act, the law allowed such proof to be
made only before the register or receiver, a judge, or in his absence, a
clerk of a court of record in the county or state, district or territory in
which the land is situated. General circular, January 1, 1889, page
15, and while the words of this act might seem at first view to au-
thorize the making of proof, "before any commissioner of the United
States circuit court " beyond the limits of the State or Territory within
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which the land is situated, yet I have concluded after an analysis of
the question that the act will not bear such interpretation.
It should be premised that from the beginning the pre-emption law
has required proof to be nade before the register or receiver. By act
of June 9, 1880, (21 Stats., 169), pre-emptors were allowed to make the
affidavit showing compliance with the law, before the clerk of the county
court, or of any court of record of the county and State or district and
Territory in which the lands are situated," or in an adjacent county in
the State or Territory if the lands were situated in an unorganized
county. Until the passage of the act of March 3, 1877, (19 Stats., 403),
homestead claimants were required to make proof before the register
or receiver. That act authorized the malting of such proof before the
judge, or in his absence, before the clerk of any court of record of the
county and State or district and Territory in which the lands are sit-
uate, with a provision similar to that above as to unorganized counties.
The act of June 9, 1880, also authorized the making of the affidavit in
commuted homestead cases as in pre-emption cases.
It thus appears that it has been the constant policy of the law to re-
quire claimants tnder these lavs to go before the local officers in mak-
ing proof or at least before a responsible officer of the county within
which the land lies. The ovious purpose of this policy is to secure
the proper an( convenient examination of the matters sbmitted. An
intention to abandon this policy should not be inputed to Congress
nless the terms of the law admnit of no other cnstruction. Morton v.
Nebraska (21 -NWaIl., 660), State of Colora(lo () L. D., 222).
Section 627 I. S., authorizes each circuit court to appoint
in different parts of the district for which it is held so many discreet persons as it
may deem necessary who shall be called Commissioners of the circuit courts" and
shall exercise the powers which ae or may be expressly cofirred by law upon com-
inissioners of ircuit courts.
If this statute in question authorizes a homestead claimant to make
his proof before any sch commissioner in any part of the United
States, it reverses the settled policy of Congress in that regard. I find
nothing in the history of the act to warrant this construction. There
was no complaint that the law as it stood worked mischief, nor was
any such remedy called for. The bill as reported from the committee
of public lands of the House of Representatives contaline(l the pro-
vision as enacted. I response to the question whether the bill changed
the system of corupensating registers and rceivers, Mr. McRae, in
charge of the bill, replied
It makes no change whatever as to the compensation. It only provides that affi-
davits for these entries may be imade before a new officer, who is named, to wit, the
commissioner of the United States circuit court, and may be transmitted to the reg-
ister and receiver. . . . The only thing left is the provision permitting, for the
convenience of the settler, these affidavits to be made before a commissioner and
transmitted by mail to the receiver, iustea(l of requiring the settler to go in person
to the land office.
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This was the substance of the debate and the bill was so passed.
The report of said committee defined the scope of the bill as follows:
The purpose of the bill is to authorize all affidavits and depositions under she pub-
lie land laws to be made before and certified by commissioners of the United States
circuit court or clerks of a court of record for the county in which the land is sit-
uated, and to fix the fees for such work. It is for the convenience of the settlers
and does not in any way change the fees of the register and receiver. Cong. Rec.
51st Cong. Ist Sess. Vol. 21 p. 2414.
The bill was passed in the Senate without debate, other than a state-
ment from Senator Berry who reported it from the committee, and
said:
It is an amendment to the homestead l aw in regard to the manner of taking proof
of homestead applications. (Idem. p. 3215).
From this history of the act I conclude that the pnrI)ose of this enact-
ment was simply to designate an additional or " new officer" before
whom such proofs could be taken, and not to change in any manner the
provisions defining the place for taking such proofs.
By this construction the act harmonizes with the history, with the
antecedent legislation on the same subject, and with itself. It would
certainly be incongruous if a pre-emptor in California might make proof
in Maine, and yet could not go before any judge in his own State out-
side of his own county.
By this construction the constant and evident object of the law that
proof should be made in the vicinity of the land is preserved. In some
instances the jurisdiction of a circuit court commissioner extends over
an entire State. It is unreasonable to suppose, in the light of the ex-
amination herein made, that Congress intended to allow proof to be
made in a part of the State distant from the land and thus deprive
other interested parties of the ordinary right of appearing in the case
and testing the claimant's compliance with law.
In the circular of June 25, 1890 (10 L. D., 687), calling the attention
of local officers to the provisions of said act of May 26, 1890, the follow-
ing appears:
The third paragraph (of said act) refers to final proofs, and affidavits requirnd tobe
made under the homestead, pre-emption, timber-culturo and desert land laws, and
provides that said proofs and affidavits may be made before any commissioner of the
United States circuit court having jurisdiction over the connty in which the lands
are situated, or before the judge or clerk (not necessarily the clerk in the absence of
the judge) of any court of record of the county or parish in which the lands are sit-
uated.
This must be read in the light of the more explicit interpretation now
put upon the act and must be held to mean that the law does not au-
thorize the making of such proofs and affidavits before such comnmis-
sioner outside of the county and State or district and Territory in which
the lands are situated, unless the lands are situated in an unorganized
county, which case is otherwise fully provided for by law.
The application is accordingly denied.
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HOMESTEAD ENTRY-COMMUTATION-ACT OF MARCH 2, 1889.
ELI M\. HUITCzINSON.
One who submits final commutation proof for part of the land covered by his original
homestead entry exhausts his rights under such entry, but may be permitted to
make application for an additional entry under section 6, of the act of March 2,] 8d9.
First Assistant Secretary handler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, August 4, 1890.
I have considered the case arising upon the appeal of Eli M. Hutch-
inson from your office decision of October 9, 1885, rejecting his final
proof for the E of the NW. of Sec. 35, T. 28 N., R. 10 W., Ironton,
Missouri, land district.
On November 22, 1882, Hutchinson made homestead entry embracing
said tract and the W. of the NE. of the same section. On April 30,
1884, he submitted final proof and made commutation cash entry for
said W. of the NE. of said section upon which patent was subse-
quently issued.
On January 17, 1885, he submitted homestead final proof for the other
tract included in his original entry which proof the local officers ap-
proved and issued final certificate to the entryman. This proof was
rejected by your office upon the theory that Hutchinson by making
commutation proof for a part of the land embraced in the original entry
exhausted his right under the homestead law. This case was hereto-
fore considered and by departmental decision of September 5, 1890, it
was held that under the law of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 854), such final
proof might be accepted. Said decision was, however, recalled for fur-
ther consideration.
The final proof is entirely satisfactory in every respect and indicates
that utchinson has acted in good faith. He states that he was led to
commute his entry as he did because he had lost his team and was una-
ble to procure another and had an opportunity to sell the pine timber
on that part of his entry; that before taking any steps however, he
consulted with the register of the Ironton land office, who informed him
he could commute on a part of his entry and afterwards make final
homestead proof on the balance and get a patent for it. This advice
wUs erroneous, however, and Hutchinson can not claim thereunder a
right not given him by the law.
The rule that by commutation the original entry becomes merged in
the cash entry, is well established. One who submits final commutation
proof for a part of the land covered by his original homestead entry,
exhausts his rights under such entry. Nathan T. Jennings (8 L. D.,53).
In the case now under consideration Hutchinson had consummated
his original entry by acquiring title by way of a commutation cash en-
try to a part of the land and there was therefore no entry in existence
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upon which to base the final certificate issued in January 1885. For
these reasons your office decision rejecting the final proof now under
consideration was correct and must be sustained, and the departmental
decision of September 5, 1890 is hereby revoked and set aside.
While Hutchinson can not be allowed to take the land involved upon
the proof heretofore submitted, yet the facts presented would seem to
bring him within the provisions of section 6 of the act of March 2, 1889
(25 Stat., 854). In view of all the circumstances of this case and the
apparent good faith of the claimant, he will be allowed ninety days from
notice hereof within which to make application for an additional entry
under said act, to cover the land in question.
The decision of your office is accordingly modified.
PRACTICE -INTERVENOR-ATTORNEY.
JULIA E. QUIRONET.
If the sworn statement disclosing the interest of an intervenor can in any case be
made by an attorney, it can only be on a full statement of his means of knowl-
edge, and such facts as will show affirmatively andpositively that the partyseek-
ing to intervene has a present interest in the subject-matter involved.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, October 4, 1890.
On May 12, 1884, Julia E. Quironet filed pre-emption declaratory
statement for the SE. Sec. 27, T. 120 N., R. 77 W., Huron land dis-
trict, South Dakota, alleging settlement May 11, 1884. November 12,
1884, she offered final proof before the clerk of the probate court of
Potter county, D. T., and on December 12, same year, final cash certifi-
cate was issued thereon for the tract.
October 6, 1887, your office suspended said entry, rejected the final
proof and required claimant to make new publication and new proof,
and directed the local office to notify her of such action and that she
would be allowed " ninety days in which to comply or appeal."
The register informed your office that notice of the decision was sent
by registered mail to claimant's address May 9,1888, but the same " was
feturned unclaimed; " that notice was also given to W. W. McDonald,
mortgagee, by registered mail May 9, 1888.
July 9, 1888, one S. M. West, attorney on behalf of the Western
Loan and Trust Company of Pierre, Dakota, filed an appeal from your
said office decision, and on April 1,1889, your office returned said appeal
to the local office so " that the appellants may comply with rule 102,
Rules of Practice."
August 29, 1889, the register informed your office that on April 10,
1889, S. M. West was duly notified of said requirement and that tp to
date no action had been taken by him. September 24, 1889, you trans-
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mitted the case to this Department in accordance with-the provisions of
Rule S2 of the Rules of Practice, and the case is now before me.
The notice of appeal filed in this case purports to be signed by S. M.
West as attorney for appellant named therein, and accompanying the
same he filed the following statement, viz:-
I, S. M. West, being duly sworn depose and say that I am attorney for the Western
Loan ad Trust Company of Pierre, Dakota, and am authorized to appear and appeal
the above case of J. E. Quironet, S. E. 27-120-77, on which said company have a pur-
chase money mortgage; that said company has informed me, and I believe such in-
formation to be true, that the claimant has left the Territory and cannot be brought
back to make new proof on the above land.
(signed) S. M. WEST.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of July 1888.
The foregoing statement appears not to have been executed before
any person authorized to administer oaths, but if it had been duly
executed it would not conform to the requirements of Rule 102 of the
Rules of Practice, which provides that " No person not a party to the
record shall intervene in a case without first disclosing on oath the
nature of his iterest."
Neither the company nor its alleged attorney were parties to the
record in the case at bar, and it has been held that-
If an oath made by an attorney could be accepted in any ease as a compliance with
that rule (102) it could only be after a full statement of his means of knowledge, and
of such facts as would show affirmatively and positively that the party seeking to
intervene had at the time a present interest in the subject matter involved. Elmer
E. Bush (9 L. D., 628).
For the reasons herein stated the appeal of said company is accord-
ingly dismissed.
PRE-EMNIPTION ENTRY-MARRIED WOMAN-EQUITABLE ADJUDICA-
TION.
MARGARET D. BAILEY.
A narried woman may be permitted to make a pre-emption entry with a view to its
equitable adjudication, where the proof shows that she had duly complied with
the law in the matter of filing, residence, and improvements prior to her marriage.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land 0ffce, October 4, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Margaret D. Bailey, formerly Wy-
braut, from your office decision of December 17, 1887, rejecting her
final pre-emption proof for the SW.' Sec. 3, T. 20 S., R. 21 W., Wa
Keeney, Kansas land district and holding for cancellation her pre-
enption filing.
Margaret D. Wybrant filed pre-emption declaratory statement for
said land August 7th, alleging settlement August 2, 1884, and on March
22, 1887, submitted finallproof in support thereof under the name of Mar-
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garet D. Bailey. This proof was rejected by the local officers upon the
ground that being a married woman at the date of her final proof she
was not then a qualified pre-emptor and that action was affirmed by
your office.
The final proof shows that this claimant was at the time of her set-
tlement and filing in August 1884, a qualified pre-emnptor; that she
then established her residence on said tract and had resided there con-
inously to date of final proof; that her improvements, consisting of a
sod house, seventeen by forty feet with three doors and four windows,
a sod stable eighteen by twenty-six feet, a corral, a well, fencing and
seven acres of breaking were worth $420, and that she was married to
James Bailey February 26, 1886.
It is not shown when the improvements were placed on this land, but
inasmuch as the claimant had made her home there for a period of
eighteen months prior to the date of her marriage, it is only fair to con-
clude that such of them as were necessary to meet the requirements of
the law were made prior to that date.
The recital of the facts in this case shows that it is in every feature
except that here the claimant had not prior to her marriage given notice
of her intention to submit final proof, the same as the case of Mary E.
Funk (9 L. D., 215), where the entry was allowed and submitted to the
board of equitable adjaudication for consideration. In the case of Emma
Mc(lurg (10 1. D., 629), after a reference to the Funk case among others,
it was said-s I am unable to preceive that the fact that the pre-emptor
has given notice of intention to make final proof can materially alter
the case." The case now under consideration differs from the Mc~lurg
case only in the fact that here no money has been paid and no final,
certificate issued.
This case clearly comes within the rule established by the decisions
referred to and should be disposed of accordingly. The decision ap-
pealed trom is reversed and it is directed that Mrs. Bailey be allowed to
complete her entry by making payment after which it will be referred
board to the of equitable adjudication for consideration.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-CONTIGUITY OF TRACTS ENTERED.
DOUGLAS RANDALL.
Tracts of land cornering on each other are not within the rule of contiguity required
under a homestead entry.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, October 9, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Douglas Randall, Sr., from the decis-
ion of your office dated June 14, 1889, affirming the action of the local
office, rejecting his application to make final proof on his homestead
entry for lots 3 and 4 See. 31, T. 33, R. 23, and E.!~ SE. j of See.
25, T. 33, R. 24 W. Valentine land district, Nebraska.
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March 1, 1884, he made homestead entry for said tract, and on March
4, 1889, he gave the usual notice of his intention to offer final proof,
which was rejected and the following endorsed thereon, viz:
This application is rejected for the reason that the lands described are not contigu-
ous. Lots 3 and 4 Sec. 31, T. 33, R. 23, only cornering with the E. SE. See. 25,
T. 33, R. 24.
(Signed) S. F. BRTCH. Reg.
SArI. G. GLOVER, Bee.
He appealed from this judgment, and on June 14, 1889, your office
affirmed the action of the local officers and directed them to notify the
claimant that he would be required
to surrender such tracts as are non-contignons, as he may elect, with the right to
amend his entry so as to embrace other contiguous land in lien thereof, or if there is
no contiguous land he can surrender his entry without prejudice to his rights to make
a new one on any unappropriated land subject to homestead entry.
Claimant again appealed.
From examination of the record in this case, I am of the opinion that
the decision of your office was proper and in accordance with law, and
the decisions of this Department. Hugh Miller (5 L. D., 683); Svang
v. Tofley (6 L. D., 621); . P. Masterson (7 L. D., 172).
The decision is accordingly affirmed.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-RESIDENCE-MILITARY SERVICE.
GEORGE W. PETERSON.
In case a discrepancy appears between the proof of military service submitted, and
the records of the War Department, the proper practice is to allow the claimant
a reasonable time to explain the discrepancy, and if he is unable to do so, he
should then be required to show sfficient actual residence on the land to com-
plete the requisite period.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, October 6, 1890.
The appeal of George W. Peterson from your office decision of Feb-
ruary 18, 1889, shows that on May 4, 1885, said Peterson made home-
stead entry ot the SW. of Sec. 8, T. 16 N., R. 26 W., North Platte,
Nebraska, and established residence thereon May 9, of the same year.
He submitted his final proof December 16, 1886, which was accepted
by the register and receiver and final certificate, No. 1209, issued
thereon. With said proof he submitted a copy of his discharge from
Co. F., 51st Illinois Infantry, from which it appear, that he entered the
service January 2, 1862, and was discharged May 26, 1865, making his
term of service three years, four months and twenty-four days, which,
with his actual residence on the laud, would make one day more than
the required five years.
Accompanying the record is the certificate of R. C. Drum, Adjutant
General, from which it appears that Peterson was enrolled on the 2d of
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June, 1862, instead of the 2d of January, as shown by his discharge,
thus making his residence five months less than the five years required.
Upon this showing your office suspended the entry, and required him
to furnish supplemental proof, without publication, showing the full
five years residence. He did not comply with this requirement, but has
appealed to this Department.
The decision of your office was right. When a discrepancy appears
between the proof of service submitted and the records of the War
Department, it is the proper practice to allow the claimant a reasonable
time to explain, if he can, the discrepancy (Thomas Graham, 3 C. L. O.,
164), and if he is unable to do so, then he should be allowed to show
sufficient actual residence on the land to complete the full five years.
An examination of the records of the War Department shows con-
elusively that Peterson was enrolled on the 2d of June, instead of Jan-
uary, 1862, and therefore his discharge, if a correct copy of it has been
certified with the appeal, is wrong as to date of enrollment. The orig-
inal muster roll of his company is on file in the War Department, and
a personal examination of the same shows that the mistake is in the
discharge and not in the certificate of the adjutant general.
The five years residence is an absolute requirement of the statute,
and this Department has no authority to waive it. While final proof
made a few days prior to the expiration of the five years required
might be allowed on the maxim that the law does not regard trifles,
this principle of law ffords no warrant to excuse five months defi-
ciency, especially when, as in this case, it is apparent that the applicant
could not have been innocently mistaken as to his term of service, for
it is not easy to conceive how a soldier can have honestly mistaken
January for Jne as the date of his enlistment.
The claimant will be allowed sixty days from notice of this decision
to comply with the requirement of your office, and your office decision
is accordingly affirmed.
HEARINGS ORDERED BY THE DEPARTENMT-CIRCULAR OF MAY 15,1889.
UNITED STATES v. FAXON.
The circular instructions of May 15, 1889, issued to special agents by the General
Land Office, directing the suspension of proceedings wherein it is believed that
the government will not be able to sustain the charge made against the entry,
is not applicable to hearings ordered by the Department.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, October
6, 1890.
In the case of the United States v. Albert D. Faxon involving the lat-
ter's Osage cash entry for the W. NE. and NE. NE. , See. 22, T.
-30 S., R. 12 W., Lared, Kansas, the Department on October 23, 1889,
found that in a hearing ordered on report of a special agent to deter-
mine said entryman's compliance with law the local officers had failed
2 4 9 7-VOL 11-24
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to consider certain testimony favorable to the entryman, and further
found that certain testimony against the entryman's interest bad been
improperly introduced and considered. A rehearing was accordingly
ordered.
A motion for review was filed by F. B. Tower, assignee, but the De-
partment on May 21, 1890, overruled the same and adhered to its orig-
inal order.
I am now in receipt of your letter of the 16th ult. transmitting a
report dated September 5, from special agent Yost who gives it as his
opinion, after examination, " that we would entail considerable expense
by having a hearing with very little prospect of cancelling the entry."
You accordingly ask authority to relieve the entry from suspension.
It appears the action of the agent was taken under your office circular
letter of May 15, 1889, to special agents which was as follows:
If, UpOD re-examination of a case reported by a former agent, or in any case, in
which you have been directed to attend the hearing, you are convinced that the gov-
ernmtnt will be unable to sustain the charges, you will continue the case, if date for
trial has been set, and notify all parties in interest, in order that they need not be
put to the trouble and expense of appearing at the local office.
You will thereupon immediately report all the facts to this office, giving in full
your reasons for believing that the government will be unable to make out a prima
facie case; and await further instructions.
By letter of June 10, last you notified the special agent of the con-
clusion reached by the Department and directed him to "' confer with
the local officers and agree upon such a date for the re-hearing as will
enable you to be in attendance and present testimony on the part of
the government."
The special agent presents the affidavits of James Crouch, John H.
Wheat and W. H. Slack. Wheat states that claimant settled on the
tract in the spring of 1880 and lived thereon during the spring and
summer, that he built a dug-out house, and a good sized sheep corral,
and " stayed here about three years." Crouch corroborated these alle-
gations. Both believe claimant acted in good faith. Slack says claim-
ant never built a house or corral on the tract. Both Slack and Wheat
were witnesses at the former hearing; the former for the government,
the latter for the entry. The issue now made by their statements is the
same as that on which the re-hearing was ordered. The issue of fact
still remains. It is true the agent states he regrets to say that in his
opinion Slack is not reliable, but this is a matter which should be a
subject of cross examination. Under these circumstances I am of
opinion the hearing as ordered should proceed.
Moreover I do not think your office circular letter of May 15, 1889,
supra, should be held to apply to hearings ordered by the Department.
Such hearings ordered by your office are upon the ex parte reports of
special agents, but those by the Department are after examination of
the testimony. The same rule therefore should not be applied to both.
The hearing will proceed as ordered.
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TIMBER AND STONE ACT-MARRIED WOMAN.
NANCY JANE HARRIS.
A married woman in the State of California is not disqualified to make a timber land
entry under the act of June 3, 1878, by the fact that her husband has made an
entry under said act and paid for the land with community money.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, October 7, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Nancy Jane Harris from your decision
of June 3, 1889, rejecting her application to purchase under the act of
June 3, 1878, the SE. I of NW. , NE. i of SW. i and N. J of SE. j of
See. 9, T. 5 S. B. 21 E., Stockton, California.
On July 23, 1888, Nancy J. Harris, and her husband Reuben C. Har-
ris, each made application to purchase one hundred and sixty acres of
land under the provisions of said act.
The application of the husband was considered first, and his entry
allowed, and payment for the land was made with community money.
The applicant, Mrs. 11arris, swore that she made the entry in good
faith for her own use and not for the use or benefit of any other person,
also that no other person or firm or association has any interest in the
entry, or in the land or timber thereon. She also swore that she is a
native born citizen of the United States, and that she is possessed of
separate property of her own, and that she intended to pay for said land
with her own separate money.
Her application was rejected by the local office, and by your office, for
the reason that her husband had already made entry for one hundred
and sixty acres of land under the provisions of said act and made pay-
ment for the same with community property.
The theory upon which this action was based is set forth in the decision
of your office in the case of Maggie Baxter (Copp's Land Owner, Vol.
14, page 288). In said decision it is stated "A husband and wife under
said act are construed to come within the meaning of the term " asso-
ciation of persons" and any purchase made by either during cover-
ture, with community property, would bar the other from making such
an entry, because by the common interest that each would have in
such an entry, they would have exhausted their rights under said act
and therefore could not be allowed to make a second entry."
In California the property acquired by either husband or wife after
marriage is community property except that acquired by either by gift,
bequest, devise, or descent, hence your office assumed that the interest
in any real estate purchased with community property enures to the
wife to such an extent that she is prohibited by the act from making a
further entry.
By section 172 of the Civil Code of California, it is provided that " the
husband has the management and control of the community prcp-
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erty with the like absolute power of disposition (other than testament-
ary) as he has of his separate estate."
The supreme court of California in the case of Greiner v. Greiner (58
Cal., 115), say,
Prior to the adoption of the codes the title to the common property vested in the
husband. He could during the coverture dispose of such property absolutely, as if it
were his own separate property. The interest of the wife during the same period was
a mere expectancy, like the interest which an heir may possess in the property of his
ancestor (Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal., 312; De Godey v. Godey, 39 id., 164). It is
true that the husband could not deprive her of it by his will (Beard v. Know, 5 Cal.,
256). The same is true under the civil code.
In section 1402 of the civil code of California, it is provided that " in
ease of the dissolution of the community by the death of the husband,
the entire community property is equally subject to his debts, the family
allowance and the charge and expense of administration."
In view of the provisions of the law of California, and the decisions of
the courts thereunder, I am of the opinion, that the interest of the wife
in the community property, is not such an interest as prohibits her from
making an entry under the act in question.
In the case of Delila Stukel (10 L. D., 47), it was held that a married
woman in the State of Oregon could purchase under the provisions of
the act in question.
To deny the same right to a married woman in the State of California
is to render the operations and benefit of the law unequal in the differ-
ent States where the law is operative, a result neither provided for nor
contemplated by the act.
The evidence shows that the applicant Harris is qualified to purchase
under her application.
For the reasons stated the rule announced in the case of Isabella M.
Dwyer (6 L. D., 32), will be followed.
Your decision is, therefore, reversed.
OSAGE LAND-RIGHT OF PURCHASE-SECTION 2285 R. S.
DANIEL W. DEBO.
The provisions of section 2285 of the Revised Statutes are not intended to exempt
the settlers named therein from the specified restrictions of the pre-emption law
except as to the particular tracts held by settlement on May 9, 1872, and the
purchase of said lands exhausts the pre-emption right either as to Osage or
other land.
Settlement on Osage land subsequent to the act of May 9, 1872, does not authorize
the purchase thereof, if prior thereto such settler had perfected an entry of
Osage land.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, October
8, 1890.
On May 24, 1886, Daniel W. Debo made Osage cash entry of the
N. of NE. and the N. of NW. , Sec. 14, T. 32 S., R. 14 B., Topeka,
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Kansas, which you held for cancellation, for the reason that he had
previously, to wit: on July 12, 1871, made entry of one hundred and
sixty acres of Osage Indian trust and diminished reserve lands, and
that having made one entry of these lands, to the extent of one hun-
dred and sixty acres, he is debarred from making another entry of Osage
lands.
From this decision the claimant appealed, alleging error in said de-
cision in holding that an entry made of Osage lands prior to "' March
22, 1872," is a bar to a subsequent entry of other Osage lands. In sup-
port of this appeal he relies upon section 2285 of the Revised Statutes,
which provides that:
The restrictions of the pre-emption laws, contained in sections twenty-two hundred
and sixty and twenty-two hundred and sixty-one, shall not apply to any settler on
the Osage trust and diminished reserve lands in tha State of Kansas, who was actu-
ally residing on his claim on the ninth day of May, eighteen hundred and seventy-
two.
By treaty of September 29, 1865 (14 Stat., 687), the Great and Little
Osage Indians ceded to the United States certain tracts of land to be
sold for the benefit of said Indians. By the 1st article of said treaty a
cession was made of what is known as the Osage ceded lands, in which
it was stipulated that Said lands shall be surveyed and sold, under the
direction of the Secretary of the Interior, on the most advantageous
terms, for cash, as public lands are surveyed and sold under existing
laws, but no pre-emption claim or homestead settlement shall be recog-
nized. " By the 2d article of said treaty, the Indians also ceded what
is known as the Osage trust lands, to wit:
A tract of land twenty miles in width from north to south, off the north side of the
remainder of their present reservation, and extending its entire length from east to
west; which land is to be held in trust for said Indians, and to be surveyed and sold
for their benefit by the Secretary of the Interior, under such rules and regulations as
he may from time to time prescribe, under the direction of the commissioner of the
general land office, as other lands are surveyed and sold.
It was also agreed by the 16th article f said treaty that, if said In-
dians should agree to remove from the State of Kansas and settle on
lands provided for them by the United States in the Indian Territory,
then the diminished reservation shall likewise be disposed of in the
same manner and for the same purpose as the trust land provided for
by the second article of the treaty.
The joint resolution of April 10,1869 (16 Stat., 55), provided that any
bona fide settler residing upon any portion of said lands sold to the
United States by the first and second articles of the treaty, who is a
citizen of the United States, or had declared his intention to become a
citizen, shall be entitled to purchase the same, in quantity not to exceed
one hundred and sixty acres, at one dollar and twenty-five cents per
acre.
The act of July 15, 1870 (16 Stat., 362), made an appropriation for
the removal of the Indians from the diminished reservation, and pro-
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vided that after the removal therefrom, said lands, as well as the trust
lands north of said diminished reservation,
Shall be sold to actual settlers only, said settlers being heads of families, or over
twenty-one years of ages in quantities not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres,
in square form, to each settler at the price of one dollar and twenty-five cents per
acre, payment to be made in cash within one year from date of settlement or of the
passage of this act.
From the foregoing, it will be seen that the joint resolution of April
10, 1869, conferred upon bona fide settlers residing upon the Osage
4eded lands and the Osage trust lands a preference right of purchase,
in quantity not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres, at the single
minimum price for public lands, and the act of July 15, 1870, restricted
the sale of the Osage trust and the diminished reserve lands to actual
settlers only, in quantities not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres
to each settler, without subjecting the disposition of said lands to all
the provisions of the pre-emption law.
The only condition necessary to the right of purchase under the act
of July 15, 1870, was that the purchaser should be an actual settler on
the land, and, although he had removed from land of his own, or was
the owner of three hundred and twenty acres of land, or had formerly
exercised the right of pre-emption of public lands under the act of
September 4, 1841, he would nevertheless be entitled to purchase Osage
lands by virtue of his settlement thereon, to the extent of one hundred
anl sixty acres to each settler. Foster v. Brost (11 Kansas, 350);
United States v. Woodbury (5.L. D., 303).
This was the law in force providing for the disposition of these lands
when the act of May 9, 1872 (17 Stat., 90), was passd, subjecting all
entries of these lands to the general principles of the pre-emption laws,
but provided by the third section of said act.
That the sale or transfer of his or her claim upon any portion of these lands by any
settler prior to the issue of the commissioner's instructions of April twenty-sixth,
eighteen hundred and seventy-one, Shall not operate to preclude the right of entry,
under the provisions of this act, upon another tract settled upon subsequent to such
sale or transfer: Provided, That satisfactory proof of good faith be furnished upon
such subsequent settlement: Providedfarther, That the restrictions of the pre-emp-
tion laws relating to previous enjoyment of the pre-emption right, to removal from
one's own land in the same State, or the ownership of over three hundred and twenty
acres, shall not apply to any settler actually residing on his or her claim at the date
of the passage of this act.
The second proviso to said section was subsequently embodied in sec-
tion 2285 of the Revised Statutes, as heretofore quoted.
It was obviously the sole purpose of the third section of said act to
protect the rights of actual settlers, whose claims were initiated under
the laws in force at the date of the passage of the act, and who were
then actually residing on their claims, by allowing them to complete
their entries and perfect their title, although they might not have the
qualifications of pre-emptors, as prescribed by the first section of the
act; but it did not intend to exempt such settlers from the restrictions
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of the pre-emption law, except as to the particular tracts then settled
upon, and the purchase of said lands exhausted the pre-emption right,
and could not be again exercised, either in the purchase of Osage lands,
or of other lands under the pre-emption law; and also where settlement
was made on Osage trust and diminished reserve lands, after the pas-
sage of the act of May 9, 1872, such settler could not acquire title to
said land, if he had previously made entry of Osage lands, or had ex-
hausted his pre-emption right under the general pre-emption law. (Todd
iKnepple, 5 LI. D., 537.)
Nor does the third section of said act authorize the entry of a tract
of Osage Indian trust and diminished reserve land settled upon after
the passage of the act of May 9, 1872, if such settler had already ae-.
quired title to one hundred and sixty acres of Osage lands. The pro-
vision contained in said section, " that the sale or transfer of his or her
claim upon any portion of these lands, prior to the issue of the commis-
sioner's instructions of April twenty-six, eighteen hundred and seventy
one, shall not operate to preclude the right of entry, under the provis-
ions of this act upon another tract settled upon subsequent to such sale
or transfer," has reference to the sale or transfer of a claim initiated by
settlement that had not been perfected, and not to an entry that had
been allowed. It was not the purpose of the act to enlarge the rights
of the settlers upon these lands, but merely to protect their rights or
claims acquired under laws existing at the date said claims or rights
were initiated, and as the act of July 15, 1870, expressly limited the
right of purchase to one hundred and sixty acres to each settler, when
an entry of this quantity was made, the right of the settler was ex-
hausted as to these lands, and he could not acquire a right to purchase
any other quantity under any of the laws.
The decision of your office is affirmed.
PRACTICE-APPEAIFOTICE-APPLICATION FOR RE-INSTATEMENT.
CHARLES A. PARKER.
Where an appeal is taken from a decision holding an entry for cancellation, 
on ac-
count of the adverse claim of another, it will not be entertained in 
the absence
of due notice to such adverse claimant.
The failure of the General Land Office to return, under rule 82 of practice, 
an appeal
which is defective for want of notice, does not relieve the Department 
from the
necessity of dismissing said appeal on account of such defect, if the time 
allowed
for appeal and notice thereof has expired.
A pending application for the re-instatement of an entry for land embraced 
within
the intervening entry of another, is at once effective on the cancellation of 
such
intervening entry, and segregates the land covered thereby.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, October
8, 1890.
I have considered the application by Charles A. Parker, for a review
of my decision of February 10, 1890, dismissing his appeal from your
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decision of June 27, 1889, holding for cancellation his timber culture
entry for the SE. t of Sec. 31, T. 3 N., R. 50 W., Denver, Colorado.My decision was based upon the ground that no copy of the appeal
of Parker had been served upon William Whitehurst, an adverse
claimant.
The material facts in the case are as follows:
William Whitehurst made timber culture entry for the tract in ques-tion September 1, 1885.
On March 28, 1887, said entry was held for cancellation upon the re-port of Inspector Hobbs, that the same was made through George FbWork and T. B. Babcock, notary public, without the formality of swear-ing claimant to the preliminary affidavits. As the claimant failed to
respond to the notice sent him, the entry was canceled December 7,.1887.
On December 31, 1887, Andrew J. Clute, jr., made timber culture
entry for the land. On January 16, 1888, the local officers transmitted
to your office, the application of Whitehurst for the re-instatement ofhis entry. In his affidavit in support of his application, he states thathe swore to the timber culture affidavits before T. B. Babcock, a notarypublic, at Yuma, Colorado, that he signed the necessary papers at Otis,Col., and by arrangement said Babcock met him as the train passed the
station at Yuma, and administered the oath to him. He also sworethat during the first year he plowed over five acres and had planted
cuttings and tree seeds, and had plowed fifty acres additional, and thathe was living on adjoining land which he had settled upon as a pre-
emptor.
T. B. Babcock, the notary public, corroborates the statement ofWhitehurst, as to the manner in which the affidavits in question weretaken.
On April 11, 1888, your office, instructed the local officers, to call uponAndrew J. Clute, jr., to show cause why the entry of Whitehurst should
not be re-instated, and his subsequent entry canceled.
It appears that before this letter was written, viz., on arch 29, 1888>Clute had relinquished his entry, and the same had been canceled atthe local office, and on the same day Charles A. Parker made timber
culture entry for the land.
By letter of April 17, 1888, you re-instated the entry of Whitehurst.On June 27, 1889, you held the entry of Parker for cancellation onthe ground that it was erroneously allowed during the pendency of the
application of Whitehurst for the re-instatement of his entry.Parker filed an appeal from your decision, alleging,-
1st. Error in re-instating the entry of Whitehurst without notice toParker, and,-
2nd., Error in holding the entry of Parker for cancellation without op-portunity to show cause why said entry should not be canceled.Parker failed to serve a copy of this appeal on Whitehurst, and on
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 37T
motion of attorney for the latter, the appeal was dismissed by my de-
cision of February 10, 1890.
The motion for review is based upon the following grounds,-,
1. That the decision appealed from was in an ex parte case in which there was no
opposing party entitled to notice.
It is sufficient answer to this assignment to say that the decision from
which the appeal was taken expressly states that the entry of Parker
was held for cancellation by reason of Whiteharst's adverse claim and
Parker was required to take notice of the same, even if by reason of de-
fective annotations the proper records of the local office did not show
the existence of such a claim.
The 2nd ground upon which review is asked is:
That if the appeal was considered-defective, for want of service on Whitehurst, the
appellant should have been notified, under practice rule 82, and allowed the oppor-
tunity of amending the same within fifteen days.
Under this rule, it was the duty of your office to notify appellant of
the defect in his appeal and to return the same for amendment. John,
Ralls (7 L. D., 454). When the defective appeal reached this office it
was too late to amend the same and file within the time required by the
rules of practice, hence the appeal was dismissed for failure to serve no.
tice on the adverse party as required by said rules. Bandy v. Fremont
Townsite (10 L. D., 595). The third ground upon which review is asked
is:
That the error of the Commissioner in the decision appealed from is so apparent and,
the injustice to Parker so great that it would be proper for you in the exercise of your-
supervisory powers to reverse it if you should hold that the appeal was not properly
taken.
In reply I would say that the decision of your office was in accord-
ance with the established rulings of the Department, that an application
to enter land segregated the same and operated to prevent further dis-
posal thereof until final decision. Saben v. Amundson ( L. D., 578) ;
Arthur P. Toombs (10 L. D., 192); Griffin v. Pettigrew (10 L. D., 510).
The application of Whitehurst for a re-instatement of his entry, was,
in effect, an application to enter the land, and should it be alleged that
the existing entry of Clute segregated the land at the time the applica-
tion was filed, the instant the land became free by the cancellation of
CMts entry, the application took effect, and the subsequent entry of
Parker was erroneously allowed.
If, as is intimnated by counsel for Parker, the entry of Whitehurst is
illegal, it is subject to contest.
The motion is denied.
p
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X j PRIVATE CLAIM-SCRIP-ACT O' MARCH 2, 1889.
1> & GX MCDONOGB: SCHOOL FUND.
° :Scrip issued under the act of June 2, 1858, in satisfaction of a private claim, may only
be located upon land subject to sale at private cash entry.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
October 10, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of the commissioners of the McDonogh
school fund from the decision of your office affirming the action of the
local officers in rejecting the application of said commissioners to pur-
ehase sections 14 and 15, township 19 south, range 28 east, S. E. Dis-
trict, Louisiana, with surveyor-general scrip.
Said application was rejected, upon tho'ground that the tract applied
for is not subject to sale at private cash entry. From this decision the
applicants appealed, alleging error in said decision upon the ground
that the original claim for which the scrip was issued had been donated
by the confirmee to the McDonogh school fund and should have been
confirmed in place.
This scrip was issued under the act of June 2, 1858 (11 Stat., 294),
which provided that where any private land claim has been confirmed
by Congress, and the same in whole or in part has not been located
or satisfied, that the surveyor-general shall issue to the claimant cer-
tificates of location for a quantity of land equal to that so confirmed,
which may be located upon any of the public lands of the United States,
subject to sale at private entry at one dollar and twenty-five cents per
acre. This scrip was received by the con firmees, or their assignees of
such claim, in satisfaction of the claim so confirmed, and the mere fact
that the claim for which the scrip was issued had been located in place
confers no right upon the holders of this scrip to locate it upon other
lands, except those subject to private cash entry at one dollar and
twenty-five cents per acre.
The act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 854), withdrew from private cash
entry all public lands of the United States, except in the State of Mis-
souri, and these lands were therefore not subject to purchase with said
scrip at date of the application.
Your decision is affirmed.
TIMBER CULTURE ENTRY-TECHNICAL QUARTER SECTION.
JAMES C. GARMAN.
Under the timber culture law an entry may embrace a technical quarter section,
without Wf ferene to its relation to the entire section.
The case of Andrew Johnson cited and distinguished.
first Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, October 10, 1890.
On February 3, 1888, James C. Garman applied at the Denver, Col-
orado, land office to make timber culture entry for the SE. , Sec. 20,
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T. 12 N., R. 51 W., which application was rejected by the local officers
for the reason that " the tract applied for contains more than one-quarter
of the area of the entire section."
Your office on June 23, 1888, upon appeal of the entryman, affirmed
that judgment and the applicant has appealed therefrom to this Depart-
ment.
The tract applied for is the ordinary quarter section of one hundred
and sixty acres, but it appears the entire section in which it is located
contains but 389.56 acres.
Section 1 of the timber culture act, (June 14, 1878, 20 Stats., 113,)
provides:
That the act entitled " An aet to amend the act entitled 'An act to encourage 
the
growth of timber on western prairies,'" approved March 13,1874, be and the 
same is
hereby amended so as to read as follows: That any person who is the head of 
a fam-
ily, or who has arrived at the age of twenty-one years, and is a citizen of the 
United
States, or who shall have filed his declaration of intention to become such, 
as re-
quired by the naturalization laws of the United States, who shall plant, protect, 
and
keep in a healthy, growing condition for eight years ten acres of timber, on any 
quar-
ter-seetion of any of the public lands of the United States, or five acres on 
any legal
subdivision of eighty acres, or two and one-half acres on any legal subdivision 
of
forty acres or less, shall be entitled to a patent for the whole of said quarter-section,
or of such legal subdivision of eighty or forty acres, or fractional subdivision 
of less
than forty acres, as the case may be, at the expiration of said eight years, on making
proof of such fact by not less than two credible witnesses, and a full compliance 
of
the further conditions as provided in section two: Provided further, That not more
than one quarter of any section shall be thus granted, and that no person shall 
make
more than one entry under the provisions of this act.
The judgment of your office and of the local office is based on the
proviso: " That not more than one-quarter of any section shall be thus
granted for a timber culture entry." In this I think you are in error.
It is clear to my mind that what Congress intended by this phrase is
that not more than one-quarter section of any section should be appro-
priated for the artificial cultivation of timber in any one section. And
what it meant by the term " one quarter of any section " as here used
means a legal subdivision covered by the descriptive term "quarter
section," and that in no ease can more than one quarter section as sur-
veyed be entered under the timber culture act. This is borne out, I
think, by the use of the language " that any person . . . . who
shall plant . . . . on any quarter section of public lands ten acres
of timber .. . . shall be entitled to a patent for the whole of
said quarter section . . . . at the expiration of eight years, etc."
The whole import of said section clearly implies that a qualified en-
tryman may enter a quarter section or any lesser legal subdivision of a
section of land subject to such entry. If the language used therein was
that " not more than one-fourth of any section " shall thus be granted,
then there could be no question about the construction to be placed
upon the act. But I am firm in my conviction, from the reading of
said section, that Congress had in mind a technical quarter section in
adopting this prohibitory clause.
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In this case the application is for a technical quarter section as sur-
veyed. It is not, therefore, technically for "more than one quarter" of
the section.
Under the homestead law (Section 2289, R. S.) entries are restricted
to "' one quarter section or a less quantity.2
It is now the established opinion of this Department that under thislanguage an entry may be made of a quarter section as it is found sur-
veyed without reference to its area or to the area of the section. Will-iam C. Elson (6 I. D., 797), Benjamin I. Wilson (10 I. D., 524).
The pre-emption law provides (Section 2259, R. S.) that an entry may
be made of "any number of acres not exceeding one hundred and sixty,
or a quarter section." This language also is held by the Department
to authorize an entry of a technical quarter section without regard toits actual area. John W. Douglas (10 I. D., 116).
These rulings clearly indicate the attitude of the Department upon
the construction to be placed upon the terms used in the laws men-
tioned as descriptive of the quantity of land which may be entered.
Following the spirit of these rulings, I find no difficulty in concluding
that the words of the timber culture law should receive a like construc-
tion. The reasons supporting the conclusion in those cases are equally
applicable in this, and need not here be set out. Reference to those
eases is sufficient.
It is true in the case of Andrew Johnson (10 L. D., 681), an applica-
tion to make entry for a certain lot was rejected on the ground that the
area of the lot added to that of a tract in the same section already cov-
ered by a timber culture entry " would exceed one-fourth of the see-
tion." I am of the opinion that case should be distinguished from the
one at bar. In that case entry of one legal subdivision, eighty acres,
of a section which contained only 380.60, had been made, and to allow
another- subdivision in a different quarter section to be entered would
be to allow entry of more than one-fourth of the area of the section.
Hence, that case does not furnish a guide for the disposition of this.
Each case must stand on the peculiar circumstances surrounding it,
and at the same time carry out the spirit of the act and the intent of
Congress. I am clearly of the opinion that the views herein expressed
are a correct interpretation of said act.
I conclude, therefore, that a timber culture entry may be made of a
technical quarter section, without reference to its relation to the entire
section.
Said decision is consequently reversed.
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SCHOOL IN DEMNITY-STATE OF WASHINGTON.
L. H. WHEELER.
An indemnity school selection made by the territory of Washington under the pro-
visions of section 2275 R. S., reserves the land covered thereby from sale or entry,
and land thus selected i not released from such reservation by the act providing
for the admission of said Territory into the Union.
Acting Secretary Chandler to te Commissioner of the General Land
Office, October 13, 1890.
This appeal is filed by L. H. Wheeler from the decision of your office
of April 27, 1889, affirming the decision of the local officers rejecting
his application, filed August 11, 1888, to make homestead entry of the
NE. 1, Sec. 15, T. 38 N., R. 2 E., Seattle, Washington, and rejecting
his several applications to purchase at private cash entry certain tracts
of land fully set forth in your decision of April 27, 1889, from which
this appeal is taken.
Said applications were made at different dates, in the months of Au-
gust and September, 1888, while Washington was a Territory, and
were rejected because the lands had been selected as school indemnity.
From the decision of your office affirming said action, the applicant
appealed, assigning the following grounds of error:
1. That all lieu selections heretofore made are absolutely void;
2. That lieu selections must be made after we become a State;
3. That the manner of selection must be determined by the legislature of the State;
4. That no selections can ever be made for losses occasioned by fractional sec-
tions or deficiencies arising from any natural cause whatever;
5. That any selections made where such deficiencies form a part are invalid as to
the whole.
The sole question to be determined in this case is, whether the lands
applied for were at the date ot the applications subject to entry, and it
is therefore unnecessary to consider the question as to what the status
of said lands was after the State was admitted into the Union.
It is contended by the applicant that the act of February 26, 1859
(11 Stat., 385), was not intended to apply to the Territory of Washing-
ton, and that all lieu selections made while the territorial government
existed are absolutely void, but if said selections were then valid, no
selections of lieu land can be valid since the act of February 22, 1889
(25 Stat., 676), providing for the admission of Washington into the
Union, for the reason that said act dissolved the reservation in mak-
ing other provisions for the grants to said State.
With reference to the first proposition, it is sufficient to say that the
question thereby presented was fully settled in the decision in the case
of John W. Bailey et a., 5 L. D., 216, in which it was held that said
selections were authorized by the act of February 26, 1859, and said
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lands so selected being in a state of reservation, were not subject to
other disposition during its continuance.
The lands being so reserved at the date of application, it is imma-
terial whether said reservation was dissolved by the admission of the
State into the Union or not, so far as it affects the applications to pur-
chase at private cash entry, for the reason that the act of March 2, 1889"
25 Stat., 854, withdrawing from private entry all public lands of the
United States, except in the State of Missouri, was in force when the
State of Washington was admitted into the Union, and was applicable
to these lands.
But, independently of this, the act of February 26,1859 (Revised
Statutes, 2275), is a general provision applicable alike to all the States
and Territories, and this provision is not repealed as to the State of
Washington by the 17th section of the enabling act of February 22,
1889, but is retained as a part of the grant for school purposes by the
10th section of said act. Therefore the reservation made by the selection
of said tracts while the territorial government existed still continues.
until said selection shall be canceled. If it can be shown that the land
for which Wheeler applies to make homestead entry was not subject to
selection by the Territory or State, by reason of adverse rights acquired
prior to selection, or of a defective basis, that question may be consid-
ered whenever a proper application is made for the land.
From the record before me, I see no error in the decision of your office
and it is therefore affirmed.
SCHOOL INDEMITY-STATE OF WASHENGTON.
IIULDA M. SMITH.
The act of February 26, 1859 (R. S., 2275) is applicable to the State of Washington,
and reservations made by school indemnity selections while the territorial form
of government existed continue until such selections are canceled.
The authority to make indemnity selections under said act rests with the county com-
missioners who derive such authority from the act of March 2, 1853.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Offce,
October 13, 1890.
On March 19, 1889, Hulda M. Smith made application to enter the
SE. -of Sec. 31, T. 24 N., R. 4 B., Seattle, Washington, under the home-
stead law.
Said application was rejected by the local officers, for the reason that
said land was not subject to entry, having been selected as school
indemnity for lands lost in said township. Your office affirmed said
decision, on July 3, 1889, and the applicant appealed therefrom, assign-
ing the following grounds of error:
First. In finding that said land had been legally selected as indemnity school land.
Second. In finding that said pretended selection withdrew said land from entry
under the homestead laws.
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Said pretended selection is void because:-
1st. The Territory is not entitled to the number of acres selected in said township.-
2d. Said selection is in excess of the basis.
3d. The commissioners of King county, W. T., had no authority to make selections.
on the basis they employed.
4th. Said commissioners took no legal action on said selection.
5th. Said commissioners had no power to delegate their authority in making saidi
selection.
6th. Said commissioners never executed or approved the execution of the list in,
which said selection is embraced.
These assignments of error are predicated upon the theory that the
Territory of Washington was not authorized to take indemnity to com-
pensate deficiencies for fractional townships, under the act of February
26, 1859 (11 Stat., 385), and that the county commissioners had no power-
to make such selections.
This case is in the main controlled by the decision of the Department
in the case of L. I. Wheeler, rendered this day, holding that the act of:
February 26, 1859 (Revised Statutes, 2275), is applicable to the State
of Washington, and that the reservations made by the selection of said
tracts while the territorial government existed is a continuing reserva-
tion until said selection shall be canceled.
The act of March 2, 1853 (10 Stat., 172), conferred upon the board of
county commissioners the authority to select indemnity for school pur--
poses, where sections sixteen and thirty-six shall be occupied by actual
settlers prior to survey, and this act must be construed in pars materia
with the general indemnity act of February 26, 1859, supra, which con-
tains no provision as to how or by whom said selections shall be made.
The authority to make selections under the latter act must therefore
rest with the county commissioners, who derive their authority to select
indemnity land for school purposes under the former act.
It is further alleged that the county commissioners had no power to-
delegate their authority to an agent to make said selections, and that.
they never executed or approved the list.
I can see Do reason why said selections may not be made by the-
county commissioners through an agent, if the act of the agent is ap-
proved by the board, but there is nothing in this appeal to show that.
said selections were not made regularly and. in the manner. provided.
by law.
The decision of your office is affirmed..
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HOMESTEAD EWTRY-SOLDIRS5 FILIN-ACT OF MARCH 2, 1889.
GEORGE W. BLACKWELL.
A homestead entry may be made under section 2, act of March 2, 1889, by one who
has previously filed a soldier's declaratory statement for another tract.
Pirst Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, October 13, 1890.
George W. Blackwell has appealed from your office decision of Feb-
ruary 8 1889, rejecting the final proof offered by him on his homestead
-entry No. 6946, for See. 10, T. 10 S., B. 25 W., Wa-Keeney land district,
Kansas. W
Said proof was rejected because he had previously filed soldier's
declaratory statement on another tract of land.
Said decision of your office was correct under the law as it existed at
the time the decision was rendered (Stephens v. Ray,5 L. D., 133; Maria
'C. Arter, 7 L. D., 136; Joseph M. Adair, 8 . D., 200). But since that
date-to wit, on March 2, 1889 (see 25 Stat., 8 51 )-Congress has passed
-an act the second section of which provides:
That any person who has not heretofore perfected title to a tract of land of whichhe has made entry under the homestead law, may mke a homestead entry of not x-
ceeding one quarter-section of pnblic land subject to such entry, such previous filing
or entry to the contrary notwithstanding.
Under this provision of said act I think it clear that the claimant is
entitled, under the act cited, to make a homestead entry, notwithstand-
ing he had exhausted his homestead right under previous laws by thefiling of a soldier's declaratory statement (Richard T. Henning, 9 . D.,
382). In case you find the proof on file to be satisfactory in other
respects, his entry will be approved for patent (John J. Stewart, 9 L. D.,
Z43).
The decision of your office rejecting his proof is modified accordingly.
RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY-ACT OF MARCH 3, 1875.
INSTRUCTIONS.
Maps showing a continuous line of road may be submitted for approval under the act
of March 3, 1875, though exhibiting sections of road in excess of twenty miles.
Acting Secretary handler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
October 14, 1890.
I have the letter of the 9th instant from the Acting Commissioner, in
which he refers to maps filed by railroad companies under the right of
way act of March 3, 1875, showing sections of road that exceed twenty
miles in length, and expressing the desire for instructions as to whether
such defect will be considered sufficient ground for their rejection.
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In reply I have to state that the almost universal rule of action by the
Department on maps submitted under the act referred to, has been to
approve them without reference to the number of miles embraced in any
continuous section of road, if found to be correct in all other respects,
and your office should be thus governed.
This action of the Department is not, however, to be confounded with
that in the case of a map showing detached portions of line of route,
or of one embracing a portion of a main line and a branch or spur. In
these instances the maps should be returned to the companies filing
them.
In case then that maps depicting a continuous line of route in excess
of twenty miles come before you for action they may be regularly sub-
mitted for departmental approval if otherwise without defect.
PRACTICE-NOTICE OF APPEAL-RULE 93.
LANG V. ST. Louis, IRON MOUNTAIN, AND SOUTHERN R. Co.
Ail appeal Will not be entertained if a copy thereof is ot served upon the opposite
party within the period prescribed by the rules of practice.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
October 14, 1890.
On October 9, 1889, you transmitted the appeal of Francis Lang from
your decision of March 25, 1889, holding for cancellation his homestead
entry for lot 1, of section 6, T. 1 N., R. 11 W., Little Rock, Ark., and
awarding the land to the St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern, and
Little Rock and Memphis Railroad companies.
Your decision was based upon the ground that the land in question
"is within the six mile granted limits of the grants by the act of Feb-
ruary 9, 1853, for the Cairo and Fulton, now St. Louis, Iron Mountain
and Southern and the Memphis and Little Rock, now Little Rock and
Memphis Railroad companies, and lot 1 of See. 6, passed to the State
upon the definite location of the railroads August, 1855, having been
vacant public land at that time and also at the revival of said grants by
act of July 28, 1866."
' Notice of this decision was given to Lang, April 3, 1889.
On May 8, 1889, he filed an appeal from.said decision in the local
office. A copy of the same, however, was not served on the agents for
the railroad companies until June 25, 1889.
On July 2, 1889, Messrs. Britton & Gray, attorneys for the St. Louis,
Iron Mountain and Southern R. R. Co., filed a motion to dismiss said
appeal for the reason that service of copy of the same was not made
on the company within the sixty days allowed by rule 93 of the rules
of practice.
As notice of this appeal was not properly given to the adverse party
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as required by said rule of practice, the same is hereby dismissed.
Brake v. California and Oregon R. R. (11 L. D., 249).
In view of allegations made by the claimant to the effect that since
the date of the grant for the railroad company the land in question be-
came an island in the Arkansas river and that the same was surveyed
in 1883, thirty years subsequent to the date of said grant, and was de-
clared to be public land subject to entry, I am of the opinion, that the
facts in relation to the formation of said island should be ascertained,
and the question carefully considered, before the land is declared to
enure to the grant.
DEPARTmENT OF THE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
Washington, D.C., September 20, 1890.
This circular is re-issued for the information and benefit of those
concerned.
LEWIS A. GROFF,
Conmissioner.
Circular in relation to the furnishing of certified copies of the records,
papers on file, or plats, in the General Land Office.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
July 20, 1875.
Annexed are the laws (Revised Statutes of the United States) relative
to the powers and duties of the General Land Office in furnishing exem-
plifications of patents, papers, or plats on file or of record therein, of
the legal force and effect of such certified copies, and the terms upon
which the same can be procured.
With a view to give proper effect to said statutes, the following require-
ments are prescribed by direction of the Secretary of the Interior.
1. All copies which may be required by parties interested will be fur-
nished when the cost thereof shall first have been paid to the General
Land Office.
2. The applicant must address a communication to the Commissioner
of the General Land Office designating the tract or tracts in regard to
which the verified transcripts are wanted, describing as accurately as
possible the record, papers, or plats of which said transcripts are desired,
and sending a sum of money quite sufficient to cover the cost according
to the extent of the copying required; and should the sum sent to this
office be in excess of the actual legal cost, such excess will be returned
to the applicant.
The following is the tariff established under the statute, section 461,
for furnishing transcripts, to wit:
First. Fifteen (15) cents for every hundred words in a transcript.
Second. Two (2) dollars for copy of township plat or diagram.
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Third. One (1) dollar for the Commissioner's certificate of verification
and official sea].
Fourth. One (1) dollar for appending such certificate and seal to
official certificates of approval of assignments of bounty-land warrants
or military bounty-land scrip.
3. Upon the receipt by the General Land Office of the application
particularly describing the record or paper of which transcripts are
required, accompanied by the requisite amount to cover the expense,
the same will be duly acknowledged, and the exemplifications promptly
transmitted.
S. S. BURDETT,
Commissioner.
The following sections of the Revised Statutes of the United States
relate to applications for exemplifications of patents, etc., as referred to
in the accompanying circular:
SEc. 461. All exemplifications of patents, or papers on file or of record Fees for exem-
in the General Land Office, which may be required by parties interested, Plficatioin of pat-
shall be furnished by the Commissioner upon the payment by such par- 2 July 1864, e.
ties at the rate of fifteen cents per hundred words, and two dollars for 224, v13'p. 375
copies of township plats or diagrams, with an additional sum of one
dollar for the Commissioner's certificate of verification with the General
Land Office seal; and one of the employds of the office shall be desig-
nated by the Commissioner as the receiving clerk, and the amounts so
received shall, under the direction of the Commissioner, be paid into
the Treasury; but fees shall not be demanded for such authenticated ;
copies as may be required by the officers of any branch of the Govern-
ment, nor for such unverified copies as the Commissioner in his discre-
tion may deem proper to furnish.
SEc. 891. Copies of any records, books, or papers in the General Land Copies of rec-
Office, authenticated by the seal and certified by the Commissioner rds, etc.,of Gen-eral Laud Office.
thereof, or, when his office is vacant, by the principal clerk, shall be
evidence equally with the originals thereof. And literal exemplifica- 25April,1812,o.68, s. 4,v. 2, p. 717.
tions of any such records shall be held, when so introduced in evidence, 4 Jly, 1836, c.
to be of the same validity as if the names of the officers signing and 352, ss. 2, 7, v. 5,
countersigniug the same had been fully inserted in such record. (See PP 109,111.
sections 2469, 2470.)
3 March, 1843, c. 95, as. 1, 2, v. a, pp. 627, 628.-Galt vs. Galloway, 4 Pet., 331.
Sac. 2469. The Commissioner of the General Land Office shall cause Copies of ree.
to be prepared, and shall certify, under the seal of the office, such copies ords, etc., to be
of records, books, and papers on file in his office as may be applied for, certified.
to be used in evidence in courts ofjnstice, (See section 891.) 4 July, 1836, e.
SEC. 2470. Literal exemplifications of any records which have been 352,s.7, v. 5.p.111
or mav be granted in virtue of the preceding section shall be deemed Exemplifica-tions valid with-
of the same validity in all proceedings, whether at law or in equity, out names of offi-
wherein such exemplifications are adduced in evidence, as if the names cers signing and
of the officers signing and countersigning the same had been fully in- countersigoing.
serted in such record. 3 March, 1843,C.895, S.l, V. 5, P.
Extract frow section 448: - 627.
SEc. 448. * * And the chief clerk of the General Lard Office shall 2 June, 1858, c.
perform the duties of the Commissioner of the General Land Office in 301 . p
case of a vacancy in said office, or of the absence or sickness of the
Commissioner.
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PRACTICE-COSTS OF CROSS-EXAMINATIONS-RUJLE 55.
DUCLOS V. 1IARKSEN.
Rule 55 of practice requiring each party to pay the cost of taking testimony upon his
own direct and cross-examination, is construed to mean that each party must
pay the cost of taking the testimony of his own witnesses, both in the direct and
cross-examination of such witnesses.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, October 17, 1890.
Samuel J. Elarksen made timber culture entry of the SW. I See. 26,
T. 110 N., R. 68 V., Yankton, Dakota, June 5, 1882, and on August 14,
1886, John B. Duclos filed affidavit of contest against said entry charg-
ing that the claimant-
Has failed to plant and cultivate said land as required by law, in this, that the
trees, seeds and cuttings planted during the third year after entry were not cared for
and cultivated, but were allowed to be crowded down and choked out by the weeds.
That the said five acres of trees, seeds and cuttings planted during the third year
after entry are not growing and standing, and have not been replowed. That the
said claim has grown up to weeds. That there is not at this date ten acres of trees,
seeds or cuttings planted and growing on said claim. That the seeds planted on said
land during the fourth year after entry were not planted in a proper way, nor in
such manner as would insure their growth in an ordinary season. That said entry is
not held in good faith for the sole use and benefit of the entryman, but is held for
speculation and for the use and benefit of another person.
Upon the testimony taken at the hearing the local officers found that
claimant had not complied with the law in the planting, cultivation or
protection of the trees, seeds or cuttings, and recommended the cancel-
lation of the entry. Your office, by decision of May 90, 1889, reversed
said judgment and dismissed the contest, holding that the contestant
had failed to sustain the charge by his own testimony. From this rul-
ing the contestant appealed, alleging error in said decision as follows:-
1. In holding that the testimony of contestant, Duclos, in any manner admitted or
proved compliance with the timber culture law by claimant, Harksen.
2. In holding that defendant Harksen's failure to have a full and healthy stand of
trees upon the land was the result of excessively dry seasons.
3. In holding or deciding that Harksen's recent arrival from Holland was a sufficient
excuse for his failure to properly comply with the law.
4. In reversing the finding of the register and receiver,
5. In sustaining the entry of defendant in view of the testimony in the case.
The hearing in this case was taken before a notary public, who upon
motion of contestant refused to allow the claimant to cross-examine con-
testant or his witnesses, unless he (claimant) paid the cost of such cross-
examination, the contestant insisting that he having waived the prefer-
ence right of entry that said examination should be governed by Rule
55 of RJules of Practice. The contestant offered no objection to the
cross examination, but declined topay the cost, and theclaimantoffered
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to cross-examine the witnesses, but also declined to pay the cost. The
notary refused to allow said cross-examination without payment of costs,
upon the ground that the testimony was being taken under rule 55, and
not under rule 54, and that the contestant was not required to pay the
cost, except upon his own direct examination.
The ruling of the local officers refusing to allow claimant to cross-ex-
amine contestant and his witnesses without paying the cost therefor
was error under either rule. Rule 55, requiring each party to pay the
cost of taking testimony upon his own direct and cross-examination, is
construed to mean, that "'each party must pay the cost of taking the
testimony of his own witnesses, both in the direct and cross examination
of such witnesses. " (ilum v. Johnson, 10 L. D., 624.)
If the decision of your office was sustained by the testimony of the
contestant, it would be im material whether he had been cross-examined,
or not, but I do not so find. You will therefore remand the case to the
local officers, with directions to allow the cross-examination of the wit-
nesses by the opposing parties, and at the hearing ordered for this pur-
pose either party may introduce further testimony material to the issue.
FINAL CERTIFICATE-PATENT-MISDESCRIPTION OF LAND.
MARTHIA BELL.
A misdescription of the land in the final certificate and patent will not defeat the
right of the purchaser to the land actually covered by the sale and purchase, or
render such land subject to the entry of another.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, October 17, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Martha Bell from your decision of
June 18, 1889, rejecting her application to make homestead entry for
the S. of SE. of Sec. 6, T. 18 S., R. 2 W., Huntsville Meridian,
Montgomery, Alabama.
In your'decision you state that the land in question was embraced in the
homestead entry No. 5504, of Samuel B. Otts made July 1, 1873, which
was commute(l to cash entry No. 16,639 on January 15, 1881, under the
act of June 15, 1880, and that patent issued October 30, 1882, for the
land. Hence the rejection of said application.
The appeal is based upon the ground that the cash entry was for
other land than that embraced in the homestead entry of Otts, and this
contention is based upon the fact that the register in his cash certificate
No. 16,639, described the land as S. J of SE. J of Sec. 6, T. 18 S., R. 2
W., St. Stephens Meridian, instead of Huntsville Meridian.
Otts original homestead application was for the S. i of SE. i of Sec.
6, T. 18 S. R. 2. W., Huntsville Meridian, containing 79.97i acres.
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The records of your office show that the entry was made for the same
land.
On December 3,1880, Otts made affidavit that he was the same per-
son who made homestead entry No. 5504, at Montgomery, Ala., on July
1, 1873, for the S. I of SE. i of See. 6, T. 18 S., B. 2 W., and he made
application to purchase said land under the act of June 15, 1880. This
was granted and payment was made to the receiver by Otts for 79.97k
acres and the register issued his certificate as above recited and patent
issued in which the land is described as S. of SE. i of Sec. 6, T. 18
S., B. 2 W., St. Stephens Meridian.
The mistake in the patent was made by erroneously describing the
meridian. With this exception the land is properly described and there
can be no doubt whatever in relation to what the intention of Otts was,
also as to the intention of the government; the former intended to pur-
chase the tract in question and did purchase it, and the government
intended to sell him said land and did sell it, and accepted his money
in payment for the same, and the receivers' receipt is evidence of that
fact.
The subsequent error on the part of the register in inserting in his
certificate the wrong meridian in no way invalidated the transaction be-
tween the purchaser and the government, that transaction ended when
the former made his proper application to the register to purchase the
tract in question, and made payment for the same to the receiver. The
register's certificate, subsequently issued, contained a recital of this
transaction. If this recital contained an error which led the Land De-
partment to issue a patent describing a meridian which improperly lo-
cated this land, that fact in no way invalidates the claim of Otts. And
it would be bad faith upon the part of the Department to now attempt to
disturb him therein, and it-will throw no obstacle in the way of defeat-
ing the intent of the government in conveying the land upon which Mr.
Otts settled, to him.
It is asserted that Bell has resided upon the land for fourteen years,
and a hearing is requested. Admitting that she settled upon the land
at the date alleged, at that time the tract was embraced in the uncan-
celed homestead entry of Samuel B. Otts, and she could acquire no legal
right under said settlement, and I see no reason why a hearing should
be ordered.
Your decision is affirmed.
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MINING CLAIM-ADVERSE PROCEEDINGS.
JAME LE LODE V. LITTLE FREPAUGHI LODE.
An adverse claim will be recognized as filed within tilme, if such filing is in accord-
ance with the reglations then in force.
No action can be taken in the Land Department on an application for mineral patent
during the pendency of adverse jundicial proceedings.
The relinquishment by the applicant of the land originally in conflict. does not
authorize the Land Department in re-assuming jurisdiction of the case, during
the pendency of judicial proceedings by adverse claimant, who has been per-
mitted in such proceedings to amend so as to embrace a larger quantity of land
than was included in the original adverse claim.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, October 20, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of James lenshall entryman of Jamie
Lee lode claim, lot No. 472, in SW. -4 of See. 18, and NW. i of Sec. 19,
T. 9 S., R. 79 W., 6th P. M., ihineral entry No. 2478, Leadville, Colo-
rado, land district, from so much of your office decision of February 13,
1889, as relates to the Alpha adverse claim, and the appeal of William
Coleman and Israel Cramer representing the adverse clai m of the Little
Forepaugh lode claim from your said office decision dismissing the ad.
verse claim of said Little Forepaugh.
The record shows that James Henshall made application for patent
for the Jamie Lee lode claim on the 23rd day of August, 1879. Due
notice thereof was given by posting and publication in a weekly news-
paper. The first publication of said notice was in the issue of said pa-
per dated the 23d day of August, 1879, and the last one on the 25th
day of Oetober, following.
On the 24th day of October, 1879, Israel A. Cramer and William
Coleman filed in the local office the adverse claim and protest of the
Little Forepaugh lode claim showing a conflict to the amount of .4385
acres with the Jamie Lee application.
On the 25th day of October, 1879, The Enterprise Mining and Pros-
pecting Company of Colorado, by its secretary, Hermann W. Polliz
filed the adverse claim of the Alpha lode claim showing a conflict of
2.0638 acres with the Jamie Lee. Suit was commenced on each of said
adverse claims, in the district court of Lake county, Colorado, within
the thirty days required by law, judgment was entered in each case in
favor of the adverse claimant, and afterwards set aside by the court,
and so far as the record shows said suits are still pending and unde-
termined.
January 28, 1885, the Jamie Lee claimant filed in the local office a re-
linquishment of all that part of said claim which was filed in the United
States land office of Leadville, Col., that conflicts with the Little Fore-
paugh claim " as described in and shown by said protest and adverse
and plat thereto annexed." It appears that the Little Forepatigh wa->
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allowed to amend its complaint in court so as to embrace a larger quan-
tity of land than was included in the adverse claim filed in the local
land office.
On the 13th day of February, 1889, your office dismissed the adverse
claim of the Little Forepaugh for the reason that the Jainie Lee claim-
ant duly relinquished from his application for patent and before entry
all the land covered in the Little Forepaugh adverse claim as filed.
From your office decision the Little Forepaugh claimants appeal.
On the same date your office decided that as " the Alpha adverse
claim was filed on the sixty third day of the period of publication of the
Jamie Lee application for patent, and under the practice of this office
prevailing at the time of such filing, to wit, October 2, 1879, it is con-
sidered as having been filed in time." This point was correctly ruled
by your office upon the authority of Miner v. Marriott et al. (2 L. D.,
709).
Your office further properly held that as the adverse claim of the
Alpha was pending in court, that the court was the proper forum
to determine all questions between the respective parties, and " pend-
ing proper evidence of the final determination of said Alpha adverse
suit the Jamie Lee will remain suspended in the files of this office."
From which decision the Jamie Lee claimant appeals.
As to the appeal of the Little Forepaugh it is insisted in argument
by the Jamie Lee that the Little Forepaugh is not entitled to be heard on
this appeal for the reason that no notice of appeal was ever served on
the Jamie Lee claimant, or his attorney, as required by Rule of Prac-
tice 93. It is urged against this claim that " It is true there is on the
appeal paper no evidence of such service, but present counsel filed no
motion to dismiss the appeal for this reason, nor any evidence (such as
the affidavit of the then attorney or of the claimants) that such copy
was not served; it is simply assumed that service was not had, but it
is too late to raise the point after argument by them on the merits of
the case; such argument is the recognition of the appeal, and waiver
of failure to serve notice." In view of the conclusion I reach upon the
case I do not deem it necessary to pass directly upon the question thus
raised. When an adverse claim is filed during the period of publica-
tion and suit commenced thereon then full and completejurisdiction over
the subject-matter connected with all of the rights of the parties is
transferred from the Land Department until final judgment is rendered
by the court and a copy of the record filed in the local land office, where-
upon full and complete jurisdiction re-vests in the Land Department to
require a compliance with the requirements ofthe law in other respects
not adjudicated by the court.
Revised Statutes, section 2326, provides:
Where an adverse claim is filed during the period of publication, it, shall be upon
oath of the person or persons making the same, and shall show the nature, bounda-
ies, and extent of such adverse claim, and all proceedings, except the publication of
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notice and making and filing of the affidavit thereof, shall be stayed until the con-
troversy shall have been settled or decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, or
the adverse claim waived . . . After such judgment shall have been rendered, the
party entitled to the possession of the claim or any portion thereof may, without giv-
ing further notice, file a certified copy of the judgment roll with the register of the
land office, together with the certificate oPthe Surveyor-General that the requisite
amount of labor has been expended or improvements made thereon, and the descrip-
tion required in other cases, and shall pay to the receiver five dollars per acre for his
claim, together with the proper fees, whereupon the whole proceedings and the judg-
ment-roll shall be certified by the register to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, and a patent shall issue thereon for the claim or such portion thereof as the
applicant shall appear from the decision of the court to rightly possess.
In the case of Richmond Mining Co. v. Rose et al. (114 U. S., 576),
in passing upon this very question the court said:
It is apparent that the law intended, in every instance where there was a possibil-
ity that one of these claims conflicted with another, to give opportunity to have the,
conflict decided by a judicial tribunal before the rights of the parties were foreclosed
or embarrassed by the issue of a patent to either claimant .... It is in full accord
with this purpose that the law should declare, as it does, that when this contest is,
inaugurated the land officers should proceed no further until the court has decided,
and that they shall be governed by that decision; to which end a copy of the record
is to be filed in their office. They have no further act of judgment to exercise. If
the court decides for one party or the other the land department is bound by the
decision . . . . With all this these officers have no right to interfere. After the-
decision they are governed by it. Before the decision, once this proceeding is initi-
ated, their function is suspended.
The Little Forepaugh claim was filed and suit commenced upon it in
the required time; after the suit was commenced and while it was pend-
ing in court the Jamie Lee filed its relinquishment as to the conflict
as originally filed in the land office, and upon this your office assumed
to resume proceedings by deciding that the Jamie Lee was entitled to,
its patent. In this your office was clearly in error. A discrepancy be-
tween the adverse claim as filed and accepted in the local office, and
that upon which suit is instituted will not warrant the Land Depart-
ment in the resumption of proceedings during the pendency of the suit
in court. Bay State Gold Mining Co. V. Trevillion (10 L. D., 194).
For the foregoing reasons your office decision as to the Little Fore-
paugh claimants is set aside and proceedings will be stayed thereon in.
your office until the proper evidence of the termination of the suit is
furnished, upon receipt of which your office will proceed as provided
by law. Your office decision as to the Alpha claim is hereby affirmed.
Said decision is accordingly modified.
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q PRACTICE-NOTICE-ATTORNEY-SETT-LEMENT RIGHT.
tol, fI A,9 0 MOODY V. KIRKLAND.
Notice of a decision to an attorney of recovd is notice to the party he represents.
One who has made settlement and de residence on a tract, bnt failed through mis-
take to ielade the same within hisentry, will be protectel as against a stbse-
quent occupant of the premkes who takes forcible possession thereof with full
knowledge of the facts.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, October 20, 1890.
I have considered the case of Jeremiah Moody v. W. B. Kirkland
involving the E. of NW. 1 and W. I of NE. i of Sec. 34, T. 26, IR. 27
B., Gainesville, Florida, on appeal by the latter from your decision of
May 5, 1888, holding his entry for cancellation.
The records show that Moody made homestead entry for the E. of
NW. i and W. of NE. of section '; 35," T. 26 S., R. 27 E., December
16, 1881, and Kirkland made homestead entry for the tract in dispute
October 19, 1882.
Upon the application of Moody who alleged that his entry did not
embrace the land upon which he had made settlement and improve-
ment, a hearing was ordered by your office which took place on May
14, 1884, and upon an application by Kirkland a re-hearing was ordered
which took place on January 23, 1886.
The local officers found that Moody mabde settlement on the land in
dispute in the winter of 1877, and built two small houses, that he
eleared a few acres of land, set out some orange and peach trees, planted
erops, etc., and had resided on the land when not necessarily absent to
work for his support and to obtain means to improve the claim. That
while Moody was absent from the land in the latter part of 1881 or first
of 1882, Kirkland took possession of the place and has resided thereon
and cultivated the same since that date. But in view of the fact that
Moody had not resided on the land since Kirkland took possession of
the same, the local officers held that he had failed to comply with the
requirements of the homestead law and recommended that the contest
be dismissed and the entry of Kirkland remain intact.
In your decision of May 5, 1888, you reversed the local officers, and
held the entry of Kirkland for cancellation and allowed Moody to amend
his entry to embrace the land in question upon which he had made set-
tlement and improvement. No appeal was taken from said decision and
by letter of March 27, 1889, the case was closed by your office and the
entry of Kirkland canceled and on May 20, 1889, the local officers noti-
fied Kirkland of this action.
On June 21, 1889, HI. N. (Jopp, Esq., attorney for Kirkland, filed an
appeal from your decision of May 5, 1888. It is alleged that Kirkland
did not receive notice of said decision. The local officers state that the
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name of A. N. Ham appears on their record as the attorney for Kirk-
land, and Mr. Ham was notified of your decision, by the local officers,
on December 26, 1888, and acknowledged the receipt of said notice.
The records show that on October 25, 1886, M. 0. Crumpler wrote to
your office stating that A. N. Ham was no longer his attorney in any
of his cases, including that of Moody v. Kirkland and stating that he
Urumpler) represented Kirkland. It is contended by the present at-
torney for Kirkland that this letter was a revocation of the authority
of Mr. Ham to appear as attorney. On August 23, 1889, the local offi-
eers reported that M. 0. Crumpler had not complied with the require-
ments of your office circular of March 19, 1887, and was not therefore
eligible to represent claimants to public land, and furthermore, that he
had never filed in the local office any authority from Kirkland entitling
him to appear as attorney.
In view of these facts it must be held that notice of your decision was
duly given to the attorney of record for Kirkland, and under rule 106 of
the rules of practice, the same was notice to him. Hence the appeal
filed June 21,1889, was not in time and it must be dismissed.
But aside from the fact that no proper appeal was taken from your
decision, I see no reason why the same should be disturbed.
The evidence taken at the two hearings shows that Moody made set-
tlement on the land in question, and resided thereon for four years or
more, and through mistake made entry for another tract. That Kirk-
land was aware of this fact, and yet he took possession of the premises
during the absence of Moody and tore down the houses of the latter and
threw them outside the enclosure. All this was against the protest of
Moody. The latter swears that he was afraid to return to the place to at-
tempt to reside there as Kirkland had threatened him. Kirkland's
actions have not been such as entitle him to the protection of the De-
partment. The papers in the case are herewith returned.
PRIVATE CASH ENTRY-EQUITABLE ADJUDICATION.
JOSEPH C. LEA.
A private cash entry, made in good faith, of the land covered by the previous timber
culture entry of the purchaser, may be referred to the board of equitable adjudi-
cation in the absence of an adverse claim.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, October 20, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Joseph C. Lea from your decision of
December 17, 1888, holding for cancellation his private cash entry No.
1149, for W. 1 of SW. i, NE. l of SW. 4 and SE. 4 of NW. il of Sec. 34, T.
10 S., R. 24 E., Las Cruces, New Mexico.
The records show that said Lea made timber culture entry for the
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tract in question on September 1, 1879, and on November 21, 1885, he
made private cash entry for the same land.
On December 17, 1888, your office held the latter entry for cancella-
tion on the ground that the same was void as it was made while the
land embraced therein was reserved by the timber culture entry, and
on December 19, 1888, your office held the latter entry for cancellation
on the ground that the claimant had abandoned the same when he
made private cash entry for the land.
With his appeal ir. Lea submitted a corroborated affidavit stating
that from 1879 to 1885, he planted 10,000 trees, constructed ditches etc.,
and expended $750, in improvements, and endeavored in good faith to
obtain title to the land under his first entry, but he found that it was
impossible to obtain sufficient water to secure the growth of timber and
in 1885 he abandoned said entry and made cash entry for the land, and
has since then expended $650 in improvements on the tract. He ap-
pears to have acted in good faith in the matter. His entry appears to
have been allowed by the local officers under the impression that the
land was liable to private entry.
There is no adverse claimant.
In my opinion this entry should be submitted to the board of equita-
ble adjudication for consideration under the appropriate rule.
Your decision is modified accordingly.
PRACTICE-RULE 48-OSAGE FILING-MARRIED WOMAN-PAYMENT.
BROOKS . SHoPPER ET AL.
A decision of the local office contrary to existing laws and regulations may be cor-
rected by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, though no appeal is taken
from such decision.
The failure of a settler on Osage land to file therefor within three months from date
of settlement subjects his claim to any other valid intervening right.
A single woman who has the qualifications of a pre-emptor, and after due compliance
with law and submission of Osage final proof, marries, is not by such marriage
deprived of the Tight to have her proof considered and entry allowed.
It may be presumed that the first payment was properly tendered with Osage final
proof, where such proof is rejected for reasons not involving the matter of pay-
ment, and the record shows full compliance with the law in other respects but is
silent as to such tender.
First A ssistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, October 23, 1890.
I have considered the several appeals of Cyrus H. Brooks, William
Conway and James M. Crabb from your office decision of May 8, 1889,
wherein you direct that nnie M. Schopper be allowed to complete her
entry upon her Osage filing, made March 14, 1881, on the NE. 1 of Sec.
19, T. 27 S., R. 12 W., Larned, Kansas.
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This appeal involves the conflicting interests of four applicants to
purchase said tract, under the provisions of the act approved May 28,
1880 (21 Stat., 143), relating to the Osage lands.
William Conway filed upon said tract March 14, 1884, alleging settle-
ment February 28, of that year. On June 6, 1q8l, he gave notice of
his intention to make final proof on August 29, of that year.
Anna M. Schopper filed upon the same tract on March 14, 1834, alleg-
ing settlement January 20, 1884. She gave notice of her intention to
make final proof on September 8, of that year.
James M. Crabb made his filing upon said tract on May 31, 1884,
alleging settlement February 27, 1884. He gave notice of his intention
to make final proof on August 27, of that year.
Each of said parties submitted final proof, pursuant -to their respect-
ive notices.
On August 15, 1884, Conway filed his protest in the local office against
the allowance of Crabb's proof; and on August 26, 1884, Schopper
filed her protest against the allowance of the final proofs of both Crabb
and Conway, asserting her superior right to make proof and payment
for the land.
Oa September 25, 1884, the register and receiver ordered a hearing
to be had before them on October 20, following, for the purpose of de-
termining which of them (if either) ought to have the land. The hear-
ing was duly had, and the case finally closed November 1, 1886.
On January 6, 1887, the register and receiver rendered their decision,
holding, in effect, that Crabbs' residence was not sufficient to entitle
him to the land, and that he had abandoned the same before he sub-
mitted his final proof. They also held that Conway had never estab-
lished an actual residence on the land,-and that his real home, at the
time of and before offering his final proof, was with his sister. As to
Schopper, they found that she began her residence on the tract about
the first of April, 1884, and resided there
personally, actualy and continuously up to month of October, 1884, when she sub-
mitted her proof and moved from the tract to Ellenwood, Burton Co., Kansas, where
she has ever since resided, and where she has since married. . . . The testimony
shows that up to October, 1884, Schopper was the only one of the three claimants for
this land who had complied with the pre-emption law as to actual personal and con-
tinuous residence up to that time; but having abandoned the laud before her entry
was allowed at this office, and having disqualified herself as a pre-emptor by marry-
ing, her final proof must be rejected.
The local officers accordingly rejected the several final proofs of Crabb,
Conway and Schopper, and held for cancellation their several declara-
tory statements. From this judgment the three claimants filed their
several appeals.
On December 19, 1887, Cyrus H. Brooks offered to file on the same
tract. His filing was refused by the local officers, by reason of existing
contests of Crabb, Conway and Schopper. Brooks appealed, alleging
that none of the parties herein named had a valid claim to the land,
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and that he had made such compliance with the law in, respect to resi-
dence and cultivation as entitled him to the land.
By your office letter 1 H," of August 8, 1888, you ordered a hearing,
to enable Brooks to show cause why none of the other claimants, Crabb,
Conway and Schopper, should )e permitted to enter the land; also to
allow said last-named claimants to rebut such testimony as Brooks
might submit. This second hearing was duly had, at which all four of
the claimants participated, and submitted testimony in support of their
respective claims and against the opposing claims of the others.
The record of the second hearing was transmitted to your office Janu-
ary 26, 1889; and on consideration of the entire testimony you modified
the judgment of the local officers, affirming the same as to the rejection
of the final proofs of Conway and Crabb, and reversed it as to the rejec-
tion of the final proof of Schopper.
I I have carefully reviewed the entire record. The several claimants
have contended with great pertinacity, and the result is a mass of testi-
mony, of great extent irrelevant and strangely contradictory. It is,
therefore, impossible to arrive at a just conclusion and at the same time
reconcile the testimony and accord to the several witnesses that honesty
of statement which should characterize every one in giving testimony
under the solemnities of an oath.
As to James M. Crabb, I think, the testimony shows that he was not
an "actual settler" on the land within the meaning of the act; and, if
he were, he failed to file on the land within three months from the time
of his alleged settlement, and therefore the land was subject to any
other valid, intervening right. Circular of April 26, 1887, 5 L. D., 581;
-Hessong v. Burgan, 9 L. D., 353. at
The testimony shows that William Conway went on the land on Feb-
ruary 27, 1884, and selected a site for a house and dug a few holes
with a spade. On the following day, he hauled a few scantlings on the
land and nailed them together in the shape of the letter " A." This so-
called house was admittedly not habitable. Conway tried to stay there
that night, but was driven away by the cold, after remaining three
hours. On the 10th of March, following, he began to plow sod for a
house. This house (about fourteen by sixteen feet), he alleges, was
completed two days afterwards. It had neither window norfloor. He
put a stove in it, and staid there the night of the 12th of March. He
swears he made this house his continuous residence thereafter; that
he dug a well, and plowed about twelve acres of ground and cultivated
it to corn.
The evidence, however, shows that he did no cooking at the place;
that such meals as he ate at the house were carried there; he kept his
clothing at the house of his brother-in-law, McCann, about two miles
from the land. He worked for farmers in the neighborhood of the
claim, and, while he doubtless slept in his house a few times, it was
evidently done to give an appearance of having his real home there.
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The furniture in his house consisted of a frame scaffold, on which was
placed some straw and a blanket for a cover; also a stove, and a few
tin cans. He was seen about the place very seldom; he says himself,
" I went to my claim once a week "; again, he says, I was at my claim
Saturday nights, and once or twice a week." One witness says his
house was in plain view of Conway's, and if ever Conway lived on the
place at any time, he did not know it; that witness had passed Con-
way's house every day for more than a year and never saw him in the
house; that Conway made his home at his brother-in-lawls.
Independent of this, I think a fair construction of the entire testimony
justifies me in concurring in the conclusion reached in your said office
letter, also by the local officers, that Anna M. Schopper made the first
settlement upon the land. She selected the land for a home January
20, 1884. The ground was then frozen, and she could not build her sod
house. Her first act of settlement was February 25, 1884, when she cut
the grass (blue stein) from off the building site and marked the founda.-
tion for her house, sixteen by nineteen feet. She employed hands, and
began her house (sod) March 8,1884, and finished it March 16th of that
month, and moved into it her furniture, and made it her continuous
home from that time until long after she submitted her final proof.
She caused ten acres of the land to be broken, and cultivated the same
to corn; dug a well, and cultivated a vegetable garden. She is cor-
roborated by five witnesses as to her residence and cultivation and prior
settlement. On February 18, 1886, about seventeen months after she
submitted her final proof, she was married to one William Lueders.
It is strenuously insisted by opposing counsel, and so decided by the
register and receiver, that by Schopper's marriage before her entry was
allowed by the local office, she disqualified herself and forfeited her
claim to the land.
This position can not be maintained. She had all the qualifications
of a pre-emptor when she settled upon the land; her residence and cul-
tivation were sufficient under the laws and regulations governing the
disposition of the public lands to show her good faith; she submitted
her final proof within the time required; the hearing developed the
fact that at the time she submitted her final proof she had literally ful-
filled every requirement of the statute, and should have been permitted
to complete her entry. Had she married before she had lived upon the
land the requisite period, it would be a far different case; but having
performed all the conditions the law imposed upon her, and having sub-
mitted her final proof in time, her marriage afterwards could not annul
her rights to have her proof considered and her entry allowed. Melissa.
J. Cunningham, 8 L. D., 433.
It is insisted by counsel that it does not affirmatively appear that
Schopper made tender of the first installment of the purchase money,
and therefore her entry should now be refused. It appearing that she
had performed every other necessary act to entitle her to the land, and
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the evidence being silent as to whether she made tender of the money
,or not, and the local officers having placed their objection to the ac-
ceptance of her final proof on an entirely different ground, it may be
presumed that she tendered the purchase money when she submitted
her final proof.
It appears that Schopper's appeal was filed one day late; but, since
the action of the local office in rejecting her proof on the grounds
stated is regarded as contrary to existing laws and regulations, your
action, correcting such error under rule 48 of the Rules of Practice,
without reference to her appeal, is approved.
Brooks settled on the land long after Schopper had submitted her
proof; he knew that the several prior applications had not been passed
-upon; he entered into the contest to defeat all others, and knew his own
claim depended upon his success. He has no right to complain of the
result.
Schopper's final proof will be returned to the local office for accept-
ance, and she will be permitted to perfect her entry within thirty days
from receipt of notice of this decision.
Your said office decision is affirmed.
HOMESTEAD-NOTICE-DEFAULT CURED.
HEPTNER V. MOCAP.TNEY.
The initiation of a contest, so far as the rights of the etryman are concerned must
be considered as of the date of his appearance at the hearing, in the absence of
record evidence showing service of iotice.
A contest must fail if, prior to the initiation thereof, the entryman without actual
or constructive notice of the pending suit, cures the default in good faith.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land ffice, October 15, 1890.
C. L. McOartney made homestead entry, No. 5061, September 3,
1885, of the SE. of Sec. 18, T. 8 S., R. 31 W., Oberlin, Kansas. April
27, 1886, Andrew Heptner filed affidavit of contest against the same,
alleging abanidonuent and lack of cultivation. Hearing was had June
17, 1886, and the local officers recommended the cancellation of the
entry. and on appeal to your office the judgment of the register and
receiver was affirmed August 13, 1888, and the entry held for cancella-
tion. From this decision McOartney now appeals to this Department.
The contestant offered evidence for the purpose of showing that claim.
ant and one Nelson built a house in partnership on the half section line
between McCartney's entry and the NE. 4 of the same section, which
was entered by Nelson at the date of McCartney's entry (September 3,
1885). This house was ten by twelve feet, built of lumber, with one
door and two windows, and cost eighty-five dollars. This, with two
DECISIONS RELATING TO TIlE PUBLIC LANDS. 401
furrows plowed around three sides of the claim, constituted all the im-
provements and cultivation up to the time of the filing of the affidavit
of contest.
It is admitted that from the date of entry until the morning of April
27, 1886, a period of more than six months, McCartney was absent from
his claim, residing in a different county, that the house was built by
Nelson during such absence of McCartney, and one witness for contest-
ant says Nelson admitted to him that he and McCartney were partners
in the building of the house. That they were such partners is contra-
dicted both by McCartney and Nelson. They both testify that the lum-
ber was bought by McCartney and that Nelson was paid for building
the house, though Nelson says he may have told contestant's witness
that he was in partnership with McCartney. This admission is the only
evidence of partnership, and the admission being of Nelson can not bind
McCartney. No rule of evidence makes it admissible for that purpose.
I must find that the house was HeCartney's alone. The preponderance
of the evidence also is clearly to the effect that the house, at least at
the time of the hearing, was wholly on the claim of McCartney.
The only remaining question then is: Did the claimant forfeit his
entry by failing to reside on it for more than six months?
So far as the record shows (although the affidavit of contest was filed
April 27, 1886), no notice of the contest was ever served upon McCart-
ney, either personally or by publication. The initiation of the contest
then, so far as it affected the rights of MNlcCartney, must be considered
as of the date of his appearance at the hearing, June 17, 1886. (Stay-
ton v. Carroll, 7 L. D., 198). At that date the evidence is undisputed
that appellant was in the bona-fide occupancy of his house, had culti-
vated six or seven acres of his claim, and planted it with corn, had
made a garden and planted shade trees, and had fully complied with
the homestead law as to residence and cultivation, and so had cured his
default before receiving legal notice of the contest. In Scott v. King,
9 L. D., 299, it is held that: "Evidence of compliance with the law
after the filing of the affidavit and before the service of legal-notice
should be considered with reference to the question whether the claim-
ant in fact had or had not knowledge of the filing of the contest," and
the general tenor of the later decisions is to the effect that even though
the claimant had cured his default before notice was legally served
upon him, yet if it was apparent that he had actual knowledge of the
filing of the affidavit and hastened to cure his default only for the pur-
pose of defeating the contest, such action on his part, unaccompanied
by evidence of good faith in other respects, would not defeat the rights
of the contestant.
In the case under consideration no actual knowledge of the filing of
the contest is shown to have been received by claimant, the only cir-
cumstance pointing in that direction being the fact that he moved into
his house on the morning of the 27th day of April, the date of contest-
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ant's filing. This may have been a mere coincidence, and as there is
nothing in the evidence to the contrary, it must be regarded as such.
In fact, the evidence on the part of appellant and his witnesses, which is
undisputed, shows that he was at the house as early as eight o'clock in
the morning, and at that time could not well have had any actual
knowledge of the filing, if, indeed, the affidavit had been filed previous
to that hour, and the evidence is silent as to the time of day the conI-
test was filed.
It will be held that the claimant had no actual or constructive notice
of the contest prior to the curing of his default, and his entry will be
sustained and the contest dismissed.
The decision of your office is reversed.
FINAL PROOF-CIRCULAR.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
Washington, D. C., October 21, 1890.
REGISTERS AND RECEIVERS,
United States Land Offices:
GENTLEMEN: Your attention is directed to the provisions of an act
of Congress approved October 1, 1890, entitled "An act for the relief
of certain settlers on the public lands of the United States and to au-
thorize the taking and filing of final proofs in certain cases," a copy of
which is hereto attached.
If you have any cases suspended in your office coming under the pro.
visions of the first section of said act, you will pass upon the same
without delay. No comment upon the provisions of the act appears to
be necessary.
Very respectfully,
W. . STONE,
Acting Commissioner.
AN ACT for the relief of certain settlers on the public lands of the United States and to authorize
the taking and filing of final proofs in certain cases.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Uited States of America
in Congtress assembled, That in ases now before any of the laud offices of the United
States in which there has been or is now a vacancy in either of the offices of register
or receiver, where the day set for hearing final proofs came during the vacancy in
said office, and there is no contest or protest against said claims, and where the re-
maining officer has taken said proofs and redueed the same to writing, the same may
now be passed upon by the register and receiver as if the same had been taken when
there was no vacancy.
SEC. 2. That hereafter, when a vacancy shall occnr in any of the land offices of the
United States by reason of the death, resignation, or removal of either the register
or receiver, and the time set for taking final proofs falls within the vacancy thus
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 403
caused, the remaining officer may proceed to take said final proofs, in the absence of
any contest or protest, reduce the same to writing, and place it on file in the offiee to
be considered and passed upon when the vacancy is filled.
Approved, October 1. 1890.
PRACTICE-MOTION FOR REVIEW.
OWENS v. GAUGER.
Au application for review calling for the exercise of the supervisory authority of the
Secretary on behalf of a stranger to the record will not be entertained, where such
applicant can assert his rights through regular proceedings instituted for that
purpose.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
October 25, 1890.
A motion for review of the departmental decision in the case of Henry
Gauger, involving a right to enter the NE± of See. 18, T. 105 N., R. 56
W., Mitchell land district, South Dakota, is now before me. In that
case, on a contest by one Bruce, the timber culture entry of Shepherd,
for the described tract, was held for cancellation by the register and
receiver on June 30, 1888. Twenty-three days thereafter and before'
the expiration of the period within which the entryman was entitled to
appeal, Gauger made application to enter said tract under the timber
culture law. This application was denied by the local officers, and, on
appeal your office affirmed the judgment. On appeal here that judg-
ment was reversed, and it was held, in effect that said application should
have been received subject to the outstanding right of appeal in the
entryman, and of the preferred right of entry in the successful contest-
ant, but should not be made of record until the rights of the former
entryman were finally determined, and then subject to the rights of the
successful contestant, if the time for the exercise thereof had not ex-
pired. (10 L. D., 221.)
In promulgating this decision, your office directed that if Bruce, the
contestant, had failed, after due notice, to exercise his preference right
of entry, then, upon proper showing and payment, the application of
Gauger should be allowed; and upon report of that fact to your office,
the timber culture entry of William J. Owens on said tract would be
canceled. It is stated that Gauger made entry May 13, 1890.
On April 23, 1890, a motion for review of said departmental decis-
ion was filed in the local office, in behalf of said Owens, which has
been duly forwarded here.
It is not necessary to go into the details as to the grounds upon
which said motion is based. It is not charged that said judgment is
erroneous because of mistake of law or fact, therein committed, upon
the record then before the Department. But Mr. Oweus, who was per-
mitted to make timber culture entry of said tract January 31, 1889,
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pending the appeal of Gauger here, claims superior rights to the latter
in the premises, and alleges that he, Owsens, had no proper notice of
the proceedings in said case, and asks that a hearing be ordered to
ascertain who has the prior right of entry. The decision sought to be
reviewed did not pass upon any rights Mr. Owens may have in the
premises and therefore cannot prejudice those rights; and he can as
readily assert them in a proper manner now as he could before said
decision. The present motion for review is not the proper method
for him to pursue. His application is in effect to re-open said case and
inaugurate a new contest between him, a stranger to the record, and
Gauger, upon matters which were not involved in the former case.
This is not the office of a review. The application is more in the nat-
iure of an appeal to the supervisory power of the Secretary, which
should not be invoked when relief may be obtained if it ought to be
afforded, by a proper application presented in the regular way to the
proper ]and officers.
The motion is dismissed.
SETTLEMENT RIGHTS-NOTICE OF CLAIM.
COOPER V. SANFORD.
Actual notice of the extent of a settlement claim will protect such claim as against
the subsequent entry of another.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, October 27, 1890.
On May 19, 1886, Daniel E. Cooper made timber culture entry for the
W. SE. 4: and E. SW. , Sec. 6, T. 25 S., R. 46 W., Lamar, Colo-
rado, and on the following day Asa L. Sanford filed declaratory state-
ment for the same tract, alleging settlement the 16th of the same month.
On March 11, 1887, Sanford made final proof before the local office
and Cooper appeared and cross-examined the witnesses, and submitted
proof on his own behalf, claiming priority of right.
The local officers, on consideration of the testimony, held that San-
ford's right to the land is fully established. On appeal your office by
letter of February 12; 1889, also found that Sanford was entitled to the
land, and directed that Cooper's entry should stand subject to Sanford's
rights.
Cooper's appeal is now before me.
The facts are that on May 16, 1886, Sanford drove across the tract in
question and determined to make settlement upon it. In pursuance of
this intention, on the morning of the 18th he cut several poles from the
banks of the Arkansas river, each of which was about twelve feet long,
and from three to five inches in diameter, hauled them to the land and
placed them in the form of a square, he says, to represent thefoundation
of a house. I the center of his foundation he drove a stake upon which
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he wrote the description of the land and signed his name. While he
was engaged in this work Cooper drove up. Several others were pres-
ent, one or more of whom were making settlement in like manner on
neighboring tracts. Cooper asked Sanford whether he thought the
structure sufficient "to hold the claim.' Snford said he did. The
former then drove away, and on the following day made entry.
It appears that building material could not be procured in the neigh-
borhood. As soon as practicable. about June 1 1886, Sanford built a
house and has since continued to reside on the tract.
I have no difficulty in finding that Sanford has the prior right.
Cooper, however, urges that the settlement right is confined to the W.
i SE. 1, because the improvements were located on that technical quar-
ter section, and that the entry should be allowed to stand for the tract
lying in the SW. .1. In support of this the case of L. R. Hall (5 L. D.,
141), is cited.
In that case Hall made settlement on four quarter-quarter sections
lying in a line running north and south, two of them being in section
26, and two in section 35. Thereafter certain additional homestead
entries were allowed for the tracts in section 35, which were shortly
passed to patent. Subsequently, Hall offered final proof, which was
rejected on account of conflict with the patented homestead entries.
He then asked that suit be brought by the government to set aside said
patents. In discussing this question the Department held that,
the settlemnent and improvemenDts of Hall, if confined to section 26, would not be
such notice as the entrymnan in section 35 would be bound to regard. The notice
given by settlement and improvement applies only to the quarter section as defined
by the public surveys. If, therefore, the rights of the entryman attached before no-
tice of the claim of Hall was given, he is without remedy. If, however, Hall had
given notice by settlement or improvement, or in any competeet manner, of his claim
to the tracts in section 35, prior to the making of said entries, then he has an ade-
quate remedy in his own bands.
It is not a proper interpretation of this ruling to hold that only actual
improvements give notice of settlement; nor will the words of the ruling
bear this interpretation. Notice given "in any competent manner" is
sufficient. Whether the notice given in this case would be sufficient as
against any applicant for the land need not be considered. It is suffi-
cient that the claim and the extent thereof were personally brought to
Cooper's attention. He was charged with notice. Settlement is not
confined by law to a technical quarter section, and it is impracticable
for a settler to place improvements on all the subdivisions of his claim
at the instant of settlement. Actual notice of the extent of the claim
therefore, is at least as good as that given by improvements. Having
had actual notice Cooper made his entry subject to the rights of the
settler. As Sanford followed his settlement by residence on the tract
claimed, it must be held that his right to the tract in controversy is
superior to the claim of Cooper.
The decision appealed fromn is ac-orilingly affirmed.
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PRACTICE-NOTICE OF APPEAL-ACCEPTANCE OF, SERVICE.
IS a49 3 q IE WHEELER V. CLARK.
There is no prescribed form of words necessary to be sed in giving notice of appeal
and to serve the appellee with a true copy of the appeal is sficient notice
thereof.
The words "service accepted ", endorsed on the appeal by the attorney of appellee,
imply service of notice accepted; and the acknowledgment of the receipt of
" copy" thus endorsed implies that such copy is of the paper so endorsed.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the ommissioner of the General
Land Office, October 27, 1890.
I have considered the case of Adeline F. Wheeler v. Walter P. Clark,
on appeal by the former from your decision of April 25, 1888, dismissing
her contest against the homestead entry of the latter for the SW. i Sec.
1, T. 110 N., R. 61 W., Huron, South Dakota land district.
Your decision states substantially and fairly the record and evidence
in the case, and having carefully reviewed the entire record I find no
ground for disturbing your conclusion, and your decision is affirmed.
The first assignment of error in the appeal to this Department is that
" no notice of appeal was served on contestant upon appeal to the Com-
missioner," and this ground is insisted upon by counsel, but I find the
appeal endorsed--" Service accepted and copy received this 24th day
of May 1886." Signed by the attorney of appellee.
This paper, after properly naming the parties and describing the land
involved, says, " Appeal by Walter F. Clark the claimant, from the
decision of the Hon. Receiver of the Huron Land Office, dated April
27, 1886."
It then gives a statement of the record of the case and this is followed
by the assignment of error, and argument of counsel. This appeal was
filed in the local office May 24, 1886, being within thirty days of the de-
cision, and on same day a copy of the same was served on the attorney
of appellee.
Rule 46 of the Rules of Practice says:-' Notice of appeal and copy
of specifications of error shall be served on appellee " etc.
There is no prescribed form of words necessary to be used in giving
notice of an appeal, and to serve the appellee with a true copy of the ap-
peal, is certainly sufficient notice of it. In the case at bar the words
"service accepted " imply service of notice accepted, and the acknowl-
edgment of the receipt of' "copy" endorsed on the paper implies that
the copy is of the paper so endorsed. The point therefore is not well
taken.
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CONTEST-SUPPLEMENTAI, CHARGE-APPEAL.
WARTHEN V. VANCPE ET AL.
A supplemental affidavit of contest does not constitute an abandonment of the prior
cbarge, e waive rights secured iuder a hearing subsequently had thereon.
The failure of a party to properly appeal from a decision of the local office does not
deprive him of due protection in the General Land Office as against a decision
contrary to existing laws and regulations.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, October 30, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Henry B. Vance from your decision
of December 17, 1888, allowing him sixty days to show cause why his
timber culture entry for the SE. I of Sec. 14, T. 8 S., R. 34 W., Oberlin,
Kansas, should not be canceled.
The records show that Asa Troxel made timber culture entry for the
tract in question December 7, 1885.
On December 7, 1886, Calvin I. Warthen filed an affidavit of contest
against said entry alleging that the same was illegal and fraudulent
from inception, also that "1 said claimant had never done any work on
said land."
On the day following, December 8, Henry B. Vance filed an affidavit
against said entry, alleging that the entryman had failed to break the
first five acres as required by law.
On February 16, 1887, Warthen filed an affidavit which was ex-
pressly stated to be " supplemental to his contest affidavit filed against
this entry on December 7, 1886." In this affidavit it was charged that
Troxel had failed to break five acres from date of entry.
On April 22, 1887, the local officers issued notice of contest, in the
ease of Warthen v. Troxel containing only the charges made in the affi-
davit filed December 7, 1886, and appointed July 7, 1887, as the day
for a hearing, at which time the contestant appeared and submitted
evidence sustaining the charges made. The claimant made default.
On said July 7, Vance appeared and moved to dismiss the contest of
Warthen on the ground that the filing of the supplemental charge Feb-
ruary 16, 1887, by Warthen was an abandonment of his contest filed De-
cember 7, 1886, and that the contest of Vance filed December 8, 1886,
thus became the prior one and that of Warthen should be held subject
thereto. This motion was granted, and on July 8, notice issued on
Vance's complaint and at the hearing October 6, 1887, he sustained
the charge made and the local officers recommended the cancelation of
Troxel's entry, and no appeal being filed, the entry was canceled by
your office on May 14, 1888, on the record sent up by the local officers
on December 19, 1887, and in the absence of any knowledge of the con-
test of Warthen, It appears that the latter had, on July 25, 1887, ap-
pealed from the action of the local officers dismissing his contest, but
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said officers retained his appeal with the record in the case, until May
11, 1888, three days prior to your decision in the case 9f Vance v.
Troxel, when they transmitted the same to your office.
On July 20, 1888, Vance made timber culture entry for the tract in
question.
Your decision contains a full and clear statement of the case, and
there can be no doubt as to the correctness of your conclusion.
The action of the local officers in dismissing the, contest of Warthen
was erroneous, and their action in retaining his appeal in their office
for nearly a year after the same had been filed, and in the mean time
transmitting the subsequent case of Vance is deserving of censure.
The appeal should have been transmitted at once and the contest of
Vance held to await the decision in said case.
Vance filed the following appeal from your decision:
The error relied upon is that the Hon. Commissioner erred in his holding that the
timber culture entry of Vance should be held subject to a preference right of Warthen
in face of the record showing that Warthen failed to comply with Rules of Practice
Nos. 45 and 46. We contending that the failure of Warthen to so comply acted as a
termination of all the rights of said Warthen to be further heard or to disturb the
acquired rights of Vance, which rights of Vance have been acquired without any
notice whatever that Warthen was resisting his atttmpts, and acts to perfect his
title to said land now embraced in his timber entry since July 20, 1888.
Very respectfully submitted,
HENRY B. VANCE
by MAY AND MELROY,
His attorneys.
No statement is added to this appeal, neither is any argument filed
in its support, and the Department is thus left to put its own interpre-
tation upon the same.
I assume that the attorneys for Vance had reference to the appeal of
Warthen from the decision of the local officers rendered July 7, 1887,
dismissing his contest and allowing that of Vance. The contention
seems to be that the rights of the former are in some manner barred
by his failure to comply with rules 45 and 46 of the rules of practice.
This appeal was filed July 25, 1887, which was within the time al-
lowed and the reasons for the same are given, thus complying with
rule 45, but no notice of the appeal was served on Vance, who was an
adverse party in interest, and who was entitled to notice. Warthen
thus failed to comply with rule 46 of the rules of practice.
By reason of this failure the appeal of Warthen should properly have
been dismissed by your office. Cone v. Bailey (10 L. D., 5461; Bndy
v. Fremont Townsite (10 . D., 595).
Had this action been taken, however, it would have been the duty
of your office in the exercise of its supervisory power, to have reversed
the decision of the local officers, as the same was not only contrary to
existing laws and regulations, but to the principles of justice, and to
have reinstated Warthen in his rights of which he had been deprived
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by the wrongful act of said officers. 11is failure to serve notice on
Vance merely lelt him in the position of one who had failed to take an
appeal, but did not deprive him of the protection of your office or of
this Department. Pearce v. Wollscheid (10 L. D., 678).
I see no reason why there should be any further hearing in this case.
The entry of Vance should be canceled and that of Warthen placed on
record if the latter still so desires. Should he, however, waive his
right to make entry, that of Vance should be allowed to remain. War-
then should be allowed ninety days in whieh to determine what action
he will take.
Your decision is modified accordingly.
PROCEEDINGS ON FINAL PROOF-MINERAL LAND.
DARRA6H V. HOLDMAN.
In proceedings had under a protest against final proof the Commissioner should pass
on the whole case as presented by the record, including the sufficiency of the final
proof.
The General Land Office has no jurisdiction over a case after an appeal from its de-
cision thereon.
When witnesses are examined by the local officers their finding of facts where there
is a conflict of testimony, is entitled to special consideration.
Findings of fact concurred in by the local and general land offices will be accepted
as conclusive by the Department unless clearly wrong.
A segregation survey at the expense of the agricultural claimant may be properly
directed, where such claim includes land of a mineral character covered by a
previous mineral location.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
October 30, 1890.
I have considered the case of Richard Darragh v. George S. Hold-
man on appeal by the former from the decision of your office dated
June 17, 1889, holding that the land claimed by foldman, in Darragh's
homestead entry No. 3250 of the fractional S 2 of the SW -of Sec. 6, and
fractional N I of NW -L of Sec. 7 in T. 5 S., R. 20 E., Stockton, California,
was mineral in character.
The record shows that Darragh made said homestead entry on July
14, 1880, and on March 4, 1886, gave due notice of his intention to make
final proof and payment for said land on April 24, same year; that on
saidlast-nameddate said Holdman appeared and filed his protest against
the allowance of said proof, for the reason that he had located a placer
claim covering 15.88 acres in the SW 4 of the SW I of said sec. 6, and
the NW i of the NW i of said sec. 7, prior to thedate of said homestead
entry, which he had continually worked during the mining season of
each year.
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A hearing was duly had and from the testimony submitted by both
parties, who were present and were represented by counsel, the local
officers found that said Holdman, on January 15. 1878. filed in the re-
corder's office of Mariposa county his notice of location of the oldman
placer mine, covering the ground in question, and afterwards, during
the same year, had said claim surveyed a the boundaries marked
with stakes; that on October 30, and November 22, 1878, Holdmau
filed for record in said office notice of his claim to the water running in
Snow creek through part of said claim and also for water running
through a certain gulch to be conveyed upon said mineral claim; that
said Jioldman has worked for two or three months upon his claim dur-
ing each winter season when he could secure water, and by means of
box and ground sluices has mined a gulch therein, extending six or
seven hundred feet; that said Darragh made his homestead entry with
constructive notice of said mineral claim, and in September, 1880, re-
ceived actual notice i writing of Holdman's claim; that after making
said entry Darragh erected a dwelling upon said placer claim, in which
he has since resided, and has also kept a store and the post office; that
Darragh fenced about thirty acres of his claim, including ten acres
claimed by Holdinan, upon which he raised crops of wheat, rye and
barley; that the soil upon said placer claim is composed of a sandy
loam, with reddish clay, granite and some gravel; that the improve-
ments of Darragh are valued at from $700 to $1,000, and the value of
thework and improvements of Holdman is from $500 to $1,200; thatit
is shown that gold exists on said placer claim in paying quantities;
that said oldman. although an illiterate man, appears to be honest,
and there is no reason to discredit or reject his testimony; that the
weight of evidence shows that the land in controversy is mineral in
character; that the residence of Darragh, having been made upon the
mineral and not upon the agricultural part of the land covered by said
entry, he could acquire no right thereby, and the local officers there-
fore conclude that said proofs should be rejected.
Upon appeal, your office concurred in the finding of the local officers
as to the character of the land in question, and held said homestead
entry for cancellation so far as the same covered said mineral claim,
and required said Darragh " to segregate from the balance of the land,
by a survey at his own expense, under the direction and with the ap-
proval of the United States surveyor general of California " that the
sufficiency of the final proof and the effect of his residence upon the
mineral claim would remain for future determination. From said de-
cision Darragh appealed, and, among other things, urged'that it was
error to require him to have a segregated survey made without any
assurance that he would receive patent for the balance. He also sub-
mitted affidavits alleging that Holdman's contest was not made in good
faith. Your office, on May 16, 1889, advised the local officers that said
objection was good, and that "if Darragh will withdraw his said appeal
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and file in lieu thereof a motion for review, the same will be duly con-
sidered."
On May 28,1889, Darragh filed a motion for review of said decision
of your office, and also submitted the affidavits filed with his said appeal,
and prayed that a new hearing might be ordered by your office, if, upon
consideration of the record, the decision should be adverse to him.
On June 17,1889, your office again considered the case, and held that
the homestead entryman must have said survey made segregating the
mineral land; that the evidence shows that Darragh resided on the
land continuously, and, having shown good faith, the fact that his resi-
dence was on that portion of the land shown to be mineral, would not
of itself defeat his rights, and that his final proof should not have been
rejected.
Darragh again appealed, upon the ground that said decision was con-
trary to law and the evidence.
If the findings of fact by the local office, and concurred in by your
office, are sustained by the evidence, the conclusions of law inevitably
follow. The witnesses were examined by the local officers, and, in such
cases, their findings of fact, especially where there is a conflict of testi-
mony, are entitled to marked consideration. Morfey v. Barrows (4 L.
D., 135; Neff v. Cowhick, G L. D., 660). Besides, when the findings of
the local officers have been concurred in by your office, as in this case,
they are accepted by the Department as conclusive, unless clearly
wrong. (hichester v. Allen (9 L. D., 302); Conly v. Price (id., 490);
Collierv. Wyland (10 L. D., 96); Finan v. Palmer, et al. (1I L. D., 321).
A careful examination of the testimony shows that the decision of
your office affirmingthe findings of the local land office as to the char-
acter of the mineral claim is sustained by the evidence. The record,
however, shows some irregularities in the proceedings which should be
noticed. I the first place, your office should have passed upon the
whole record, including the sufficiency of the final proof. And, sec-
ondly, after said appeal was filed your office had no jurisdiction of the
case, it being removed at once to this Department by virtue of said ap-
peal. John M. Walker, et al. (5 L. D., 504); Ida May Taylor (6 L. D.,
107); Sapp v. Anderson (9 L. D., 165); Keller v. Bullington (11 L.ID.,
140).
The decision of your office requiring said segregation survey is
affirmed, and upon presentation of the same, if satisfactory, Darragh's
final proof will be accepted, and upon payment of fees and commis-
sions, certificate will issue for the agricultural part of his entry.
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ADDITIONAL H1OM4ESTEAD-COMPLIANCE WITH LAW
BOWEN V. MCMICHAEL.
An additional homestead entry under the act of March 3, 1879, cannot be maintained
through acts of the entryman's tenant in the matter of residence, occupancy, and
cultivation.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, October 31, 1890.
I have considered the case of Ephraim Bowen v. Daniel McMichael,
on appeal by the former from yourdecision of May21. 1889, dismissing
his contest against the additional homestead entry of the latter for the
NE. of NW. of Sec. 32, T. 1 N., R. 11 E., Lincoln, Nebraska land
district (Beatrice series).
On November 20, 1882, McMichael made additional homestead entry
for this land, under act of Congress of March 3, 1879, and Ontober 13,
1884, he submitted final proof in support of the same which was ac-
cepted by the local officers.
On November 15, 1884, Bowen filed an affidavit of protest against
the same, alleging, in substance, that said entry was not made in good
faith as an additional homestead for the entryman, but that the same
was made for one Fred Parli and that said entryman had failed to com-
ply with the requirements of the law in regard thereto, and that he did
not occupy or cultivate the land, and did not control or use it from date of
entry up to making final proof, but that it was in the sole control of said
Parli. He further alleges that said entryman has failed to maintain a
residence on the homestead to which the tract in controversy was made
" additional," but was absent from the same more than six months at
one time.
Notice of said protest and of a hearing which was set for August 31,
1887, was given defendant, at which the parties appeared and the plain-
tiff offered the testimony of sundry witnesses, when an adjournment
was taken until September 6th following, at which time the parties again
appeared and the testimony was concluded and on the 13th of same
month the local officers passed upon the case and decided in favor of
the defendant and dismissed the protest. From this decision Bowen
appealed to your office and on May 21, 1889, you affirmed said judgment
and dismissed said protest, from which ruling he again appealed.
The testimony shows that one Frederick Parli made a timber culture
entry for this land, of date March 13, 1875; that he had fenced the
tract with Osage hedge and wire on one side and on the other three
sides he had railand post and wire fence. This "forty" in eontroversy-
was situated in the corner of Parli's farm and joined the land of Mc-
Michael. Parli had broken a few acres and made some pretence from
time to time of growing trees, but used the land as a pasture. There
was a stone quarry on the tract and he sold stone therefrom.
In October, 1882, one Henry lolton initiated a contest against Parli's
timber culture entry, and hearing of the same was set for November 20,
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1882. A few days before te date fixed for the hearing Parli paid Hol-
ton $50 to abandon said contest, and on the (lay of hearing he and
McMichael appeared at the local land office and had an entry of dismis-
salthereof made. Then Parli filed arelinquisbinent of his entryand can-
cellation of the same was entered and McMichael made additional home-
stead entry for the tract.
The testimony of McMichael shows that he and Parli talked about a sale
of the land to Parli, but made no actual contract. He paid Parli nothing
for the relinquishment and did not refund any of the money paid iol-
ton. After the entry was made he rented the land to Parli for $12.50
per year. Parli was to break some ground to hold the land, and was to
reset and repair some fences and to have all the stone he wanted to take
from the quarry. He does not fix any particular time or place where
this agreement was made and gives it in piecemeal. He has not exer-
cised any act of ownership over the land since the entry was made, has
paid no attention to it. When asked his purpose in making the entry
he said " I took it to enhance my pecuniary interest." He says he knew
the law did not allow him to make an agreement of sale. He promised
Parli that if he sold he, Parli, should have the refusal of it. Parli never
spoke to him about paying anything for the relinquishment or the money
paid Holton.
Parli requested him to go to the land office and make the entry. He
does not remember whether he told him that Holton had abandoned
his contest. Parli furnished the team to go to the land office and noth-
ing was said about the expense; he paid for feeding the team; does
not remember whether they talked about the law prohibiting a contract
of sale or not, but expected they did. Parli has had possession since
the entry; he does not know how much has been broken since, may be
an acre or an acre and a half; nothing in the agreement as to how
much was to be broken; does not know if the plowed ground was
sowed to rye or if cultivated in any way; does not know about the
fence; Parli reset some of it, does not know if the wire is barbed or
smooth, nor does he know anything about the posts; does not know
how much stone has been taken from the quarry. He refused to tes-
tify on the first day and says he saw Parli and talked over the case and
the testimony that had been offered, before testifying in the case.
One witness who worked for Parli testifies that Parli told him that
the land had cost him about $200.
The testimony is voluminous in the. case, but without going into fur-
ther detail, it is sufficient to say that it convinces me that this entry-
man has wholly failed to comply with the law relative to additional
homesteads. After providing therefor on certain conditions, it con-
cludes as follows:
Provided, That in no case shall patent issue upon an additional or new homestead
entry under this act until the person has actually and in conformity with the home-
stead laws occupied, resided upon and cultivated the land embraced therein at least
one year. Act of March 3, 1879, (20 Stat., 472).
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The entryman, to take the most charitable view of the case, made by
him, attempted to occupy, reside upon and cultivate the land by a ten.
ant. It is well settled that this can not be done. See West v. Owen,
(4 L. D., 412); Byer v. Burrill, (6 L. D., 521).
From a careful consideration of the evidence in the case I am satis-
fied that the entryman has not acted in good faith, and it is quite clear
that he has not complied with the requirements of the statute in the mat-
ter of residence, occupancy and cultivation of this tract.
Youi; decision is reversed; the entry will be canceled.
DESERT ENTRY-UNSURVEYED LAND-FINAL PROOF.
C. B. MENDENHALL.
Final proof under a desert entry should be made within three years from date of the
initial entry, even though the official surveys have not been extended over the
land.
Where satisfactory final proof has been made in such a case, supplemental proof,
without republication, should be required after survey, showing that the claim
conforms, or has been adjusted, to the lines of said survey.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
October 31, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of C. B. Mendenball from the ruling of
your office of August 3, 1889, in which you held that as he had sub-
mitted final proof on a desert land entry before the official survey was
filed, he must, when the land is officially surveyed, make new proof,
showing the proper reclamation thereof.
On March 24, 1884, Mendenhall filed in the local office at Bozeman,
Montana, his declaration of intention to reclaim the SE. of Sec. 15, N. *
of NE. See. 22 N. of NW. and NW. of NE. of Sec. 23 SW. .
and W. of SE. of Sec. 14, and lot No. 1 of See. 14 (as it may be des-
ignated), all in Tp. 1 S., R. 12 E., Boseman, Montana, land district,
containing six hundred and forty acres. He paid the receiver $160.
It appears that within three years, but before the official survey was
filed, he made final proof to the acceptance of the local officers, and the
same was transmitted to your office.
On July 20, 1889, your office called upon him to show-
why his entry should not be canceled for expiration of the statutory period, and to
serve notice in the manner prescribed by circular of October 28, 1886.-(5 L. D., 204.)
On August 3, 1889, in reply to a letter from the local office, asking
the return of the final proof that final payment might be made, you re-
turned the proof, and instructed the local officers that:
In such cases, when the land is officially surveyed, the claimants are required to de-
scribe by legal subdivisions, section, township and range, the land embraced in their
respective entries, and to make new proof, showing the proper reclamation thereof.
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From this ruling the entryman appealed, assigning the following
errors:
First, that he had made final proof within three years; that the same
was accepted, and the $1.00 an acre tendered; that there is no provis-
ion of law requiring a repetition of final proof after the filing of the sur
vey, and that the Commissioner erred in holding the contrary.
The statute (act of March 3, 1877, 19 Stat., 377) allows a desert land
entry to be made before survey, the land in such case to be described
"as nearly as possible." By circular of General Land Office, 1889,
page 37, it is provided that: "After a township has been surveyed the
claim must be adjusted to the lines of the survey."
The act above cited provides that:
At any time within the period of three years after filing said declaration, upon
making satisfactory proof to the register and receiver of the reclamation of said tract
of land in the manner aforesaid. a patent for the same shall be issued
to him.
In the case of Edward C. Simpson, 9 L. D., 617, it was held that:
The law does not authorize an extension of the time within which to make proof
upon a desert entry, but proof submitted after the expiration of the statutory period
may be equitably considered, etc.
This rule was also laid down in case of Morris Asher 6 L. D., 801.
There is no provision of statute for delay of proof on account of the
delay of the official survey; nor does any of the decisions mention that
fact as an excuse for delay. Want of an official survey does not, in
law, excuse the making of final proof within three years from date of
filing. This being so, if proper, acceptable proof is made, before sur-
vey showing reclamation, the means of irrigation, etc., it would be use-
less to have such proof duplicated after the survey is filed, but the
claim must conform to the official survey, or it " must be adjusted to
the lines of the survey," and the lots and tracts in the claim must agree
in their numbers with those in the survey. Proof that the claim does
so conform or has been so adjusted to the lines of the survey, must be
furnished, but the same may be made as supplemental to the final
proof on file, and may be offered without publication.
Your decision is modified accordingly.
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HOMESTEAD CONTEST-APPEAL-ACT OF JUNE 15, 1880.
MACBRIDE V. STOCKWELL.
A contestant who fails to appeal from an adverse decision of the local office is barred
thereby from asserting any frther claim or right under his contest.
An application to purchase under section 2, act of June 15, 1880, reserves the land
covered thereby nntil final action thereon.
The cancellation of a homestead entry is no bar to a purchase under said act, in the
absence of an intervening adverse right.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, October 31, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Henry R. W. Macbride from your
decision of September 8, 1888, holding for cancellation his homestead
entry for the SW. 4 of NW. t of Sec. 10, E. of NE. and W. I of
NE. of Sec. 9, T. 28 S., R. 37 E., Gainesville, Florida, and allowing
Geo. HI. Stock well to purchase said land under the second section of
the act of June 15, 1880.
The record shows that said Stockwell made homestead entry for the
tract in question October 14, 1876. The seven years during which he
was allowed to make final proof for the same expired October 14, 1883,
without any action on the part of tu claimant to perfect his title.
On December 6, 1883, Henry 1S. W. Macbride filed an affidavit of con-
test against said entry alleging abandonment. The hearing in this case
took place May 9 1884, and the local officers rendered a decision recom-
mending that the contest be dismissed. Due notice of this decision was
given to Macbride, who failed to take an appeal therefrom, and the
same became final so far as he was concerned.
On February 16, 1885, your office considered the case and decided
that in view of the fact that the entry had been reported by the local
officers for cancellation as having expired by limitation, which was
p imafacie evidence of abandonment, that the entry should be canceled.
Sixty days were allowed for appeal. No appeal was taken and the entry
was canceled September 18, 1885, and on October 3, 1885, Macbride
made homestead entry for the land.
It appears that sometime between July 6, 1885, and September 9,
1885, (but the exact date is not given) Stockwell filed in the local office
an application to purchase the land under the second section of the act
of June 15, 1880.
The contention by Macbride is, in substance, that he is a successful
contestant and procured the cancellation of Stockwells entry, and had
the preference right to enter said land. I do not think this position
can be successfully maintained.
The action of your office on February 16, 1885, holding the entry of
Stockwell for cancellation was not based upon the evidence submitted
by M acbride at the hearing, but was based upon the fact that more than
seven years had elapsed since the entry was made, and the claimant had
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failed to show cause why his entry should not be canceled for expira-
tion of the statutory period after due notice given him by the local
officers.
The decision of the local officers was a proper one upon the evidence
submitted to them and Macbride failed to appeal therefrom, and by that
failure he was barred from asserting any further claim or right under
his contest. This being the case it is unnecessary to discuss at length
the question of the validity of the contest of Macbride. The record in
said case shows that the notice was given by publication but no affi-
davit was filed showing that personal service could not be made, neither
was there any evidence that notice was sent to the claimant by reg-
istered letter, nor was there sufficient evidence that the notice was
published for a period of thirty days. On account of these failures to
comply with the rules of practice, the contest might properly have been
dismissed.
As it thus appears that Macbride has no right as a contestant, the
question to be determined is, has he any right to the land by virtue of
his entry made subsequent to the cancellation of Stockwell's entry.
Stockwell's application to purchase was transmitted to your office
September 9, 1885, which was prior to Macbride's entry, October 3,
1885. This application reserved the land from entry until final action
thereon. Griffin v. Pettigrew (10 L. D., 510). The application should
also have operated as a bar to the action of your office, September 18,
188S5, cancelling said entry. Said cancellation was an inadvertence on
the part of your office, but should it be admitted that the entry was
canceled in the regular order of business, in the absence of an adverse
right by virtue of a subsequent entry under the homestead laws, at the
date of application to purchase, said cancellation would be no bar to
the purchase of the land under the act of June 15, 1880. Simpson v.
Foley (4 L. D., 21); Martha A. Carter (9 L. D., 604).
Your decision is, therefore, affirmed.
CIRCULAR-FAILtURE OF CROPS-PAYMENT.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
Washington, D. C., October 27, 1890.
REGISTERS AND RECEIVERS,
United States Land Offices.
GENTLEMEN: Your attention is directed to the joint resolution of
Congress, approved September 30, 1890 (26 Stat., 684), which reads as
follows:
Joint resolution to extend the time of payment to settlers on the publie lands in certain cases.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assenbied, That whenever it shall appear by the filing of such evidence in
the offices of any register and receiver as shall be prescribed by the Secretary of the
2497-VOL 11-27
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Interior that any settler on the public lands, by reason of a failure of ciops for which
he is in no wise responsible, is unable to make the payment on his homestead or pre-
emption claim required by law, the Commissioner of the General Land Office is hereby
authorized to extend the time for such payment for not exceeding one year from the
date when the same becomes due.
Any party applying for the extension of time authorized by said
resolution will be required to submit testimony to consist of his own
affidavit, corroborated, so far as possible, executed before the register
or receiver, or some officer authorized to administer oaths in land mat-
ters within the county where the land is situated, setting forth in detail
the facts relating to the failure of crops, on which he relies to support
his application, and that he is unable by reason of such failure of crops
to make the payment required by law.
On receipt of such application in your office, you will note upon your
records in pencil that the same has been filed, and transmit it, together
with the testimony filed in support thereof, to this office, accompanied
by your report, and await further instructions.
Very respectfully,
W. M. STONE,
Acting Commissioner..
Approved:
-EQ. CHANDLER,
Acting Secretary.
PRACTICE-NOTICE-EVIDENCE-ABANDONMENT.
DvRKicN V. LINDSTRAND.
The notice of a contest should recite the charges contained in the affidavit of contest,
but it will not be regarded as defective if it shows on its face a sufficient allega-
tion to support a judgment of cancellation.
A defendant who appears to the merits of an action, without objection to the suffi-
ciency of the notice, can not, after judgment against him, be heard to question
the legality thereof.
A notice of contest may be signed by one or both of the local officers.
It is not necessary that thd affidavit of contest should accompany an order desig-
nating an officer to take testimony, nor that said affidavit should be in the pos-
sesions of such officer.
Under rule 35 of practice an officer designated to take testimony in a contest may
properly authorize any other qualified officer to take such testimony.
It is not error that a party is not informed of his right to cross-examine witnesses,
where due opportunity for such cross-examination is allowed.
A charge of abandonment against an entry is sustained byevidence showing that the
entryman has not established residence on the land within six months after entry.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, November 1, 1890.
In the record transmitted with the appeal of William Lindstrand,
from your office decision of April 23, 1888, in the case of Thomas Dur-
kin v. William Lindstrand, the following facts appear:
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March 19, 1833, said Lindstrand made homestead entry No. 2349, for
the SW. 1 Sec 24, T. 115 N., R. 61 W., Huron, Dakota.
November 11, 1881, Durkin filed a contest against said entry, alleg-
ing in his affidavit that "'Lindstrand is now living on his pre-emption,
and has wholly abandoned said tract (homestead) and changed his resi-
dence therefrom for more than six months since making said entry and
next prior to the date herein; that said tract is not settled upon and
cultivated by said party as required by law."
Embodied in the affidavit was a request that the hearing might be
had at Doland, Dakota.
Service on this affidavit was made by publication, summoning the de-
fendant to appear at the office of H1. Beecher, a notary public, at Do-
land, Dakota, on February 17, 1885, to respond, etc. Liudstrand did
not appear at the place designated to take the depositions, and the evi-
dence was taken ex parte before one William M. Rogers, a notary pub-
lic, at Doland, and forwarded to the register and receiver at Huron,
who, on February 27, 1885, rendered judgment canceling the entry.
At the time of filing the affidavit and publication of notice, as afore-
said, the defendant, Lindstrand, was absent in Europe.
On application of the defendant, alleging certain irregularities in the
above proceedings, your office, by letter dated December 26, 1885, re-
manded the case for a rehearing.
In obedience to this direction, on January 9, 1886, notice was again
issued to the defendant, summoning him to appear " at the office of El.
Beecher, a notary public, at Doland, D. T., before him on the 23rd day
of March, 1886," and stating therein that the testimony would be ex-
amined and final hearing had and decision rendered at the local office
(Huron, Dakota,) April 2, 1886.
This notice was signed J. S. McFarland, register, and recited that
complaint had been entered at " this office by Thomas Durkin against
William Lindstrand for abandoning his homestead entry No. 2349,"
describing the land. The notice was based on the original affidavit,
containing the charges heretofore recited, and was served personally
upon the defendant February 1, 1886.
On the 23d of MAarch, pursuant to notice, plaintiff and defendant ap-
peared before William M. Rogers, a notary of Doland, who had been
authorized by Beecher to take the testimony in his place, because he
(Beecher) was unable to be at Doland on the day specified. The testi-
mony of plaintiff and one other witness was taken by Rogers at the of-
flee of Beecher when it was stipulated in writing between plaintiff and de-
fendant that the further taking of testimony should be " adjourned or
moved to the office of Wm. XI. Rogers,"1 which was done, and the testi-
mony completed the same day. On this hearing testimony was intro-
duced by, both parties. No objection was made by the defendant to the
notice, nor to the place or places of taking the testimony, nor officer
before whom it was taken. This testimony as above taken was properly
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certified and forwarded to the register and receiver at Huron, who on
the 2d of April, 1886, rendered theirjoint decision thereon, recommend-
ing that t~he entry be canceled.
April5 (not 15, as stated in your office decision), 1886, both parties were
notified of the decision of the local officers, and on May 8, counsel for
defendant tiled a motion with the register and receiver for a " rule or
order " to setaside the testimony taken as above, also thejudgment of the
local officers, and that a new hearing or trial be had at Huron, alleging
as ground therefor:
1st. A variance between the complaint and notice.
2d. That the complaint or affidavit was not in the hands of the officer
(Rogers) who took the testimony.
3d. That the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment.
4th. That the officer before whom the testimony was taken was not
the proper officer, and had no authority so to do.
5th. That the claimant was not informed of his right of cross-exam-
ination.
6th. Same as 3d.
t7 h. That there is a variance between proof and notice.
8th. That there is a variance between the proof and the charge in
the information.
May 24, 1886, this motion was overruled-
1st. Because untimely, and
2d. Because the judgment had become final, and
3d. Because the defendant was present at taking of testimony and
cross-examined the witnesses and submitted testimony, and none of the
reasons offered are sufficient to set aside this judgment.
This judgment is attached to the motion, and signed by E. W. Miller,
receiver.
The defendant appealed, and your office affirmed the action and de-
cision of the register and receiver, and he now appeals to this Depart-
ment.
The errors complained of before the Commissioner and this Depart-
ment are in substance the same as those above enumerated in the mo-
tion to set aside the judgment of the local officers.
I find no reversible error in these proceedings. The objection that
there is a variance between the complaint and the notice is answered
in Green v. Berdan, 10 L. D., 294.
While the notice should recite the charges contained in the affidavit,
it will not be regarded as defective if it shows on its face a sufficient
allegation to support a judgment of cancellation. This notice charged
abandonment of the entry, which, if proved, would support such judg-
ment. (Smith v. Johnson, 9 L. D., 255.) Moreover, the notice is a
means to obtain jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, and in this
case the defendant appeared to the merits of the action and made no
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objection to the sufficiency of the notice, and he can not after judgment
against him be heard to complain of the legality thereof.
As to the second point, that the affidavit was not in the hands of the
officer who took the testimony, it is sufficient to say that it did not be-
long there. That it was made for the sole purpose of giving informa-
tion to the register and receiver, upon which to issue notice or sum-
mons to the claimant alleged to be in default. This done, its office was
performed, and it was not necessary that it should accompany the writ,
nor be or remain in the hands of the officer taking the testimony. The
objection that the officer before whom the testimony was taken was
without authority to take the same is untenable. Subdivision 7 of
Practice Rule 35 expressly authorizes the taking of testimony by an
officer other than the one designated by the local officers. This rule
was followed in this case.
There is no provision of the Rules of Practice sustaining the 5th
alleged error. Rule 40 provides that " due opportunity will be allowed
opposing claimants to cross-examine the witnesses," which was done in
this case.
The variance alleged in errors 7 and 8, between proof and notice and
proof and information is not such as will invalidate the judgment or
support a motion for a new trial. The proof showed that three years
had passed since he made his entry, and that he had never established
a residence on the land, his own witnesses testifying that he went to the
tract about once every six mon-ths and stayed in a shanty over night,
he and his witnesses thinking that he thus avoided the charge of aban-
doning the tract.
It will be observed that the charge in the motion is that of abandoning
his entry. This charge is sustained by showing that he has not estab-
lished a residence on the land within six months after making entry.
One material allegation of the information and notice (that of abandon.
ment) is sustained by the proof, and it is a universal rule of practice
that if one material count in a petition or complaint is sustained by the
evidence, the judgment based thereon will stand.
There is no force in the argument of appellant's counsel that the no-
tice is void because not signed by both the register and receiver, for
the 2d subdivision of Practice Rule 8 provides that such notice may be
signed by one of them, and, besides, the defendant appeared and so
waived any irregularity in the issuance or service of notice.
There being no error in the proceedings, and the evidence clearly
showing an entire lack of residence on the land for three years after
entry, your decision is affirmed, and the entry canceled.
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HOMESTEAD ENTRY-RESIDENCE.
RUTH MCNICKLE.
Temporary absences on account of exceptional circumstances may be excused, but
such absences should be the exception and not the rule goveraing homestead resi-
dence.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, November 1, 1890.
Ruth MeNickie, whose maiden name was Ruth Tofflemire, has ap-
pealed from the decision of your office of April 22, 1889, holding for
cancellation her homestead entry No. 22,220, cash certificate No.
13,272, embracing the SE.4, Sec. 3, T. 107 N., R. 64 W., Mitchell, Dak-
ota.
She made her said entry September 22, 1882, and submitted final
proof (commutation) November 8, 1884, and received her certificate
(cash entry 13,272) November 28, 1884.
Your office, by letter of November 3, 1888, rejected her said proof
because her residence was not shown to be satisfactory, and suspended
her entry to allow her to make new proof without publication.
February 13, 1889, she submitted new proof, made before the clerk
of the district court of Jerauld county, Dakota. The new proof dif-
fered in no material respect from that first submitted, except that it
was accompanied by claimant's affidavit, excusing her lack of contin-
uous residence. This proof was also rejected, and "1 by reason of the
bad faith shown " the original entry and final certificate were held for
cancellation, and the claimant now appeals to this Department.
- The material facts in relation to her residence are correctly stated in
your office decision, and show that her residence on the claim con-isted
of occasional visits, three or four times a month, excepting in the winter
months, when the weather was so cold that she "could not make the trip."
That during these visits she resided in Huron, about thirty miles distant
from her claim, or in the neighborhood, working as a hired girl for the
neighbors; that in September, 1884, she returned to the claim and
" rpsided there continuously, until after making final proof November 8,"
of the same year; that on the 27th of that month she was married to
MeNickle, and has resided with her husband in Winona, Minnesota, ever
since. erexcuse for notliving continuously on her claim is, that she
had to earn at living, and that her lawyer told her that, if " I wanted to
make proof, the almost universal practice, and the one tacitly sanctioned
by the Land Department, was for parties without a family to be on the
claim once in thirty days."
This was bad advice. and can not receive the sanction of this Depart-
ment. While temporary absences on account of sickness or other ex-
ceptional circumstances have been and may b.- excused, such absences
must be the exception, and not the rule governing residence on home-
stead claims.
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This claimant made the exception the rule, and immediately after
receiving her certificate removed to a town several hundred miles dis-
tant, and has ever since resided there. Her improvements, though
valued at $75, consist of a house, eight by ten feet, and six acres of
cultivation; no fencing.
The case is parallel with that of Sydney F. Thompson, 8 L. D., 285.
I do not think the proofs submitted show that the claimant intended in
good faith to make her home on the land, and the lifetime of her entry
having now expired, the same will be canceled.
The decision of your office is affirmed.
TIMBER CULTURE CONTEST-AMENDMENT OF CHARGE.
DAVTS v. BOTT.
The amendment of an affidavit of contest, by adding thereto an additional charge,
does not preclude the contestant from showing a default originally charged.
Acts in compliance with law performed after the initiation of contest, and induced
thereby, will not relieve the entryman from the effect of a default existing at
date of contest.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, November 3, 1890.
I have considered the case of Clarence H. Davis v. Valentine Bott on
appeal by the former from your decision dismissing his contest against
the timber culture entry of the latter for the NE. i Sec. 10, T. 108, R.
36, New Ulm series, Tracy land district, Minnesota.
On February 13, 1880, Bott made timber culture entry for this land
and on March 13, 1884, Davis filed an affidavit of contest against the
same. Hearing was set for May 30,1884, at which the parties appeared
and the contestee moved to dismiss the contest because the contestant
had not applied to enter the land, which motion was sustained by the
local officers. From this action contestant appealed and your office on
July 21, 1885, reversed said decision, whereupon the contestee appealed
to this Department and the matter coming on for hearing your decision
was affirmed by the Secretary of the Interior, and the complaint was
returned with directions that contestant be allowed to proceed with his
case. Notice was given the parties, and on April 11, 1887, they ap-
peared and contestant on said day filed an amended affidavit and the
hearing was then had upon said amended affidavit and the local officers
found in favor of contestee and dismissed the contest, from which the
contestant appealed and on May 1, 1889, your office affirmed said de-
cision, from which he appealed to this Department.
In this case there does not appear to be much dispute upon the ques-
tion of compliance with the law at the time the case was heard, to wit,
on April 11, 1887, but it is contended that the claimant has cured his
laches by planting trees and cultivating them since the notice of contest
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was served and that he should not have been allowed to show any act
of compliance with the requirements of the law after service of notice of
contest upon him.
It will be observed that contestant's original affidavit read thus:-
Valentine Bott, failed during the year after date of entry or at any time since to
plant in trees, tree seeds or cuttings five acres of said tract, and also failed to cul-
tivate in any manner such trees as were planted on said claim as-by law required.
This was'filed March 13, 1884. On the day of trial, April 11, 1887,
he amended his original complaint so as to charge that:-
Valentine Bott, failed and neglected during the third and fourth year after entry
(or at any time since said entry) to plant or sow in trees, tree seeds or cuttings, ten
acres of said tract and that said Bott has failed and neglected to cultivate in any
manner such trees tree seeds, or cuttings as were planted or sown on said tract.
This amendment cannot be considered an abandonment of the orig-
inal charge. It incorporates all of the old complaint and enlarges
thereon by covering the time from the filing of the affidavit of contest
up to the day of trial. If the contestant failed to prove a default during
the time covered by the amendment, he failed to that extent of estab-
lishing his charge, but that did not preclude his showing under the
allegations of his amended complaint a default during the third year,
which was embraced in his original complaint, and which existed prior
to the entryman curing his latches. The contestant is not bound to
stand or fall by the proof of all his allegations. Though he fail to the
extent of being unable to establish some one or more of them, yet he
may succeed apon as many auses of complaint as he is able to estab-
lish by the preponderance of the evidence, and his success in these may
warrant a judgment in his favor.
It will not do to hold that on account of the amendment the contest-
ant may not still show a default as originally charged. He may still
fall back upon his first cause of action for it is still embraced in his
complaint. He has waived nothing by expandinghis charges, or adding
to his original cause of action still another. Heis not thereby estopped
from showing that the entryman had failed to comply with the require-
ments of the law during the third year after date of entry. Under the
rulings of the Department, a default cannot be cured after notice of con-
test.
The entry must be weighed in the balance of the law, as it stood at the time of the
initiation of the contest. Waldroff v. Bottomly, (10 L. D., 133).
The testimony shows that the entryman was in default during the
third and fourth years, that he made an effort to comply with the re-
quirements of the law and had at the date of hearing, April 11, 1887,
substantially cured the laches of the third and fourth years of his entry,
but the testimony shows that this condition was induced by the contest.
I am of the opinion, therefore, that under the law and departmental
rulings the entry must be canceled. Your decision, is, therefore, re-
versed.
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MINING CLAIM-ENTRY-ALIEN CORPORATION.
HOOK ET AL. V. LATHAM ET AL.
A citizen of the United States acting in the interest of a foreign corporation can not
make a mineral entry for the benefit of such corporation.
Acting Secretary Ohandler to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, November 10, 1890.
On October 22, 1875, Milton S. Latham made mineral application No.
239, for the Buchanan copper mine, lot 37, Sec. 34, T. 8 S., B. 18 E., M.
D. M., Stockton, California, and on March 14, 1876, made mineral entry
No. 123 therefor.
On June 17, 1888, B. F. Hook and D. McIntyre filed protest against
the issue of patent on said entry and a hearing was thereupon ordered.
After the taking of certain depositions the case was submitted on
an agreed statement of facts. The local officers concluded that the
application and entry were made by said Latham for and on behalf of
the London and San Francisco Bank (limited), a foreign corporation,
organized and existing under the laws of England. They, therefore,
held that the entry had been made in contravention of section 2319,
Revised Statutes.
Your office, by letter of June 1, 1889, held the entry for cancellation.
Appeal has been taken by said bank and Arthur Scrivener, trustee.
It appears that Latham was a citizen of the United States and presi-
dent of the branch office at San Francisco of said London and San
Francisco Bank, (limited) a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of England; that on May 4, 1869, one William T. Atwood,
having the mere possessory title to said mine executed to said Latham
his promissory note for $12000, secured by mortgage on said mine;
that said note and mortgage though made and executed to said La-
tham individually, were in fact made to him as president of said bank
and for the benefit of said bank; that on September 1, 1870, another
note for $5,650.51, made by said Atwood and secured by mortgage on
said mine, was assigned to said Latham individually, but in fact for the
benefit of said bank; that subsequently Latham, acting in his own
name, but in fact for the benefit of said bank, brought suit against said
Atwood to foreclose said mortgages, and obtained judgment for $16,-
385.34; that under these proceedings said mine was, on February 7,
1871, struck off to said Latham as the highest bidder for $16,863.40,
" but no purchase money was paid by Latham to the sheriff or at all,
but the price for which said mine was bid off by him at said sheriff's
sale was in satisfaction of the judgment of foreclosure aforesaid and
was merely credited to said judgment as if it had been received by said
sheriff, though in fact no money whatever had been received by him,
the purchase having been made by said Latham for the benefit of the
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bank, in pursuance of his said trust as aforesaid: " that on November
30, 1877, Latham, being about to retire from the bank, transferred said
mine by deed to said Arthur Scrivener as trustee for said bank, and no
consideration passed to said Latham therefor; that the expenses of said
mineral application and entry and other expenses were paid by said
bank.
This recital puts it beyond question that said entry was made by
Latham in the interest of said foreign corporation and for its benefit.
In the case of Capricorn Placer (10 L. D., 641), it was held that a citi-
zen of the United States acting as the trustee of an alien corporation,
can not make a mineral entry for the benefit of such corporation. In
accordance with that ruling this entry must be canceled. The facts re-
lating to the mortgages and their foreclosure are irrelevant to this issue.
The legal title remains in the United States and patent can issue only
upon an entry made in accordance with law. No such entry has been
made. The proceedings on foreclosure gave to the bank only such in-
terest as the mortgagor had. if that interest has failed, it shows only
that the bank has taken insufficient security.
Said decision is accordingly affirmed.
TIMBER CULTU2RE CONTEST-DEVOID OF TIMBER-PRACTICE.
CROTTINGER V. LOWE.
A timber culture entry made in good faith of land not strictly devoid of timber, will
not be disturbed where it is allowed in accordance with the departmental con-
struction of the statute then in force.
Concurring decisions of the local and general laud offices are generally accepted by
the Department as conclusive on questions of fact, but the rule does not extend
to questions involving an interpretation of the law.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, November 10, 1890.
I have considered the case of Albert 0. Crottinger v. saiah A. Lowe
on appeal by the latter from your decision of February 20, 1889, can-
celling his timber culture entry for the NW.J of Sec. 10, T. 18 S., R.
17 W., Wa-Keeney, Kansas land district.
Lowe inade timber culture entry for this land December 16, 1883, and
Crottinger filed affidavit of contest December 9, 1885, alleging that
there were twenty-four hundred trees aggregating ten inches in diameter
growing on said land; farther that the entryman had failed to plow or
break five acres of said land during the first year of said entry.
Notice of said contest was duly issued, setting the hearing for Jan-
uary 23, 1886. On that day, upon motion of the contestant, the cause
was continued to March 23, 1886, and an amended affidavit filed and
service of notice duly made, hearing being set for May 21,1886. Said
amended affidavit repeated the averment that the land contained a
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natural growth of timber, omitted the averment that there was a want
of breaking and cultivation, but contained an averment charging the
entrymen with fraudulently making said entry for one Shelby Wilson.
Testimony was taken on the last namued day and the local officers
held from the evidence that the land was timber and the entry illegal,
and decided to hold the entry for cancellation. From this decision
Lowe appealed, and upon February 20, 1889, your office affirmed said
judgment and held said entry for cancellation, from which he again
appealed.
There was no testimony taken on the charge of failure of breaking or
cultivation nor upon the complaint that the entry was fraudulently
made for Wilson, so that the only matter for consideration is the ques-
tion of whether the natural growth of timber on the land excluded it
from the operation of the timber culture act.
The testimony shows that there is a small stream flowing through
this tract, just what part does not appear, nor is the trend of the stream
given. Its banks are from six or eight to thirty feet high, sloping with
more or less abruptness. Along the slope thereof grow water-elm,
cottonwood, some ash and box-elder trees, probably (averaging the
statements) seventy-five over ten inches in diameter, a few which are
twelve to fifteen inches, several hundred are over two and under ten
inches. These are low, gnarled, toisted and scrubby, unfit for lumber
for building purposes, and of little use for anything except fire-wood.
There are no trees on the tillable land except those which were planted
by a former entryman. The tenant of Lowe says he planted or "set
out" about 1,200 cottonwood and elms along the creek bank. This
entire strip of timber is estimated to contain about three and one half
acres.
[n the case of Blenkiter v. Sloggy (2 L. D., 267), the trees, some six
hundred ash,oak, elm and underbrush, were scattered over five to eight
acres, and -he entry was allowed.
In the case of Bartch v. Kennedy (3 L. D., 437), it was found that-
On the banks of the Knife river, which passes through the western half of See. 18,
there are from live to six acres of trees of different kinds . . . . and located
mostly on the river bank, where the land is subject to overflow, etc.
In this case it was held that the testimony failed to show such a
natural growth of timber as would make a timber culture entry illegal.
In the case of James Spencer (6 L. D., 217), decided October 11, 1887,
the law was fully discussed and the liberality of the Department con-
sidered and it is there held:
The former rulings on this subject will not be allowed to prevail longer. Timber
eulture entries made after the date of this decision mast be made of land . .
devoid of timber-
but this judgment is not retroactive. In the case at bar the entry
was matde in 1883, when the decisions of the department recognized
such tracts as subject to entry under the timber-culture act.
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Fringes of timber along the banks of streams may be found in many
places where all the tillable land is barren of trees, and will so remain
until cultivation and protection produces them.
This ease comes under the liberal rulings of the Department prior to
October 11, 1887. The fact that this contest was initiated so soon
after the entry was made, and as there is no evidence reflecting upon
the entryman's good faith in the matter of *' breaking " or cultivating,
and no. testimony tending to show fraud, I feel disinclined to ancel it.
I am not unmindful of the rule that on questions of fact the concurring
decisions of the local and General Land Office are generally accepted as
conclusive, but this case does not come within that principle, for as a
matter of law, under the interpretation placed upon said act by this
department when this entry was made, it should be upheld.
Having considered the case fully, I am of the opinion that this contest
should be dismissed and the entry allowed to stand, subject to com-
pliance with the law, and the entryman be allowed a reasonable time
within which to comply therewith by growing and cultivating trees
upon tillable land of said tract, and if he fails in this regard, his entry
should be canceled.
Your decision is therefore reversed.
RAILROAD GRANT-INDEMNITY-ORDER OF MAY 28, 1883.
NORTHERN PAC. R. R. CO. v. JOHN 0. MILLER.
(On Review.)
Indemnity can only be selected in lien of a section, or part of a section, lost in place,
and the basis for such selection must be specifically designated, and shown to be
excepted from the grant before indemnity can be allowed; and the rights of set-
tlers can only be ascertained and protected by the enforcement of this rule.
The departmental order of May 28, 1883, did not contemplate the selection of lands
subject to settlement without designating the basis therefor, but was applicable
only to such lands as were protected by withdrawal.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
November 13, 1890.
The Northern Pacific Railroad Company has filed a motion for re-
view of the decision of the Department of July 1, 1890, (11 L. D., 1)
affirming the decision of your office of September 16, 1885, rejecting the
selection of said company of the SE.-1 of the NE. and the NE. of
the SE. 4, Sec. 19, T. 131 -., R. 40 W., Fergus Falls, Minnesota.
The land in controversy is within the granted limits of the St. Paul,
Minneapolis and Manitoba Railroad Company, which was definitely
located opposite the tract in question December 20, 1871, and is also
within the indemnity limits of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company,
and was embraced in a withdrawal for the benefit of this company,
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which was received at the local office January 6, 872. At both of said
dates the land was covered by the pre-emption declaratory statement
of Jens Anderson, which excepted it from the grant to the first named
company, and also from the withdrawal for the benefit of the Northern
Pacific Company.
On January 30, 1881, the Northern Pacific Company applied to select
this land, but no specific tract was designated as a loss for which the
indemnity was claimed. The application was rejected by the local of-
fice, and the company appealed.
On April 8, 1884, John 0. Miller applied to make homestead entry of
the tract.
The selection of the company was rejected by the Department in the
decision now sought to be reviewed, upon the ground that the right to
select a particular tract as indemnity can not be recognized, if the loss
for which the indemnity is claimed is not specifically designated.
The company asks for a review of this decision upon the following
grounds:
1st. That said application to select was filed January 30, 1884, and was made under
the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, it being in accordance with his instruc-
tions May 28,1883 (copy enclosed), directly applicable to this company's grant.
2nd. That upon the issue of the circular of your Department of August 4, 1885 (4
L. D., 90), this company endeavored to comply therewith, and has designated the
lands lost ' in place,' and for which indemnity selections had been made, and sup-
posed it had made such designation for all lands selected, and that it is only an over-
sight that no land was designated for the tract here in dispute.
3rd That your said circular of August 4. 1835, does not declare selections of indem-
nity lands unaccompanied by designation of lost lands, illegal, bat only directs that
no new selections shall be admitted until the losses for those already made shall be
specified.
4th. That the company not having been originally in default, but being clearly
within the instructions of the Secretary, its selection or application to select is not
illegal, and should not be canceled, but that the company should be permitted to
designate a loss therefor.
Conceding, for the sake of argument, that this selection was made in
accordance with the instructions of May 28, 1883, I do not see why it
should affect the rights of Miller, which must be determined by the act
making the grant. Indemnity can only be selected in lieu of some sec-
tion or part of section lost in place, and the basis for suchselection must
be specifically designated and shown to be excepted from the grant be-
fore the right to indemnity can be exercised. While, as between the'
government and the company, the practical effect would be the same,
where indemnity was allowed in.bulk for an equivalent quantity of land
lost in place, as where indemnity was allowed tract for tract, yet the
individual rights of the settler can only be ascertained and protected
by the latter mode.
Where lands are settled upon which have been selected by the com-
pany in lieu of an equivalent quantity of lands, without designating the
particular basis for each tract, and part of the basis should from any
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cause be disallowed, it would be impossible to determine which of the
selections should be rejected and which retained. The rights of the set-
tler in cases where the lands were subject to settlement at date of the
company's selection would be materially affected by any rule that did
not require the selection to be made tract for tract and the basis spe-
cifically designated, so that his rights as against the company might be
definitely determined.
But the selection in this instance is not in my opinion protected by
the order of May 28, 1883, as that order did not contemplate the selec-
tion of lands subject to settlement by merely listing the lands, with-
out designating the basis, but was intended to be applicable only
to such lands as were protected by the withdrawal. The purpose of
the order is expressed in the first paragraph, to wit: "' to open for set-
tlement as speedily as possible all the lands within the indemnity limits
of the grant to the Northern Pacific Company, not actually required to
supply the lands lost in place within the granted limits."
Now, as lands not subject to the withdrawal were already opened to
settlement at date of said order, it could not have been intended that
such lands should be simply listed as selections, without designating
the specific.basis, because no purpose could be accomplished by such
listing, and such selection could not have accomplished the purpose of
the order or facilitated the restoration to settlement of lands within the
indemnity limits, for the simple reason that such lands had already been
restored.
After a careful consideration of this case, I am satisfied that the va-
lidity of the selection is subject to attack by the settler, and that it is
not protected by the order of May 28, 1883.
The motion is denied.
RAILROAD GRANT-CONFLICTING ENTRY-CERTIORARI.
FORNEY V. UNION PACIFIC R. Co.
The erroneous allowance of an entry for land included within the limits of a railroad
grant cannot divest the right of the company nder its grant.
The writ of certiorari will be denied if, from the application therefor, it is apparent
that the applicant's appeal if before the Department would be dismissed.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, November 13, 1890.
I am in receipt of your letter of the 3d instant, transmitting an appli-
cation for certiorari by Wm. G. Forney in the case of said Forney v.
Union Pacific railway company, involving the E. NE. SW. , NE.,
and SE. NW. , See. 5, T. 17 N., R. 84 W., Cheyenne, Wyoming.
It appears that in 1886 Forney applied to make homestead entry for
said tract and that the local officers, being in doubt as to whether the
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tract was within the withdrawal for said company, forwarded the ap-
plication to your office for instructions. Your office by letter of April
7, 1886, advised the local office that the official diagram showed the
tract to be outside of the withdrawal. The entry was, accordingly, al.
lowed. Claimant alleged settlement in 1880.
By letter of April 4, 1889, your office directed the cancellation of the
entry for conflict with the railroad grant. Notwithstanding this direc-
tion the local officers, apparently acting on the former instructions,
allowed the etryman to make final proof, and issued certificate.
In February, 1890, the local officers called attention to the conflict in
the instructions, and your office thereupon, oil February 10, 1890, re-
qtested the company to relinquish its claim in favor of Forney. The
company responded that the tract had been sold to a third party, and
suggested that Forney might be able to reach a satisfactory agreement
with the purchaser.
On March 8, 1890, your office directed the local officers to notify For-
ney of the resalt of the correspondence, and that pending his action in
the matter the order of cancellation would be suspended.
Forney was notified, but failed to reach an agreement with the pur-
chaser. On June 30, 1890, more than ninety days having elapsed, your
office canceled the entry.
By letter of September 1, 1890, the local officers forwarded the appeal
of Forney. On September 26, 1890, your office dismissed the appeal
for the reason that Forney had never appealed from the order of can-
cellation of April 4, 1889, and for the further reason that he had not
availed himself of the opportunity of negotiating with the purchaser of
the tract.
Forney then filed the present application.
The diagram on file in your office shows this tract to be within the
limits of the withdrawal for said company, made on the filing of the
map of definite location on January 6, 1868. Forney does not allege
any right prior to 1880, nor does he allege that the tract was excepted
from the operation of the withdrawal, by any other claim. The record
therefore shows the right of the company was superior. The erroneous
allowance of the entry by your office cannot divest the right of the
company under the statute.
Passing other questions, the case here presented is fully met by the
rulings of the Department that the writ of certiorari will be denied if,
from the application therefor, it is apparent that the applicant's appeal
if before the Department, would be dismissed. A. B. Cook (11 L. D.,
78); Rudolph Wnrlitzer (6 L. D., 315).
On the authority of these cases the application is denied.
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RIGHT OF WAY ACT-PROOF OF ORGANIZATION.
MONTANA AND WYOMING EASTERN R. R. Co.
An application for the benefit of the right of way act can not be approved in the
absence of due proof showing the organization of the company under its incorpo-
ration.
Acting Secretary Chandler to Miessrs. Thompson and Slater, November
15, 1890.
Your letter of yesterday enclosing a certified copy of the articles of
incorporation of the Montana and Wyoming Eastern, Railroad Com-
pany, together with a certified copy of the law of Montana relating to
the incorporation of railroad companies, and under which the company
named was incorporated, has been received.
The papers have been examined and are found to be in proper form
so far as they have been supplied by the company. It is observed, how-
ever, that there are yet lacking certain of the required due proofs of
organization, which must be supplied before the papers are acceptable
to the Department, viz:
First; The copy of articles is not certified to by the proper officer of
the company under its corporate seal;
Second; The official statement, under seal, by the proper officer that
the organization has been completed; that the company is fully author-
ized to proceed, etc., etc., and
Third; A true list, under oath, signed by the president, under seal
of the company, showing the names and designation of officers.
Explanatory of the failure of the company to supply the omissions
noted above, there are with the papers two affidavits made by Mr. D.
S. Wade, to the effect that the company is a body corporate, that all
necessary steps are being taken to perfect its organization, that the or-
ganization has been completed as fas as possible under the Montana
law and further that it is intended to at once consummate the organi-
zation.
It is understood from these affidavits that at the present time the or-
ganization of the company, under its charter, has not been completed,
but that all has been done that can be, to that end, till stock subscrip-
tion books have been opened after thirty days notice, and thereafter a
meeting of stockholders has been held after another thirty days notice,
which acts are required by law.
The right of way act provides, in its first section, that its benefit can
be secured by
any railroad company duly organized under the laws of any State or Territory, ex-
cept the District of Columbia, or by the Congress of the United States, which shall
have filed with the Secretary of the Interior a copy of its articles of incorporation,
and due proofs of organization under the same, etc. (18 Stat., 482).
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As evidenced by the affidavits filed, the company is not yet organ-
ized under its incorporation, and its good intention to so organize can-
not be accepted for the purpose of giving the company the standing of
a beneficiary under the right of way act, in place of the plain require-
ments of both the law and the regulations thereunder. The intent of
the company to supply the defects in the future does not warrant the
Department in accepting incomplete papers.
That portion of the law and regulations in regard to due proofs of or-
ganization was intended for the protection of the Department, particu-
lary as an evidence of bonafides on the part of railro ad companies, and
in no instance have the requirements in this regard been deviated from
with respect to companies organized under the Montana law or under
those of any other State or Territory. Exception cannot now be made
in favor of the Montana and Wyoming Eastern Railroad Company, as
such action would not be just to companies heretofore accepted as bene-
ficiaries under the right of way act, and might be used a a precedent
by companies applying for future recognition.
The papers are therefore returned herewith. On being re-submitted
in the required and complete form they will be duly considered.
PRACTICE-NOTICE-SERVICE BY PUBLICATION.
BUGiBEE V. (COSBY.
Notice by publication, defective for want of copy by registered letter, is not made
good by subsequently mailing such notice, without ew posting and publication.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, September 11, 1890.
This is an appeal by Henry Bugbee from your office decision of Feb-
ruary 23, 1888, dismissing the proceedings upon his contest against the
homestead entry of Hiram H. Cosby made ovember 16, 1882, for the
SW. *t, Sec. 7, T. 100 N., R. 65 W., Yankton, Dakota, and remanding
the case " for rehearing after due and proper notice."
Notice of hearing on said contest to be had at the local office Febru-
ary 9, 1887, was made by publication and a copy thereof was posted in
the local office and on the land.
On the day fixed for hearing, Bgbee filed an affidavit setting forth
that his attorney had failed to send said notice to Cosby by registered
mail and asking a continuance " to enable him to give said notice
legally."
Thereupon March 29, 1887, (at the local office) was duly designated
as the date of hearing and on the same day (February 9, 1887) notice
thereof was sent to Cosby by registered mail, but such notice was neither
published nor posted.
Bugbee appeared in pursuance of the notice last mentioned and sub-
mitted testimony and Cosby made default.
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The local office recommended the cancellation of the entry in ques-
tion. By the decision appealed from your office found that as " no alias
notice was issued the local office erred in allowing the contestant to
proceed on the original" notice.
Bngbee's first notice of contest was irregular for the reason that it
was not sent by registered mail. Rule 14 of practice. Watson v.
Morgan et al. (9 . D., 75). This being so the publication and posting
of his second notice were essential to its legality.
I must therefore find that no legal notice has been issued upon ag-
bee's contest and that the local officers were consequently without juris-
diction in the premises. Watson v. Morgan et al., supra.
The decision appealed from is accordingly affirmed.
CIRCULAR-SETTLERS ON RAILROAD LANDS.
DEPARTMENT OF TE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
Washington, D. ., November 1, 1890.
REGISTERS AND RECEIVERS,
United States Land Offices.
SIRS:
Your attention is called to an act of Congress entitled " an act to
amend an act entitled ' an act for the relief of settlers on railroad lands,"
approved June twenty-second. eighteen hundred and seventy-four,'"
approved August 29, 1890, as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Bepresentatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That the privileges granted by the aforesaid act approved June
twenty-second, eighteen hundred and seventy-four, are hereby extended (subject to the
provisos, limitations, and restrictions thereof) to all persons entitled to the right of
homestead or pre-emption under the laws of the United States, who have resided upon,
and improved for five years lands granted to any railroad company, but whose entries
or filings have not for any cause been admitted to record.
It appears to be the intention of this bill to enlarge the class of cases
in which relinquishment by the company will be permissible under thib
act of June 22, 1874 (18 Stat., 194), by removing the requirement that
an entry or filing should have been allowed, thus aiding the adjust-
ment of claims growing out of settlements made upon railroad lands
subsequent to the attachment of the rights of the companies under the
grants.
Upon the filing of a relinquishment under this act, it being shown
that the person in whose favor it is made is entitled to the right of
homestead or pre-emption, and has resided upon and improved the
land for a period of five years, you will permit entry to be made as in
the case of other public lands, it being held by this Department that a
relinquishment under the act of June 22, 1874, releases the land from,
all claim of the company, and it thereby becomes subject to disposal
under the general land laws (6 L. D., 716; 7 L. D., 481).
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Lands within the indemnity limits of a grant do not afford a basis
for relinquishment and selection under this act (10 L. D., 50; Ibid., 609),
and your acceptance of a relinquishment does not amount to an ap-
proval of the selection based thereon (8 L. D., 472), as a relinquishment
confers no right upon the com pany, if the land covered thereby was, in
fact, excepted from the grant (10 L. D., 264).
The relinquishment maybe made by a simple waiver of claim when
the land has not been certified or patented to or for the benefit of the
company; but, when title has passed, formal reconveyance will be
required.
This act is not mandatory upon the companies, and confers no right
upon the settler as against the company in the absence of a relin-
quishment.
It simply provides a mode of adjustment dependent upon the vol-
untary action of the companies, and it is hoped that, by a liberal and
mutual spirit of compromise and concession, the benefits intended for
the settler may be made available.
Respectfully,
W. M. STONE,
Approved: Acting Commissioner.
GEo. CHANDiER,
Acting Secretary.
CIRCULAR-SETTLERS ON NORTHERN PACIFIC INDEMNITY LANDS.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
Washington, D. C., November 7, 1890.
REGISTERS AND RECEIVERS,
United States Land Offices.
GENTLEMEN:
Your attention is called to the provisions of an act of Congress entitled
" An act for the relief of settlers on Northern Pacific Railroad indemnity
lands," approved October 1, 1890, copy of which is attached, containing
two sections.
By the first section of the act the right is given to those persons who,
afterAugust 15, 1887, and beforeJanuary 1, 1889, settled upon,improved,
and made final proof under the homestead and pre-emption laws, for
lands within what is known as the second indemnity belt of the grant
for the Northern Pacific Railroad, to transfer their entries to any other
vacant government land they may select, in compact form, and subject
to entry under the homestead and pre-emption laws, and to receive final
certificates and receipts therefor, in lieu of the entries heretofore made
in said second indemnity belt, provided the transfer be made within
twelve months from the passage of the act.
In case of the death of any person so entitled, the transfer may be
made by his legal representative.
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The right given is personal and can not be transferred, nor can the
transfer provided for in the act be made through the intervention of an
agent or attorney; frther, no transfer will be approved by the land
department, except where theproof made upon the original entry shows
a satisfactory compliance with law in the matter of residence and im-
provement.
When application is made to make such transfer to lands in your
district, you will require the applicant to make affidavit as to the facts
in relation to his former entry, and whether he has received the return
of the fees and commissions, or purchase money, paid upon said entry;
and in the event that he has received such return, you will require that
he make payment anew for the land to which the transfer is made.
The second section provides for a similar transfer within one year
from the passage of the act where persons, possessing the requisite
qualifications under the homestead or pre-emption laws, in good faith
have settled upon and improved lands in said second indemnity belt,
having made filing or entry of the same, and for any reason otherwise
than voluntary abandonment, failed to made proof thereon. The entry
or filing must have been allowed within the time specified in section one.
In making proof upon the tract to which the transfer is made, credit
will be given for the period of bona fide residence and amount of im-
provements made upon the tract heretofore entered or filed for in said
second indemnity belt; but final entry will not be permitted except
upon proof of continuous residence upon the land to which the transfer
is made for a period of not less than three months prior to the making
of proof.
When application is made for transfer under this section, you will
require that the party make affidavit as to the facts relative to the
former entry or iling, and where the fees and commissions paid thereon
have been returned, it will be necessary that he make payment anew
before the allowance of the transfer.
Said affidavit must be corroborated by at least two witnesses having
knowledge in relation to the party's residence and improvement upon
the land from which the transfer is sought, and should satisfactorily
show a compliance with the requirements of law to the extent claimed,
as the same will necessarily form a part of the final proof for the land
to which the transfer is made.
The corroborating affidavits may be made before any officer author-
ized to administer oaths.
Final payment upon entries and filings transferred under this section
will be made as under existing laws.
Very respectfully,
LEWIS A. GOFF,
Approved: Commissioner.
GEo. CHANDLER,
Acting Seeretary. 
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[PUBLIC-NO. 344.]
An Act for the relief of settlers on Northern Pacific Railroad indemnity lands.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Rlepresentatives of the United States of AmericW in
Congress assembled, That those persons who, after the fifteenth day of August, in the
year of our Lord eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, and before the first day of Jan-
uary, in the year eighteen hundred and eighty-nine, settled upon, improved, and
made final proof on lands in the so-called second indemnity belt of the Northern
Pacific Railrjtd Company's grant under the homestead and pre-emption laws of the
United States, or their heirs, may transfer their said entries from said tracts to such
other vacant surveyed government land in compact form and in legal subdivisions,
subject to entry under the homestead and pre-emption laws, as they may select, and
receive final certificates and receipts therefor, in lieu of the tracts proved up on in
said belt by the respective claimants: Provided, That such transfer of entry shall be
made and completed within twelve months from the date of the passage of this act,
and be so made in person by the claimant, or in case of death by his legal represent-
ative, and without the intervention of agent or attorney.
SEC. 2. That all persons possessing the requisite qualifications under the pre-
emption or homestead laws, who in good faith settled upon and improved land in
said second indemnity belt, having made filing or entry of the same, and for any
reason, other than voluntary abandonment, failed to make proof thereon, may, in
lien thereof within one year after the passage of this act transfer their claims to any
vacant surveyed government land subject to entry under the homestead or pre-
emption laws, and make proof therefor as in other cases provided; and in making
such proof credit shall be given for the period of their bona fide residence and amount
of their improvements upon their respective claims in the said indemnity belt, the
same as if made upon the tract to which the transfer is made: Provided, That no
final entry shall be permitted, except upon proof of continuous residence upon the
land, the subject of such new entry, for a period of not less than three months prior
thereto. Payment for said final selection shall be made as under existing laws. The
provisions of this act shall be carried into effect under such rules and regulations as
may be prescribed by the Secretary f the Interior.
Approved October 1, 1890.
RAILROAD GRANT-PROCEEDINGS ON FINAL PROOF.
SOUTHERN PACIFIC R. R. CO. V. CONNIFF.
In proceedings under the protest of a railroad company against the final proof of a
settler, the qualifications of such settler at date of settlement will be presumed
on appeal, in the absence of any allegation to the contrary in the protest.
Where the company in such a case does not in its protest raise any question as to the
settler's citizenship at date of settlement it will not be heard to do so on appeal.
The existence of a valid settlement claim excepts the land covered thereby from the
operation of a subsequent withdrawal.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
November 13, 1890.
I have considered the case of the Southern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany v. Michael Conniff, as presented by the appeal of said company
from the decision of your office, dated September 27, 1888, holding for
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cancellation its selection of the SW of Sec. 25, T. 4 N., R. 21 W., San
Bernardino meridian, Los Angeles, California.
The land in question is within the indemnity limits of the grant of
March 3, 1871 (16 Stats., 573-579), the withdrawal of which became
effective on May 10, 1871.
On July 20, 1883, Conniff filed pre-emption declaratory statement No.
2440 for the SW I of Sec. 25, T. 4 N., R. 21 W., S. B. M., Los Angeles,
California.
On October 3, 1887, the Southern Pacific Railroad Company selected
all of said section in lieu of Sec. 19, T. 2 N., R. 15 W., which was within
the primary limits of said grant.
On August 15, 1887, said order of withdrawal was revoked, and on
October 7, same year, the lands within the indemnity limits were re-
stored to entry.
Conniff alleges that he first made proof in support of his claim in
January, 1885, at which time the company appeared and filed its pro-
test. Said proof having been lost, new proof was reqired and made.
The company filed its protest against the allowance of said proof alleg-
ing seven specific grounds of objection, which may be condensed as
follows: (1) that said land was within the limits of said withdrawal,
and that said order of revocation was and is null and void; (2) that
said company made said selection as aforesaid, "and the title thereto
is in the Southern Pacific Railroad Company ;" (3) that said company
"s will be obliged to contest the said application of Michael Conniff
through the various departments of the Land Department of the United
States, and, if defeated therein, will be forced to prosecute its claims
for said piece of land in the federal courts of the United States and
the supreme court of the United States, in order that the proper
adjudication of its rights in the premises may be determined for all
time to come .and that said application has not been
made within the time prescribed by the provisions of section 2267 of
the Revised Statutes, and that, by reason thereof, said Conniff has for-
feited all right thereto."
It thus appears that in said protest no question was raised by the
company that said Conniff was not a qualified pre-emptor at date of
settlement, or that he was not a citizen of the United States, or had not
filed his intention to become such at date of said settlement and at the
date of said withdrawal.
The final proof shows that said Conniff was " a naturalized citizen of
the United States;" that he first settled on said land on January 1,
1871, built a house, twelve by fourteen feet, a stock corral, cleared some
land of brush, and fenced and plowed a portion of the land and raised a
crop of hay; that his improvements are worth $150; that he has con-
tinuously resided upon said land and made the same his home, since the
date of his said settlement. With his said proof was filed his certificate
of naturalization, issued on July 20, 1875, by the judge of the county
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eourt of Ventura county, California, which recited, among other things,
that " the said applicant has heretofore, and more than two years since,
and in due form of law declared his intention to become a citizen of the
United States."
It thus affirmatively appears from the record that Conniff was a
qualified pre-emptor when he filed said declaratory statement, and it
does not clearly appear that Conniff was not a qualified settler at the
date of settlement, prior to said withdrawal. Moreover, the company
did not, in said protest, raise the question of Conniff's citizenship at
the date of his said settlement, and it will not be heard to do so on ap-
peal, nor will the Department reject his proof, since it does not affirm-
atively appear that he is not entitled to the land. It is, therefore,
unnecessary in this case to consider the question whether the natu
ralization of a pre-emptor relates back to the date of his settlement
so as to defeat the indemnity withdrawal.
The record shows that, prior to the selection by the company, Conniff
was a qualified pre-emptor and his filing was then of record: that the
company appeared and offered no objection to his qualifications to make
said settlement on the (late alleged, and it will therefore be assumed,
on appeal, that (onniff was a qualified settler prior to said withdrawal,
on the date of his alleged settlement.
For the foregoing reasons the decision of your office holding said se-
lection for cancellation was correct, and the decision appealed from to
that effect must be, and it is hereby, affirmed.
PRACTICE SERVICE OF NOTICE-RESIDENT ATTORNEY
L.AA | M SA1 s a PETERSON V. FORT. L3
The time within which an appeal from the decision of the Commissioner must be
filed begins to ran from the date that service is first made, whether it be upon
the party himself or upon his attorney, either local, or resident in Washington.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
November 13, 1890.
Catharine Peterson files this application, praying that the record in
the above stated case may be certified to the Department under rules
83 and 84 of Rules of Practice. Said application presents the follow-
ing case:
On October 1, 1889, your office rendered a decision in the case of Cath-
arine Peterson v. George W. Fort, rejecting the final pre-emption proof
of said Peterson for the E. A of the NW. i, NW. - of the NW. 1, Sec. 20,
and NE. 1 of the NE. i, Sec. 19, T. 32 N., R. 15 W., Niobrara, Nebraska,.
and allowing the homestead entry of George W. Fort for said tract; that
on December 28, 1889, the applicant, by her said attorney, filed in the
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General Land Office an appeal from said decision, which your office de-
clined to transmit to the Department, for the reason that " it was not
filed within sixty-one days from the date of the decision."
The applicant contends that under the rule laid down in the case of
Boggs v. West Las Animas Townsite, 5 L. D., and in King v. Leitens-
dorfer, 2 L. D., 374, the time for filing such appeal did not expire until
on or about January 6,1870, or seventy days from the day when notice
of the decision was mailed by the local officers.
In the letter of your office of January 10, 1890, declining to transmit
said appeal, it is stated that " said appeal is denied under rules 86 and
97 of practice."
Rule 86 is as follows:
Notice of an appeal from the Commissioner's decision must be filed in the General
Land Office, and served on the appellee or his counsel within sixty days from the date,
of the service of notice of sch decision.
Rule 97 provides that:
Fifteen days, exclusive of the day of mailing, will be allowed for the transmission
of notices and papers by mail, except in case of notice to resident attorneys, when
one day will be allowed.
It is not stated in the application when or how notice of the decision
of your office of October 24, 1889, was served, but from the fact that it
was decided under rule 97, it may be assumed that the service was made
on the resident counsel in this city.
The rule that the time for filing an appeal from the Commissioner's
decision does not expire until after seventy days from date of notice,
only applies where notice of said decision is sent through the mails by
the local office. This was the ruling in the case of Boggs v. West Las
Animas Townsite, supra. The case is not controlled by that ruling, for
the reason that this notice was not sent through the local office, but
was served on the resident counsel in Washington. In the former case,
the time allowed for appeal is controlled by rule 87, but in the latter case
it is controlled by rule 97. It is, however, contended by counsel that
rule 87 is made applicable to this case by the ruling in the case of King
v. Leitensdorfer, 2 L. D., 374. This was a decision of the Commissioner,
in which it was held that, where notices of the decision of the Commis-
sioner is served on resident attorneys in Washington, and also by the
local office on the party or his local attorney, the time for appeal will
commence t run from date of the latter service. Also to the same effect
is another decision by the same Commissioner: that of Roach v. lyers
et al., 1 L. D., 464.
This construction of the rule, which is not evolved from any sound
principle or process of reasoning, has not been followed by the Depart-
ment; but, on the contrary, the reverse has been the ruling. (Case of
John G. Parker, Lands and Railroad Div., Vol. 70, page 3).
It is a well settled rule that service may be made upon either the
party in interest or his attorney, and service upon the attorney is suffl-
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cient service upon the party. It is also a well settled rule that where
there are several attorneys of record, service upon any one of them is
sufficient service to bind the client. Rule 106, Rules of Practice;
Thomas Howard, 3 L. D., 409; George Premo, 9 L. D., 70; Thomas C.
Cook, 10 L. D, 321. Now, if service upon either of the attorneys of
record "will be deemed notice to the party in interest, it must neces-
sarily follow that the time within which the appeal must be filed com-
mences to run from the date that service is first made, whether it be
upon the party himself, or upon his attorney, either local, or resident
in Washington.
The petition is denied.
MINING CLAIM-RES JUDICATA-MINERAL LAND.
SEARLE PLACER.
A departmental decision that land is mineral in character does not preclude subse-
quent investigation, o the part of the Department, as to the character of such
land, as the Department retains jurisdiction to consider and determine the char-
acter of land claimed under the mineral laws until deprived thereof by the issu-
ance of patent.
A placer application will not be allowed if the evidence does not show as a present
fact the placer character of the land involved.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the CommissiL'ner of the General Lana
Office, November 13, 181J0.
This is an appeal by A. D. Searle from your office decision of March
6,1886, rejecting his application to make mineral entry for the Searle
placer claim, amended survey No. 435, Leadville, Colorado.
His original application was filed July 5, 1879, for 150.02 acres. By
the pending application filed March 10, 1882, his claim was reduced to
101,918 acres, thereby excluding certain conflicting lode claims.
It appears from the statements of your office that prior to the original
application the county judge having applied on behalf of the inhabit-
ants of North Leadville to enter the land as a townsite, a hearing was
ordered to determine its character and the priority of right, that upon
the evidence adduced your office decided in favor of Searle, and that.
on appeal, this Department on April 17, 1880 (7 C. L. 0., 36), affirmed
that decision and held that the surveyor general's return as to the min-
eral character of the land had not been overcome. The townsite appli-
cation was accordingly dismissed.
Subsequently, on the report of a special agent of your office and the
representations of certain residents of Leadville, alleging among other
things that the ground was not placer, the Department, December 27,
1882, finding a "great doubt whether or not the ground claimed is
mcqre valuable for placer mining than for other purposes " ordered a
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hearing to ascertain the character of the land and the status of all ex-
isting claims and interests and suspended all prior orders and proceed-
L' ings.
Upon the evidence adduced at the hearing had (November, 1883), in
pursuance of the above order the local officers found that the land was
not distinctively valuable for placer mining and that the same had not
been inproved as required by law and recommended the rejection of
the pending application.
On Searle's appeal from this ruling, the same was affirmed by your
said office decision of March 6, 1886.
In his appeal here he alleges that the question as to the character of
the land became res adjudicate by reason of the action o the Depart-
ment (7 C. L. O., 36, supra) upon the former hearing.
This contention is disposed of adversely to him by the departmental de-
eision in the case of the Central Pacific R. R. (Jo. v. Valentine (1] L. D.,
238), wherein it was held (p. 246), that the Land l)epartment had jurisdic-
tion to ascertain and determine what lands were subject to the railroad
grant (from which mineral land was expressly excepted) and that such
jurisdiction continues " until the lands have been either patented or cer-
titled to, or for the use of, the railroad company."
The matters touching the merits of the case are sufficiently stated by
your office in the decision appealed from and reference is had thereto.
It, will therefore be quite unnecessary for me to comment in detail,
-upon the voluminous testimony submitted in this case.
It is the rule of the department that the "' firk{ care in recognizing an
application for patent upon a placer claim must be exercised in deter-
-mining the exact classification of the lands," which are sought to be
acquired as such. (Sec. 1, Circular September 22, 1882 ,1 L. D., 685.)
The testimony produced at the rehearing had before the local officers
in November, 1883, although conflicting in its character, I think by a
/ fair preponderance, establishes the fact that continued prospecting for
several years failed to disclose in any appreciable quantity, the pres-
ence of valuable placer mineral in the claim or to establish as a "4 pres-
ent fact" within the meaning of section 2329, R. S., the " placer" char-
-acter of the land. Peirano et al. v. Pendola, 10 L. D., 536.. It further
appears that while the appellant has constructed some ditches on the
tract, he has brought no water thereon and that the work on the claim
-consisted mainly in making a considerable number of shafts with the
view to the discovery of " lodes " and not for the purpose of placer"
development.
The testimony was taken before the register and receiver, who saw
, and heard the witnesses on the stand, observed their demeanor and
eould judge therefrom who is most worthy of credit.
Their joint opinion is accordingly entitled to special consideration.
Kelly v. Halvorson 6 L. D.,225); Morfey v. Barrows (4 L. D., 135).
In accordance therefore with the views heretofore expressed, I must
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find thAt no sufficient warrant is shown for disturbing the concurring
decisions of the local and your office, which under like circumstances are
generally accepted by this Department as conclusive. (hichester v.
Allen (9 L. D. 302); Conly v. Price (id., 490). Cleveland v. North, 11
L. D., 344.
The judgment of your office is affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT-PRE-EMPTION FILING-SETTLEMENT CLAIM.
NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. CO. V. MARSHALL.
A prima facie valid pre-emption filing of record, at date ot statutory withdrawal on
general route, excepts the land covered thereby from the operation of such with-
drawal.
A claim based on settlement, residence, and cultivation, existing at the date when
the grant becomes effective, excepts the land covered thereby from the grant.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Of-
fice, November 15, 1890.
With your letter of October 9, 1889, you transmit the appeal of the
Northern Pacific. Railroad Company from your office decision of April
9th of that year, wherein you hold that the NW. j of See. 29, T. 1 S., R.
1 W., Bozeman, Montana, is excepted from the operation of the grant
to said company, by act of July 2, 1861 (13 Stats., 365). It appears
from the record that on June 5, 1885, Ira M. Marshall made homestead
entry of said tract. That the land is within the granted limits of the
Northern Pacific Railroad Company. The withdrawal of the odd num-
bered sections for the benefit of which became effective February 11,
1872, upon the filing of the map of general route. The line of road op-
posite the land in question was definitely located July 6, 1882, and the
right of the company is held to have attached at that date.
When the land was withdrawn from market, it was occupied by one
Jerome Bishop, a citizen of the United States, who had filed a declara-
tory statement for the tract January 29, 1872. He built a house and
barn, and cultivated about twelve acres to wheat in 1671, and cut forty
or fifty acres of grass in the year 1872. He also dug an irrigating ditch
and extended it through the land the same year. Bishop lived on the
claim until the fall of 1873, when he sold his possessory right to Alonzo
Gillam, who was a single man, over twenty-one y ears of age, and a citi-
zen of the United States. Gillam occupied the tract until the spring of
1874, when he sold the improvements to the defendant for $500, and he
has been in possession of the tract since that date, cultivating and im-
proving the same every year.
On the 31st day of May, 1881, Marshall appeared at the local land
office and applied to file on the land. Ee was informed by the receiver,
John V. Bogert, that the tractbelonged to the Northern Pacific Railroad
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Company. Subsequently, Marshall made homestead entry of the land,
as above set out, and on March 15, 1886, after publication and posting
of notice, he made his final homestead proof and final certificate was
duly issued.
From the above it will be seen that the unexpired filing of Bishop,
prima facie valid at date of the statutory withdrawal on general route,
excepted the land covered thereby from the operation of said with-
drawal. Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Stovenour, 10 L. D.,
645, and the land was continuously occupied and cultivated thereafter.
At date of definite location of the road it was occupied and claimed by
Marshall, whose settlement, residence and cultivation served to except
it from the operation of the grant to the company. Northern Pacific
R. R. Co v. Anrys, 10 L. D., 258.
For these reasons your said office decision is affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT-SETTLEMENT CLAIM.
NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. CO. v. WILDER.
An allegation, made by an applicant for a tract of land within thelimitsofa railroad
grant, that said tract is excepted from the grant by reason of a settlement claim
will be investigated by the Department, even though such action may not inure
to the benefit of the applicant.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Comm isioner of the General Land Ofice,
November 17, 1890.
On July 28, 1890, the Department rendered a decision in the above-
stated case, directing the cancellation of the homestead entry of Wilder
for the E. of the NW , the SW. of the NE; and the NW. of the
SE. 4, Sec. 31, T. 15 N., R. 17 E., North Yakima, Washington, holding
that said tract passed to the railroad company under its grant.
Your office rejected the claim of the company and allowed the home-
stead entry of Wilder, for the reason that the land was excepted from
the operation of the withdrawal of June 11, 1879, on filing of map of
amended general route (even if there was authority for such with-
drawal), by the unexpired pre-emption filing of one Thomas Chambers,
made March 2, 1877, alleging settlement February 22, 1877, which re-
nained of record May 24,1884, the date of filing the map of definite
location, and excepted said tract from the operation of the grant.
This ruling was reversed by the decision of the Department aforesaid
upon the ground that the filing of Chambers had expired at date of
definite location, and, in the absence oan allegation that the claim was
still subsisting and maintained at date of definite location, it may be
presumed that it had been abandoned.
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Wilder now files a motion for review of said decision, upon the follow-
ing grounds:
I. That by mistake the local land offieers at the said land office where said homestead
filing was offered declined to take proof of the continuous residence and cultivation
of said land since the year 1877, which excepts said land from. the grant to the North-
ern Pacific Railroad Company.
II. That said Wilder acted under the direction and under the advice of said local
land officers, and did not thus produce any testimony as to the residence of Thomas
J. Chambers, whose filing was then of rec ord in said land office and of said Wilder's
succession to the rights of Chambers and of Wilder's continuous residence and cul-
tivation of said land.
The motion is supported by the affidavits of the claimant and four
other witnesses, to the effect that said land was occupied and claimed
by the said Chambers from the time of his alleged settlement up to
about April, 1880, when he sold his improvements to Wilder, who con-
tinued to improve and occupy the tract from that time to the present;
also that the claimant offered to make such proof before the local
officers, who declined it, for the reason that it was unnecessary, as the
filing of record excepted the tract.
Independent of the rights of Wilder, if such a claim by a qualified
homesteader existed at date of definite location, it excepted the tract
from the operation of the grant, and upon information of the existence
of such facts it would be the duty of the Department to investigate it,
whether it would inure to the benefit of Wilder, or not.
The decision of the Department of July 28, 1890, is therefore modified,
and you will order a hearing, for the pur pose of determining whether
the land was so occupied and claimed at date of definite location, and
upon the testimony taken at said hearing you will re-adjudicate the
case.
RAILROAD GRANT-PRE -EMPTION-PUBLIC OFFERING.
CENTRAL PACIFIC R. R. Co. V. EDWARD L. TAYLOR.
The pre-emptive right is not defeated by the failure of the settler to make proof and
payment forthe land covered by his claim prior to a day erroneously appointed
for the public offering thereof, where such tract, on the discovery of the error, is
subsequently withheld from sale.
Central Pacific R. R. Co. v. Orr, 2 L. D., 525, overruled.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, November 17, 1890.
A motion to review aud reverse the departmental decision of June 25,
1890, in the case of the Central Pacific Railroad Company v. Edward L.
Taylor, is now before me for consideration.
The case arose on the application of Taylor to make homestead entry
of the fractional NE 4 and N i of the SE J Sec. 25, T. 10, N., R. 7 E., M.
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D. M., Sacramento land district, California, which is within the limits
of the grant of July 1, 1862 (12 stat., 489), to said company. The de-
cision referred to states that, at the time the maps of designated route
and definite location were filed, June 30, 1862, and March 24, 1861, res-
pectively, the tract was covered by the pre-emption declaratory state-
ment of George Auztt filed Jane 17, 1857, alleging settlement May
15th, previous; and that said filing remained intact upon the records
until August, 1885, when it was canceled upon a hearing had upon the
application of the railroad company. It was further stated that, though
said tract was included in the land described in the proclamation of the
President as land to be offered for sale at Maryville on February 14,
1859, yet the records of the General Land Office show that the lands in
the township, in which said tract is located, were witheld from sale in
accordance with official information received from the surve3 or-general,
stating that they were covered in whole or in part, by private land
claims. On this state of facts, it was held iii said decision that the tract
in question, being unoffered land, was covered at the date of the filing
of both maps, by an unexpired pre-emption filing intact upon the recordr
which, under the decisions of the Departments, excepted said tracts
from the operation of the railroad grant, and therefore that the applica-
tion of Taylor to make homestead entry of the same should be allowed.
In the motion to review and reverse said decision, the facts as stated
are substantially admitted, but it is said in behalf of the company that
the fact that said land " was not offered for sale" is not material, inas-
much as-
It was proclaimed to be offered on and after a certain day, and the law says if the
settler fails to make his proof and payment before the day appointed, the pre-emption
law shall not be available; that is, he shall have no pre-emption right by reason of
his settlement before that day.
It is therefore insisted that, as Auztt failed to make his proof and
payment before February 14, 1859, the day " appointed" for offering
said tract for sale, his pre-emption claim then and there expired and
could not serve thereafter to except said tract from the railroad grant.
The legislation of Congress bearing upon this question is to be found
in two acts.
By section 14 of the pre-emption act of September 4, 1841 (5 Stats.,
453-7), it is provided:
And be it farther enacted, That this act shall not delay the sale of any of the public
lands of the United States beyond the time which has been, or may be, appointed by
the proclamation of the President, nor shall the provisions of this act be available
to any person or persons who shall fail to make the proof and payment, and file the
affidavit before the day appointed for the commencement of the sales as aforesaid.
By the'last clause of section 9 of the act of March 3, 1843 (5 Stats.,
619-21), it is declared:
And said act shall not be so construed as to preclude any person who may have
filed a notice of intention to claim any tract of land by pre-emption under said act,
from the right allowed by law to others to purchase the same by private entry after
the expiration of the right of pre-emptioin.
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In relation to the construction of a statute, it was said bv the su-
preme court in the case of Heydenfelt v. I)aney Gold, etc., (93 U. S.,.
634-38):
We are not to look at any single phrase in it, but, to its whole scope, i order to,
arrive at the intention of the makers of it. it is better always," says Judge Shars-
wood, " to adhere to a plain common-sense interpretation of the wordsof a statute,
than to apply to them refined and technical rles of grammatical constrnction."
Gyger's Estate, 65 Penn. St. 312. If a literal interpretation of any part of it would
operate unjustly, or lead to absurd results, or be contrary to the evident theaning of
the act taken as a whole, it should be rejected. Tere is no better way of discovering
its true meaning, when expressions in it are rendered ambiguous by their connection.
with other clauses, than by considering the necessity for it, and the causes which in-
duced its enactment.
Following the rule thus laid down, there ought to be but little diffi-
culty in arriving at a conclusion on the point presented.
Prior to 1841 the settled policy of Congress was to dispose of the pub-
lic lands by public and private sales in quantities to suit purchasersa
The passage of the act of September 4, 181, was the first legislative
action in the direction of a change to the present beneficent policy of
distributing the public domain among the people as homes for the home-
less. This legislation was apparently only tentative, for while the pub-
lic lands were thereafter to be thrown open to settlement and entry, the
policy of selling them was adhered to; the settler was permitted to
acquire, by his inhabitancy and improvements, only a preferred right
to purchase the lands when sold. But this preferred right was not to
interfere with the cherished policy of public sales at stated intervals.-
If any of the lands advertised for sale were occupied by settlers, unless
they availed themselves before the day of sale of the right of pre-emp-
tion, acquired by settlement and improvement, it would be forever lost.,
and the lands would be offered first at public sale, and if not sold there-
after became subject to private sale. Hence the passage of the four-
teenth section as quoted. Its great purpose as declared by its language,
is to provide that the pre-emption right conferred by the act "shall not
delay the sale "of public lands beyond the time appointed. So that if
it was thought expedient to sell any portion of the public lands, a pre-
etnption claimant by bare assertion, without full compliance with the
requirement of the law, should not indefinitely delay or defeat the sale..
This is the apprehended evil which section fourteen was intended to
prevent, and only this. There is no known rule of law which would
justify this Department in extending the provisions of that section be-
yond the obvious purpose for which it was enacted. To hold, when a
day had been erroneously "1appointed"1 for the offering of this tract for-
sale, which appointment was revoked or abandoned by the authority
making it, because of the discovery of the error, that the settler was
obliged to make payment and proof before that day or forfeit his one
pre-emptive right, would be, in my opinion, making the law applicable
to a condition of affairs beyond its declared purpose, and obviously be-
yond its purview.
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No good reason is suggested why a forfeiture should be enforced
under such circumstances, the only one suggested being that, the let-
ter of the law says payment is to be made before the day " appointed,"
and a day once appointed is always appointed. Concede, for the sake
of argument, that there is room for such a contention, how could Auztt,
the pre-emptor in this case, have complied with the requirement to make
proof and payment prior to the day appointed? The land in question
was reported by the surveyor as being covered by certain private land
claims and consequently, under the law, it was reserved from sale and
entry until the final adjudication of those claims.
Now if, under these circumstances, Auztt had gone to the local land
office and offered to make proof and payment, as it is contended was his
duty to do, the officers would not, and, under the law, could not, have
received either, or given him a final certificate or permitted his entry,
because of said reservation; or, if they had done so, their action would
have been not merely irregular but absolutely null and void, as theland
was then placed by law outside of their jurisdiction. Nor would a mere
offer on the part of the pre-emption claimant to make the proof and a
tender by him of the price of the land, to the register and receiver,
have availed him, in this instance, if we are to adopt the theory of the
company and follow the letter of the law; for the language applies,
without qualification, under that theory, to any one who "shall fail to
-make proof and payment" by the day " appointed." If the statute is to
be construed literally, without regard to its purpose and sense, in the
one instance, it must be so construed in the other. We would then have
a relentless and unbending requirement for the pre-emptor to make-
not offer to make, bat successfully and completely to make his proof and
payment by the day named, and if he fail, through his own fault or that
of the officers, or of the law itself, there is no excuse, he simply fails to
make the proof as required and must abide by the result. I can not bring
myself to believe that the law contemplated such "absurd results," or
required such impossible or vain things of the settlers upon the public
lands, under penalty of a forfeiture of their one pre-emptive right.
In the case of the Central Pacific Railroad Company v. Orr (2 L.D.,
525), the construction of law here contended for by the company's
attorney seems to have been adopted. But my convictions as to the
correctness of the construction placed by me upon the statute are so
clear and strong that I find myself unable to concur in the conclusion
arrived at in that case, but am compelled to disregard and overrule it
as an authority in that respect.
Entertaining these views, the motion for review is denied.
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PROCEEDINGS ON FINAL PPEOOF-PRE-EMPTION.
HIASKET V. CANON ET AL.
One who has filed a declaratory statement for a tract and submitted final proof there-
for, is under no obligation to protest against the final proof of another who sub-
sequently initiates a claim for said land and offers proof thereon.
Final proof should not be submitted for land involved in a pending contest.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, November 18, 1890.
On July 11, 1885, Alban B. Canon filed Osage declaratory statement
No. 2817 for the NE. A, of Sec. 14, T. 32 S., R. 22 W., Garden City, Kan-
sas, alleging settlement thereon June 7, of that year.
On October 21, 1885, Joseph R. Hasket filed Osage declaratory state-
ment No. 3729, for the E. of the NW. 4: and W. of the NE. i, said
section, alleging settlement June 24, of that year.
Canon published notice that he would make his final proof on De-
cember 24, 1885, and on that day Hasket filed his protest against the
same.
Canon submitted his proof, after which several witnesses were exam-
ined, touching the residence and improvements of both Canon and
Hasket.
The hearing was closed on April 15, 1886, and on May 27, 1887, the
register and receiver held that " anon's proof be accepted." Hasket
duly appealed, and on March 30, 1889, you rendered your opinion,
affirming the judgment of the local officers, and held for rejection the
final proof of Hasket as to the W. of the NE. of Sec. 14, being in
conflict with Canon's filing. Your said opinion frther states:
I find upon examination of the tract books that you have allowed one Joseph
Swords to enter the E. of the NE. of Sec. 14, and the S. of the SE. of Sec. 11,
T. 32 S., R. 22 W., and have issued a receipt and final certificate to him under Osage
cash entry No. 6821, application No. 4144, and dated February 24, 1887, alleging set-
tlement June 8, 1886. As the above entry conflicts with Canon's filing as to E. of
the NE. of See. 14, I hold it as regards said tract for cancellation, subject to appeal.
Hasket did not appeal, but appears to have filed his relinquishment
of the W. of the NE. of said section, on receiving notice of your
said decision. Swords, however, appeals from that part of your de-
cision above quoted, and insists that Canon waived his right to the
land and abandoned the same by failing to assert such right at the time
Swords made final proof, and that you have no jurisdiction to cancel a
primafacie valid entry, though it may conflict with a prior uncompleted
adverse filing.
This position is not well taken. Canon's filing being first in time, he
was under no obligations to protest against the final proof of Swords,
whose filing and settlement on eighty acres of the land were made sub-
sequent to the submission of Canon's final proof. Moreover, Swords
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knew that Canon's filing embraced eighty acres of the land in his filing.
He went upon the land with the full knowledge that, if Canon's final
proof should be accepted, he could not procure this eighty acres under
his filing. He made no protest against Canon's final proof, and must
have depended on asket to secure the cancellation.
The contest between Hasket and Canon was in progress at the time
Swords made his filing, and, while it specifically applied to the W. of
the NE. of Sec. 14, yet it also involved the whole of the NE. 1 of said
section, and postponed the acceptance of the final proof of Canon.
Haskets charge against Canon went to the latter's good faith, so that
the filing and final proof of Swords were made during the pendency of
a contest, involving part of the land embraced in his filing.
Final proof should not be submitted during the pendency of a con-
test. Rule of Practice 53, 4 L. D., 43; Bailey v. Townsend, 5 L. D.,
176; Wade v. Sweeney, 6 L. D., 234; Lewis Peterson, 8 L. D., 121.
Your said office decision, holding for cancellation Swords' entry as to
the E. J of the NE. of said section, is affirmed, and Canon's final
proof will be accepted.
PRE-EMPTION CLAIM, RESIDENCE
SAMUEL C. HAVER.
To establish residence there must be, concurrent with the act of settlement, an intent
to make the land a home to the exclusion of one elsewhere.
The fitness of the land as a place of permanent abode, the period of inhabitancy, and
the claimant's relation to the land after final proof, may be considered in determin-
ing whether the claim of residence is made in good faith.
Fir8t Assistant Secretary Chandler to tde Commissioner of the General
Land Office, November 19, 1890.
On July 28, 1885, Samuel C. Haver made pre-emption cash entry
based upon declaratory statement filed June 10, 1884, alleging settle-
ment the 5th of the same month upon the NE. 1 of Sec. 21, T. 12 S., R.
77 W., Leadville, Colorado.
By letter dated July 6, 1888, your office finding that Haver's pub-
lished notice of intention to make final proof did not " properly describe
the land involved " and that said proof did not satisfactorily show the
'" claimant's good faith or compliance with legal requirement" required
him to make within ninety days new proof " after due advertisement."
Such new proof having been transmitted by register's letter dated
October 29, 1888, your office on November 16, following found the same
to be insufficient and held the said entry for cancellation.
From this action Haver appeals to this Department.
It appears from his original pre-emption proof madie July 25, 1885,
before the judge of the Park county court, that Haver was the head of
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a family consisting of his wife and three children; that he made settle-
ment on the land June 5, 1884, by laying a foundation; that his resi-
dence thereon established June 10, 1884, was continuous, that the alti-
tude of the land being too great for frming he neither broke nor culti-
vated any part thereof but used the same for grazing and that he has
built thereon a house fourteen by eighteen feet valued by himself at
ninety and by his witnesses at fifty dollars.
In his new proof (new form) made October 27, 188S, before the county
judge both Haver and the witnesses thereto, who appear to be the
same persons who testified in support of his original proof, (old form),
in reply to the various questions concerning Haver's residence on the
land simply refer to the general and affirmative statements made by
them in such original proof. The said new proof sets out that in ad..
dition to the house mentioned, Haver has constructed on the land two
irrigating ditches, each one-quarter of a mile in length, a log stable
twelve by fourteen feet, a cattle corral and horse pasture; that his said
-Improvements have a total value of $155, that the altitude of the land
is nine thousand feet, that it "is mostly on the open range and used by
all having stock on that range," and that after making final (original)
proof flaver conveyed the land to "a small cattle company in which
he was the principle owner.
It further appears from the affidavits of Haver and ot four others,
made in September, 1890, an tiled during the pendenecy of the appeal
here, that the land is valueless for agriculture, that it is some three
miles from the nearest habitation, that by reason of the springs thereon
and its "' sheltered " location its chief value was for " a drinking place
and good headquarters for range stock," that Haver's wife and children
lived with him on the land during the summer of 1884 for about two
months, after which, owing to his wife's delicate health, they stayed in
Denver until May or June, 1885, when they returned to the land and
continued to live thereon until the "close of the summer," that Haver,
who during the greater part of the winter of 1884 and 1885, when
"elsewhere working for wages as a rider and stockman" visited the
tract occasionally to look after his stock; that (as he avers) aver
' took this land up in good faith for a headquarters for a small individ-
ual stock enterprise of his own and intended to keep it as such; 7' that
he did not change such intention " till at or after the taking of his first
final proof when the president of the company with which he was con-
nected . . . . learning of it, questioned the propriety of a rival, though
small, cattle business being conducted in the same part of country by a
member of the company;" and that upon consideration the said com-
pany offered laver a fair price for the land which he accepted.
The foregoing shows that the land is undesirable as a place of resi-
dence and valuable only as an appurtenant to a stock range. This and'
his limited inhabitancy considered in connection with Haver's subse-
quent sale (and evident abandonment) of the land which seems to have
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been made about the time of his first proof shows, I think, that his
settlement thereon was not made with the intention of making the
same his permanent abode. To establish residence there must be con-
current with the act of settlement or going upon the land an intent to
make it a home to the unqualified exclusion of one elsewhere. Albert
H. Cornwell (9 L. D., 340).
The circumstances attending Haver's occupancy of the land showing
his said settlement to have been made with no such intention, but
rather with a view to securing the same as " headquarters for a small
individual stock enterprise," through a colorable compliance with the
law, I must find that his entry has been properly held for cancellation.-
The decision appealed from is affirmed.
RESERVATION-SETTLEMENT RIGHTS-FINAL PROOF.
ETNIER V. ZOOK.
Acts of settlement on land held in reservation confer no right against the government
but may be considered in determining the priorities of subsequent claimants.
A pre-emption filing for land covered by the prior homestead entry of another should
not be allowed, unless the superior right of the pre-emptor is established on a hear-
ing had for that purpose.
Final proof should not be submitted during the pendency of an action involving the
right of the claimant to the land in question.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, November 19, 1890.
'The case of Mary J. Etnier v. Ellianan Zook is here on appeal of. the
latter from your office decision of June 8, 1889.
The record is in some respects imperfect, and the proceedings in the
local office irregular; but I think enough can be gleaned therefrom to
correctly determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the
principles of law involved therein. The facts as I gather them, are as
follows:
On the 11th of September, 1886, said Zook made homestead entry for
the NW. of the SE. , the NE. i of the SW.1, the SE.k of the NW. 1
and the SW.I of the NE. J, Sec. 5, T. 2 N., R. 52 W., Denver, Colorado.
On the same day T. B. Stuart made timber culture entry for the N. *
of the NE. J and the NE. i of the NW. J of the same section.
September 15, 1886, Mary J. Etnier applied to file her pre-emption
declaratory statement for the NE. J of the SW. J the E. of the NW. i
and the NW. J of the NE. 1 of the same section, alleging settlement
thereon August 11, 1886.
Four years prior to these proceedings, namely: August 21,1882,
said lands had been reserved for artesian well purposes, but on July
31, 1886, the order of reservation was revoked, and the land opened to
settlement and entry. September 11, 1886.
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When Etnier applied to file her said declaratory statement, she
entered into an agreement in writing with Zook, whereby the question
of her right to file for said tract was to be submitted to the register
and receiver for their determination upon affidavits and such other evi-
detce as they might present on or before September 22, 1886. This
agreement was signed by Leon F. Moss, as attorney for Etnier, and T.
B. Stuart, as attorney for Zook. The said Stuart, although not a party
to the record, has filed herein an agreement signed by himself and
Etnier that his rights shall be determined boy this controversy.
November 10, 1886, the local officers rendered their decision thereon,
in which they say: " We sustain the entries now of record, and reject
the pre emption filing offered by Mary J. Etnier."
She appealed, and on March 21, 1887, your office, by its letter " G,"
instructed the register and receiver to allow her declaratory statement
to be filed as of date of presentation, September 15, 1886.
May 30, 1887, Zook offered final proof (commutation) when Etnier
protested against its allowance, alleging prior rights in herself by reason
of her acts of settlement, improvements, residence, etc., and asked for
a hearing thereon and that such hearing be had before a judge of the
county court of Washington county, the county in which the land was
situated, alleging as a reason therefor that nearly all the witnesses for
herself and Zook resided in or near Akron, in said county, which was
more than a hundred miles from the local office. This application was
denied, and the protest overruled, Zook's proof accepted, and he was
allowed to make cash entry No. 7077 for the land embraced in his
homestead entry.
This decision was rendered by the receiver during the absence (on
leave) of the register. On his return, the register also rendered a sep-
arate opinion, in which he concurred in that of the receiver.
Etnier appealed separately from both these decisions.
May 7, 1888, your office by its letter "H 1," suspended Zook's cash
entry and ordered a hearing on the protest, at a time and place most
convenient for the parties concerned.
August 1, 1888, Zook moved for a review of the Commissioner's de-
cision ordering a hearing, as above. This motion was overruled by the
Commissioner's letter " E " of October £2, 1888.
After taking depositions before several officers in different States,
the register and receiver, on March 5, 1889, rendered the joint decision,
stating that " upon a full consideration of all the testimony which has
been submitted, we find no reason to change our opinion as to the pri-
ority of right of Mr. Zook, or as to the sufficiency of the proof .....
We therefore sustain the entry of Mr. Zook." Etnier appealed from
this decision, and your office, by its letter of June 8, 1889, reversed the
judgment of the local officers, aI(l held Zook's homestead and cash en-
tries for cancellation as to that part of the land embraced in the declara-
tory statement of Etnier. From this decision Zook now appeals to this
Department.
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From this abstract of the record, it will be seen that the land in dis-
pute between Zook and Etnier is the NE. of the SW. and the SE. -
of the NW. I of said section 5, while the E. -1 of tile NW. 4- and the
NW. i of the NE. It of said section embraced in Etnier's declaratory
statement, is claimed by Stuart under his timber culture entry, whose
rights are dependent upon the result of this case, as per agreement
heretofore mentioned.
The homestead entry of Zook being the first claim of record afterthe
land was opened to entry, reserved the tract covered thereby from
other entries or filings, while the same remained uncanceled. The de-
claratory statement of Etnier, however, alleged settlement prior to the
said entry, which allegation in effect charges, that the entry of Zook
was improperly allowed, because of such settlement. A hearing was
therefore properly allowed to determine the respective rights of the
parties. (James A. Forward, 8 L. D., 528; James et al. v. Nolan, 5 L.
D., 526.)
The alleged settlement of Etnier was made while the land wae not
subject to entry, it having been reserved for artesian well purposes,
and, although such reservation had been discontinued in July of the
same year, it was not opened to entry until September 11th. While
she could not acquire any rights as against the government by her acts
of settlement while the land was so reserved, yet, as between herself
and another claimant, priority of settlement was properly considered.
(Geer v. Farrington, 4 L. D., 410; Tarr v. Burnham, 6 L. D., 709;
Rothwell v. Crockett, 9 L. D., 89.)
On the hearing ordered for this purpose the register and receiver
rendered a decision, in which they sustained " the entries now of ree-
ord " and rejected the pre-emption filing of Etnier.
The reasons upon which this judgment is based do not appear in the
decision, except that it was rendered "upon examination of the evi-
dence and agreement submitted." The agreement " referred to is the
one heretofore noted, which provided that the evidence should be sub-
mitted on or before September 22, 1886.
On appeal by Etnier to your office, it reversed the judgment of the
register and receiver and returned her declaratory statement, with di-
rections that it should be allowed. This, in effect, was a judgment can-
celing the entries of Zook and Stuart, so far as they conflicted with her
filing, for it could not be allowed while the land embraced therein was
covered by their entries. Grove v. Crooks, 7 L. D., 140.
But an examination of your decision shows that it was not designed
to determine the rights of the parties, because it says 'these matters
(acts of settlement) might be considered in determining the respective
rights of the parties, should either offer proof, or contest be regularly
initiated against either of the several claims." The error was in hold-
ing that a pre-emption declaratory statement which alleged settlement
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prior to the date of an entry of record should have been allowed with-
out a hearing in support of such allegation of prior settlement.
No appeal was taken by Zook from this judgment, but on May 30,
1887, he offered final proof on his homestead entry and asked to have
it commuted to cash. Zook failing to appeal from this decision, he
must be considered as acquiescing therein. In fact, the record shows
that both parties followed the suggestions contained in this decision,
Zook in offering proof, and Etnier in protesting against its acceptance
on the ground of her superior rights.
Although these proceedings were irregular and unnecessarily compli-
cated, yet. as all parties have acquiesced therein, and as their rights
mav be investigated and adjusted on the evidence and record now
before me, these errors will not be allowed to stand in the way of a
judgment on the merits ot the controversy.
The only question remaining to be considered then is as to which has
the prior right to the land under the evidence submitted: Zook or
Etnier.
Zook's entry consists of the four forties that corner at the center of
section 5. Etnier lays no claim to the two eastern subdivisions of his
entry, but disputes his right to the NE. 1 of the SW. I and the SE. i
of the NW. I of section 5.
The evidence shows that on August 11, 1886, a month before the land
was opened to entry, each of these parties commenced the erection of a
house on this land. Mrs. Etnier built her house on the NE. I of the
SW. i and Zook on the NW. I of the SE. I of said section, the latter subdi-
vision, on which Zook built his house, is not claimed by Etnier. Etnier
has lived in her house continuously ever since its completion, about the
12th or 13th of August, 18i6. She is a widow, having one son about
twelve years of age living with her. Zook is a married man, and'
while he claims to have made his residence in his house on the land ever
since its erection, his wife had never resided there up to the time of the
hearing, and his residence consisted of staying there all the time when
not necessarily away attending to his business of a roadmaster for a
railroad which ran through Akron, a town in the near vicinity of the
land. e explains his wife's absence from the land as due to the deli-
cate condition of her health, yet he claims that his house is comfortable,
and there is no evidence showing that the climate is unhealthy. Mrs.
Etnier, however, does not endeavor directly to impeach his residence,
but claims that, granting his continuous residence, he acquired no
right thereby to the subdivision on which she resided, nor the other
one in dispute, which lies immediately north of it.
The act of settlement by Zook upon which he bases his right to the
two quarter sections in dispute was in having them surveyed and two
furrows plowed around them on August 11th, the day on which Etnier
alleges her settlement. She, on her part claims that a few hours pre-
vious to these acts by Zook she had her land surveyed, and had thrown
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up sod mounds on the boundaries of her claim. While these acts were
nearly simultaneous, a careful examination of all the evidence, includ-
iug the depositions and affidavits, will, I think, lead to the conclusion
that she was first to establish her boundaries. One witness for Zook
(Lewis Vookland) states in his affidavit that when he plowed around
Etnier's claim (12th of August) he found sod mounds that had been
thrown up as a guide to follow in his plowing; that these mounds were
not found where Zook had plowed (probably the day before) on the
boundaries of his claim, where the same also bounded the Etnier claim,
which may indicate that Zook had plowed over the sod marks which
had been placed there by Etnier previous to his plowing.
James Irwin, another of Zook's witnesses and the one who plowed
the two furrows on the 11th of August, says that when he was plow-
ing around Zook's claim, he came upon Mr. Vance and some other men
surveying, and thattheyremovedtheircompassto lethim pass. Vance
was the man who surveyed for Etnier, and who testifies that his survey
was previous to that of Zook.
The survey and the plowing of Zook were done at the same time, the
plow following along with the surveying party, while Mrs. Etnier's
plowing was not done till the day after she had surveyed her land
and thrown up sod marks to indicate the boundaries and guide the
plowman. There is an effort on the part of Zook to show that Mrs.
Etnier could not have been on her land prior to August 12. I do not
think, however, that he has successfully impeached her testimony in
this behalf. I concur therefore with the decision of your office in find-
ing that the evidence shows that Etnier's settlement was prior to that
of Zook.
During the pendency of the appeal in this case, namely: June 20,
1889, Etnier applied to make final proof on her pre-emption filing,
which was rejected by the local officers, because a part of the same was
covered by the cash entry of Zook. Her application was properly re-
jected because of the pendency of this appeal, the decision of which is
necessary to determine her rights in the premises.
The pre-emption filing of Mary J. Etnier will be allowed, and so
much of the homestead and cash entries of Zook and timber culture
entry of Stuart as is embraced in her said filing will be canceled, and
she will be allowed to submit her final proof on due publication of notice.
The decision of your office is modified accordingly.
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MINING CLAIM-PUBLICATION-EQUITABLE ACTION.
OLO PLACER CLAIM.
The publication of an application for mineral patent, in a weekly paper, requires ten
insertions, but where the proof shows that such publication was made under a
for-ner practice that recognized nine insertions as sufficient, the entry may be
equitably confirmed in the absence of an adverse claim.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, November 20, L890.
I have considered the appeal of the heirs of Walter Willey, applicants
for patent for the Oro placer mine, mineral entry No. 1088, Sacramento,
California, land district, from your office decision of November 27, 1888,
holding said entry for cancellation.
The record shows that on the 27th day of )Iarch, 1873, 0. G. Spauld-
ing, James Abram, and C. S. Strobel made application for a patent for
said mine. On the second day of April, 1873, notice was given of said
application. The evidence shows that on the 25th day of September,
1879, Walter Willey became the sole owner of said mine.
December 19, 1885, a deputy mineral surveyor made his report on
the mine, showing the survey and proper requisites of a placer mine,
as well as the working and improving of the claim at an expense of not
less than ten thousand dollars by claimants and their grantors. On the
21st of December, 1885, John Abram, J. S. Bickford and E. D. Hlurd
filed sworn statements, corroborating the fact stated by the deputy
mineral surveyor. Abram is shown to be the executor of the estate of
Walter Willey, including the Oro placer mine, and as such applied for
patent.
On the 21st day of January, 1886, thelocal officers accepted the proof,
received payment, and issued final certificate, and on the same day
transmitted the evidence to your office. On March , 1888, your office
notified the register and receiver that the evidence of publication fails
to show that the notice of application for patent was published for the
full statutory period, the affidavit showing that said notice was pub-
lished from April 5, 1873, to and including May 31, 1873, and in case
the notice was actually published for the statutory period, proper evi-
dence thereof must be furnished. On March 23, 1888, they trans-
mitted to this office the affidavit of Walter B. Lyon, made March 22,
which shows that during the year 1873 he was the business manager and
as such had charge of the "Placer Arguse a weekly newspaper
published in Auburn, Placer county, California; that notice of the ap-
plication of Abrams et al for the Oro Placer Mine was published in
each weekly issue of said newspaper, commencing April 5, 1873, and
ending June 6, 1873, which affidavit appears to be in the handwriting
of said Lyon. On the 7th day of May, 1888, the local officers tians-
mitted to your office the corroborated affidavit of Walter Croft et al.
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asking for a hearing with a view to the cancellation of said entry. On
the 26th day of M; y, 1888, your office denied the petition for a hearing,
and directed the local officers to notify the parties and report at the
exJ)iration of thirty days. On the 21st day of July, 1888, you notified
the register and receiver that no response to your letter of May 26th
had been received, and directed a prompt report as to what action, if
any, had been taken on said letter. O the second day of August, 1888,
they transmitted to your office an appeal of Walter Croft et al. from
your said decision of May 26, 1888. On the 24th day of August, 1888,
you decided that Walter Croft et al. appear in this case only as pro-
testants, and that they are not entitled to an appeal, and declined to
forward the same.
There was forwarded with said appeal an affidavit of J. M. Fulweiler,
in which he alleges that in the mouthof November, 1885, he examined the
files of the local land office and the only affidavit of publication of the
application for said Oro placer mine was one made by Walter B. Lyon,
and that said affidavit contained the statement that said notice had only
been published from April th to and intduding May 31, 1873; that
any affidavit subsequently made by W. B. Lyon in said application
for patent, showing any publication of said notice for patent after May
31, 1873, does not state the truth, was false, and fraudulently procured,
as affiant believes, from said Walter B. Lyon.
In view of these charges your office required corroborative proof.
Thereupon, there was filed in your office, on the 12th day of November,
1888, an affidavit of Walter B. Lyon, sworn to on the 25th day of Sep-.
tember, 1888, in which he states generally, that the notice of application
for patent was published first on the 5th of April, and in each subse-
quent issue of the "d Placer Argus," a weekly newspaper, until and in-
cluding the 31st day of May, 1873; that he was the managing editor of
the paper at the time; that imediately after the 31st of May, 1873, he
made out in proper form proof under oath, according to thefact, and for-
warded the same to the officers of the land office at Sacramento. Not long
thereafter he severed his connection with the paper, and for more than
ten years past has been living and doing business in the city of San
Francisco, California; that the matter of the publication of the notice
of said appplication had passed almost out of his mind; that in the
month of December, 1885, or January, 1886, one William Muir, " came
to me and stated to me that there had been a slight and technical
mistake made by me in my affidavit and proof of said publication ;" and
"that he had with him a corrected and proper proof of the said pub-
lication, that he wished I would sign and swear to, in order that they
might correct the proof thereof. I asked him whether it was according
to the facts, and he stated to me that it was, and desiring to accommodate
him and fully relying upon his representations as to the truth of its
contents, I signed and took oath to the same, without careful exami-
nation thereof; that since the making of the said last mentioned proof
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of publication of the said notice, I have caused the files of the said
newspaper to be carefully examined, and find that the said notice of
application for patent to said Oro Placer Mine was only printed and
published in the said Placer Argus on the 5th, 12th, 19th, and 26th days
of April, and the 3rd, 10th, 17th, 24th and 31st days of May, 1873, and
not iiiore, and that if the said affidavit or proof of said publication as
made by me at the request of the said William Muir shows a publica-
tion thereof in said newspaper after the 31st day of May, 1873, such
statement therein is not true and the same was made by me under a
misapprehension of the facts as aforesaid."
On the 27th day of November, 1888, your office held the entry for
cancellation.
From your judgment the heirs of Walter Willey appeal. There is
no adverse claim involved, and the only irregularity suggested is that
the notice of application was only published for nine weeks. The stat-
ute (act of May 10, 1872), Revised Stat., See. 2325, requires the register
to publish notice of the application for sixty days and also to post such
notice in his office. The statute is silent as to how or by whom the proof
of this publication and posting shall be made. The regulations while
requiring the register to certify as to the posting of the notice, do not
specify who shall make proof of the publication thereof. The mining
circular issued June 10, 1872, thirty days after the passage of the act
under which these proceedings are taken, does not specify the number
of insertions required, hut in the case of MeMurdy et al. v. Streeter et al.
'(1 C. L. O., 34) decided April 30, 1874, it was held that ten insertions
are required where the notice is published in a weekly newspaper, and
this ruling has since been followed. Prior to the decision of MeMurdy
v. Streeter, supra, it was the custom of the Laud Department to accept
evidence of publication for nine weeks as sufficient. In Miner v. Mariott
(2 L. D., 709), it is said, " The rule of this decision should not operate
to interfere with or take away any rights acquired under the law as it
hasheretofore been construed by your office. Though such construction
is, in my opinion, clearly erroneous, such fact does not render illegal
any acts which have been performed in accordance with and pursuant
to that construction or interpretation. Until a rule is changed it has
the force of law, and acts done under it while it is in force must be re.
garded as legal."
In Becker v. Sears (1 L. D., 575), it is in effect held that as the duty
of publication is put by statute upon the register, the claimant should
not be made to suffer from an insufficient compliance in that respect
(nine insertions) where no prejudice to the rights of others is shown.
In the case of the Mimbres Mining Company (8 L. D., 457), it is held
that if the published notice is not as explicit as the notice posted on
the claim, such defect is properly chargeable to the register, and may
be cured by a reference to the board of equitable adjudication. Under
the facts as developed in this case, the burden should not be put upon
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the claimant at this late day of proving affirmatively that the register
properly discharged his duty, when the presumption is in favor of such
conclusion. Conceding that but nine insertions were made, the entry
should not be disturbed but referred to the board of equitable adjudi-
cation for its action which is accordingly done. The decision of your
office is modified accordingly.
TIMBER CULTURE CONTEST COMPLIANCE WITH LAW.
GRENGS V. WELLS.
The breaking done by a former occupant of the land inures to the benefit of a tim-
ber culture entryman, if it is properly utilized.
Planting trees before the time fixed by the law is compliance with its requirements,
so far as time is of the essence of the matter, provided the land has been broken,
cultivated, and properly prepared.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, November 20, 1890.
I have considered the case of Nicholas Grengs v. Perry G. Wells on
appeal by the latter from your decision of May 2, 1889, canceling his
timber culture entry for the SW. of Sec. 8, T. 114, R. 43, Marshall,
Minnesota land district.
On December 31, 1883, Wells made timber culture entry for this land,
and on April 21, 1887 Grengs filed affidavit of contest against the same
alleging that-
Perry G. Wells has failed to plant and cultivate to trees, tree seeds, nuts or cut-
tings the five acres required by law to be planted the third year after his said entry,
and that said failure still exists.
iHearing thereon was set for June 7th following, and personal service
of notice of same was made on contescee on April 25,'1887. On the
day of hearing contestee filed an affidavit for a continuance, averring
the absence of two material witnesses, which affidavit was in substan-
tial compliance with Rule 20, Rules of Practice. The same was disal-
lowed and the hearing proceeded. Upon the testimony introduced the
local officers recommended that the entry be canceled. From this de-
cision the entryman appealed, and your office on May 2, 1889, affirmed
said decision and held the entry for cancellation, from which he ap-
pealed to this Department.
The contestant testified in the case and introduced as witnesses his
brothers George and Frank Grengs and one Franz Antony. Antony
knew but little about the case. The testimony of the other witnesses
tended to show that no trees or seeds were planted in 1886, the third
year of entry, and they say they could find no trees on the land in 1886.
The entryman was sworn in his own behalf and he was asked how
many acres he plowed on the land in contest in 1884. Objection was
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made to this question. The objection was sustained, and exceptions
noted. The attorney for contestee stated " that he expected to prove
and show by the witnesses that in the spring of 1884 he (the entryman)
plowed twenty or twenty-five acres on the land in contest that had been
previously plowed and cropped; that the ground was in a good state
of cultivation . . . . that he put it in crop . . . . that after
harvest he had a part of the land that had been cropped plowed " etc.
This was the first year after entry; what he did to prepare the land
for trees was competent, as reflecting on his compliance with law and on
his good faith. Not only so, but the breaking done by a former occu-
pant inures to the benefit of a timber culture entryman if it is properly
utilized. See McKenzie v. Killgore (10 L. D., 322).
This entryman had a right therefore to show that some land had been
previously broken and cultivated in the tract and that he had utilized
it. It was error to rule out this testimony. Following this the witness
was asked what work he did on the land in contest in the spring of
1885. To this objection was interposed. The objection was sustained
and exceptions noted. The attorney stated that he expected to show
and prove by this witness that in the spring of 1885 he (the entryman)
had plowed, dragged, marked and planted to tree seeds, of maple, box
elder and elm, over five acres of the land in controversy, and that he
had cultivated twenty-five acres of the land in crops during that season.
The register held that what he did this, the second year, was not in
issue. This ruling was clearly erroneous. This evidence was competent
and nMaterial as tending to show a compliance with the law.
Planting trees before the time fixed by the law is compliance with its
requirements so far as time is of the essence of the matter, provided
the land has been broken and cultivated, and thus reclaimed from its
wild state.
A number of other material questions were asked, calling for testi-
mony entirely competent and relevant to the issue as showing com-
pliance with law and as reflecting upon the good faith of the entryman;
but they were not permitted to be answered, and the error does not
stop with the rejection of the testimony, but the register excluded it
from the record in violation of rule 41, Rules of Practice, it not being
" obviously irrelevant." It may be that this entryman had not complied
with the law, but the proceedings before the register and receiver show
such disregard of the rules of evidence, rules of practice, and the de-
partmental regulations, that I can not uphold their judgment.
Your office decision affirming their action is therefore reversed, the
case will be returned to the local office for a hearing, de novo in accord-
ance with law.
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SPECIAL AGENT'S REPORT-MINERAL AND-ACT OF JUNE 1, 1880.
JOHN E. WILLIAMS.
The admission of the entryman that the facts as stated in a special agent's report
are true, does not extend to a conclusion of said agent contained therein.
The proximity of land to coal veins will not warrautthe conclusionthat itis mineral
in character, where it is not returned as such, and its mineral character is not
made to appear as a present fact.
The failure of a homesteader to comply with the law in the matter of settlement and
residence does not affect his right to purchase the land under section 2, act of
June 15, 18O.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, November 20, 1890.
This record involves the validity of cash entry No. 16,995, made by
John E. Williams under the second section of the act of June 15, 1880,
21 Stats., 237, for the NE. 1 Sec. 32, T. 16 S., R. 5 W., Montgomery,
Alabama.
He made original homestead entry January 27, 1874, and the entry
in question on June 22,1881.
On September 17, 1887, Special Agent Griffin of your offlice, reported
that in connection with adjoining land where he has lived for twenty
years, Williams cultivated some four acres of the tract involved, that
he has made no frther improvements nor settled or resided thereon,
that "large veins of coal have been developed in near vicinity" and
that the same is " mineral land but there are no out-croppings."
On November 19, 1887, your office held said cash entry for cancella-
tion and allowed Williams sixty days to apply for a hearing to show
cause why the same should be sustained. On May 11, 1888, such hear-
ing was, upon his application, ordered by your - office. Pending the
hearing thus ordered, on August 4, 1888, he filed a petition in your of-
fice wherein he set out that he accepted the said special agent's report
" as a true statement of the facts in the case " and that he relied upon
the second section of the act of June 15, 1880, spra, to sustain his en-
try, and asked that your office decision of November 19, 1887, be set
aside and the entry passed to patent.
On December 19, 1848, your office revoked said order for hearing and
held the entry for cancellation.
This decision on motion by Williams for reconsideration, was on
April 11, 1889, adhered to by your office. He appealed from the order
of cancellation to this department. Your office found that in allowing
the facts as stated by the special agent, Williams admitted that his
original entry was made without intention of settlement and that sllh
entry being consequently fraudulent, it could not, under the ruling in
the case of J. S. Cone, 7 L D., 94, constitute a basis of purchase under
the act of June 15, 1880, spra.
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This conclusion is not sustained by the record. In his said report
Special Agent Griffin in reply to the question (14) " Was the fraud wil-
ful " says: " It is evident that the entryman never intended to settle
on the land." This being simply a conclusion by the agent, could not
come within the scope of Williams' admission, which obviously related
only to the facts. Moreover such conclusion is expressly controverted
by his original homestead affidavit and by his sworn statements in sup-
port of the said motion for reconsideratiou.
The tract involved, as I am advised by soar office, does not appear
on the mineral list and as further shown by the record, Special Agent
Harrison on May 31, and October t3. 1883, and Special Agent Toole oi
September 12, 1887, reported to the effect that it is non-mineral. Fur-
thermnore, it is not shown by the said Special Agent Griffin to be "as a
present fact " valuable for coal or other mineral.
As the land in question had not been returned as mineral the record
shows that it was properly subject to homestead entry at the time of
Williams' original and also at the time of his cash entry. Consequently
it appears that said original entry was valid at its inception and in this
respect the case at bar differs from that of J. S..Cone, supra. No ad-
verse claim has intervened and the failure of Williams to comply with
the homestead law with regard to settlement and residence, could not
affect his right to purchase under the act referred to. Geo. E. Sanford
(5 L. D., 535). See also Compbell v. Kelly (8 L. D., 75); Chapman v.
Patterson (10 L. D., 129).
The entry in question will, accordingly, remain intact.
The judgment of your office.is reversed.
RES JUD[CATA PRIVATE CLAIM-1IO'IESTEAD OCCUPANCY.
BRADY V. CENTRAL PACIFIC R. R. Co.
The final adverse decision of the Department precludes favorable consideration of a.
subsequent application of the same party raising the question involved in the
former action.
A Mexican grant of quantity, within a tract of larger area, is a float, andithe lands.
within such larger area are subject to the operation of a railroad grant, at the
date it becomes effective, except as to the quantity that may be actually required
to satisfy the float.
An allegation that land is excepted from a railroad grant by reason of a settlement.
claim, is not established by a showing that said tract was included within a
large body of land improved and occupied as a whole for the purposes of a cattle
ranch.
Secretary Noble to the Oommissioner of the General Land Office, November
21, 1890.
The land in controversy embraces lots 1, 8, 9, 10, and 11 in Sec. 1, T.
2 S., R. 3 W., M. D. M., California and lies within the twenty mile
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limits of the grant to the Central Pacific Railroad Company, the line
of which was definitely located opposite the tract in question January
21, 1870.
In March 1884 James Brady applied to make homestead entry of
said tract, alleging that it was within the claimed limits of the Moraga
and El Sobrante Mexican grants. This application wasfinallyrejected
by the Department December 9, 1886 (58 Lands and Railroads 67),
holding that said application was controlled by the decision in the case
of Rees v. Central Pacific R. R. Co. (5 L. D., 62), the land in both cases
being in the same range of townships. On April 30, 1887, he renewed
his application to enter said land, alleging that it was excepted from
the grant to the railroad company for the reason that it was within the
claimed limits of the Moraga and El Sobrante grants at date of definite
location and for the further reason that from 1861 to date of application
the land was claimed, occupied and improved by different claimants-
citizens of the United States who had erected dwellings and made other
improvements thereon. Upon this application a hearing was ordered to
determine the status of the tract at date of withdrawal, January 31, 1865,
and of definite location, Janury 21, 1870, and upon the testimony taken
at such hearing the register found that the land was within the exterior
limits of the Moraga grant from 1841 to August 10, 1878, when it was
excluded therefrom by official survey and restored to the public domain,
and that it was used, occupied, improved and claimed by successive set-
tiers and claimants-citizens of the United States-from 1855 to date of
hearing, and held as private property. The receiver found that it was
not within the exerior limits of staid grant under the ruling of the
Department in the Rees case, and that the evidence did not show the
occupancy of the land by any settlers such as would reserve it from the
operation of the grant to the company.
From these disagreeing decisions of the local officers the company and
Brady respectively filed appeals.
Your office held that it was necessary to consider the question as to
whether said land was within the exterior limits of the Mexican grants,
for the reason that this question had been once adjudicated and defi-
nitelysettled in the case of Rees v. Central Pacific R. IR. Co., supra. As
to whether the land was claimed, occupied, and improved at date of
withdrawal and of definite location, you held that the evidence shows
that this tract was part of a larger tract comprising over four hundred
acres, which was used as a whole for stock purposes, that-
The land in question was never occupied by any one claiming it under any of the
laws permitting occupation or settlement, but only by cattle roaming at large over
the entire tract, the owners of which were non-residents, whose agents lived in a
house situated at least half a mile from the tracts applied for by Brady.-
From this decision Brady appealed.
The question as to whether this land was embraced within the limits
of the Moraga or El Sobrante grants is not only controlled by the
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ruling of the Department in the Rees case, but that question was
directly adjudicated adversely to this applicant by the Department in
its decision of September 9, 1886, upon the application of Brady to
enter this identical tract. Moreover, it was held in the case of Childs
v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co. (9 L. D., 471), following the case of United
States v. McLaughlin (127 U. S., 428), that a lexican grant of quan-
tity, within a tract of larger area, such as the said Moraga grant, was a
float, and that the lands with in such larger area are subj ect to the oper-
ation of a railroad grant, except as to the quantity actually required to
satisfy the float.
The only remaining question is whether there was such a claim exist.
ing at date of withdrawal and of definite location as would except
it from the operation of the grant. The evidence shows that this
land was occupied, claimed and iproved by various persons from 1855
to date of definite location, but such occupancy was by persons who
claimed it as the Grass Valley Ranch, and who improved it and occu-
pied it as a ranch for grazing cattle, not as part of the governmeiit land
which they expected to enter under the homestead laws, but by pur-.
chase of the right from private parties. In fact there is no testimony
showing that the identical land claimed by Brady was occupied by any
one prior to definite location except in connection with the entire ranch,
and none of the improvements of the ranch were upon the land claimed
by him except the fence which did not enclose that tract but the entire
ranch which was under one fence. The character of the occupancy of
this land is shown by the admission of the counsel for Brady in his
argument, in which it is stated that this land was considered as being
embraced in a private land grant, and the method of settlement was by
taking up ranches and awaiting the adjudication of the claims, when
they hoped to get title from the grant claimants. He says:
These ranches were in many cases redeemed from a state of nature and covered
with valuable improvements. The ranch embracing the land in controversy con-
tained over five hundred acres, and at one time was held by a number of owners. In
1871, the improvements thereon were extensive and as far back as 1860, according to
the testimony of witness Field, there were on it a dwelling house and tree or four
barns " holding cattle in the winter and so forth." Stich possessory claims were
bought and sold, and taxed, and the owners by reason of possession, occupancy and
expenditure of money, had an equitable interest therein.
It is contended that such claim and occupancy excepted the land
from the operation of the grant under the ruling of the Department in
the case of Bowman v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. (7 L. D., 238). But
in the Bowman case the tract claimed by Bowman did not exceed the
quantity of land that could have been claimed and entered under the
homestead law, and the limits of the tract were defined and part of it
was under fence. In this case the land claimed was part of a tract of
five hundred acres known as the Grass Valley Ranch, and the improve-
ments and occupancy of the entire five hundred acres by ranchmen,
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was not such an occupancy of the land by homestead settlers as would
except it from the operation of the grant.
Your decision is affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT-LOCATION OF TERMINAL LINE.
MICHIGAN LAND AND IRON OMPANY.
Pending further consideration as to the proper location, under the forfeiture act of
March A, 889, of the western terminal line of the grant in aid of the Marquette,
Houghton and Ontonagon R. R. Co., the action heretofore had in said matter
will remain suspended.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, November
24, 1890.
This is a petition filed by the Michigan Land and Iron Company (lim-
ited) asking that you be directed to certify to this Department the rec-
ord and proceedings in the matter of the application filed by it for a
correction of the terminalline established by your office under the act of
March 2, 1889 (25 Stats., 1008), of the Marquette, Houghton and On-
tonagon Railroad at the western, or L'Anse end thereof, as constructed
under a grant to the State made by the act of June 3, 1856 (11 Stat., 21),
in that such further action may be had in the premises as nWay be
deemed lawful and proper.
By said act of March 2, 1889, all lands theretofore granted to said
State by the act of June 3, 1856, " which are opposite to and cotermi-
nous with the uncompleted portion of any railroad, to aid in the con-
struction of which said lands were granted, or applied," were forfeited
to the United States. The Marquette, Houghton and Ontonagon Rail-
road appears to be one of the roads embraced within the contemplation
of said forfeiture act.
The petition sets forth, among other things, that shortly after the
passage of said act you transmitted to the local office certain instruc-
tions relative to the restoration to market of the lands forfeited thereby,
accompanied by a diagram, or sketch, purporting to show the lands for-
feited at the western or L'Anse end of the Marquette, Houghton and
Ontonagon line of constructed road; that the terminal lineof constructed
road was thus established by you as a matter of ex parte routine busi-
ness, without notice to the State, or to any of the parties interested in
the title to the lands affected thereby; and it is alleged that such ter-
minal line does not correctly designate the lands earned by the location
and construction of the road.
It is also alleged that certain lands at the L'Anse end of said con-
structed road, with many others elsewhere, were. in 1860, conveyed by
the United States to the State of Michigan in part satisfaction of said
grant; that the State subsequently conveyed said lands to the Mar-
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quette, Houghton and Ontonagon Railroad Company, and that said
company, in 1881 conveyed them to the petitioner-the said Michigan
Land and Iron Company (limited)-for a large money consideration;
that under the title thus acquired the petitioner continued in the undis-
turbed possession and enjoyment of said lands from the year 1881 until
after the passage of said forfeiture act; that the terminal line in ques-
tion, as shown by the aforesaid diagram, or sketch, is improperly and
erroneously located, in that it is drawn with reference to the line of
constructed road, as the base thereof, whereas it should have been
drawn at right angles with the line of road as originally located under
the grant; and that said location, if allowed to stand, will result
greatly to the prejudice of the petitioner in the matter of the lands
thereby designated as having been forfeited by said act.
It is further set forth that, on April 18, 1890, the petitioner, having
obtained knowledge of the transmission by you of the diagram, or
sketch, aforesaid, filed in your office its application for a correction of
said terminal line so as to conform to the law; that by office decision of
July 17, 1890, you declined to consider the question presented by said
application, and dismissed the same, on the ground of want of sufficient
parties to the record, it being stated that there was nothing to show
that the petitioner was authorized to represent the Marquette, Hough-
ton and Ontonagon Railroad Company; and further, that any applica-
tion looking to a re-adjustment of such terminal line should be made by
said railroad company to the Secretary of the Interior; that the peti-
tioner thereupon filed an appeal, which, by office decision of September
19, 1890, you declined to entertain, for the same reasons set forth in the
decision dismissing the application. Copies of said decisions, with said
rejected appeal, are iled with the present petition.
It is further alleged in said petition,
that notwithstanding the instructions accompanying the said map were submitted
to and received the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, yet that the
proceeding was entirely ex-parte, without notice to any one interested, or a hearing,
and that as matter of fact neither the proper location of said terminal line, nor the
accuracy of the Commissioner's location thereof, nor the question what lands had
been earned by location and construction was presented to, considered or determined
by the Honorable Secretary; but that his approval of the said instructions were
made in the usual order of routine business, and upon the assumption that no contro
versy as to its accuracy as to what lands had been earned existed or was likely to
arise, that the line as designated was correct and that no existing vested rights were
prejudiced thereby.
And the "petitioner denies, upon information and belief, that the
question of the accuracy of this line or of what lands had been earned
was ever, in any proper sense of the word, presented or submitted to
the Secretary, for consideration, or was by him considered or decided.
In my opinion, the correctness of the location of said terminal line
should be fully considered by the Department, giving to all parties ad-
versely interested an opportunity to be heard upon the merits. You
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are therefore directed to certify to the Department the record in said
case, including copies of letters of your office giving instructions to the
local office relative to the status of the lands in controversy. The local
office should be advised to take no action relative to the lands in con-
troversy until the correctness of said terminal line shall have been
finally adjudicated by the Department.
TIMBER CULTURE CONTEST-COMPLIANCE WITH LAW.
KELSEY v. BARBER.
The failure of the entryman to secure the requisite growth of trees does not call for
cancellation, where such result is not due to negligence in planting and cultiva-
tion, but to the character of the season, and seed that proved defective.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the Generar
Land Office, November 24, 1890.
I have considered the case of James M. Kelsey v. Eber Barber on the
appeal of the former from your decision of February 11, 1889, dismiss-
ing his contest against the timber culture entry of the latter for the W. i
of NW. and W. J SW. -1 of Sec. 14, T. 17, R. 20 W., Grand Island Ne-
braska land district.
On July 20, 1883, Barber made timber culture entry for the land, and
on August 26, 1886, Kelsey filed affidavit of contest against the same,
alleging-
failure to plant or cause to be planted, up to this date, to trees, seeds, nuts or cut-
tings, five acres of said tract and that the only attempt was to plant not to exceed
two and one-half acres; that the cuttings were dead when planted; that they were
not cultivated and that said Barber has failed to cultivate the tract according to law.
The time for the hearing was set for October 16, 1886. After some
preliminary motions and delays final hearing of the case was had Janu-
ary 27, 1887, both parties being present in person and by attorney, and
upon motion for continuance, and application to take depositions on the
part of the claimant being overruled, the testimony was submitted and
on April 22, 1887, the register and receiver, upon consideration thereof,
decided the case against the entryman and held his entry for cancella-
tion. He appealed from this judgment to the Commissioner, where, on
February 11, 1889, the decision of the local office was reversed and the
contest dismissed, from which ruling the contestant appealed to this
Department.
The testimony is quite voluminous and discloses the fact that there is
a good deal of ill feeling on the part of the contestant and his witnesses
against the entryman, and on account thereof, there is a great deal of
irrelevant matter contained in the record. It appears, however, that
this entryman broke in the first year of his entry about fifteen acres, and
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raised sod corn on it; that in the year 1885, he cultivated this ground
and had some ten acres more broken and in May 1886, he had five and
a half acres plowed, harrowed and marked in rows. Some three and a
half acres of this ground he had planted to cottonwood cuttings and
the remainder to box-elder, cottonwood and other tree seeds.
It appears that the season of 1886 was quite dry during Jane and
July, and the cuttings did not do well, although it appears that he gave
the ground reasonably good cultivation. The seeds did not germinate
as they should have done, but there is evidence tending to show that
the seeds grown in Custer and some adjoining counties of Nebraska in
1885 were injured in some way and did not grow well.
This entryman has put wire fence around sixty acres of the land, dug
a well and has stock on the land.
I think he has manifested good faith in the work performed and it
appears to have been owing to the dry season and defective seeds which
were not easily detected except by trial, that he has not more growing
trees on the land.
Your decision is affirmed and the contest will be dismissed.
HOMESTEAD CO:NTEST-RESIDENCE-APPLICATION.
PATTON V. KELLEY.
Residence can not be established, nor maintained, by occasional visits to the land
while the actual home of the claimant is elsewhere.
An application to enter can not be allowed during the pendency of an appeal to the
Department from a decision holding for cancellatiou the existing entry of another
for the land in question.
First Assisttnt Secretary Chandler to the ommssioner of the General
Land Office, November 24, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Mrs. Tempie Kelley (widow of John
Kelley) from your office decision of June 1, 1889, in which you held for
cancellation homestead entry No. 8168, made by said John Kelley,
December 20, 1886, upon the NW. I of Sec. 26, T. 4 S., R. 67 W., Denver,
Colorado.
It appears that a pre-emption filing was made by him upon the tract,
March 29,1884, and transmuted to a homestead entry on the date above
given.
On June 27, 1887, Ambros E. Patton filed in the local office his affi-
davit of contest, charging claimant's abandonment of the land for more
than six months since making the entry. 
After due notice, the hearing was had and the register and receiver
found that claimant " has not established and retained his residence as
required by law," and recommended that the entry be canceled; and by
your said decision you affirm that judgment.
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I have carefully examined the evidence, and find it substantially and
correctly set forth in your opinion.
It shows that claimant's real home after making the entry was in
Denver, Colorado, where he was engaged in the saloon business. More-
over, he voted in that city, and his alleged residence on the tract was
nothing more than visitations to keep up an appearance of residence.
It can hardly be said that he abandoned his residence on the tract, for
the reason he never established it there. He was doubtless in poor
health, and it may be conceded that he could not make a living on the
land, and was compelled to seek employment elsewhere; but this can
not excuse his lack of compliance with the law in the matter of resi-
dence. His house, ten by twelve feet; was built with four posts roughly
boarded; it had no floor and no window, and the furniture placed
therein he says consisted alone of 'a chair, stove, dishes and bed."
This shows very meagre preparations for housekeeping, and (lemon-
strates a lack of good faith-taken in connection with the other ad-
mitted fact that he lived in Denver. Your said decision canceling the
entry is accordingly affirmed.
It appears that on July 10, 1889, Mrs. Kelley, widow of the entryman,
appealed from your said judgment of June 1, 1889, and on August 8,
1889, Eva H. Patton, widow of contestant, Ambros E. Patton, (the latter
having died since your decision), filed an application to be allowed to
make homestead entry of the land in question. The register and re-
ceiverrejected this application, because the tract was covered by Kelley's
entry. Mrs. Patton appealed, and on October 7,1889, you sustained the
action of the local officers, saying:
Kelley's homestead entry was not canceled by office letter "1 H" of June 1, 1889,
and as long as it remains of record, it is a bar to the appropriation of the land by
any other person.
She made this application so as to be first on record, and thus " reap
the benefits of the contest made by her husband, providing the Secre-
tary of the Interior affirms the decision of the Commissioner."
Your decision " held the entry for cancellation" and directed notice
to be given to Kelley of his right of further appeal." His widow ex-
ercised this right before Mrs. Patton applied to enter the land, and MVrs.
Kelley's appeal removed the case from your jurisdiction, and suspended
all action touching the disposition of the land, until the case should be
finally decided by this Department. Saben v. Amundson 9 L. D., 578.
It is insisted that your said decision had the eect of canceling the
entry, and that the land thereby became subject to entry, and the case
of John H. Reed (6 L. D., 563) is cited as authority.
This case, however, differs from the Reed case, in this: that prior to
Mrs. Patton's application to enter, the case was appealed to this Depart-
ment, and thus the jurisdiction of the local office was removed; whereas,
in the Reed case no appeal was taken from the judgment of cancella-
tion, and, although it was held that the expiration of the sixty days
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was not essential to the finality of the judgment, yet the proper prac-
tice would be not to allow another entry of record until the time al-
lowed for appeal had expired, or the entry had been canceled by the
appellate tribunal. But the filing of the appeal within the sixty days
suspended the judgment of cancellation and operated to reserve the
land from further disposition until the final decision upon the appeal as
effectually as if the judgment of cancellation had not been rendered.
For the reasons above given, Mrs. Patton's application was properly
rejected, and her appeal is hereby dismissed.
RAILROAD GRANT PRE-EMPTION CLAIM SETTLEMENT RIGHT.
NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co. v. DUNHAM ET AL.
Land covered by aprima facie valid pre-emption filing, at date of withdrawal on gen-
eral route, is excepted thereby from the operation of suelh withdrawal.
The occupancy of land at definite location, by one who holds under and by virtue of
the company's title, and asserts no right under the settlement laws, will not de-
feat the attachment of the grant.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, November
24, 1890.
This record presents the appeal of the Northern Pacific Railroad com-
pany from your office decision of January 21, 1888, in the case of said
company against Elijah Dunham and Fred T. Kegler, involving the SW.
j, Sec. 35, T. 12 N., R. 20 W., Helena, Montana.
Kegler made homestead entry for the tract on July 7, 1885. On June
5, 1886, he published notice of intention to make proof in support of
such entry against the allowance of which protests were filed by Dun-
ham.
In pursuance of said notice Kegler's proof was made before the clerk
of the district court for Missoula county, on July 17, 1886, when both
parties appeared with counsel and submitted testimony.
Upon the evidence adduced the local officers rendered separate opin-
ions. The register found that Kegler's entry should be passed to patent
and the receiver, that the same should be canceled.
No further action appears to have been taken by the said parties and
on January 19, 1E87, the local office transmitted the record.
Thereupon your office by the decision appealed from finding the only
question presented to be u as to the right if any of the company " de-
clined to consider the respective claims of Dunham and Kegler and re-
jected the company's claim to the tract involved.
From the said decision it appears that the tract "6 is within the forty
mile limits of the grant to said company by act of July 2, 1864 (13 Stat.,
365), as shown by map ox general route filed February 21, 1872, and by
map of definite location filed July 6, 1882, at which dates respectively
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the withdrawal for the company took effect and its right to lands in the
granted limits attached."
The records show that on November 17, 1870, John Silverthorn filed
declaratory statement alleging settlement o the tract April 1, 1870,
and that William Church filed in like manner on March 23, 1872, alleg-
ing settlement August 4, 1871.
It appears that Dunham having bought the improvements of a prior
occupant went on the land in the spring of 1875, that he has since con-
tinued to live thereon and that his improvements valued at $1,500
consist mainly of a log house about eighteen by forty-two feet, a frame
house sixteen by eighteen feet, stable, chicken house, fencing and about
thirty-five acres cultivated.
Dunham subsequently bought the land from said company for $480
and the same was conveyed to him by deed acknowledged February 18,
1885.
Dunham had borrowed the said purchase money from Kegler to whom
he executed for the same, a mortgage on thetract dated January 27,
1885.
During April or May following, Kegler hearing that the company's
title to the land was doubtful, made said homestead entry therefor.
Kegler's roof sets out that with his wife ad two children he resided
on the land continuously from about September 25, 1885, and that his
improvements valued at $,200 comprise a frame house, barn, corral,
fencing, water-ditch and fourteen and a half acres cultivated.
Your office found that the land was excepted from the withdrawal on
general route by the filings of Silverthorn and Church and also from
the operation of the grant at the date of definite location by the " set-
tlement, occupation and residence " of Dunham.
The said filings being of record and primafacie valid at the date of
the withdrawal on general route it was correctly held by your office that
they operated to except the land therefrom. Malone v. Union Pacific
Railway Co. (7 L. D., 13), Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Sto-
venour, decided June 7, 1890 (10 L. D., 645).
I cannot, however, agree with the conclusion that the occupancy of
Dunham excepted the land from the operation of the grant on definite
location.
Prior to the Kegler entry in July, 1885, Dunham had asserted no
claim under the settlement laws to the tract involved. This with his
said purchase of the same shows that at the time when its rights under
the grant attached Dunham was occupying the land under and by vir-
tue of the company's title and with the obvious intention of ultimately
acquiring the same. That such occupancy could not prevent the at-
tachment of the company's rights is, I think, manifest.
I must, therefore, find from the record before me that the right to the
land in question passed to the company upon the definite location of
its line of road.
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The decision appealed from is accordingly reversed. The said case
of Dunham v. Kegler is remanded for appropriate action by youroffice.
CERTIORARI-APPEAL-RES TUDICATA.
ROBERT H. STEEVES.
Certiorari will not lie where the right of appeal to the Department is lost through
failure to appeal fron the decision of the local office.
An application for certiorari will not be granted if it appears that substantial justice
has been done in the disposition of the case below.
The issuance of a final certificate by the local office, can not be set up by the entry-
man as an adjudication that precludes such office from rendering a decision on a
hearing subsequently ordered by the General Land Office.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, November
24, 1890.
Robert H. Steeves has applied for a writ of certiorari directing your
office to certify to the Department the record of proceedings in the case
of the St. Paul & Duluth Railroad Company v. said Steeves. (and
others), involving the SE. 1 of the NE. I of Sec. 3, T. 36, R. 26, Taylors
Falls land district, Minnesota.
His application is based upon the allegation that your office decision
of August 20, 1890, adverse to him, in summing up the decision of the
register and receiver, stated that it held, "' that Steeves, having failed
to appear, waived his claim, and that final certificate should be issued
upon the entry of Hoeft," when in fact these exact words are not to be
found in said decision of the register and receiver.
The finding of the local officers was in favor of Hoeft and against
Steeves; and in the report of proceedings at the hearing, prefixed to
their decision, they state that Steeves did not appear. o, while the
language quoted and objected to by counsel for Steeves is not a literal
extract from the opinion of the local officers, it is a correct summary of
the facts.
Applicant contends that as "the register and receiver had issued
final certificate to Steeves a year prior thereto' (to the hearing), " so
far as their office was concerned the matter as between Steeves and
Hoeft was res judicata."1 When your office ordered a hearing in the
case, upon the conclusion of said hearing it was the duty of the local
officers, as directed by your office, to report their opinion upon the evi-
dence adduced; and the doctrine of res judicata has no application in
the premises.
It appears that Steeves failed to appeal from the decision of the local
officers; and that for this reason his application to appeal from your
office decision of August 30, 1890, was denied; hence this application
for certiorari. But as the right of appeal from your office was lost by
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the failure to appeal from the decision of the local officers, an applica-
tion for writ of certiorari will not lie (Blake v. Rasp, 4 L. D., 277).
The application might very properly have been denied because not
made under oath (Rule 84 of Practice); also because no copy of the Com-
missioner's decision, complained of, is furnished (Smith v. Eowe, 9 L. D.,
648; Lyman C. Dayton, 10 L. D., 59); but it has been deemed prefer-
able to consider the question upon its merits. Moreover, "applica-
tion for certiorari will not be granted if substantial justice has been
done" (Reed v. Casner, 9 L. D., 170; Lyman C. Dayton, 10 L. D., 159;
Stiles v. Newman, 10 L. D., 491; Reuben Spencer, 3 L. D., 503; Dobbs
Placer Mine, 1 L. D., 565; Tomay v. Stewart, 1 L. D.,570); and there is
no showing-indeed, no allegation-in the case at bar that substantial
iustice has not been done.
The application is denied.
CONTESTANT-PREPERENCE RIGHT-NOTICE OF CANCELLATION.
KIBBE v. BATES ET AL.
The successful contestant is entitled to thirty days from the receipt of notice of can-
cellation within which to exercise the preference right of entry.
The entry of an intervening claimant must be canceled if, after due notice, he fails
to show sufficient cause why the right of the successful contestant should not be
recognized.
First Assistant Secretary handler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, November 21, 1890.
I have considered the case of Everett W. Kibbe v. Franklin H. Bates
and John J. Caldwell on the appeal of Caldwell from- the ruling an-
nounced in your office letter H " of April 6, 1889, to the effect that
Kibbe would be allowed to make entry for the N. SE. and SW. 
SE. and SE. i SW. of Sec. 10 T. 17 S., R. 36 W., Wa-Keeney, Kan-
sas land district, and that the entry of Caldwell for said land would be
canceled.
Your said letter sets forth substantially the record and history of the
case.
It was held in case of Robertson v. Ball et al., (10 L. D., 41), that
the successful contestant is entitled to thirty days from the receipt of
notice of cancellation within which to exercise the preference right of
entry. It was also held in that case that notice should be given the in-
tervening entryman to show cause, if any, why his entry should not be
canceled, where the contestant applies to make entry within the time
fixed by law, and a this notice has been given and no sufficient cause
shown, your action is approved and your instructions to the local officers
as per said letter will be complied with.
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CONGRESSIONAL GRANT-CERTIFICATION-JURISDICTION.
SMITH ET AL. V. PORTAGE LAI= AND LAKE SUPERIOR SHIP
CANAL CO.
Under a grant that does not require the issuance of patent, the certification of lands
is equivalent to patent, and divests the Department of all jurisdiction over the
lands, or the title thereto.
Such a certification is in effect a decision of the Department that the lands thus certi-
fied are in fact subject to the grant, and the validity of such action can only be
questioned in the courts.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the Generat Land Office, Novem-
ber 21, 1890.
This case comes before the Department upon the appeal of Angus
Smith and others from the decision of your office, rejecting their appli-
cations, presented at the local office in January 1887, to locate Porter-
field scrip upon certain tracts of land which had been selected by the
Portage Lake and Lake Superior Ship Canal Company, under the grant
of March 3, 1865 (13 Stat., 519), and which were approved by the De-
partment October 30, 1868.
The material ground of error alleged is in holding that the certificate of
these lands to the State for the benefit of the Canal Company vested the
title in the State for the benefit of the company and deprived the Depart-
ment of alljurisdiction over them. The reasons assigned in support of
said allegations of error are-(1) that said selections were not nearest to
the location of the canal, and had been designated as " mineral " before
the passage of the act, and not being the lands granted, the certifica-
tion of the Secretary was absolutely null and void, and (2) because the
certification of these lands is not equivalent to a patent.
The act of March 3, 1865, supra, granted to the State of Nichigan, for
the purpose of aiding in the construction of said canal, two hundred
thousand acres of land in the upper peninsula of said State. The sec-
ond section of said act is as follows:
That there be, and hereby is, granted to the said State of Michigan, for the pur-
pose of aiding said State in constrecting and completing a harbor and ship-canal to
connect the waters of Lake Superior with the waters of Portage Lake, two hundred
thousand acres of public lands, to be selected in subdivisions agreeable to the United
States survey, by an agent or agents appointed by the governor of said state, subject
to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, from auy lands in the upper penin-
sula of said State, subject to private entry: Provided, That said selections shall be
made from alternate and odd-numbered sections of land nearest the location of said
canal in said upper peninsula, not otherwise appropriated, and not from lands des-
ignated by the United States as ' mineral' before the passage of this act, nor from
lands to which the rights of pre-emption or homestead have attached.
The approval of these selections by the Secretary of the Interior was
to all intents and purposes a decision by that official that the lands so
selected were the odd numbered sections nearest the location of said
476 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
canal, not otherwise appropriated, and that said lands were subject to
selection under the terms of the grant. Although this certification
might have been erroneous, and although it might now appear that
there were at the date of selection lands nearer to the location of the
canal than those selected which had not been appropriated,yet the ap-
proval and certification having been made in the exercise of the juris-
diction of the Secretary to determine whether said selections were un-
appropriated lands nearest the location o the canal, removed from the
Department all further jurisdiction over those lands, and the validity
of said certification could thereafter only be questioned in the courts.
Whether the lands selected were of "' lands nearest the location of
said canal . . . . . not otherwise appropriated," was a question
of fact, to be determined by the Secretary, and that determination was
made by his approval of the list of selections and the certification
thereof to the State.
The act excepted from the grant all lands " designated by the United
States as mineral' prior to the passage of this act." It is therefore
contended that, as these lands had been so designated, it is immaterial
whether they actually contained mineral or not; that if they had been
designated as mineral prior to the passage of the act, they were ex-
pressly excepted from the operation of the grant, and the certification
of such lands was an absolute nullity. The language of the act will
reasonably bear a different construction. The lands may at one time
prior to the passage of the act have been designated as mineral, and
yet that designation may also have been changed prior to the passage
of the aet, and may have been designated and known to be non-mineral.
I do not think the mere fact that the lands had once been designated
as mineral prior to the passage of the act would except them from the
operation of the grant, if that designation had been afterwards changed
and they were known to be non-mineral prior to that date. Without
determining this question, it is sufficient to say that it may have been
presented to the mind of the Secretary when the lands were certified,
and in the exercise of his jurisdiction to determine whether the lands
had been properly selected the statute may have been so construed.
It appears that these lands had at one time been designated, in com-
mon with a large tract of country in the upper peninsula of Michigan,
as mineral lands, but in 1851 they were offered at public sale under the
proclamation of the President. No information is contained in the let-
ter of your office, or in the appeal and argument of the appellants, as
.to whether these lands are actually mineral in character, but it may be
assumed that they are not, otherwise they would not be subject to
these locations, even if they were public lands. Whether the true char-
acter of these lands had been ascertained prior to the date of the grant,
I am unable to determine, but from all the facts before me I am satis-
fied that the approval of these selections removed from the Department
all further jurisdiction over them, and there was no error in the decis-
ion of your office rejecting said applications.
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The granting act contains no provision requiring the issuance of pat-
ents for the lands selected, but simply that said selections shall be
made by an agent or agents appointed by the State, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior. This approval is the only
act required to divest the government of the title to the land selected,.
and to invest that title in the State, and it is therefore the equivalent
of patent. Garriques v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Com-
pany, 6 L. D., 543; Frasher v. O'Connor, 115 U. S., 102.
I (o not deem it necessary to take any action in this decision upon the
question as to whether any steps should be taken looking to the can-
cellation of this certification by the courts, in the absence of direct
action thereon by your office. If such action should be deemed advisa-
ble, it may be presented hereafter.
Your decision is affirmed.
MOTION FOR REVIEW.
CRAWFORD V. FERGUSON.
Motion for the review of the departmental decision rendered March
7, 1890, 10 L. D., 274, denied by Secretary Noble, November 22, 1890.
PRE-EMPTION-SETTLEMENT RIGRTS-SECTION 2209 R. S.
ORvis v. BIRTC11 ET AL.
A settlement on land that is inder reservation confers no right of pre-emption, and if
the settler dies, while the land is in such condition, his heirs have no right thereto
that can be perfected, under section 2269 of the Revised Statutes, after th land
is restored to the public domain.
The right to amend a declaratory statement can not be exercised in the presence of
a valid intervening adverse claim.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, November 22, 1890.
These cases involve the rights of the several parties under their con-
flicting claims to the S. J SW. 1, NW. I SW. 4 and SW. i NW. i of
Sec. 22, T. 45 N., R. 8 W., N. M. P. It., Lake City, Colorado, embraced in
the declaratory statement of Lewis F. Orvis, as administrator of the es-
tate of A. H. Jarvis, deceased.
The first case arose upon the application of Martin Birtch to make
final proof under his declaratory statement, covering the S. of the
SW. i of said Sec. 22, and other land in Sec. 27, which was offered
November 27, 18i6, when Orvis. administrator, appeared and protested
against the allowance of said proof, o the ground of prior settlement
as to the S. of the SW. i of See. 22.
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The second case arose upon the application of Orvis, administrator,
to make final proof in support of the claim of the heirs of A. H. Jarvis,
deceased, for the land covered by the declaratory statement of Orvis,
adm'r, aforesaid, which was offered March 14, 1887, when Birtch, Wil-
liam Rothwell, and James W. Austin, each protested against the allow-
ance of the entry for said heirs, denying their right to make entry of
said tract. The claims of the several protestants under their respective
filings conflicted with the claim of Orvis, administrator, as follows:
The conflict between -Orvis, administrator, and Birtch is as to the S. i
of the SW. of Sec. 22, and between Orvis, administrator, and Roth-
well and Austin it is as to the NW. t of the SW. 1 and the SW. i of the
NW. i of said section.
On March 16, 1887, the local officers rendered a decision in favor of
Birtch, and on April 4, thereafter, Orvis filed a motion for review thereof
and at the same time asked to amend his declaratory statement so as to
claim the land in his own right instead of as administrator. On April
18, 1887, the local officers overruled both motions, and on April 20, they
passed upon the final proof submitted by Orvis, and rendered judgment
denying his right to make entry of the land, either as administrator of
the estate of Jarvis, or in his own right, and the entire record was trans-
mitted to your office. From the action of the local officers Orvis ap-
pealed, both as administrator of the estate of Jarvis and in his individual
right.
On May 4, 1889, you affirmed the action of the register and receiver
rejecting the proof of Orvis in the case of Orvis, administrator, v. Birtch,
and in rejecting the application of Orvis to amend so as to claim in his
own right, and held his filing for cancellation, also upholding their de-
cision allowing the proof of Birtch in the case of Birtch et al. v. Orvis.
From this judgment Orvis, administrator, appealed, assigning the fol-
lowing grounds of error:
First. In holding that on May 24th, 1886, there was no right of pre-emption exist-
ing in Orvis as administrator of the estate of Jarvis, deceased.
Second. In holding that on May 24, 1856, there were no rights existing in the heirs
of Jarvis, deceased, by reason of their long and continued residence, which could
antedate the claimed rights of Birtch.
Third. In denying Orvis' application to amend his declaratory statement to read
in his own right, as such privilege is clearly due him by reason of his prior settle-
nment and claim to the land in conflict, and
Fourth. In holding either as a matter of fact or of law that Birtch, Rothwell or
Austin, or either of them, had any rights which could defeat Orvis, either in his own
right, or in his administrative capacity. The contrary is shown by the facts in the
testimony and law cited in our brief.
The controlling issue in this case, so far as it affects the claim of the
heirs of Jarvis, is, whether a settlement made on land not subject to
settlement and entry by oe who dies while the land is so reserved,
will entitle the heirs of such settler to the right to make pre-emption
entry of said land after its restoration to the public domain, by virtue
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of such settlement, under the provisions of section 2269 of the Revised
Statutes, which reads as follows:
Where a party entitled to claim the benefits of the pre-emption laws dies before
consummating his claim, by filing in due time all the papers essential to the estab-
lishmen' of the same, it shall be competent for the executor or administrator of the
estate of such party, or one of the heirs, to file the necessary papers to complete the
same; but the entry in such cases shall be made in favor of the heirs ofthe deceased
pre-em ptor, and a patent thereon shall cause the title to inure to such heirs, as if
their names had been specially mentioned.
The material facts in this case are fully and correctly set forth in the
decision of your office of May 4, 1889, from which this appeal is taken.
By reference thereto, it appears that the land was originally within the
Ute Indian reservation, and so continued until the act of June 15, 1880
(21 Stat., 199), when it was set apart for the benefit and enjoyment of
the people as a public park. This last reservation continued until it
was restored to the public domain by the act of May 14, 1884 (23 Stat.,
22). It further appears that Jarvis moved on the land, August 3, 1877,
while it was so reserved, and continued to reside thereon with his wife
and 'child, and to improve the tract until February 14, 1879, when he
died. His widow and child continued to reside upon the land, and in
June, 1882, she married Orvis, who took up his residence on the tract,
and continued the same up to the time of hearing, March 14, 1887.
The exemption of this tract from pre-emption or settlement by reason
of its being, first, a part of the Ute Indian reservation and its subse-
quent dedication as a public park fr the benefit of the people, existed
at the date of Jarvis' settlement, and continued to be so reserved until
May 14, 1884, supra, when it was restored to the public domain; but
the subdivisional plat of survey was not filed in the local office until
April 24, 1886.
Not only was this land exempt from pre-emption entry or settlement
under the general law, by reason of such reservation (2-958 Revised
Statutes), but the act of June 15, 1880, supra, expressly reserved this
land from settlement, occupancy or sale, and declared that all persons
who locate or settle upon or occupy any part of said land are trespass-
ers, and provide for their removal.
Jarvis died in 1879, while the land was in reservation, and having
acquired no right himself by virtue of his settlement, he had " no estate
in the land that he can devise by will, or which, in case of his death,
will pass to his heirs at law." Buxton v. Traver, 130 U. S., 232.
If the heirs of Jarvis have any right by virtue of his settlement, it
must be under section 2269 of the Revised Statutes.
But in the case of Buxton v. Traver, sprca, it was held that " Section
2269 of the Revised Statutes has no application to the case of a settler
who dies before the time arrives when the papers necessary to establish
a pre-emption right can be filed." This ruling is directly decisive of the
question involved in the case at bar, and it must be controlled thereby.
The rule invoked by appellant, to the effect that, although a person
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can acquire no right against the government by settlement upon segre-
gated or reserved lands, yet as between such settlers and another claim-
ant priority of settlement will be considered, can only apply where
adverse claimants having the right to enter are on the land claiming it
at the time when it is restored to the public domain, and becomes sub-
ject to settlement and entry.
At the time this land became subject to settlement and entry, the
widow of Jarvis had married, and her child was a minor. Neither she
nor the child was then qualified to make entry, but Orvis, if otherwise
qualified, might by virtue of his settlement at that time have filed for
the land in his own right, and the question of priority would then have
been between himself and Birtch, as to one part of the tract, and be-
tween himself and Austiu and Rothwell, as totheother. Buthefailed
to file a declaratory statement in his own name, and when he applied to
amend his filing so as to claim the tract in his individual right, the right
of Birtch, Austin and Rothwell had attached by their filings, made
within three months from the filing of the township plat in the local
office, and the application to so amend his declaratory statement was
therefore properly rejected.
I find no error in the decision of your office, and it is affirmed upon
each and all of the points therein decided.
PRACTICE-PETITION FOR RE-REVIEW.
REEVES . EBLEN.
A petition for re-review that presents no suggestions of facts, or points of law, that
have not already been considered in the case will not be granted.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, Novem-
ber 24, 1890.
I have considered the petition filed by Rufus 1. Thayer, attorney for
George F. Emblen (not eeves, as stated in your office letter dated
June 11, 1890), asking for reconsideration of the decision of the Depart-
ment, dated May 23, 1890 (10 L. D., 600), in the case of David W.
Reeves v. George F. Emblen, involving the NW of Sec. 23, T. 2 N.,
R. 48 W., Denver, Colorado, in which the Department refused to review
and change the departmental decision dated November 27, 1889 (9 L.
D., 584), declining to revoke the decision of your office ordering a hear-
ing upon the contest affidavit filed by said Reeves against Emblen's
commuted homestead entry No. 11,579 of said land.
The ground of said petition for review is, that the Department erred
in not finding that the allegations in the contest affidavit of said Reeves
were identical with the allegations in the former contest of VLcue
against said entry, which having been finally adjudicated in favor of
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the entryman, was conclusive against any subsequent contest based
upon the same allegations.
The record shows that upon the petition of Emblen a writ of certio-
rari was awarded, directed that the record in the case of Reeves v. Em-
blen, and also in the case of Frank McCue against Emblen, involving
the latter's homestead entry, decided September 15, 1888, "be trans-
mitted to the Department for consideration." (8 L. D., 444.) It was
expressly stated in said decision granting the certiorari that, " it does
not clearly appear that the charges contained in the contest of McCue
cover all the grounds alleged in Reeves' contest," and the writ was
allowed, because of the allegation of the applicant that he "met and
overcame each and every charge that is now made b Reeves," and
also because "1 proof might have been offered in said case upon all
issues presented in Reeves' contest."
Upon the transmission of the record, the Department, on November
27, 1889 (9 L. D., 584), after reciting the record facts, and referring
specially to the decision of the Department holding that " Emblen
should not be required to defend against charges that had previously
been in issue and passed upon by the Department," stated that the
record had been carefully examined, and nothing appears that indicates
an abuse of the discretion of the Commissioner in ordering said hear-
ing, nor was there such a state of facts as would justify the Department
in interfering with said order directing a hearing.
The decision of the Department granting said writ does not purport
to decide upon the merits of the question only so fr as to direct that
the record be transmitted for the consideration of the Department.
The departmental decision of November 27, 1889, quotes from your
office decision of January 17, 1889, giving the allegations of Reeves'
contest, which are precisely the same as those contained in the certified
copy of the contest affidavit of Reeves, filed by said Emblen with his
said petition. Afterwards, Emblen filed a motion for review of said
departmental decision, alleging that "the question in issue was over-
looked," and that the Department, not having a copy of Reeves' affida-
vit of contest, could not have had an accurate knowledge of its contents.
But the Department denied the motion, and held " that the question as
to the charges in these two contests being the same ... . was not
overlooked, but was carefully considered," and that there was " no good
reason for setting aside the decision complained of." -
The petition for re-review presents no suggestions of fact, or points
of law, which have not already been considered in the case, and there-
fore it can not be granted. Neff v. Cowhick, 8 L. D., 111; Dayton v.
Dayton, 9 L. D., 93; Anderson et al. v. Byam et al., id., 295; Frost et
al. v. Wenie, id., 588; Spicer et al. v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 11 L.
D. 349.
Besides, upon a careful examination of the record, no error appears
in the departmental decision sought to be revoked. Said petition is
therefore dismissed.
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RAILROAD GRANT-WITHDRAWAL-SETTLEMENT RIGHTS-SELECTION.
NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co. v. EDWARD MILLER.
A valid settlement right, existing at date of withdrawal on general route, excepts
the land covered thereby from the operation of said withdrawal, and such land
is thereafter open to settlement or entry by the first legal applicant.
The existence of a valid settlement claim at date of definite location excepts the
land included therein from the grant, and the failure of the settler to place his
claim of record cannot be called in question by the company.
No rights are acquired by the " selection " of land within granted limits, as the right
of the company is determined by the status of the land at the date the grant be-
comes effective by definite location.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, November
24, 1890.
I have considered the case of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company
v. Edward Miller, as presented by the appeal of the former from the
decision of your office, dated March 23, 1889, rejecting its claim to the
SW* of the SWJ of Sec. 19, T. 13 N., R. 19 W., Helena, Montana.
The acts are fully set out in said decision, from which it appears that
said tract is in an odd-numbered section within the withdrawal on gen-
eral route of February 21, 1872, and also within the primary limits of
the grant to said company by act of Congress approved July 2, 1864 (13
Stats., 365), upon the filing of the map of definite location on July 6,
1882; that on September 18, 1871, one Dennis K. Butler filed pre-emp-
tion declaratory statement No. 1964, for certain tracts in said section
alleging settlement thereon September 14, same year, and on July 29,
1872, filed his aendatory declaratory statement No. 2726, embracing
the tract in question, alleging settlement on the same day as in his first
filing; that on November 9, 1885, said Miller made homestead entry
No. 2975, of the SE of the NW-' and the E of the SWj of said sec-
tion, alleging settlement " in May, 1878," and on April 8, 1886, applied
to amend said entry so as to cover the tract in question. which was
pending when " The Northern Pacific Railroad Company selected the
WJ SWj, 19, July 28, 1886, list No. 11;" that on June 15, 1888, your
office ordered a hearing to determine the status of said tract at the date
of said withdrawal, and also, at the date of the definite location of said
road; that a hearing was duly had at which both parties were repre-
sented, and, upon the evidence submitted thereat, the local officers
found that said tract was excepted from the withdrawal on general
route by the settlement of said Butler, and from the grant by the set-
tlement of said Miller, and "that the railroad selection should be can-
celed and Miller allowed to amend his homestead entry."
On appeal, your office affirmed the findings of the local office and held
said " selection " for cancellation to the extent of the land in contro-
versy.
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It is insisted by the company in its appeals that it was error to hold
that " the pre-emption of Butler excepted the tract from the withdrawal
on general route," or " that the settlement of Miller excepted the land
from the grant on definite location," and it is claimed that the land,
upon the abandonment by Butler, became reserved from sale and entry,
except by the company, under the provision of the sixth section of said
granting act. This contention cannot be maintained.
Said granting act is in prcusenti, and the withdrawal on general route
took effect upon " the odd seetions hereby granted at the date thereof,
and if the odd sections or any part thereof were excepted from said
withdrawal, then they became subject to settlement or entry by the first
legal applicant. If the odd sections are not mineral and are "free froin
pre-emption, or other claims or rights at the time the line of said road
is definitely fixed, and a plat thereof filed in the office of the Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office," they pass under the express terms
of the grant to the company. (See sections 3 and 6 of the granting
act.)
But it must be held that the valid settlement of Butler excepted the
tract in question from said legislative withdrawal of 1872. (Harris v.
Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 10 L. D., 264; Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v.
Evans, 7 L. D., 131, and the numerous departmental decisions therein
cited.)
Since said tract was settled upon and occupied by said Miller, while
the same was subject to settlement and entry, and said settlement and
occupancy being valid and continuing at the (late of definite location,
served to except the tract from the grant to the company, and the fail-
ure of the entryman to place his claim of record cannot be called in
question by the company. (Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Kerry, 10 IL. D.,
290; Northern Pac. R. R. Co. v. Roberts, id., 427; Northern Pac. R. iR.
Co. v. Anrys 8 L. D., 362).
It is stated in your office decision that said tract was " selected " by
the company. This could give the company no advantage, for the rea-
son that the prior application of Miller to amend his homestead entry
reserved said tract, and also because being in the granted limits the
land either passed by the grant to the company or was excluded there-
from. (Roeschlaub v. Union Pac. R. . Co., 6 IL. D., 750; Northern
Pac. R. R. Co. v. johnson, 7 L. D., 357).
U1pon a careful examination of the whole record, no error appears in
the findings of the local office and the conclusions of your office. Said
decision is accordingly affirmed.
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TIMBER LANDS-ACT OF JUNE 3, 1878-JURISDICTION.
UNITED STATES V. MONTGOMERY ET AL.
Timbered land that is fit for cultivation by ordinary agricultural process, when the
timber is removed, is not subject to-entry under the act of June 3, 1878.
Until patent issues, the Department has authority to cancel an entry on sufficient
proof that the land is not subject to such appropriation, or that the entry is in
fraud of the law.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, November
24, 1890.
I have considered the case of the United States v. J. B. Montgomery,
E. W. Bingham, E. W. Rogers, Hamilton Knott and Ziba M. La Rue,
as presented by the appeals of the latter from the decision of your office,
dated June 21, 1888, holding for cancellation the following timber
land entries, in the Vancouver land district, in the State of Wash-
ington, namely: No. 2024, of the SW 4 of See. 10, made October 28,
1882, by said Montgomery; No. 2025, of the S J of NE i and N 4 of SE J
of See. 10, made December 13, 1882, by said Bingham; No. 2046, of
the WI of NE 4 and E J of NW 4 of See. 22, made December 13,
1882, by said Rogers; No. 2132, of the W. of NE. and E. of NW.1
of See. 18, made June 2, 1883, by said Knott; and No. 2133 of the NW.,'
of See. 28, made June 2, 1883, by said La Rue-all of said entries being
in township 9 north of range 1 west.
The local officers rendered an elaborate and exhaustive decision, in
which they state that all of said entries were held for cancellation for
fraud, " the first three upon the reports of Special Agent S. P. C. Stubbs,
made October 30, and November 3, 1885, and the last two upon the re-
ports of Special Agent J. A. Munday, made March 8, and 9,1886;" that
hearings were ordered by your office letters, dated April 2, and June 14,
1886, which were had, beginning on September 20, and ending October
9. same year that said Special Agent unday represented the United
States at said hearing, and the defendants were represented by counsel,
who were duly authorized so to do; that following the ruling in the case
of George W. Macey et al. (5 L. D., 52), the local officers considered all
of said cases in one decision, because the entries were all made under
the same act, involve the same questions, affect the same parties in in-
terest, and are deemed " as integral parts of a general scheme, designe d
to vest in one and the same individual title to a large body of land ;'7
and that it was not possible to properly understand the bearing of said
entries upon each other, except by considering them together. The
local officers held that said cases involved but two points: (1) Would
the lands in question be unfit for cultivation if cleared l and (2) Were
the entries made in the interest and for the benefit of one and the same
party as alleged by the government ? that the defendants might insist
that there was a third question involved, namely: whether the lands
DECISIONS RELAT1( TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 485
are valuable chiefly for timber, but the local officers thought that it was
unnecessary to consider said question, for the reason that it may be
presumed that said lands were valuable for timber, for, if otherwise,
" defendant, Montgomery, would not have sough t title to them for that
purpose, and under the timber act ;" that it was clearly shown that the
value of the land for timber is only prospective, and will depend upon
transportation to be supplied in the future; that if a way of transpor-
tation of said timber be opened up, it would enhance the value of
the lands for agriculture, and the sale of the timber on said lands
would furnish funds sufficient in whole or part to pay the expense of
clearing the land and fitting it for cultivation; that it matters not
how dense or valuable the growth of timber may be on said lands, if,
when cleared, it would not be under the terms of the act "unfit for cul-
tivation," and that the only questions properly before the local officers
were, (1) the fitness of the lands for cultivation, and (2) were the entries
made fraudulently. The local officers reviewed at length the evidence
submitted. quoting freely from the testimony of the witness for the gov-
ernment and for the defendants, and decided "i that it is evident that
the lands in controversy are clearly susceptible of cultivation when the
timber is removed," citing as authority the cases of Spithill v. Gowen
(2 L. D., 631), and Rowland v. Clemens (id., 633). Upon the question
of fraud the local officers found that the lands covered by said entries
lie conveniently near railroad lands and other entries claimed by said
Montgomery, making a large and compact body of land; that final proofs
in support of nearly all of said entries were made by George F. White
afid Robert Rockwell, assisted by one George W. Taylor, who was " a
member of-White's household, and, like him, a professional timber
claim witness ;" that it was upon the testimony' of said witness that
the title to all of said land rested; that said White " finally became so
notorious as a witness in supposed fraudulent timber cases, and so bold
in his movements, that the then register and receiver refiused to accept
any further final proof from White," and advised the Department that
they were of the opinion that said White and said Montgomery, together
with one E. W. Bingham, " were conspirators in an effort to secure a
large body of timber land fraudulently." The local officers also refer
to the fact that final proof was made by said White and Rockwell in
support of the timber land entry in Sec. 28, T. 10 N., . 1 W., of one A.
J. Moss, and that prior to making said proof the land was entered under
the homestead law by one Woodward, who was then occupying and
successfully cultivating the same; that said Taylor was indicted for
perjury in the pre-emption proof in support of cash entry No. 2052,
made by Charles L. Large, of the NE. -' of See. 12, T. 9 N., R. 1 E., which
was canceled for fraud, together with several other cases, all of which,
in the opinion of the local officers, "' throws a suspicion over all testimony
given by White and Taylor and Rockwell, and with the testimony on
behalf of plaintiff overturns the prima facie ease made on final proof,
both as to unfitness for cultivation and good faith."
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The local officers further find that the witnesses White and Taylor,
in the case of Montgomery, and White and Rockwell, in the La Rue
and Knott cases, were employed and paid by said Montgomery, either
directly or indirectly, and that said entries were made by parties who
* knew little or nothing about them, and "' who were in the employ of or
indebted to J. B. Montgomery; that shortly after making final proof
said La Rue and Knott conveyed to said Montgomery, for the sum of
one dollar, the land covered by their respective timber entries; that
said White, who was a witness to the final proof in all of said cases,
was also the chief witness for the defense, and guided and controlled
the other witnesses, nearly all of whom had never been on a majority
of the claims prior to the time they went for the purpose of becoming
witnesses, and saw only that part which was pointed out to them by
said White; that none of the entrymen attended the hearings, except
*: ' Montgomery, who did not testify, and Rogers, who was called to the
witness-stand by the United States, although tey were not farther
away than Portland, Oregon. The local officers therefore concluded
from the testimony:
(1) That the lands embraced in the five entries herein are susceptible of ultiva-
tion by ordinary farming processes, when cleared, and hence not timber lands within
the meaning of the act of June 3, 1878; (2) that they were made on speculation, and
- in the interest of J. B. Montgomery, as component parts of a general scheme to secure
to himself title to a large body of timbered lands, in con travention of law.
From said decision of the local officers an appeal was duly taken by
said Montgomery, alleging therein several specifications of error, which
may be grouped under three heads, namely:-
1st. Want of jurisdiction in the local office to render any decision in
the premises, for the reason that final certificates had issued for the land
upon proofs regularly submitted and decided by the proper tribunal to
* be sufficient.
2d. Error in finding that the land was fit for cultivation by ordinary
methods of agriculture, and, hence, not subject to entry as timber land;
and
3d. Error in holding that said entries were made with fraudulent in-
tent, for the reason that the notice given of the hearing contained no
allegation of fraud, or notice that any other issue would be tried than
"the character of the land."
Your office, on June 21, 1888, considered said appeal, and found from
the testimony that the land embraced in said entries " would be suit-
able for cultivation when cleared;" that the effort of the defense to
show that the land was chiefly valuable for the timber thereon, if suc-
cessful, would make no difference, since it was shown by the testimony
that~the lands, if cleared, would befitfor cultivation.
Your office further found from the evidence, that said Montgomery
had purchased from the Northern Pacific Railroad Company its selec-
tions in said township; that the final proofs in nearly all of the timber
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land entries in said township were made by one George F. White and his
assistants, Robert Rockwell and George W. Taylor; that said White
and his assistants v ere hired, either directly or indirectly, by said Mont-
gomery to examine lands for him; that said White was the chief wit-
ness for the defendants, and guided the other witnesses in making an
examination of said lands, for the purpose of becoming witnesses at said
hearings; that White's testimony in said final proofs was impeached at
said hearings; that one of said entrymen, Bingham, was the attorney
of said Montgomery and had charge of the completion of the entries
and the payment of the purchase money in some instances, and the
question is asked: "Why did not Montgomery testify in his own behalf,
and refute the charge of conspiracy, or why did he nt put the entry-
man on the stand for the same purpose l"
Your office further found that the local officers had jurisdiction to
determine the question of fraud, for the reason that the entrymen were
duly advised of the charges contained in the reports of the special
agents, upon which their said entries were held for cancellation under
the provisions of circulars of July 31, 1885 (4 L. D., 503), and May 24,
1.886 (id., 515), and when they applied for hearings the parties had
already been advised of the allegations against their entries; that
under the well settled ruling of the Department, until the issuance of
patent, it has the jurisdiction to determine the validity of any entry,
upon any charge that may be brought against it; that the testimony
clearly shows that the lands in question " when cleared, would be sus-
ceptible of ordinary cultivation, and are not therefore such lands as
are contemplated by the act of June 3, 1878, and further that said en-
tries were procured to be made by James B. Montgomery, in his inter-
est in violation of law." Said entries were accordingly held for can-
cellation, and said Montgomery duly appealed to this Department,
alleging, substantially, the same errors as in his appeal from the decision
of the local land officers, and also that the notice for hearing contained
no suggestion or intimation that said entries were fraudulent.
On February 27, 1890, counsel for Montgomery was heard orally in
support of said appeal, and in addition to the points specially mentioned
therein contended strenuously that, as to the entries of Montgomery
and Bingham, which were made under the construction by the Depart-
ment of the timber land act then in force, they ought not to be disturbed
on account of the subsequent change of ruling by the Department; that
the rest of said entries should be allowed to go to patent, for the reason
that the lands are chiefly valuable for timber and unfit for cultivation,
and, if it shall be adjudged that said entries would be fit for cultivation
if cleared, then the Department should return to its former ruling and
make the value of the tract for the timber or stone, at the date of the
sale thereof, the criterion in determining whether it is subject to sale
under said act that the record fails to show that there was any fraud
committed by said entrymen in making said entries.
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The act of Congress, approved June 3, 1878 (20 Stat. 89), is entitled,
"An act for the sale of timber lands in the States of California, Oregon,
Nevada, and in WashiDgton Territory." The first section provides that
the surveyed public lands of the United States within said States, not
reserved,
Valuable chiefly for timber, but unfit for cultivation, and which have not been
offered at public sale according to law, may be sold to citizens of the United States
or persons who have declared their intention to become such, in quantities not ex-
:- - ceeding one hundred and sixty acres, to any one person or association of persons, at
the minimum price of two dollars and fifty cents per acre, and lands valuable chiefly
for stone may be sold on the same terms as timber lands.
The second section of said act provides that any person wishing to
purchase timber or stone land-
Shall file with the register of the proper district a written statement and dupli-
cate, one of which is to be transmitted to the General Land Office, designating by
i* legal subdivisions the particular tract of land he desires to purchase, setting forth
that the same is unfit for cultivation, and valuable chiefly for its timber and stone;
that it is uninhabited, contains no mining or other improvements, except for ditch
or canal purposes, where any such do exist, save such as were made by or belong to
the applicant, nor, as deponent verily believes, any valuable deposit of gold, silver,
cinnabar, copper, or coal; that deponent has made no other application under this act;
that hie has not, directly or indirectly, made any agreement or contract, in any way
or manner, with any person or persons whatsoever, by which the title which he
might acquire from the government of the United States should inure in whole or in
part to the benefit of any person, except himself.
It is also provided that " effect shall be given to the foregoing pro-
visions of this act by regulations to be prescribed by the Commissioner
- of the General Land Office."
On August 13, 1878, the Commissioner of the General Land Office
issued instructions to registers and receivers under said act, approved
by Secretary Schurz, which required the timber or stone applicant to
make oath to the duplicate statement required, to give due publication,
and make proof by " at least two disinterested witnesses " that the land
applied for is non-mineral in character, unoccupied and unimproved,
and, if no adverse claim be filed at the expiration of the sixty days'
notice by publication, upon receipt of the purchase money, the local
land officers were required to issue final entry papers for the land. (2
C. L. L., 1456.)
This statute has been frequently construed by the Department. In
the case of Spithill v. Gowen (2 L. D., 631), decided May 8, 1833, Mr.
Secretary Teller said:
All timbered lands are unfit for cultivation in their natural condition; but if they
may be redeemed and made susceptible of cultivation by ordinary farming process,
they are not, in my opinion, within the purpose of this act, which was intended to
embrace within its provisions timbered tracts only in broken, rugged ormountainous
districts, with soil unfit for ordinary agricultural purposes when cleared of timber.
This case was a contest between a pre-emptor and a subsequent tim-
ber land applicant, and the Department dismissed the timber applica-
tion and allowed the pre emption declaratory statement to remain intact.
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In the case of James W. Baird (10 C. L. O., 328), Secretary Teller also
said:
If a settler desires to make a home on the public land, he has the right to select a
timber lot, if he chooses; and, if he does select a timber lot, he will not select a poor
one, if he is wise. The timber may be the real inducement for him to make the se-
lection of the land; bt, if he goes on the land with the intention of settlement under
the laws, and carries out such intention by conforming to the provisions of the stat-
utes, and completes his title, he is not a trespasser.
In Hughes v. Tipton (2 L. D., 334-338), it was held that
the character of the soil at date of entry, apart from the character and value of the
trees then covering it, is the true test of its status as agricultural land .... . The
burden of proof must be on the timber applicant where the issue is on the character
of the land; for this law is an exception to the general settlement laws, and the per-
son claiming its benefits must show that his case comes within the exception.
See also Rowland v. Clemens (id., 633); Merrit v. Short et al. (3 L.
D., 435); Woolway v. Day (4 L. D., 164); Houghton v. Junett. (id.,
238); Ellis v. Moore (6 L. D., 630); Porter v. Throop (id., 691); Grove
v. Crook (7 L. D., 140) ; Reed v. Fitzgerald (8 L. D., 159).
The contention of counsel that Mr. Secretary Teller changed the for-
mer construction of said act, in the case of Spithill v. Gowen (supra) is
not supported by any departmental decision in the brief of counsel, nor
has any such ruling been brought to my attention. Spithill v. Gowen
did not specifically overrule any former decision of the Department.
It is quite evident that Congress was not actuated by the sole pur-
pose of receiving revenue from the sale of lands under the provisions of
said act. If such had been the object, the sale would not have been
limited to one entry of one hundred and sixty acres to each person, but
the lands would have been put up at auction for sale to the highest
bidder, without any limitation or restriction, except, perhaps, to fix a
minimum price for the sale of the lands.
It will hardly be necessary to cite many authorities in support of the
proposition that until patent is issued, this Department has the author-
ity to cancel entries upon sufficient proof, showing that the land was
not subject to such entry, or that the entry was made in fraud of the
law. Such has been the uniform practice of this Department, and is
sanctioned by the decisions of the United States supreme court. United
States v. Johnson et al. (5 L. D. 442) Leonard F. Case (6 L. D., 255);
John W. 8etchel (9 L. D., 573); Richardson v. Moore (10 L. D., 415);
Witherspoon v. Duncan (4 Wall., 210); Lee v. Johnson (116 U. S., 48).
There was no error therefore in exercisingjurisdiction in the premises,
by the local officers under the direction of your office.
The second and third divisions of errors assigned (supra) involve
mainly questions of fact upon which both the local office and your of-
fice agree. If the findings under the second head e correct, namely-
the land in question was fit for cultivation by ordinary agricultural
process, then the entries must be canceled, without regard to the ques-
tion of the good faith of the entrymen.
490 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
It is not deemed necessary to comment in detail upon the conflicting
testimony in the record. If the witnesses for the government are tobe
believed, then the lands in question when cleared will be fit for profit-
able cultivation by the usual methods of agriculture, and, on the con-
trary, the evidence in behalf of the defendants, if true, shows that theland in controversy will not be fit for profitable cultivation when
-cleared, and, hence, it was properly subject to entry nder said act.
In such case it must be evident that due weight should be given to the
concurring decisions of the local and your office.
In the case of Morfey v. Barrows (4 L. D., 135), Acting Secretary
Jenks said:
The local officers, before whom the witnesses personally appear, have the advan-
tage over appellate tribunals, from their opportunity to observe the appearance andbearing of the witnesses, their manner in giving their testimony, etc., for which
reason, especially in ase of contradictory evidence, the Department looks with great
respect upon the conclusions of the local office as to matters fact.' See also Kelley v.
Halvorson (6 L. D., 25); Austin v. Thomas (id., 330); Neff v. Cowhick (id., 660);
Chichester v. Allen (9 L. D., 302); Conly v. Price (id., 490); Collier v. Wyland (10 L.
D., 96).
While the evidence of the witnesses, relative to the character of the
land, must be almost wholly a matter of opinion, yet, taking into con-
sideration all of the evidence in the case, including the field notes of
survey, which show that the land in question is first and second rate,
and the general description states that the land in said township "is
well adapted to farming and grazing" (Vol.'5, p. 489, General Land
Office Records) there does not appear to be sufficient ground for dis-
turbing the conclusions of the local office and your office relative to the
character of the land.
Since said land was not subject to entry under said act, it will be un-
necessary to pass upon the question of fraud, for the entries must nec-
essarily be canceled.
- The decision of your office is accordingly affirmed.
Note-A similar ruling was made by Secretary Noble in the case of
the United States v. Joseph Hughes, William F. Hummel, Joseph J.
Meagher, James L. Jewett, and James B. Montgomery, decided Novem-
ber 24, 1890, and involving lands in township 9, range 1, west, Van-
eouver land district, Washington.
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RAILROAD GRANT-PRIVATE CLAIM-SURVEY.
SOUTHERN PACIFIC R. R. CO. V. MACKEL.
The land reserved by a private claim for a specific place, or rancho, is that included
within the boundaries of the claim as finally ascertained and confirmed.
The survey of a private claim, made under the act of July 1, 1864, that has not been
approved by the surveyor general, the General Land Office, or the Department, is
not effective as against the operation of a railroad grant.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, ANovem-
ber 24, 1890.
The attorney for the Southern Pacific R. R. Company has filed a mo-
tion for review of departmental decision of February 25, 1889, in the
case of said company v. James Mackel, involving lots 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and
12, Sec. 23, T. 2 S., L. 7 W. S. B. M., Los Angeles, California land dis-
trict.
It seems that in March 1887, Mackel applied to make timber culture
entry for said tracts which application was refused by the local officers.
On appeal to your office it was said:
The claim of the railroad company was finally rejected as to lots 7, 9, 10, and 11
of the section specified by departmental decision of February 19th 1884, in the case of
Charles Howard, and was finally rejected as to lot 8 of said section, by departmental
decision of April 11th 1887 in the case of E. E. Duncanson. It only remains therefore,
at this time to decide as to the right of said company to lot 12, applied for by Mackel.
As to this lot it was held that it was excepted from said grant by
reason of being embraced in the claimed limits of the Jurupa Rancho
at the date the grant to the company took effect.
In the departmental decision complained of the history of the action
bad in your office and this Department in reference to the tracts in-
volved in the Howard and Duncanson cases was recited and it was
said
It is not contended by the railroad company in its appeal that the status of lot 12
is different in any respect from that of the other lots. The contention is that not
only the decision appealed from but the decisions in the Howard and Duncanson
eases were erroneous.
In such interpretation of the law I do not concur. Your decision is in accordance
with the ruling of the supreme court in the case of Newhall v. Sanger (92 U. S. 761),
and is affirmed.
It is now sought to have that decision revoked on the ground that
the case of Newhall v. Sanger cited as authority therefor as construed
and explained in the case of United States v. McLaughlin (127 U. S.,
428), does not justify the conclusion reached.
The decisions of this Department upon the status of those tracts of
land involved in the Howard and the Duncanson cases were in accord
with the rulings of the Department in force at that time and had become
final before the decision in the McLaughlin case had been rendered by
the supreme court, and as between the parties to those cases would not
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now be disturbed. In the case now under consideration the parties are
different and as between these parties the question as to the status of
the land at the date the rights of said company attached under its grant
is not res judicata. Until such time, as the legal title to a tract of the
public land has passed out of the United States, the duty of passing
upon and deciding questions relating to the right to the title thereto is
cast upon this Department. In passing therefore upon Mackel's appli-
cation to enter, the claims of the railroad company as against the allow-
ance of such application should, and will be, taken into consideration.
The decision to be rendered herein, will not and can not affect any
rights that either Howard or Duncanson may have acquired under the
decision in his favor.
These tracts are within the primary limits of the grant of March 3,
1871 (16 tat., 579) to the Southern Pacific R. B. Company as shown by
the map of designated route filed April 3, 1871. An order of withdrawal
embracing said tracts was made April 21, and received at the local office
May 10,1871.
- The grant of the Jurupa Rancho was confirmed by the board of land
* commissioners in 1854 and that decision was in 1861 confirmed by the
district court, it being said in the decree of confirmation
The lands of which confirmation is hereby made are those known as " Jurupa"
situated in the county San Bernardino to the extent of eleven square leagues and
no more within the boundaries designated in the jridical possession given of said
lands to Juan Bandini.
This was a grant of a specific place or rancho and the donee was en-
titled to the whole tract accordingto theboundaries given, subject only
to the limitation imposed by the Mexican colonization law of 1824, lim-
iting all grants of this character to eleven square leagues in quantity.
The subsequent surveys of this grant demonstrated that the bounda-
ries set forth in the grant embraced a less quantity than eleven square
leagues. The only thing necessary to locate land included in this grant
was to ascertain and establish on the ground by proper survey the
boundary lines as designated by the decree of confirmation. For this
purpose a survey was made in 1869 which included within the boundaries
of said grant the tracts here in controversy. The grant as located by
this survey contained 33,819.11 acres, while the survey made in 1878
upon which patent was finally issued showed the grant to contain
32,259.16 acres. The survey made in 1869 was published in accordance
with the provisions of the act of July 1, 1864, and on February 26, 1872,
was approved by the surveyor general for the State of California. When
this survey was examined in your office it was decided on May 13, 1876,
that the lines as therein designated did not correspond with the bounda-
ries set forth in the record of the juridical possession, the survey was re-jected and the matter referred to the surveyor general with instructions
to amend the survey in accordance with the views in said letter set forth.
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Upon appeal to this Department that action of your office was by decision
of February 21,1877 (21 L. and R. 255), affirmed. The survey made in
1878 by which the tracts in controversy were det ermined to be outside
the limits of said rancho, was finally approved and on April 3, 1879,
patent was issued for the land thereby designated. It is contended
that these tracts were excepted from the operati on of the grant to the
railroad company because they were at the date the same took effect
within the claimed limits of Jurupa Rancho, as designated by the sur-
vey of 1869. The extent to which these private land grants are effect-
ive to exclude land from a subsequent grant was under consideration
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Doolan v.
Carr (125 U. S., 618), where it was said:-
Those Mexican claims were often described, or attempted to be described, by specific
boundaries. They were often claims for a definite quantity of land within much
larger outboundaries, and they were frequently described by the name of a place or
rancho. To the extent of the claim when the grant was for land with specific bound-
aries, or known by a particular name, and to the extent of the quantity claimed
within outboundaries containing a greater area, they are excluded from the grant to
the railroad company.
The same statement in effect was made in the case of the United
States v. McLaughlin (127 U. S., 428). Under the rule thus laid down
the land reserved by the Jurupa grant was that included within the
boundaries of the claim as confirmed, i. e., within the boundaries shown
by the record of the juridical possession. These boundaries were de-
termined on the ground by the survey of 1878 and hence the only
land reserved by said private grant was that within that survey. To
render a survey made under the act of July 1, 1864 effective, it was
necessary that it should be approved by the Commissioner of the Gen-
eral Land Office. The survey of this grant made in 1869 never received
the approval of your office or of this Department and in fact had not,
at the date the grant to the railroad company took effect, been approved
by the surveyor general. Such a survey was not effective to except
these tracts in controversy from the operation of the latter grant.
For the reasons herein set forth the departmental decision of Febru-
ary 25, 1889, is hereby revoked and set aside, and the decision of your
office of November 23, 1887, allowing Mackel's application is reversed
and said application is, for the reasons herein set forth, refused.
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RAILROAD GRANT-PROCEEDINGS ON FINAL PROOF-SELECTION-.
SOUTHERN PACiFIC R. R. Co. v. BARRY.
A railroad company claiming rights under a selection within a revoked indemnity
withdrawal, will not be heard to plead insufficient notice of an adverse settle-
ment claim, where it appears in response to the settler's published notice of in-
tention to submit final proof, files protest setting up its rights, and is duly heard
thereon.
A settlement claim, acquired and maintained in good faith after the revocation of an
indemnity withdrawal, is entitled to priority as against a subsequent selection
by the company.
Secretary Noble to the Qommissioner of the General Land Office, November
24, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of the Southern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany from the decision of your office of November 24, 1888, holding for
cancellation its selection of lot 2 of section 11, T. 3 N., R. 20 W., S. B.
M., Los Angeles, Cal.
The land selected is within the indemnity limits of the grant of March
3, 1871 (16 Stats., 579), to the branch line of the Southern Pacific Rail-
road Company, which became effective when the company's map of
designated route was filed in your office April 3, 1871. The indemnity
lands under this grant were withdrawn from market by order dated
April 21, 1871, and received at the local office on the 10th of the follow-
ing May. The order for this indemnity withdrawal was revoked by
subsequent order dated August 15, 1887, and the indemnity lands, ex-
cept those covered by approved selections, were restored to the public
domain and opened to settlement. See order referred to (6 L. D., 92),
and circular dated September 6, 1887 (6 L. D., 131). The order of re-
vocation took effect from its date, August 15, 1887, but filings and en-
tries were not to be received until notice of the restoration had been
given as required by the circular.
This notice was duly given, and Barry, the claimant, on the 27th of
October, 1887, filed his pre-emption declaratory statement for the land
in controversy, alleging settlem ent thereon October 1, 1887. This land
had not been selected by the railroad company at the time that the
order of revocation took effect (August 15, 1887,) but was included in
its selection of October 3, 1887, list 25, a few days subsequent to Barry's
alleged settlement.
On the 9th of May, 1888, Barry gave the req uired notice through the
register of the local land district, of his intention to make final pre-
emption proof before the county clerk at San Buena Ventura, on the
5th day of July, 1888. The railroad company appeared by attorney at
the same time and filed its protest, claiming the land in question under
its indemnity selection of October 3, 1887. The final proof of Barry,
taken under protest, was submitted to the land officers, who rejected
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the same on the ground that Barry had not complied with the require-
ments of the pre-emption law as to residence.
On appeal, this action of the local officers was reversed by your office,
and the conpany's selection of this land was held for cancellation.
The company appealed from that decision, and the case is now before,
this Department for consideration.
The specifications of error in substance allege:
1. Error in making a decision, Barry having failed to enter a contest against the
company's selection, as required by the rules of practice.
2. Error in holding that Barry's residence was such as required by the pre-emption
law; and
3. Error in holding the company's selection for cancellation.
As to the first of the alleged errors, it may be said that the rules of
practice (Nos. 1, 2, 8 and 9) referred to by counsel for the company, do
not require contests. A contest may be initiated by an adverse party
against a party to any entry or filing for good and sufficient cause af-
fecting the legality or validity of the claim, and provision is made for
conducting such contests, but they are not required. The circular
issued by this Department September 6, 1887, and above referred to as
relating to the restoration of indemnity land, provides, in substance,
that whenever application to file or enter is presented, alleging upon
sufficient prima facie showing that the land is not subject to the com-
pany's right of selection, notice thereof will be allowed thirty days after
service of said notice within which to present objections to the allow-
auce of said filing or entry.
Under the provisions of this circular the company was entitled to
notice of Barry's filing, and to thirty ays after receiving such notice
to present its objections to the claim; but the circular does not specify
when or by whom such notice shall be given. Notice by publication
was given in this case of Barry's intention to make his final proof and
present his pre-emnption claim. This notice exceeded thirty days, and
was intended for all parties, the railroad company included. The com-
pany appeared by counsel at the time appointed for making this final
proof, and filed its protest. The evidence, taken under protest, was
submitted to the local officers, who held the same to be insufficient.
The action of the local officers having been reversed, the company
has appealed to this Department and submitted its arguments, thus
showing it had ample notice of Barry's claim and sufficient opportu-
nity to present its alleged prior rights to the land under its selection.
It now contends that the Department had no authority to revoke the
indemnity withdrawal by its order of August 15, 1887. But this is not
an open question. The decisions of this Department in the cases of the
Southern Pacific Railroad Company v. Meyer (9 L. D., 250), of the same
company v. Cline (10 L. D., 31), and of Lane v. Southern Pacific Rail-
road Company (10 . D., 454), are conclusive on this point. They not
only recognize the right of the Secretary to revoke an order withdraw-
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ing indemnity lands under a railroad grant, but hold that a settlement
made on such lands after the order of revocation entitles the settler to
a priority of right over a selection of the same land subsequently made
by a railroad company. The settler, however, must prove that he
acted in good faith and in compliance with the settlement law, to en-
title him to the land.
In this case, the proof shows that Barry settled on this land October
1, 1887, several days prior to the selection by the railroad company, and
this selection remains unapproved. On the day of settlement Barry
built a house on the land and took possession of it with his family, and
elaiths that his residence has been continuous, except when absent on
account of sickness in his family. About the Ist of November, 1887,
one of his children being severely ill, he went with his family to San
Buena Ventura, where the sick child could have medical treatment;
and was detained there by the continued sickness of this child and the
confinement of his wife until March 1, 1888, when he returned to the
land with his family and remained there continuously until he made
his final proof. Being a surveyor by occupation, he was occasionally
absent, as explained in his final proof, looking after and attending to
work connected with his business.
Having established a residence on the land, and having no other
home, temporary absences, occasioned by illness or for the purpose of
making alivelihood, do not justify a presumption of abandonment. (See
Evan L. Morgan, 5 L. D., 215; Houf v. Gilbert, id., 238; John W. Al-
derson, 8 L. D., 517; Helen E. Dement, id., 639).
According to the evidence, Barry frequently returned to the land
when his family were in San Buena Ventura, and ate and slept there,
thus evincing good faith and a determination to make the tract a per-
manent home. The house built on this land was constructed of boards;
it was twelve by fourteen feet in size, one story high, with window, door
and floor, and valued at fifty dollars. The land itself, containing 17.55
acres, was enclosed, and the greater part, if not the whole of it, was
under cultivation after Barry made his settlement; the crop was har-
vested shortly before the final proof was made. It is said that the crop
was put in and harvested by another party, and it does not appear what
interest in it was owned by Barry; but there seems to be no contention
as to the crop, and as the land was under cultivation after Barry's set-
tlement, the cultivation should inure to his benefit.
The ease of the Central Pacifie Railroad Company v. Geary (7 L. D.,
149), referred to by counsel for the Southern Pacific Railroad Company,
differs materially from the case under consideration. At the time that
Geary submitted his final proof although he gave notice by publication
of his intention, the Central Pacific Company made no appearance, filed
no protest at that time, and presented no brief in support of its right
to make selection of the land. This Department, in that presentation
of the case, held that the claimant sould have special notice.
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But in the pending case, the Southern Pacific Railroad Company
availed itself of the published notice given by Barry, appeared by
counsel at the time of making his final proof; protested against its
being allowed, and subsequently, on appeal, filed specifications of error,
and supported the same with a carefully prepared argument.
The company has had its day in court, and its right to make selection
of this land having been considered, no exception to a want of notice
can now be sustained. There are other distinguishing features between
the Geary and the pending case, but they need not be referred to at
present.
Barry's settlement on the land in controversy, being subsequent to
the revocation of the indemnity withdrawal as above mentioned, and
prior in point of time to its selection by the railroad company, has
priority of right to the said land, and this right will be sustained, pro-
vided the claimant be able to show that he has subsequently acted in
good faith and in compliance with the provisions of the pre-emption
law.
The decision of your office, holding the company's selection of this
tract for cancellation, is therefore hereby affirmed.
HOMESTEAD CONTEST-FAILURE TO ESTABLISH RESIDENCE.
LA BARRE v. HARTWELL'S HEIRS.
The plea of sickness and poverty can not be received as an excuse for failure to estab-
lish residence within the requisite period, unless good faith is clearly shown, and
it is apparent that such failure is due to the causes alleged.
Secretary Noble to te Commissioner of the General Land Offire, November
24, 1890.
This motion is filed by the heirs of Helen B. Hartwell, deceased,
asking for a review and reconsideration of the decision of the Depart-
ment of April 10, 1890, in the above stated case.
The decision of the Department now sought to be reviewed reversed
the decision of your office of November 23, 1888, dismissing the con-
test of La Barre, and held that the claimant never built or placed a
house upon her homestead, nor established actual residence thereon
from the date of entry up to the date of her decease; that there being
no evidence that she was prevented by sickness, poverty, or climatic
reasons from living upon her homestead and establishing actual resi-
dence thereon within six months after entry, such failure should be
treated as an abandonment of her entry, and any cultivation of said
tract by her heirs after her decease can not avail or care the default of
the entryman. This was substantially the finding of the Department,
in the decision now complained of.
2497-vOL 11--32
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A review of this decision is asked upon the following grounds.
1. The Hon. First Assistant Secretary erred in holding that Helen E. Hartwell, the
decedent, was not prevented by sickness or poverty from establishing a residence on
said land before the expiration of the first six months.
2. He erred in holding that the improvements and cltivation by the heirs of the
decedent's death did not enre any laches she may have committed.
3. He erred in holding that decedent was not taken sick until August 28, 1881, and
before the expiration of the first six months.
6. He erred in holding that because decedent did not establish a residence on said
land or bnild a house thereon within six months that such failure should be treated
as an abandonment of said land by her.
The entry in controversy was made February 25, 1881, and the entry-
man died September 17, 1881, without having established an actual
residence on the land. These facts are admitted, but it is contended
that the claimant was taken sick prior to the expiration of six months
from date of entry, and under the ruling in the cases of Grimshaw v.
Taylor, 6 L. D., 254, and Nilson v. St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba
Railroad Company, lb., 567, her failure to establish residence within
that period is therefore excusable and can not be treated as an aban-
donment of the land.
The six months from date of entry expired August 25, 1881. In the
decision of the Department it is stated, that " during the summer of
1881 decedent was employed teaching school, and about August 28,
1881, she became sick and went to the house of one Henry Gardiner, in
sections 24 and 25, township 103, and died there September 17, Th81.7)
There seems to be no question that the claimant was not confined to
her bed with sickness until August 28, as above stated, but it is con-
tended that the testimony shows that she was sick prior to that time,
It is also shown by the testimony that the same day the decedent made
her homestead entry, she also made final proof and entry of her re-
emption claim, which she sold on the same day to George S. Bidwell,
reserving the shanty on said claim, intending to remove it to her home-
stead. The evidence shows that she never built or placed a house
upon her homestead, nor established an actual residence thereon, and
that after her death Bidwell removed the shanty from the pre-emption
claim to his own homestead.
It may be admitted that Miss Hartwell was taken sick prior to Au-
gust 25, as contended for by counsel, but notwithstanding this admis-
sion it does not appear that sickness, poverty or climatic reasons pre-
vented her from building a house and establishing a residence upon the
tract within the six months from date of entry.
The rule that the settler must within six months after making his
entry establish his actual residence in a house upon the land is a
regulation of the Department, and a failure to comply with it will be
considered as evidence of abandonment of the land, unless the utmost
good faith be shown. f as in the cases of Grimshaw v. Taylor, 6 L.
D., 254, and Nilson v. St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railroad.
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Company, b., 567, the subsequent conduct of the entryman showed
that it was his bonafide intention to acquire the tract for a home, and
that the failure to establish actual residence within said period was
only prevented by poverty, sickness, or other unavoidable causes, such
failure would not sustain a charge of abandonment, and the settler
would be allowed to perfect his entry. Bt there is not sufficient evi-
dence in this case to warrant the finding that this entrymani was pre-
vented from establishing a residence upon the tract, and the fact that on
the day she made her homestead entry she made proof and payment on
her pre-emption claim, which she immediately sold, reserving the shanty
for the purpose of removing it to her homestead, and the failure to take
any action looking to the establishment of a residence upon the claim
from the (late of entry to the month of August, may all be taken into
consideration in determining whether the entry was made with bona
fide intention of acquiring the tract for a home.
Upon a full consideration of this case, I see no sufficient reason for
disturbing the deciion of the Department.
The motion is refused.
PRACTICE-APPE AL-INTERVENOR.
ABRAHAM V. GAMMON.
An appeal by one not a party to the record, will not be entertained, in the absence
of due showing as to the nature of the interest claimed by the intervening ap-
pellant.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, November 24,1890.
On April 5, 1882, Frederick W. ammon made homestead entry of
the SE. of Sec. 31, T. 104 N., B.. 61 W., Mitchell, Dakota. On Janu-
ary 20, 1883, he commuted the same to cash entry, and final certificate
No. 9014 was issued.
On February 3, 1886, Will G. Abraham filed his affidavit of contest
against the entry, charging substantially that during the time claimant
held said tract as a homestead he and his family resided in Mitchell,
Dakota, continuously.
A hearing was ordered, service being had by publication. The regis-
ter and receiver recommended the cancellation of the entry, and by
your office letter of lay 27, 1889, you affirm that judgment.
One 0. T. Letcher brings this appeal from your said office decision.
He is not a party to the record, and there is nothing to show that he is
a transferee of the entryman.
Rule 102 of the Rules of Practice provides as follows: "1 No person
not a party to the record shall intervene in a case without first disclos-
ing on oath the nature of his interest."
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There has not been a compliance with the requirements of this rule.
On July 23, 1889, Mr. J. M. Adams, attorney for contestant filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal herein, for the reasons above assigned.
Notice of this motion was served by registered letter upon David W.
Scott, attorney for appellant herein, on July 24, 1889.
For failure to comply with the requirements in such cases, the motion
is sustained and the appeal dismissed.
Mary L. Tiffany, 7 L. D., 480; Scott Rhea, 8 L. D., 578; Emmert v.
Jordan, 9 L. D., 249; Elmer E. Bush, Ibid., 628.
The papers transmitted are herewith returned.
TIMBER CULTURE CONTEST-" DEVOID OF TIMBER."
ZORNE V. REID.
A timber culture entry within a section containing a natural growth of valuable tim-
ber trees is invalid, and will be canceled.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, Novernber 25, 1890.
I have considered the case of Joseph Zorne v. John W. Reid on appeal
by the former from your decision of May 1, 1889, dismissing his contest
against the timber culture entry of the latter for the E. J SE. J Sec. 26,
T. 4, R. 11, Kirwin, Kansas land district.
On January 2,1880, Reid made timber culture entry for said land,
and on July 23, 1886, Zorne filed affidavit against the same alleging
that said entry was made in fraud and violation of law; that at the
date of said entry there was a large amount of timber in said section of
natural growth, to wit, ash, elm, hackberry, cottonwood and box elder,
ranging in size from one and a half inches to twenty inches in diame-
ter and a large quantity of stumps of same kind from which timberhad
been cut; that said timber is fit for use for very many practical pur-
poses on a farm.
Notice thereof was served on the entryman, the case being set for
September 6, 1886. Continuances of the hearing were had until No-
vember 5th following when the testimony was taken and considered by
the local officers, and they found that the allegations were sustained by
the evidence, and recommended the cancellation of said entry, from
which decision the entryman appealed, and your office decision of May 1,
1889, reversed said decision and dismissed the contest, from which the
contestant. appealed to this Department.
The testimony shows that this section is not devoid of timber, but on
the contrary that there is a thrifty growth of ash, elm, hackberry and
box elder, with a few cottonwood trees growing upon it-not merely
fringing a stream-but scattered in groves about the section in the lower
portions of the land. The weight of the testimony shows from five
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thousand to six thousand trees from one and a half inches to twenty
inches in diameter upon the land and that there are about three hun-
dred stumps of various sizes from seven to twenty-two inches in diame-
ter, from which timber had been cut.
A number of the witnesses say the section has always been consid-
ered a timber section, others say it has been regarded as prairie land,-
all agree that the timber on the land is increasing rapidly by natural
growth, and that prairie fires and stock ranging over the land formerly
interfered to some extent with the growth of timber.
The entryman introduced in evidence the record showing that his
application to enter said tract had been rjeeted by the local officers on
the ground that the land was not subject to timber culture entry, from
which action he appealed, and to secure favorable action by the Com-
missioner he sent to the General Land Office the joint affidavit of a Mr.
Baffington and a Mr. Kellum, who swear positively that " they know of
their own personal knowledge that there is no timber whatever in said
entire section, and that the only indications of timber in said section
are two stumps left where trees had been cut off, and some small scrub
brush in heads of drains."
This affidavit was ex parte and neither of these men was called as a
witness at the hearing, or was ever cross examined. Not only so, but
these statements were untrue, or all the witnesses in this case have
sworn falsely at the hearing. Even the witnesses for the entryman
admit there are several hundred trees over seven inches in diameter
and one says there were several hundred "poles" between four and
seven inches in diameter, that he did not count as timber.
Taking the case as it stands it is quite apparent that this entryman
felt that if by any means he could secure this entry. he could hold it,
and have the benefit of the timber growing upon it, as well as the bene-
fits ordinarily accruing to a timber culture entry.
It is true that the rulings of the Department at the time this entry
was made were quite liberal. A few "scrubby pines " scattered about,
or trees and brush merely fringing a stream and kept alive by the
moisture of the water of the creek or river and its occasional overflows,
would not prevent a timber culture entry being made for the land, but
a line must be drawn somewhere, ad, where thousands of trees of va-
rious varieties are growing in groves on the tillable lands, and hundreds
of stumps from eighteen to twenty-two inches, prove that other trees
have grown there, the case is beyond the most liberal construction ever
placed upon the law, and it is certainly past the point where the line
should be drawn. A step beyond this case and the forests of the west
would beentered under the timber culture law. Nature has supplied this
section with timber, and according to the testimony, had done so prior
to this entry. The presence of three hundred stumps, some of which
are twenty-one inches in diameter and the presence ot several hundred
trees from seven to twenty inches in diameter, prove conclusively that
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while there may not have been as many trees upon the land when the
entry was made as at date of contest, there was such a growth of tim-
ber as would take the land out of the class open to timber culture entry,
and render the entry invalid.
Your decision is reversed, and the entry will be canceled.
RAILROAD GRANT-INTDIAN COUNTRY-SETTLEMENT RIGHTS.
OSTLUND V. NORTHIERN PACIFICR. R. Co.
Settlement on an odd numbered section which lies partly within the former bounda-
ries of the "Indian country," claimed by the Wahpeton and Sisseton Sioux, and
wholly within the limits of the grant to the Northern Pacific, does not, on the
extinction of the Indian title, confer any rights as against said grant, if the set-
tlement is on that part of the land lying within the Indian conntry.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Leand Offee, November
25, 1890.
The record in the case of Jonas Ostlund v. Northern Pacific Railroad
Company shows that on July 5, 1871, Ostlund settled on the NE. of
Sec. 33, T. 146 N., R. 51 W., Fargo, Dakota. At the time of his settle-
ment all of said tract, excepting about twenty acres along the northern
boundary thereof; was within the Indian country formerly claimed by
the Wahpeton and Sisseton bands of the Sioux Indians, and the whole
of said tract was within the limits of the withdrawal for the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company, ordered March 30, 1872, on the map of gen-
eral route, also within the granted limits as defined by the map of defi-
nite location, filed with the Secretary of the Interior May 26, 1873.
The Goose River is the northern boundary of the Indian country, and
flows eastwardly through this land, leaving about twenty acres of the
northern portion thereof subject to pre-emption, at the time of Ostlund's
settlement in 1871.
By letter of March 11, 1886, your office allowed Ostlund to file his
declaratory statement for the land in dispute. From that action the
defendant herein appealed, claiming that at the time Ostlund settled
on the land it was not open to settlement by reason of the same being
Indian land and occupied as such by the said bands of Indians.
On said appeal the Secretary ordered a rehearing by the register and
receiver to determine whether the settlement of Ostlund in 1871 was
made north or south of the Goose river, that is: whether within or be-
yond the limits of the Indian country. (See case of Northern Pacific
Railroad Company v. Ostlund, 5 L D., 670.) The register and receiver
found that his settlement was, and still remains, south of the river, and
so within the Indian lands. On this finding of fact, which is conceded
to be true, your office awarded the land to the railroad company, and
held the filing of Ostlund for cancellation, and Ostlund now appeals to
this Department.
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This Department in the case of Hogland v. tbe Northern Pacific
Railroad Company (5 C. L. U., 107,) held that all lands wholly within
the Indian country and embraced within the limits of the withdrawal
for said railroad vested in the company under the terms of the grant,
upon the extinguishment of the title of the Wahpeton and Sisseton
bands of the Sioux Indians. Their title' was fully extinguished by
treaty on the 19th of May, 1873. This was also ruled in the case of
Buttz v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company, 119 U. S., 55.
The, disposition to be made of lands settled upon prior to the extin-
guishment of the Indian title, which, as in this case, lay partly within.
the Inldian country and wholly within the withdrawal for the railroad,
was determined in the unreported departmental decision of July 29,
1880. relative to claims of settlers along Goose River.
The rule laid down by said decision was in brief that if the residence
an(l settlement of the claimant were upon the Indian lands, he could
have no right of pre-emption to any part of the land covered by his
filing. But if his residence was on that portion of the claim not em-
braced in the Indian country, such residence and settlement drew to it
the constituent portion of the legal subdivision upon which it was made.
(See 5 L. D., sapra.) Under the rule so adopted, the residence of Ost-
lund, having been within the Indian country, he acquired no rights by
his settlement as against the defendant. Had he settled north of Goose
river, that is, outside the Indian country, such settlement being on land
subject thereto, he would have been allowed to hold thereunder the
constituent portion of the two quarter quarter sections (smallest legal
subdivisions) embraced in his filing, notwithstanding much the larger
portion of such subdivisions was on land not open to settlement.
At the time of the adoption of the rule above mentioned, many other
plans were suggested and maturely considered by the Department, and
this one adopted as being on the whole the most equitable and just to
the settlers, and, although, as in this case, it may at times work a hard.
ship to the settler, I see no reason to change it after it has been fol-
lowed for ten years.
Counsel for plaintiff has submitted an ingenious argument, insisting
that at the time Ostlund settled on this land it was not Indian land,
because in 1864 the government had treated with the Red Lake and
Pembina bands of the Chippewa Indians for the same land, therefore
the Wahpetons and Sissetons had no claim thereto, and the land was
open to settlement in 1871. (See case of flogland v. N. P. R. R. Co.,
supra.)
Without noticing this argument in detail, it is sufficient to say that
this Department, Congress and the highest judicial tribunal of the gov-
ernment have recognized their title, and I do not now feel at liberty to
question the wisdom of such judgment
The decision of your office is affirmed.
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REVIEW-RES JUDICATA-SCHOOL LAND.
MICHAEL DERMODY (ON REVIEW).
The final decision of the Secretary of the Interior is not subject to review by his sue-
cessor in office.
Where the State takes school indemnity for land returned as mineral it is estopped:
from asserting a further claim to the basis even though it is in fact agricultural
land.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, Novem..
ber 25, 1890.
I am in receipt of your letter of June 19, 1890, in which you state,
"I have the honor to transmit herewith a motion for review of your
decision of April 9, 1890, in the case of Michael Dermody (10 L. D.,
419).
The motion transmitted by you is one by Michael Dermody 'i for re-
view on error of the Department decision rendered August 12, 1881,
canceling the homestead entry of Peter Dermody now deceased, as to,
N. of the NE. of section 16, T. 35 N., R. 9 W., Durango, Colorado.
Admitting that Michael Dermody is the legal representative of Peter
Dermody he has no more right in the present instance, than would be
possessed by Peter Dermody were he still living, and an application by
the latter for a review would be denied for the reason that the decision
of Secretary Kirkwood iii the case has become final, and can not be
reviewed by the present head of the Department. This doctrine is so
well settled that no lengthy discussion of the same is necessary. J.
H. Tiopperud (10 L. D., 93) and cases therein cited.
The motion iss therefore denied.
Michael Dermody asserts that his brother Peter and himself have
maintained possession of the tract since 1875, and have improved and
cultivated the same, and he asks that some relief be extended to him
by the Department.
This land was returned by the surveyor as mineral and was so desig-
nated on the plat, and it is contended that under the grant of school
lands to Colorado, said land could not pass to the State even though
such an award was made by this Department.
If the land is in fact mineral, it can neither be taken un ler the grant
by the State, nor by Dermody as agricultural land. If it is in fact agri-
cultural land it passes to the State under the grant. The presumption
that it is mineral which arises from such a return by the surveyor, may
be overcome by testimony. (U. S. Mining Laws and Regulations there-
under, Circular of October 31, 1881).
If, acting upon the returns of the surveyor, the State applied for, and
accepted indemnity for this tract, she is estopped from asserting any
further claim to the same, even though it is agricultural land, but it
should be considered public land subject to disposal under the public
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land laws. If it should be found on investigation that the facts, as
above suggested, warrant this conclusion and Dermody should apply
to enter the land as a homestead, his application should be considered
upon its merits as an application for public land, and in such an event
the departmental decision of April 9, 1890, should not be construed as-
denying his iight to make entry for the tract in question.
HOMESTEAD CONTEST-RESIDENCE.
HILTON V. SKELTON.
Temporary absences on business may be excused, where residence is established to
the exclusion of a home elsewhere, and the improvements demonstrate the claim-
ant's good faith.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the Generar
Land Office, November 25, 1890.
Boyington Skelton made homestead entry No. 4839 on June 10, 1882,
for the SE. i See. 12, T. 5 S., R. 69 W., Denver, Colorado.
On January 31, 1887, F. W. H1ilton filed a contest against said entry,
charging that claimant
has wholly abandoned said tract; that he has changed his residence therefrom for
more than six months since making said entry; that said tract is not settled upon,
and cultivated by said party as required by law; that said Skelton never established
a bona fide residence on said tract.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was duly had-both parties being pres--
ent-and upon the testimony taken, the register and receiver sustained
the contest and recommended the cancellation of the entry. Upon ap-
peal, your office, by letter of May 17, 1889, reversed said judgment and
held, " as facts, that claimant established a bona fide residence on the
land in 1882, and maintained the same up to the date of the hearing,
and that he has cultivated and improved the land and complied in good
faith with all the requirements of the law and the regulations of the.
Department." From this decision contestant appeals, alleging sub-
stantially the following grounds of error:
1. That the decision is unsupported by the facts and against the-
weight of the evidence.
2. It was error to dismiss the contest.
Claimant is thirty-eight years old and has lived in Colorado twenty-
six years; he is unmarried, and prior to the entry lived with his father
about one and a half miles from the land; about June, 1882, he con-
structed upon the land a single-room frame house, with one doorandone-
window, comfortable at all seasons in the year, and respectable in ap-
pearauce.
It appears that eighty acres of this tract was claimed by John P.
Marston, or his stepson Hall, and after claimant had entered the land,
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he purchased from them their possessory right, giving therefor $218,
and a span of horses.
Ulairnaut fenced the entire tract with barbed wire, red spruce posts,
boile-d in tar and placed two rods apart; he placed his stock, consisting
of horses and cattle, on the land. Hb used it as a stock ranch until 1884,
being too dry, as he thought, to cultivate; in that year he sowed a
piece of wheat; in 1886 he plowed twenty acres and sowed a part of it
in wheat; he then organized a company to get water across a sag a
mile long and twenty-four feet deep. This was constructed at a cost of
$3,000.00, claimant owning one-third interest. By means of this water
system his whole tract can be irrigated. He also constructed a lake,
covering forty acres, with an embankment from five to twelve feet on
the west side, and fifty feet at the base, at a cost of $,000.00. He ex-
pended in all about $3,500.00 on the land. In the spring of 1887, he
sowed twenty acres of oats and constructed ditches leading from the
water pipe to his land.
There is little controversy over the improvements or amount ex-
pended on the land; the principal inquiry relates to the matter of resi-
Aence.
Marston and his stepson Hall, from whom claimant purchased the
possessory right to eighty acres of the land, are the principal witnesses
against the entry. The evidence given by them and others is of a neg-
ative character. Marston swears: I have found him at his home with
his father and mother when ever I have found him at all, without I
have found him in town." I never met him but once on the land. I
have lived by it for eight years and in plain view. I have been on it
several hundred times in last five years. I am hunting and fishing on
the lake every day when it is favorable. Mr. Skelton has not lived on
the place. I understood he lived with his father and mother." Other
witnesses, Hall, Brooks and Elliott, also give evidence of frequently
being at the place and failure to see claimant thereabouts. There is
-also evidence tending to show mealger preparations for housekeeping;
that the floor of the house was found torn up several times, and claim-
ant not about the premises. Claimant swears that, as soon as he built
his house, he put therein his furniture, consisting of a bed, bedding,
veooking utensils, dishes and provisions, and occupied the place as a
home thereafter; that the first year he was on his land nearly every
day, sleeping there at night and also taking his meals there; that his
residence was continuous all the time: he made several trips away on
business, but always returned to the land, and often found on his return
that his house had been broken into, his things disturbed and his floor
torn up; that he repeatedly repaired his house, and never found out
who had done the mischief; that he always left his furniture in the
house when he went away; that his business as a breeder of fine stock
necessarily kept him from home. He has three imported Norman
horses, worth $9,000.00, and he has kept them a few weeks at a time in
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Denver and other places; he was also in Denver during the sitting of
the legislature, looking after certain measures of legislation pertaining
to stock, and while there rented a room. He swears his home was not
with his father, but on the contrary on the land, and in this he is cor-
roborated by several witnesses, among whom is his mother, who swears
he has not lived with her since he made the entrv. He admits frequent
absences from the land; admits he occasionally ate and slept at his
father's, but swears he had no other home' besides the land in contro-
versy.
It is said in Edwards v. Sexson (1 L. D., 63), that in every possible
case actual personal continuous residence is not necessary, and in the
ease of Patrick Manning, 7 L. D., 144, it is said,
Actual presence on the land is necessary in the first instance in order to acquire
residence, as the entryman must go on the land for that purpose, but continuous pres-
ence, thereafter is not essential to the continuity of such residence.
Each case, however, must depend upon the facts and circumstances
surrounding it, and if it can be gathered or inferred therefrom that the
eutryman established his residence upon the land in good faith, with
the intent to make it his home as evidenced by his residence, cultiva-
tion and improvement, then he should be awarded the tract although
he may be temporarily absent therefrom at short intervals on business
or for the purpose of earning means to improve the tract.
In this case the entryman, although not at all times on the land, has
no other recognized home; his improvements abundantly demonstrate
his good faith. I agree with you that the evidence shows that he es-
tablished a bona fide residence on the land in 1882 and maintained the
same up to the date of the hearing.
Your said office decision is affirmed, and the contest is dismissed.
PROCEEDINGS BY THE GOVERNMENT-SECOND H1OMESTEAD.
UNITED STATES V. ALEXANDER.
In proceedings by the government against an entry, a stranger to the record, alleg-
ing intervening settlement rights, will not be heard to set up his claim, but
must await the disposition of the pending action.
The Land Department has authority to cancel an entry where it is duly shown to
have been procured through false testimony.
A second homestead entry will not be allowed to one who has perfected title under a
former entry; and such an entryman will not be heard to allege that his first
entry was in fact illegal, and fraudulent, and hence no bar to the second.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, November 26, 1890.
I have considered the case of the United 'States v. Charles G. Alex-
ander on his appeal from your decision of April 27, 1889, holding for
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cancellation his commuted homestead entry for the NW. i Sec. 17, T.
36 S., R. 25 E., Lakeview Oregon land district.
On October 12, 1880, he made homestead entry for this tract and
commuted the same to cash entry on June 20, 1883, and received final
certificate therefor.
On July 31, 1886, Special Agent McCormick reported that said entry-
man had exhausted his right of entry by making a homestead entry in
California at the Stockton land office and the entry in controversy was
thereupon held for cancellation, and on November 5, 1886, Alexander
was, by your office, given sixty days in which to apply for a hearing.
On January 7, 1887, he made such application supported by his affi-
davit which contains among other averments the following:
That prior to making this said entry (in the Lakeview district) I had never made
a homestead entry under any of the laws of the United States of America. I fur-
ther say I did not make homestead entry No. 755 in the Stockton California Land dis-
trict. At the time it is alleged I mnade final proof and commuted said entry at Stock-
ton, Cala., to wit, November 16, 1872,1 was residing in Tehama county, Cala., engaged
in the general merchandise business . . . . I was not within the Stockton land
district during the said month of November 1872 . . . . nor was I in said land
district dring said year 1872 except to pass through it on the cars without stopping,
while on my way . . . . If any entry was made in my name either nder the
pre-ernption or homestead laws in said Stockton land district, it was done without
my knowledge, and was a fraud upon my rights and upon the rights of the govern-
ment of the United States. This application for a hearing is made in good faith and
not for the purpose of delay.
Upon this showing a hearing was granted, on May 13, 1887, and the
same was set for November 21, 1887, and Special Agent Brockenbrough
was directed to appear on behalf of the government. The hearing was
continued from time to time until July 10, 1888, when the entryman ap-
peared in person and by counsel, and the government produced in evi-
deuce the original papers in the Stockton California entry in the name
of Alexander, and also a duly certified copy of a deed executed by him
to one Pickens for the land entered.
On being confronted with this evidence Alexander went upon the
witness stand and testified among other things, that he was forty-one
years of age and resided in Warner Valley; that the entry made at
Stockton land office and the commuting of the same was made in his
name by J. A. Pickens, who lived in resno county California, and was
engaged in speculating in lands. He denies having ever seen the land
or having been at the land office; that he was engaged in merchandis-
ing. The patent eame to Pickens and he (Alexander) made a deed to
him (Pickens). Pickens said to him " sign these papers and I can get
some land," he signed them and made the affidavits; does not know
whether they were filled up or not. Pickens had assisted him in getting
a clerkship and he signed the papers to help him get the land as a mat-
ter of friendship, received no compensation therefor. Hle (Alexander),
had been in the confederate army three years.
Upon this testimony the local officers found that he had exhausted
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his right to make homestead entry and recommended the entry in con-
troversy for cancellation, from which action Alexander appealed to
your office and on April 27, 1889, you affirmed said decision and held
the entry for cancellation, whereupon he appealed to this Department.
He assigns as error:
First: That the Commissioner erred in holding that claimant had exhausted his
rights, etc.
Second: In holding that a person who had borne arms agaiast the government of
the U. S. could, prior to revision of the statutes of the U. S. make a homestead entry.
The so called first homestead entry having been made under the act of Congress ap-
proved May 20, 1862 and before the enactment of Sec. 2289 (Rev. Stat.).
Third: In not holding that the entryman was enti tled to make a homestead entry
under Sec. 2289 (Rev. Stat.) even though he had made an entry under the act of Con-
gress approved May 20, 1862.
Pending this appeal, Henry N. Copp, attorney for Nehemiah Fine,
filed, on September 14, 1889 in your office, an application that Fine be
allowed to appear in the case as an intervenor, and the same is sup-
ported by the affidavit of Fine corroborated by several witnesses setting
forth that in 1888, immediately after the local officers had recommended
the cancellation of Alexander's entry he (Fine) had gone upon the land
to make a settlement and that he had built a house thereon and moved
his family into the same, and that he had earnestly tried to make a
settlement and residence on the land and had applied to enter the same;
that Alexander and his hired men had torn down his (affiant's) house
and carried away the material at two different times; that he had re-
built each time and was continuing to live on the land; that Alexander
had transferred his interest in the land to one H. C. Wilson, and that
Wilson had brought an action in a justice's court and upon a judgment
of restitution had caused him to be ejected from the premises, but that
he had again returned and was attempting to retain his settlement; that
Wilson had brought suit against him in the United States court at
Portland, Oregon (Wilson being a citizen of California) and that the
same was still pending.
It is insisted by counsel for Fine that the appeal of Alexander is
made in bad faith and is fraudulent; that it is for delay merely and to
harrass a settler, and he moves that the appeal be dismissed.
Also: That Alexander's entry being fraudulent is therefore abso-
lutely void; that it (lid not segregate this land from the public domain
and was therefore no bar to Fine's settlement, and that Fine being a
legal settler in possession of the land, has rights in the premises that
should be protected.
On October 15, 1889, Cogswell and Ross, attorneys for Alexander
filed in your office objections to Fine's application to he allowed to in-
tervene, and among other objections they allege that the contest was
not initiated by Fine, but by the general government and that he could
acquire no rights thereunder, or claim to the land thereby, other than
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could any other citizen-they deny that his settlement gives him any
prior right to enter the land.
Upon the appeal of Alexander they raise the questioi of the jurisdic-
tion of the Land Department of the government to try this cause, and
to show their good faith in this objection to jurisdiction, wiiieh they say
can be raised at any time, and than it is not "frivolous" they offered a
newspaper clipping which they say is the printed decision of Circuit
Judge M. P. IDeady, involving this identical land.
The decision purports to be the decision of the United Staves circuit
court, district of Oregon.-Henry C. Wilson v. Nehemiah Fine-Action
to recover possession of real property, heard upon demurrer to answer.
In this decision the court held that:
An entry and certificate issued to a settler under the homestead act for land subject
to entry thereunder, can not be set aside or canceled by the land Department on its
own otion for fraud or mistake committed or occurring in obtaining or issuing it.
In such case the government must seek redress in the courts, etc.
- This is substantially the case as it appears of record.
The case is regularly before the Department.
The right of Fine to make entry by reason of his settlement can be
determined when the question as to the legality of his settlement arises.
A decision of the question before me, viz, the validity of Alexander's
entry, does not involve the rights of third persons, except they should
claim under Alexander, and I therefore see no reason for considering
Fine's claim at this time, or for making him a party hereto. This being
so, the motion to dismiss the appeal is not properly before me.
This leaves only the question of the jurisdiction of the Land Depart-
ment of the government to try thiscause. This question has been so
well settled that it does not require discussion. I note the fact how-
ever, that the supreme court of the United States in the case cited by
counsel herein, to wit, Cornelius v. Kessel (128 U. S., 456) say-
The power of supervision possessed by the Commissioner of theGeneral Land Office
over the acts of the register and receiver of the local land office in the disposition of
the public lands, undoubtedly authorizes him to correct and annul entries of land al-
lowed by them .. . . . But the power of supervision and correction .
can be exerted only when the entry was made upon false estimuouy or without au-
:; thority of law.
This implies authority to inquire into, to try and determine whether
the entry was made on false testimony and if so to cancel it, as this is
all the jurisdiction that is sought to be exercised in the case at bar, I
shall proceed to dispose of the case.
The first assignment of error, is a mere assumption that your office
decision was wrong; it does not specify any error.
The second and third amount to one assignment, and are not well
taken.
An entryman can not make a second homestead entry, ie having per-
fected title under the first. One having made an entry, is estopped to
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plead his own wrong-to say that it was fraudulent and procured by
his own perjary. This entryman admits that he was an instrument in
the hands of a " land speculator to aid in defrauding the government,
the record shows th it he, himself, made the entry ad perfected his_
title, to secure a hearing he swears that if such entry was made it was
made without his knowledge and was a fraud upon his rights and the
rights of the government, this too after deliberation and consultation
with his counsel. When confronted with the proof, he attempts to
plead ignorance of law when the first entry was made, but he no
where explains his affidavit for a hearing. Taking the case as it stands
it illustrates the wisdom of the law that gives the Land Department
authority to cancel a fraudulent entry, procured by false swearing.
Your decision is affirmed and the entry of Alexander will be canceled
PRACTICE-MOTION FOR REVIEW-HYPOTHETICAL CASE.
CATLIN V. NORTHERN PACIFIC R. B. Co. (ON REVIEW).
In the absence of sufficient reason shown, a motion for review will not be considered,
if not filed within the period prescribed by the rules of practice.
The Department will not render an opinion in a hypothetical case.
Secretary Noble to the Commnitioner of the General Land Office, November
26, 1890.
On March 27th last, the attorney for the Northern Pacific railroad
company submitted a letter asking for " a reexamination of the law of
April 21, 1876, as applied in the case of Wm. Catlin decided Septem-
ber 26, 1889 (9 L. D., 423).
The attorney says that,-
While the time for filing an application for review of that case has elapsed, and we
may not now obtain a reversal of said decision to the extent of an award of said land
to s, we respectfully ask that you will re-examine the law of the case in connection
with the accompanying argument, and that you may reach and adopt the conclusion
therein contended for. This we ask because the decision will reach a large number
of other cases along the line of the road.
Should you coincide with onr view-of the law, we would ask that you will so in-
struct the Commissioner, to the end that your decision in said case of Catlin may not
be taken by him as controlling in other like cases which are now before him, and to
which he will of cohrse apply the rule of said decision.
He further states.:
By a reference to the case of Catlin it will be observed that his claim was initiated
April13, 1883.
The slat of definite location of the line of road opposite said land was filed in the
Office of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, July 6, 1882, but the with-
drawal was not ordered until June 9, 1883.
Now our contention is that the 1st section of the law of 1876 is not prospective in
its provisions; it cannot and was-not intended to apply to entries initiated since its
passage as it was enacted with the view to remedy an evil then existing-to relieve
certain settlers who had been brought into misfortune by conflicting rulings of the
Land Department.
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No reason is assigned by the company for its failure to file a motion
for review within the time prescribed by the rules of practice. Had
such motion been filed the alleged errors would have been fully exam-
ined.
To grant this request now before me would be to invite applications
for the reconsideration of many decisions without reference to the rules
of practice. Sach an undertaking cannot be assumed in justice to the
many cases pending and awaiting examination in regular order.
Furthermore, eliminating the facts in the Catlin case, the question
becomes merely hypothetical. It is the practice of the Department to
decline to answer such questions. Neil A. Hill (9 IL. D., 194); W. H.
Miller (7 IL. D., 254). The wisdom of this practice must be obvious.
For the reasons herein stated the request is denied.
PRIVATE CLAIM-INI)EMNITY SELECTION.
RANCHO PUNTA DE LA L]AGUNA.
Selections under the act of October 1, 1890, in lieu of lands belonging to said rancho,
and disposed of by the United States, must be made within one year from the
date of said act, and may be made by duly appointed attorney, or authorized
agent, under appropriate instructions to the local officers.
iScretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Offiee, Novem-
ber 26, 1890.
I am in receipt of your office report daued the 13th instant upon the
communication of the attornev for the beneficiaries under the act of
Congress entitled "Au act relative to the Rancho Punta de la Laguna,"
approved October 1, 1890 (26 Stat., 644), requesting that an order may
be issued at an early date authorizing selections to be made under the
provisions of said act, on account of the limited time within which said
selections can be made. The preamble of said act recites that:
Whereas it is alleged that five thousand and ninety-nine and ninety-three one-hun-
dredths acres of land embraced in the Rancho Punta de la Laguna, in the counties of
Santa Barbara and San Lnis Obispo, State of California, granted and confirmed to
Luis Arellanes and Emidio Miguel Ortega, have been appropriated to the use and
disposed of by the United States, and that the said colfirmees, claimant5, and owners
have been deprived of tb use of the same.
The enacting clause authorizes and directs the Secretary of the In-
terior-
to carefnl]y investigate the said allegation in the preamble of this act mentioned,
and if he shall find that said allegation is true he is hereby authorized and directed
to make good any such deficiency so found to exist to the persons justly entitled
thereto, by issuing to them patents for an equal quantity of the unoccupied, unap-
propriated, and unreserved public lands of the United States in the State of Cali-
fornia, not mineral, to be selected by them, respectively, within one year next after
the passage of this act, and not afterward, and in tracts not less than the subdivis-
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ions provided for in the United States land laws, and if not surveyed when taken,
to conform, when surveyed, to the general system of the United States land surveys;
and the issuance and acceptance of patents under this act shall be deemed and taken
as a release to the United States of all claims of all persons so found to be entitled as
aforesaid to any and all lands not embraced in the survey made under the confirma-
tion of the said grant in the preamble of this act mentioned.
In support of his said application, said attorney filed with the Depart-
-ment an abstract of title to said rancho, also affidavits of the alleged
owners, and beneficiaries under said act, and the affidavits of the local
attorneys giving the names of the parties entitled to the benefits of
said act, together with a copy of court record in a partition suit to de-
termine the relative rights of the several claimants to said Rancho.
There is also filed a power of attorney appointing W. E. Dargie, of the
city of Oakland, in California, attorney in fact with full power to act
for all of said beneficiaries, except one, and another power of attorney
from said Dargie constituting George C. Hazleton, of the District of
Columbia, his attorney in fact to act for him and the said beneficiaries
under said act.
Upon the evidence submitted and from the records of your office,
you report: (1) That the Punta de la Rancho was legally entitled to
six square leagues of land in amount to equal 26,632.08 acres; (2) That
by reason of an erroneous survey, including lands " within the grant
and juridical possession of the ' Guadalupe' . . . . its area has,
therefore, been reduced to 21,530.14;" (3) That the lands within the
juridical possession of the Punta la Laguna rancho, erroneously ex-
claded from the final survey and patent thereof have been disposed of
by the United States as public lands, and (4) you therefore find that
said allegation in the preamble of said act is sustained by the evidence.
In this view I fully concur.
I am also of the opinion that the finding in said report relative to the
proportionate shares of the several claimants and owners is sustained
by the evidence. Said finding is based upon the final decree of the
Superior Court of the county of Santa Barbara, in said State, in a suit
for partition of the interests of the several claimants as tenants in
common of said "Rancho Punta de la Laguna," and transfers subse-
quently made by some of the parties in interest. At the date of said
act the record shows prima facie that the following persons were each
entitled to indemnity under its provisions to the amount set opposite
each name, to wit:
W. L. ADAM ....... ..... 110-1320 ......... .. 424.99 acres.
J. L. SCHUMAN .............. 110-1320.-......... 424.99 "6
ERMINIA DARGIE, formerly
ERMINIA PERALTA ....... 110-1320 ... 424.99 "
JOSEFA P. VAN VRANKEN
formerly JOSEFA PERALTA. 110-1320 .42.99 "
ISAAC GOLDTREE .......... 220-1320 ................ 849.99 "
2497-vOL 11-33
514 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
J, B. ARELLANES ............ 220-1320 . -............ 849.99acres
W. E. DARGIRE ........... 220-1320 ............ . 849.99 "
J. H. Rice . 55-1320 . 212.49 "
ELIZA DUTARD, wife of HIP-
POLYTE DUTARD .......... 55-1320 .............. 212.49 *
L. M. KAISER ................. 55-1320 ................ 2t2.49 ."
S. I. JAMISON ................. 45-1320 ....... 173.86
Estate of A. TOGNAZZINI 10-1320 ... 38.63 "
Total . .... . ..... ... 5099.89
The record fails to show that said attorney in fact, Dargie, is author-
ized to represent the estate of A. Tognazzini which appears to be en-
titled to select as indemnity only 38.63 acres less than the smallest legal
subdivision. But since it appears that he left several minor children,.
and that an administrator of said estate has been duly appointed, I
agree with you that such administrator or duly authorized guardian of
said children may be allowed to select the indemnity to which they ap-
pear to be entitled. Said act requires patents to be issued to said bene-
ficiaries duly found entitled thereto, "' for an equal quantity of the un-
occupied, unappropriated, and unsurveyed public lands of the United
States in the State of California, not mineral," which lands are required
" to be selected by them (that is, the beneficiaries), respectively, within
one year next after the passage of this act, and not afterward, and in
tracts not less than the subdivisions provided for in the Ubited States
land laws, and if not surveyed when taken, to conform, when surveyed,
to the general system of the United States land surveys." The benefi-
ciaries are therefore limited by the express terms of said act to one year
from October 1, 1890, to make said selections. If they fail to make said
selections within the time specified, or select land of the character not
granted, they do so at their peril, for this Department has no authority
to extend the time prescribed in said act. Baca Float No. three (5 L..
D., 705). 1 see no objection, however, to allowing said selections to be
made by the duly appointed attorney or authorized agent of said bene-
ficiaries under appropriate instructions to the several local land officers
in said State. You will please prepare said instructions, as soon as,
practicable, and transmit the same for my approval.
It is not intended to decide herein that the Department will issue
patents upon the selections made by said beneficiaries, if it shall appear
from further evidence that the parties are not "justly entitled" thereto.
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COAL LAND-DECLARATORY STATEMENT-PREFERENCE RIGHT.
BULLARD V. FLANAGAN.
A coal declaratory statement sholid not be received wbile the land is covered by the
existing homestead entry of another.
Priority of possession and improvement of coal land, followed by proper filing and
development of the mine in good faith, entitle the claimant to the preference
right of purchase under the statute.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, November 26, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of William . Ballard from your office
decision of May 18, 1889, holding for cancellation the coal declaratory
statement of said Bullard for lot 4, of Sec. 2, T. 7 N., R. 47 E., Miles
City, Montana, and allowing A. P. Flanagan to perfect his coal filing
for said tract.
The record shows that on the 12th of May, 1880, said Flanagan filed
a pre-emptiou declaratory statement for said lot together with one
hundred and twenty acres adjoining it.
On January 5, 1881, one Carland made a timber culture entry for
said tract. A contest between said arland and Flanagan was had
which finally resulted in favor of Garland.
January 9, 1883, upon receipt of the final decision in that case at the
local office one H. H. Gerrish filed an affidavit of contest against Car-
land's entry. A hearing was ordered for May 16, 1883, at which
Carland made default and Gerrish's homestead entry was allowed.
On January 22, 1883, Flanagan presented an application to contest
Carland's timber culture entry which was denied by the local officers
and your office sustained them, and upon appeal here, your said office
decision was affirmed.
April 5, 1884, Flanagan tiled here a motion for review thereupon, on
May 9, 1884, the decision was revoked and a hearing ordered between
Flanagan and Gerrish which was had and the local officers found in
favor of Flanagan and upon appeal to your office their decision was
affirmed on the 22nd day of June, 1885.
November 10, 1885, your office ordered Gerrish's homestead entry
canceled. Afterwards on November 24, 1885, your office ordered action
thereon suspended to allow time for Gerrish to proceed under Rule 85
of Rules of Practice.
January 11, 1886, your office directed the local officers to proceed as
under your letter of November 10, 1885.
September 12, 1885, Flanagan filed his rlinquishment as a pre-emp-
tion claimant to said lot 4 and accompanied it with a coal declaratory
statement for said lot but neither paper was entered of record.
September 15, 1885, Ballard the present contestant also filed a coal
declaratory statement for saidlot 4, which was disallowed. On Novem-
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ber 20, 1885, Bullard again filed his coal declaratory statement for said
lot, which was allowed by the local officers after they had noted on their
docket a cancellation of Gerrish's homestead entry pursuant to your
office decision of November 10, 1885.
On the 17th day of January, 1886, the local officers made opposite
Gerrishl's homestead entry the annotation on their docket " Finally can-
celed as per Commissioner's letter G January 11, 1886."
On January 23, 1886, Flanagan offered again to file a coal declaratory
statement for said lot 4, which was accepted by the local officers his
former application, as well as Ballard's first one, having been rejected
for the reason that said lot was then covered by Gerrish's homestead
entry then pending in contest on appeal.
On September 29, 1886, Ballard published notice of his intention to
make final proof on his coal declaratory statement and particularly
notified Flanagan of his intention.
On October 7, 18S6, notice was given by Flanagan of his intention to
make final proof on said tract. November 8, 1886, was fixed as the
time for both of the parties to make their proof at which time both par-
ties appeared and submitted their evidence. From the evidence intro-
duced before them the local officers found. in favor of Flanagan and
against Bullard. From this decision Bullard appealed to your office,
which on the 16th day of March, 1889, reversed their decision and dis-
allowed Flanagan's coal declaratory statement and allowed Bullard's for
said tract.
Afterwards a motion for review was filed in your office by Flanagan
and on the 18th day of May, 1889, your office reversed your said decis-
ion of March 16th, 1889, and recalled the said decision and affirmed the
decision of the local officers and awarded the tract to Flanagan.
From your said office decision of May 18, 1889, Bullard appeals.
It appears from the evidence that in 1880, Flanagan first laid claim
to the tract in ispute by filing his preemption declaratory statement
for it. Afterwards it appears that coal was discovered in close prox-
imity to it, so much so that it appeared reasonably certain that the tract
was more valuable for coal than for agricultural purposes and no doubt
acting on this assumption Flanagan, on the 12th day of September,
1885, offered to file his relinquishment to said tract as a pre-emptor and
at the same time offered his coal filing on it neither of which was ac-
cepted by the local officers. They were both rejected on the ground
that said tract was embraced in the subsisting homestead entry of
Gerrish. The homestead entry of Gerrish was subsequently canceled
on the proceedings by Flanagan but before Gerrish's entry was finally
ordered canceled by your office, to wit, on November 20, 1885, Bullard
again presented his coal declaratory statement for said tract which was
allowed by the local officers.
On November 24, 1885, your ffice suspended action on your letter of
November 10, 1885, ordering Gerrish's entry canceled and the suspen-
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sion remained until the 11th day of January, 1886, when your office
directed the local officers to cancel Gerrish's homestead entry. On
January 23, 1886, Flanagan again presented his coal declaratory state-
ment for said tract which the local officers accepted. Both parties gave
notice of their intention to perfect their title under their coal declaratory
statements. The hearing was ordered and had thereon to determine
their respective rights. The evidence adduced is voluminous and con-
flicting. I have examined it carefully and I find that Flanagan has
been in the actual possession of the tract since 1880, claiming it all the
time under either his pre-emption or coal declaratory statement. That
his good faith is shown as a coal claimant from the date of his first offer
to file coal declaratory statement, to wit, September 12, 1885, that he
commenced to take out coal a few days thereafter and has continued to
take out coal in considerable quantities and develop the mine as best
he could. That his improvements are worth from $800 to $900, thereon.
On the other band Bullard was never on the tract until the 14th day of
Septem her,1885, the day before he offered his first filing. His improve-
ments are not worth to exceed $550. There is some doubt as to whetber
his improvements were made for the purpose of development of the
mine, or for his own benefit or the benefit of another.
Flanagan's good faith is shown to be superior to that of Bullard's in
the premises. The offer of Flanagan to file coal declaratory statement
on September 12, 1885, and Bullard his of September 15, 1885, were
properly rejected because at that time the tract was covered by Ger-
rish's homestead entry. The acceptance of Bullarl's coal declaratory
statement of November 20, 1885, was erroneous and illegal for the same
reason, as Gerrish's homestead entry was not finally directed to be can-
celed by your office until January 11, 1886, and in fact canceled by the
local officers on the 17th day of January, 1886. On the 23rd day of
January, 1886, five days after the final cancellation of Gerrish's home-
stead entry Flanagan offered his coal declaratory statement which was
properly accepted by the loeal officers and which was the first legal
filing after the cancellation of Gerrish's homestead entry. It is clear
that Flanagan's possession and improvement of the tract were prior to
Bullard's and being followed by proper filing and continued good faith
entitles him to the preference under the statute. See Revised Stats.,
sections 2348, 2349, and 2351.
After a careful examination of the case I am satisfied that the con.
elusion reached by your office in the decision appealed from is correct
and it is accordingly affirmed.
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PRIVATE CLAIM-STATEMENT OF ACTION.
NOLAN GRANT No. 39,
In view of the conflict between the opinions heretofore expressed and entertained
with respect to the validity and status of this grant, and the various complica-
tions arising thereunder, and the further fact that the present claimant proposes
to assert his alleged right through the representative of a foreign government, the
Department does not deem it expedient to express an opinion upon the case in
its resent condition.
Secretary Noble to the Secretary of State, November 26, 1890.
I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of October 23, 1890, trans-
mitting a note from the Charge ad interim of Mexico, here, relative to
the complaint of William Pinkerton, said to be a Mexican citizen, as to
the action of this Department in declaring that certain lands, claimed
by him are part of the public domain, whereby he has sustained heavy
losses; and you request my views as to Mr. Pinkerton's complaint and
the practicability of his proposition to secure indemnity in the premises,
provided he is entitled thereto.
The alleged claim of Mr. Pinkerton grows out of what is known as
the Nolan grant, No. 39.
Under section eight of the act of July 22, 1854 (10 Stats., 308), it be-
came the duty of the surveyor-general of New Mexico, under the direc-
tion of the Secretary of the Interior, " to ascertain the origin, nature,
character and extent of all claims to lands under the laws and usages
and customs of Spain and Mexico," and report to Congress his opinion
as to the validity or invalidity of each of the same; and it was declared
that:
until the final action of Congress on such claims, all lands covered thereby shall
be reserved from sale r other disposal by the government.
On February 27, 1860, the widow and heirs of one Gervacio Nolan
filed before the surveyor-general of New Mexico, under said act of Con-
gress, a claim to a tract of land, situated in Mora county in said Terri-
tory, which was said to have been granted by the Mexican authorities
to said Nolan and two others on November 18, 1845; and that previous
to the decease of said Nolan, he purchased all the right title and interest
of his saidassociates. On this application proceedings were duly had
before the surveyor-general who, on July 10, 1860, reported that, in his
opinion, the grant was valid, and ought to e confirmed to the heirs
and legal representatives of said Nolan, in whom title to the whole
grant was shown to be vested. Said report was transmitted to Con-
gress by this Department on January 11, 1861. See House Executive
Document No. 28, 2d Sess. 36th Congress.
Some time afterwards, the exact date does not appear, the widow
and heirs of the said Gervacio Nolan presented another application to
the surveyor-general of New Mexico, under the act of 1854, wherein
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claim was set up to a different tract of land alleged to have been
granted to said Nolan by the Mexican authorities on December 1, 1843.
After investigation, the surveyor-general, on October 8, 1861, reported,
favorably on said grant also, and his report was transmitted to Congress
by this Department on May 12, 1862. See House Executive Document
No. 112, 2nd Sess., 37th Congress, page 30. The first described claim
was No. 9 in the surveyor-general's report, which to prevent confusion
was subsequently changed to 39 ; and tbe second claim was numbered
48, which number was retained. The claim in which Mr. Pinkerton
asserts an interest is the one known as No. 39.
On July 1, 1868, the committee on private land claims of the House,
to which had been referred the two Nolan grants and a number of some-
what similar claims, in reporting thereon, said that the Mexican coloni-
zation law of 1824 and the regulations thereunder of 1828 limit "the
amount of public lands to be granted to a single individual to the areal
extent of eleven square leagues." The committee recommended a num-
ber of claims for confirmation, because they did not exceed the above
area, and because they were prior in date to the Mexican laws quoted.
The committee then said:
'The clairms of Gervacio Nolan being numbered thirty-nine (39) and forty-eight (48)
being of a date long subsequent to said decree and regulations, and as your committee
are informed exceeding the limits of said decree, are withheld for further iuvestiga-
tion. (H. Report No. 71, 40th Cong. 2d sess., p. 5.)
After this, no mention of claim No. 39 is found among the congres-
sional proceedings, hut by act of July 1, 1870 (16 Stats., 616), Congress
confirmed grant No. 4S to the extent of eleven square leagues.
By the second section of said act the claim as confirmed is directed to
be located in a compact body, the extent or lines thereof being ad-
justed to the public surveys as far as practicable; and claims of ac-
tual settlers within the located tract are to be protected and for the
aggregate area of such claims the heirs of Nolan are authorized to lo-
cate a like quantity of public lands according to the lines of public sur-
veys within the boundaries of the original grant by the Mexican au-
thorities to Nolan. Section four provided:
That upon the adjustment of said claim of the heirs of Gervacio Nolan, according
to the provisions of this act, it shall be the duty of the surveyor-geueral of the dis-
trict to furnish properly approved plats to said claimants, or their legal representa-
tives, which shall be evidence of title, the same to be done according to such instruc-
tions as may be given by the commissioner of the general land office: Provided, how-
ever, That when said lands are so confirmed, surveyed, and patented, they shall be
held and taken to be in full satisfaction of all further claims or demands against the
United States.
The survey of said grant was duly made, the claims of the settlers
and grantees adjusted and patent issued to the confirmees.
On August 2, 1876, Mr. M. W. Mills, claiming to represent a number
'of settlers on lands within the boundaries of claim No. 39, filed in the
General Land Office a protest against the re
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said lands on the part of the alleged grantees, on the ground that un-
der the Mexican laws Nolan could obtain but eleven leagues, which
had already been confirmed to him by Congress.
The surveyor-general of New Mexico having made a contract, among
others, for the survey of said private land claim No. 39, on September
1, 1877, the Commissioner of the General Land Office wrote to him re-
fusing to approve of the said contract because said laim has " no legal
status." A copy of this letter marked "A" is herewith sent.
On March 29, 1880, application was made to the Commissioner of the
General Land Office for a survey of said tract by Mr. Martin Andrews,.
who offered to deposit a sum of money sufficient to cover the estimated
cost of the survey, and on December 1, 1880, the Commissioner wrote
to the surveyor-general to furnish an estimate of the cost of the pro-
posed survey as he, the Commissioner, " has become satisfied that no
objection exists to the making of a preliminary survey of said claim
under the deposit system."7 A copy of this letter marked " B" is also
sent you. In pursuance of these instructions, a survey of said grant
was made and the plat thereof was transmitted to the General Land
Office March 7, 1883.
On May 23, 1881, Mr. J. M. Cunningham, claiming to be part owner of
said grant, filed a protest against the intrusion of settlers thereon.
On August 21, 1882, Mr. 0. P. MMains, claiming to represent set-
tlers upon said grant, filed before the Secretary of the Interior an
appeal from the action of the Commissioner of the General Land Of-
fiee in re-opening the case and ordering a survey. On October 9,
1882, Secretary Teller dismissed said appeal because no final decision
had been made by the Land Office from which an appeal would lieSee copy of his decision arked "C."'
On May 7, 1883, MeMains filed the protest of a number of settlers.
upon the grant against te approval of the survey, a copy of which pro-
test marked " D " is herewith. O reference of the same to the Com-
missioner of the General Land Office, he reported adversely thereon on
August 19, and 25, 1884. See copy of the two reports, respectively,.
marked " E " and " F" and on November 18, 1884, the Secretary con-
curred in the views of the Commissioner. See Secretary's letter
marked G "7.
On April 11, 1885, Mr. MMains filed before this Department another
application to have the lands within said grant thrown open for settle-
ment, and on reference of the same to the General Land Office the Com-
missioner, on May 30, 1885, reported favorably, as will be seen by refer-
ence to the Land Office report for 1885, p. 121.
On June 23,1885, Mr. Pinkerton wrote to the Secretary of the Interior
protesting against the injustice of the last report of the Commissioner,
and stating the grant had been divided among the original grantees, and
that he represented the interest of Lucero. A copy of this letter,.
marked " ", is inclosed.
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On January 9, 1886, my predecessor, Secretary Lamar, decided that
the lands in question should no longer be held in reservation on account
of said grant, and directed them to be thrown open to settlement and
entry; a copy of whicW decision, marked * I "', is also inclosed, and will
be found reported in volume 4, of the Land decisions, p. 311.
On March 11, 1886, the heirs of Juan Maria Baca claiming, through
Nolan, to own one-half of said grant, filed a protest against the depart-
mental decision, ad as evidence of their right and title in the premises
they produced a copy of the decree of the district court of Mora county
dividing said grant between themselves and the heirs of Nolan. A
copy of said protest and decree is also sent you, marked " J. "
Subsequently an application to the Secretary to review and reverse
his said decision was filed, but, on April 5, 1886, after full consideration
of the subject, he decided to adhere to his former ruling. A copy of
this last decision, marked '1 ", is sent you, and it is also reported in 4
L. D., p. 479.
In pursuance of the directions of the .secretary in the decision or
January 9, 1886, the lands within the claimed limits of said grant have
been thrown open and a large number of settlers have located thereon,
as alleged.
Mr. Pinkerton, on April 24, 1886, made application to the President
to investigate the case and reverse the action of the Secretary in the
premises. The matter was referred by the President to the Attorney-
General for an opinion, which was submitted by that officer on April
23, 1887, and a copy whereof is furnished you, marked " ."
No action seems to have been taken by the President upon the At-
torney-General's opinion, which conflicts with that of Secretary Lamar,.
as to the construction to be placed upon the act of July 1, 1870, spra,.
confirming the other Nolan grant. Said opinion, I am advised, was in-
formally sent to the Secretary and by him sent to the files of the De-
partment here without action.
There has been much other correspondence between the Land Office,
the named, and other parties in relation to said grant. Protests and
counter-protests have been filed, particular reference to which has not.
been deemed necessary in the very full and detailed statement which I
send and which is believed to contain a fair narrative of all the matters,
which may have any bearing upon the claim of Mr. Pinkerton, in the
premises, or afford any light in your investigation of the same.
There has also been much litigation in the local courts between the
grant-claimants and settlers or intruders upon the disputed territory,
of, which latter Mr. M. W. Mills, the District Attorney of New Mexico,
wrote, on June 13, 1885, to the General Land Office-" There are about a.
thousand settlers on this grant." He also wrote that hundreds of suits
had been instituted against the settlers, many of which were pending,
and that of those which had reached a judicial determination, without
exception, the decisions were in favor of the settlers. On November 9,
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1885, Mr. Mills wrote that one of said cases, that of William Pinkerton
,v. Epifanio Ledaux, had been carried to the United States supreme
court, and as he was unable to follow it there, he suggested that the
Attorney-General take charge of the case in that court. Acting upon
this suggestion, on January 9, 1886, Secretary Lamar wrote to the At-
tornev-General calling his attention to said case, and requesting him,
inasmuch as the interests of the settlers and of the government seemed
to be identical, to appear and protect said interests. This case was ar-
gued at the October term, 1888. of the supreme court, but the Attorney-
General did not appear therein. It is reported in 129 U.. S., p. 346.
The judgment of the lower court in favor of the settler was affirmed,
mainly upon the ground that the tract in controversy was not clearly
shown to be within the limits of the grant. No question as to the va-
lidity of the grant or the construction of the proviso in the act of July,
1870, supra, was raised, though both of these questions would seem to
have been presented by the record. Indeed, the court commented
sharply upon the omission to raise and discuss these questions. It said,
on page 355:
This case seems to have been very perfunctorily tried and discussed. There is a
question which may be entitled to much consideration, whether the Nolan title has
any valility at all without confirmation by Congress. The act of July 22, 1854, be-
fore referred to, seems to imply that this was necessary. There is also another act of
Congress which may have a bearing on the case. We refer to the act of July 1,1870,
16 Stat., 646, c. 202, by which another grant to Nolan was confirmed to the extent of
eleven leagues. Aftervariousprovisions with regard to the exterior lines of those eleven
leagues, the 4th section declares "that upon the adjustment of said claim of the heirs
of Gervacio Nolan, according to the provisions of this act, it shall be the duty of the
surveyor general of the district to furnish properly approved plats to said claimants,
etc.: Provided, that when said lands are so confirmed, surveyed and patented, they
shall be held and taken to be in full satisfaction of all further claims or demands
against the United States."
Whether this provision was not intended to affect the entire claim of Nolan for
any grant of lands in New Mexico may be a serious question. Without expressing
any opinion on the subject, it suffices to say that we see no error in the judgment of
the supreme court of New Mexico, and it is therefore affirmed.
It is very much to be regretted that the question of the construction
of said proviso was not presented to and settled by the court in that
ease, as it would have prevented further controversy as to the title to
the lands within the limits of grant No. 39.
It will be seen from the foregoing statement that the action of the
'Land Department in relation to the Nolan grant No. 39 has not been
.entirely consistent. In the first instance the Commissioner (William-
son) refused to approve of a contract for the survey thereof, whereby its
reservation would have been noted on the tract books, holding that said
grant, under the act of 1870, supra, had "1 no legal status." Three years
afterwards, the same officer found no objection " to the making of a
preliminary survey of said claim under the deposit system." Four years
later, Commissioner McFarland, and Acting Commissioner Harrison,
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recommended that the lands within the limits of the grant, as shown by
the survey, be suspended from entry and that the petition of the settlers
to the contrary be rejected. In this recommendation Secretary Teller
concurred. The next year Commissioner Sparks recommended that
said lands be thrown open to entry and settlement, and in this view
Secretary Lamar concurred. And hen there is the opinion of the
Attorney-General which conflicts, as to the law, with that of Secretary
Lamar, and the dubitantur of the supreme court.
The question in the case, which has heretofore been considered by
the Department, is purely legal, and arises out of the construction
placed upon the statute of July 1, 1870, supra, and more particularly
the proviso to the fourth section thereof. On the one side it was
thought that the proviso only declared that acceptance of patent under
that act should be in full satisfaction of all further claims in relation
to grant No. 48. It is asserted that said grant was for a much larger
quantity of land than the amount for which it was confirmed, and that
the proviso was meant to prevent the setting up of any claim there-
after against the government, because of the curtailment of the original
area, or because of the recognition of the claims of settlers within the
limits of the grant when located. And it is insisted that it is not to
*be supposed that the government in carrying out its treaty stipula-
tions, confirming a grant made by a former government and securing
the citizen the enjoyment of his private property, would exact sch a
hard condition as a release of " all further claims or demands against
the United States" of every kind or description; that even if it were
held that under the Mexican laws Nolan could receive but one grant,
limited in amount to eleven square leagues, yet, inasmuch as grant No.
39 was made to Nolan, Lucero and Aragon, even if Congress meant to
restrict the first to a grant of eleven square leagues under the Mexican'
law, it is not fair to suppose that the grant to the others was to be ob-
literated entirely, even though they had exercised their lawful right of
selling their interest in said grant to Nolan or any one else.
In this connection it may be as well to mention that said Nolan at
the time of his death as also the owner, by transfer from his uncle
Antonio Sandoval, of the Estancia grant, situated in Valencia county,
New Mexico; that on the application of his heirs the surveyor-general
investigated said claim and reported favorably thereon, which report
was duly transmitted by this Department to Congress on February 8,
1873, as will be seen by reference to Senate Ex. Doe. No. 40, 42nd Con-
gress, 3rd Session.
On the other hand, it is argued that to arrive at the true intention of
'Congress the entire act must be read and construed as a whole in ac-
cordance with the well-settled rules applicable thereto; that the claim
of Nolan was but an equitable claim at most and not a perfect legal
right or title to the land in question; that of the extent of the equities
Congress is the sole judge, and its judgment cannot be questioned;
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that reading the act in this light it is apparent there was no necessity
for the exaction of a release from the Nolans on account of the curtail-
ment of the area of grant No. 48, inasmuch as there was no legal claim
against the government for more than it had thought proper to recog-
nize by its confirmation; that the release in the proviso cannot
properly be construed to be required to protect the government from
any claim on the part of the Nolan heirs, because of the recognition of
the claims of the settlers within the limits of the grant, inasmuch as
lieu lands are awarded therefor to the heirs, and the right of the settlers
to make entry of their claims is especially provided for by the third sec-
tion of said act. In view of this provision, it is asserted, as a familiar
rule of construction, that where a statute contains a particular enact-
ment, and a general enactment, which might include the particular one,
both should be operative, but the general enactment must be taken to
affect only eases outside of those within the particular language. (End-
lich on Statutes, par. 399). That the general language of the proviso is
not to be construed as applicable to all claims of every nature and kind,
but is restricted, by the more specific language with which it is associ-
ated, to claims ejusdem generis as those designated by the particular
words, in the absence of clear intention otherwise. (ibid, par. 405)
That under-these canons of construction the conclusion is clear that it
was the purpose of Congress, as a condition annexed to the acceptance
of patents under said act, to require a release of all claims of a like
nature as against the United States.
It is not made very clear how, or through whom, Mr. Pinkerton claims
title. It appears from the letter of the Miexican Charge, inclosed by
you, that he purchased from the Nolan heirs, who are bound to protect
and defend him in the possession of the tract sold; whilst Mr. Pinker-
ton himself states, in his letter herewith sent you, that he purchased
the interest of Lucero and now owns the same. It will be observed that
in the record of grant 39, sent up by the surveyor-general, it is shown
that Lucero sold to Gervacio Nolan his interest in said grant; that
Nolan asserted a claim to the whole grant, and the record contains
what purport to be conveyances from both, Lucero and Aragon, to
Nolan of their interest in said grant, and that the surveyor recoin-
mended the confirmation of the whole grant to the heirs of Nolan; and
all these matters were of record before Pinkerton claims to have pur-
chased. The decree of the district court of New Mexico seems to have
been an amicable suit, and therefore settled nothing except perhaps as
between the parties thereto. The claim now made through Lucero
would seem to have additional complications connected with it.
Amid these complications and conflicts of opinion, and in view of the
fact that Mr. Pinkerton, through the minister of a foreign government,
proposes to make reclamation or demand indemnity of the United States
for an alleged wrong, claimed to have been aused by the improper
action of this Department, it seems to me that it would be perhaps un-
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wise f r me at this time to express an opinion upon the merits of his
ease, as suggested by you. With every disposition to throw all the light
upon the case and its complications, I send this very fall statement and
the numerous exhibits referred to, and shall be glad to furnish any other
information in the possession of the Department which may be desired;
but prefer to postpone an expression of opinion upon the cage in its
present aspect lest it might be a prejudgment in a matter which has
not yet assumed definite shape.
I also inclose copy of the report of the Commissioner of the General
Land Office ma(le on the reference of your letter to him and marked "M."
TIMBER CULTURE CONTEST-RELINQUISHMENT.
DORRrNGTON v. DE HART.
A timber culture entry within a section that contains a natural supply of timber trees
is illegal and must be canceled.
The right of a contestant to proceed against an entry and secure the results of the
contest, is not defeated by a subsequent relinquishment of the entry, and the in-
tervening filing of another.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the ommissioner of the General
Land Office, November 28, 1890.
Your letter of November 6, 1889, transmitted the papers in the case
of Albert Dorrington v. Henry L. De'Hart on appeal by the former
from your decision of February 5, 1889, dismissing his contest against
the timber culture entry of the latter for the NW. Sec. 17. T. 2, R.
57 W., Valentine land district, Nebraska. It also transmitted the papers
in the contest case of one Nathaniel Searcy against the same entry, also
the affidavit of a contest by L. A. Dorrington upon a very different
charge, and also the affidavit of contest of one Frank T. Roxbury against
the same entry, also the relinquishment of De'Hart to the entry and
notice by the local officers that one Peter Wernsmann had also filed a
declaratory statement for the land.
On October 10, 1884, De'Hart made timber culture entry for this
land, and on June 21, 1886, Albert Dorrington filed affidavit of contest
against the same, alleging-
That said section contained not less than ten acres of timber land and a good thrifty
growth of five acres of timber growing naturally upon the same, composed of cotton-
wood, ash, box elder and elm trees.
Service of notice was made by publication, and the taking of testi-
mony was fixed for September 28, 1886, before J. A. Wilson, notary
public, Chadron, Nebraska. Continuances were had under stipulations
until November 26, 1886, when the testimony was taken and on Decemii-
ber 20th following the local officers passed upon the case and recom-
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mended the cancellation of the entry, from which decision the entry-
man appealed.
On October 12, 1887, one Nathaniel Searcy filed an affidavit of con-
test against said entry alleging that "H enry De'Hart has failed to plant
trees, tree seeds or trae cuttings during the third year as required by
law or up to date of this contest," and he accompanied said affidavit
with an application to make homestead entry for said land. This was
placed on file to await the result of former contest.
On April 25, 1889, the local officers transmitted said papers with the
information: " Entry relinquished and D. S. filing made by Peter Werns-
mann. Case dismissed."
On February 18, 1889, L. A. Dorrington filed an affidavit of contest
alleging that the entrviman has failed to cultivate or cause to be cul-
tivated said tract during the past year and has failed to plant or cause
to be planted any trees, seeds or cuttings on the land during the year
last past, and that these defects still exist.
On April 22, 1889, Frank T. Roxbury filed affidavit of contest against
sai(l entry alleging failure to plant ten acres to trees as required by
law, etc., and that the default still exisis. Nothing was done with either
of the three last named cases except that a memorandum shows Searcy's
contest dismissed, and on April 23, 1889, De'Hart filed his relinquish-
ment and Peter Wernsmann filed declaratory statement for the land.
In the mean time on February 15, 1889, your office decided the case
of Albert Dorrington v. De'llart and dismissed the contest, from which
decision the former appealed to this Department.
On June 28, 1889, in pursuance of your instructions of May 16, Dor-
rington notified Wernsmann of his appeal and furnished him copy of
same.
Wernsmann has not filed any brief in the case nor any statement in
regard to his declaratory statement.
Thetestimony in the case is somewhat conflicting as to the number
of trees upon the section, but it appears from the testimony that there
were from even to ten acres of timber thereon and that while the belt
of timber follows the trend of a stream running through the section, it
extends back upon the upland and grows independent of the water of
the stream and its overflow. There appears also to be a grove of ash
timber away from the stream. A large number of stumps of various
sizes are found upon the land, and the testimony tends to show that
men have been taking firewood and some building material off the land
for several years, yet it is in evidence that the timber is increasing by
natural growth, and rapidly so, since the land has been protected from
fire and from cattle that formerly ranged over it.
Delart did not testify in the case, and produced but one witness.
He testified that there was no timber on the section, but the preponder-
ance of the evidence shows that he is mistaken; that nature has sup-
plied and is continuing to supply the section with timber, without
planting or cultivation by man.
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 52?
I have examined the cases you cite and note the fact that in the case
of Bartch v. Kennedy (3 L. D., 437) the trees on the section were con-
fined to the banks of the Knife River, and that they were " located
mostly on the river bank, where the land is subject to overflow." In
the other case cited the facts are not given. In case of Box v. Ulstein
(3 L. D., 143), the testimony showed that the timber was in groves on
the tillable land, not confined to the banks of streams, the varieties be-
ing, poplar, oak, willow and balm of gilead. It is said in that case:
The question then is, has nature in this case provided what in time will become an,
adequate supply of timber for the inhabitants of the section I think that we find,
the proper standard of "an adequate supply" in the timber culture act which pro-
vides for the planting of ten acres of timber and for the existence of .
sixty-seven hundred and fifty trees on a section, or the probability that from the
existing natural supply there will be that number in the future.
In the case of Blenkner v. Sloggy (2 L. D., 267) the timber grew in
the bend of a creek in the extreme corner of the section and partially
if not wholly subject to overflow, the remainder of the section being
prairie land. Therein it is said:
It is eminently proper that the situation of the natural growth of timber and its
relation to the section should be considered as well as the actual amount and charac-
terof the timber itself.
Having carefully considered the testimony in the ease at bar, I con-
cur with the local officers that the entry should be canceled. The right
of the contestant, Albert Dorrington, is not defeated by the relinquish-
ment of Delart, and the filing of the declaratory statement of Werns-
mann.
See Gardner v. Spencer (10 IL. D., 398).
Your decision is therefore reversed.
SCHOOL LAND-SETTLEMENT BEFORE SURVEY.
JOHN W. JOHNSON.
Settlement on school land, prior to the survey thereof; by one who has exhausted his
pre-emptive right, and claims as a homesteader, does not defeat the reservation
for the benefit of the Territory, where the survey is made prior to the passage of
the act of May 14, 1880.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the Generat.
Land Office, November 29, 1890 .
I am in receipt of your letter of October 24, 1890, relative to the home-
stead entry of John W. Johnson for the W. of the NE. and the W.
i of the SE. of Sec. 16, T. 13 N., R. 5 E., G. and S. R. meridian, Pres-
cott, Arizona, which was canceled October 28, 1874, and which you
recommend to be re-instated, and that authority be given your office to
pass upon the final proof submitted by Johnson. From said communi-
cation and accompanying papers the following facts appear:
The land is a school section, and wasssurveyed in 1873. The-town-
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ship plat was filed in the local office August 6, 1874, and Johnson made
homestead entry of the tract August 15, the same year. His entry was
canceled by your office October 28, 1874, on the ground that rights un-
der the homestead law attached only at date of entry. Subsequently,
the receiver at the Prescott land office addressed a letter to your office,
enclosing the corroborated affidavit of claimant stating that he settled
upon the land prior to survey, and asked that the entry be re-in-
stated. This application was transmitted to the Secretary, who, on
June 18, 1875, affirmed the action of your office canceling the entry,
holding that:
The survey was made before Mr. Johnson made his entry. His entry can take ef.
feet only from its date, and at that date the lands were reserved as aforesaid.
Johnson can not take this land as a pre-emptor and allege the actual date of his
settlement before survey, for he has already exhausted his privilege as a pre-emptor.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of the entry, Johnson continued in
the occupancy of the tract, and, on March 16, 1885, he offered final
proof, showing continuous residence for twelve years and improvements,
estimated to be worth from $2,000 to $4,000.
In view of the long residence of the claimant and his valuable im-
provements, and of the act of May 14, 180, which provides that the
homestead right shall relate to the date of settlement, you recommend
that the entry be re-instated, and that your office be authorized to act
upon the proof offered.
The Department is without authority to grant relief to this settler.
Prior to the act of May 14, 1880, no right could be initiated or acquired
under the homestead law, except by actual entry at the land office.
Said act, which provided that rights under the homestead law may be
initiated by settlement upon unsurveyed land as under the pre-emption
law, and that the right shall relate back to the date of settlement, did
not legalize settlements made prior to its passage, so far as to divest or
affect rights that had been acquired prior to entry and before the pas-
sage of the act.
This view was plainly and forcibly expressed in the ease of Southern
Pacific ailroad Company v. Lopez, 3 L. D., 130, which involved the
question as to whether a settlement upon unsurveyed lands within the
limits of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, made prior to the act
of May 14, 1880, with a view to entering the same under the homestead
law when surveyed, is such a claim as will except the land from the
grant. The Secretary held that the words "occupied by homestead
settlers," occurring in the excepting clause to said grant, was deliber-
ately used by Congress for the purpose of excepting from the grant
lands settled upon with the intention of entering them under the home-
stead law when surveyed, knowing that, under the law in force at the
date of the grant, no right could be acquired under the homestead law
by mere settlement as against the right of the company, without an
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express exception and reservation for that purpose. But, in speaking
of the scope and purpose of the act of May 14, 1880, he says:
This act introduced several new features into the homestead law, and among others
the initiation of a homestead claim by settlement, whether the land is surveyed or
unsurveyed. Prior to the passage of the act, the only lawful initiation of a home-
stead claim was by an entry or filing (except in cases coming under section 2294, Re-
vised Statutes), and there was no right of homestead upon unsurveyed land. In
granting these additional rights to homestead settlers, it is not to be supposed that
Congress intended te act to operate so as to divest rights already acquired under
other laws; and hence it cannot be held that. in the case before me, it clothed Lopez
with any right against the railroad company superior to that which he had at date of
the definite location of their line, or that it destroyed any vested interest which they
may have thereby acquired in the land.
This has been the uniform ruling of the Department, and I know of
no case in which a contrary ruling has been made, or which has held
that any right under the homestead law could be acquired by settle-
ment upon unsurveyed lands prior to the act of May 4, 1880.
In the case of Thomas F. Talbot, 8 L. D., 495, the Secretary, in speak-
ing of a settlement made upon school lands in Wyoming Territory prior
to and existing at date of a survey made in 1870, said, that such settler
as against the rights of the Territory could have perfected a claim un-
der the homestead or pre-em ption law, under the act of February 26, 1859
(11 Stat., 358). But this was mere dictum, not necessary to a decision
of the case, and from an examination of the question involved and de-
cided, it is evident that the word " homestead " was inadvertently used,
and that it was not intended to hold that a settlement made upon a
school section prior to survey by a person not qualified to enter it under
the pre-emption law, but having the qualifications of a homesteader,
would defeat the reservation for school purposes, under the act of Feb-
ruary 26, 1859, which provides that "where settlements, with a view to
pre-emption, have been made before the survey of the lands in the field,
which are found to have been made on sections sixteen or thirty-six,
those sections shall be subject to the pre-emption claim of such settler."
The only question involved and decided in the case of Talbot was,
that if a settlement was made upon school lands prior to survey which
would except it from the grant r reservation, and such settler subse-
quently abandoned the land, before indemnity ad been taken, the
grant or reservation immediately attaches, and the purchase of the im-
provements of such settler by one who settled subsequent to survey
gives no right as against the grant or reservation, either under the act
of February 26, 1859, or the act of August 9, 1888 (25 Stat., 393), au-
thorizing the leasing of school and university lands in the Territory of
Wyoming. In other words, that such settlement does not except the
tract from reservation, except in favor of the settler i actual occupa-
tion at date of survey. The question as to the character of settlement
was not involved.
At the date of Johnson's entry, the land in controversy had been
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designated by survey as a school section, and was then in reservation
for school purposes for the Territory of Arizona.
The 5th section of the act of July 22, 1854 (10 Stat., 308), which was
extended to and continued in force in the Territory of Arizona by the
act of February 24, 1863 (12 Stat., 664), provided:
That when the lands in the said Territory shall be surveyed, under the direction
of the government of the United States, preparatory to bringing the same into mar-
ket, sections numbered sixteen and thirty-six in each township, in said Territory,
shall be, and the same are hereby, reserved for the purpose of being applied to schools
in said Territory, and in the States and Territories hereafter to be created out of the
same.
While such reservation does not amount to a grant, or such a dedi-
cation in the strict legal sense as to withdraw from Congress the power
of disposition over such sections, yet it has all the force and effect of a
grant to a State, so far as to withdraw said lands from other disposi-
tion or control, except by Congress. Minnesota v. Bachelder, 1 Wall.,
109; John W. Bailey et al., 5 L.D., 216. The right of the Territory to
have sections sixteen and thirty-six held in reservation is statutory, and
the Secretary has no power or authority to impair that right by recog-
nizing any claim of the settler, except such as is expressly authorized
by law. Thomas F. Talbot, suJpra.
When this survey was made andl the township plat filed in the local
office, the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections were reserved for school
purposes, subject only to the provisions of the act of February 26, 1859
(Sec. 2275 R. S.), which excepted from reservation such sections upon
which settlements with a view to pre-emption bad been made prior to
said survey, and declared that those sections should be subject to the
pre-enption claim of such settler.
It appears from the decision of the Department of June 18, 1875, that
Johnson had exhausted his pre-emptive right, and could not take the
land under the pre-emption law; therefore he could not claim the ben-
efits of said section 2275, although he was a settler upon the land prior
to and at date of survey.
if this settler is now residing upon the tract and has continuously re-
sided thereon since his alleged settlement, and has made valuable im-
provements on the land, it would present a case that appeals strongly
to Congress for relief, which has the power to authorize the entry of
this tract and to require the Territory to select indemnity in lieu
thereof; but upon the facts presented in your letter I know of no au-
thority that would authorize the Department to re-instate his entry
and allow his proof as against the right of the Territory.
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 531
RAILROAD GRANT-SETTLEIENT RIGHTS.
NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. CO. . POTTER ET AL.
Where possession and occupancy alone, at the time rights uder a railroad grant at-
tach, are relied on to except the land from the grant, it must affirmatively appear
that the party in such possession had the right, at that time, to assert a claim to
the land in question under the settlement laws..
The occupancy and possession of one who has exhausted his rights under the home-
stead and pre-emption laws do not constitute such a "claim " as will defeat the
operation of the grant.
The case of Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Bowman, cited and distinguished.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, November
29, 1890.
On December 23, 1885, William H. Potter made application at the
Bozeman, Montana, land office to make homestead entry for the NW.
NW. of Sec. 29 and the N. NE. of Sec. 30, T. 1 N., R. 4E., of
that district.
The register and receiver rejected the application, on the ground
that part of the tract was in an odd numbered section within the grant
to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, and listed by the same June
27, 1885, list No. 6.
Potter appealed to your office, and, on January 13, 1888, the local
officers were directed to order a hearing to ascertain the true status of
the land in the odd numbered section. July 6, 1882-the date of the
definite location of the line of said company's road opposite the land in
question.
On this hearing, from the evidence, they held that said tract in See.
29 was excepted from the grant to the company, but as Potter had ex-
hausted hispre-emption and homestead privileges, his application should
be dismissed.
From this judgment both Potter and said company appealed, and
Potter also gave notice of his intention to withdraw his application to
make homestead entry of the land and substitute a timber culture ap-
plication for the tract in the odd numbered section, retaining intact his
pre-emption claim for the land in the even numbered section under his
filing made March 20, 1883, and alleged settlement of March 17th of that
year.
* - It was shown at the hearing and so found by the register and receiver,
which finding was concurred in by you, that Potter had exhausted his
homestead and pre-emption privileges at the date he made application
to make homestead entry of the tract in question, and I think this find-
ing is fully warranted by the evidence.
By your said office decision, you also held that the land in question
in the odd numbered section is excepted from the grant to the company.
From this judgment the company again appealed.
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The land is within the forty mile granted limits of the Northern Pacifie
Railroad Company, and was withdrawn upon filing the map of general
route of said road, February 21, 1872.
The map of definite location was filed July 6, 1882, from which date
the right of the company attached to the odd numbered sections within
the grant.
It appears that on February 2 L, 1872, Enos Swan filed his declaratory
statement for the land above described, including the tract in Sec. 29,
alleging settlement thereon October 1, 1869. He was a citizen of the
United States, and resided on the tract, with his family, in 1871. He
built a house and stable and a half mile of fencing during that year,
and cultivated the land. He sold his improvements to one Clauson
about the year 1876; and the latter sold to S. H. Murry, from whom
Potter obtained possession in 18.82, and lived on the place "1 off and on'"
till 1883, when he moved his family to it, and has since that time re-
sided on the place. He has raised crops on the land since 1882, and
has claimed the land and had no other home.
It has been occupied and cultivated continuously since 1871, and
claimed by the parties above named.
At the date of the withdrawal, the land in Sec. 29 was embraced in
the filing, prima facie valid, and covered by the settlement of Swan,
and was therefore free from the operation of such withdrawal. North-
ern Pacific B. R. Co. v. Stovenour, 10 L. D. 645.
The land thereafter was continuously occupied and claimed by other
settlers, and at the date 'of definite location was occupied and claimed
by Potter; but since he had exhausted his pre-emption and homestead
privileges, and thereby become legally disqualified under the then ex-
isting laws from holding or taking the land under the settlement laws
of the United States, his settlement and supposed claim could not avail
him. The title to the land in the odd numbered section at date of defi-
nite location had not been " sold, granted or otherwise approprited,'
and was " free from pre-emption or other claims or rights," and thus
became subject to the grant to the company. Northern Pacific Rail-
road Company v. Fitzgerald, 7 L. D., 229.
In the case of Northern Pacific R. R. Co v. Bowman, 7 L. D., 238,
which is relied on by the Commissioner, it was expressly held that Bow-
man had not exhausted his right of entry under the homestead law,
and could have entered the land in dispute as a homestead if he so de-
sired, there being no intervening adverse settlement claim thereto.
The statement in that case "that the question as to whether the claim
of said Bowman was a lawful claim, cannot enter into the consideration
of the case or have any influence in the determination of the issue in-
volved. It is sufficient if he had a claim to the land in dispute at the date
mentioned of such a nature as the act defines, and any question as to
the lawfulness or validity of such claim is immaterial (Newhall v. San-
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ger, 92 U. S., 761; K. P. R'y.v. Dunmeyer, 113 U. S., 62)," must be
limited to the facts of that case. It is not by any ineans clear that the
cases cited uphold the doctrine so broadlly enunciated, and certainly it
could not have been the intention of the Supreme Coort to announce
that any "claim," no matter how shadowy, could except land fronh the
grant. It must at least be a claim capable of being asserted by the
party in possession under the settlement laws of the United States; other-
wise, the claim of an alien, in possession at the time the railroad com-
pany's rights attach, who could never take the land, must except the
land rom the grant. The Department has expressly ruled against this
view i the cases of Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Saunders, 6 L. D., 98;
Central Pacific I. R. Co. v. Painter, id. 485; Titamore v. Southern Pacific
R. R. Co., 10 L. D., 46:3; Central Pacific R. R. Co. v. Booth et al., 11 L.
D., 89, and Central Pacific R. R. o. v. Taylor et al., id. 305. It is
deemed that the true rule is that where parties rely on an entry or filing
of record, the railroad company cannot inquire into the validity of the
same, unless it alleges that the filing or entry of record was fraudulent
and void ab initio because the alleged settler was not in existence at
the date of said record. Northern Pacific R. R. Co v. Brown, 10 L. D.,
662, and Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Haines, on review, 11 . D., 224.
But that where possession or occupation alone at the time the railroad
rights attach are relied on to except the land from the grant, it must
affirmatively appear that the party in sch possession had the right at
that time to assert a claim to the lands in question under the settlement
laws of the United States.
Itbeing shown that Potter had exhausted his right of homestead
and pre emption at the time of the definite location of the road, he had
no "c clain thereto such as would except the land from the grant.
James Brady v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 11 L. D.,
Your said office decision is accordingly reversed.
It appears that on April 10, 1889, Robert Porter made application to
make homestead entry of the land in question; this was rejected, for
the reason that the land applied for was embraced in this case, then on
appeal to your office. Porter appealed. I herewith return the papers,
with directions that you pass upon the merits of the case as between
Potter and Porter, as to the lands above described in section 30.
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RAILROAD GRANT-INDEMNITY SELECTION-CONFLICTING GRANTS.
SOUTHERN PACIFIC R. t. Co. v. MOORE.
Lands within the grant to the Atlantic and Pacific company are expressly excepted
from the later grant to the Sonthern Pacific; and the act of Congress forfeiting
* certain lands granted to the former company confers no rights upon the latter to
to select lands never embraced within its grant.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Offies, November
29, 1890.
The appeal of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company from the de-
cision of your office of November 2t. 1888, holdin- for cancellation its
selection of the Et NWL, SW4 NWi (lot 1) and lots 2 and 3 of Sec.
29, T. 4 N, R. 19 W., S. B. M., Los Angeles, California, has been on-
sidered.
The land selected is within the indemnity limits of the grant of
March 3, 1871 (16 Stats., 579), to the branch line of the Southern Pa-
cific Railroad Company as shown by its map of esignated route filed
April 3, 1871, and also within the primary limits of the grant of July
27, 1866 (14 Stats., 292), to the Atlantic and Pacitic Railroad Company,
as shown by its map of designated route filed March 2, 1872.
Mattie Moore made an application, August 10, 1888, for a homestead
entry of the same land. Her application was rejected by the local offi-
cers on the ground ";that the tract was covered by the idemnity
selection of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, No. 5, approved
May 25, 1883."
The records show that this selection has never been approved by
this Department; and on appeal your office reversed the action of the
local officers and held the company's selection for cancellation pon the
ground that one company cannot go into the granted limits of another
company to seek indemnity, and also under the proviso in section 23
of said granting act to the Southern Pacific. In its appeal to this De-
partment, the railroad company insists pon its right to make the
selection. The first ground of objection in said office ecision is not
tenable, for the company wouldhave the right to go into the granted
limits of another company provided the land was excepted from its
grant and within its indemnity limits sulbjeet to selection. Allers v.
Northern Pac. R. R. et al (9 L. )., 452). But tnder section 23 of said
act of March 3, 1871, supra, it is provided "that said section shall in
no way affect or impair the right, present or prospective, of the At-
lantic and Pacific company, or any other railroad company."
* This Department, in construing this section, has repeatedly held that
lands within the grant to the Atlantic and Pacific company do not pass
under the grant to the Southern Pacific company, but are excepted
therefrom. Gordon v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company (5 L. D.,
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691); and Coble v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company (6 L. D., 679),
which ol review was adhered to (6 L. D., 812).
The act of July 6, 1886 (24 Stat., 123), forfeits and restores to the
public domain certain lands within the primary and indemnity limits of
the Atlantic and Pacific company, adjacent to and coterminus with
the uncompleted portions of its road. The land in contest is part of
the land forfeited under this act, but the forfeiture confers no right
upon the Southern Pacific Railroad Company to make selection of land
never embraced in its grant.
The decision of your office is therefore affirmed, and the selection of
said tract by said company will be canceled.
Mattie Moore will be allowed to enter the land under her application
on showing compliance with the provisions of the homestead law.
MOTION FOR REVIEW.
CLARK V. MARTIN.
Motion for review of departmental decision rendered July 21, 1890, 11
IL. D., 72, in the case above entitled, denied by Secretary Noble, Decem-
ber 1, 1890.
RAILROAD GRANT-HOMESTEAD ENTRY-ACT OF MARCH 3, 1887.
UNION PACIFIC RY. Co. v. WASLEY.
A homestead entry of record at date of definite location excepts the land covered
thereby from the operation of the grant, and it is immaterial whether the-entry-
man subsequently complies with the law, or not.
An application to purchase under section five, act of March 3, 1887, will not be finally
considered until presented in accordance with departmental regulations.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, December
1, 1890.
This case comes before the Department upon the appeal of the Union
Pacific Railroad Company from the decision of your office, holding for
cancellation the selection of said company of the N. A of the NW.4
and the NW.1 of the NE. i of Sec. 35, T. 4 N., R. 67 W., Denver, Colo-
rado.
Said tract is within the limits of the grant of July 1, 1862, to the
Denver Pacific Railroad Company (12 Stat., 489), now Union Pacific
Railroad Company, which was definitely located August 20, 1869. At'
the date of definite location the tract was covered by the homestead
entry of Amos Widner, made April 11, 1866, which was canceled No-
vember 6, 1873, for failure to make proof within the statutory period.
The company selected the tract December 31, 1879, but no patent
has issued therefor.
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Cephas Nyce made timber-culture entry for this land February 7,
1885. William P. Wasley appliel to enter the tract under the home-
stead law March 3, 1885, and at the same time filed an affidavit of con-
test against the entry of Nyce, charging that said land was not devoid
of timber, upon which a hearing was had Nay 6, 1885. yce failed to
appear at said hearing, and upon the testimony sbmitted your office
held that the land was not subject to entry nder the titnber-culture
law, from which o appeal was taken by Nyce. Your office further
held that the homestead entry of Widner, subsisting at date of defi-
nite location, excepted the land from the operation of the grant, and
the company's selection was therefore held for cancellation. Fr6m this
action the company appealed, alleging, substantially, that the Comis-
sioner erred in holding thau the entry of Widner excepted the tract
from the operation of the grant, for the reason that said entry expired
without final proof being made thereon, and there was no evidence that
Widner was qualified to make a homestead entry, nor that he ever per-
formed any act whatever in connection w ith the land, save to file his
homestead application. They also alleged, as a farther ground of error,
the failure of your office to pass upon the protest of the Colorado Mort-
gage and Investment Company, it appearing from the record that said
company claims to be in possession of said lands as purchaser from the
railroad company.
The entry of Widner, subsisting at date of definite location, excepted
the tract from the operation of the grant, and it is immaterial whether
the entryman subsequently complied with the law, or not. Kansas
Pacific R. R. Co. v. Dunmeyer, 113 U. S., 629; Hastings & Dakota R.
R. Co. v. Whitney, 132 U. S., 357.
With the record is also an application of the Colorado Mortgage and
Investment Company to purchase said land under the fifth section of
the act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat., 556), in which it is alleged:
That the railway company sold and conveyed this land to Margaret J. Metcalf, a
native born citizen of the United States, for $800, and that such sale and purchase
were in good faith; that Metcalf took possession June 29, 1878; that the land was
not, at the date of said purchase, sale and possession, in the possession or occupation
of any adverse claimant, and has not since, at any time, been in the posses ion or oc-
cupation of any claimant other than said Metcalf or her grantees and successors;
that on November 3, 1878, Metcalf sold an undivided one-half interest in said land to
Agnes B. Mitchell, a native born citizen of the United States; also, that on June 2,
1880, Metcalf and Mitchell sold and conveyed the whole of said land to Elizabeth J.
Weare, a native born citizen; and also that on 26th January, 1881, said Weare and
husband executed a deed of trust o one Jones, for the use of the Colorado Mortgage
and Investment Company, to secure payment of their joint note for $5,000 loaned by
said company; and that upon default, foreclosure, etc., the said trustee, on Septem-
ber 25, 182, conveyed the land to said company.
It is further shown that each and all of these purchasers paid a valuable consider-
ation, and that each and all relied upon the title of the railway company; that the
Mortgage and Investment Company still owns the land, and that it not only has been
in the continuons and nninterrnpted possession of said company and its grantors
since June 29, 1878, but that it has likewise been in continuous improvement and culti-
vation.
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There is also filed with the papers an abstract of title, showing that
the company sold said land to Margaret J. Metcalf and executed to her
a deed therefor, dated June 29, 1878, and recorded July 17, 1878; also
that the title to said land passed from the said Metcalf through mesne i
conveyances to the Colorado Mortgage and Investment Company, the
present holder of the title, and that all of said conveyances have been
duly recorded.
The fifth section of the act of March 3,1887, under which the company
claims tLe right of purchase, provides-
That where any said company shall have sold to citizens of the United States, or
to persons who have declared. their intention to become sucb citizens, as apart of its
grant, lands not conveyed to or for the use of such company, said lands being the
numbered sections prescribed in the grant, and being co-terminus with the con-
strncted parts of said road, and where the lands so sold are for any reason excepted
from the operation of the grant to said company, it shall be lawful for the bona fide
purchaser thereof from said company to mnake payment to the United States for
said lands at the ordinary government price for like lands, and thereupon patents
shall issue therefor to the said bona fide purchaser, his heirs or assigns: Provided,
That all lands shall be excepted from the provisions of this section which at the date
of such sales were in the bona fide occnpation of adverse claimants under the pre-
emption or homestead laws of the United States, and whose claims and occupation
have not since been volontarily abandoned, as to which excepted lands the said pre-
emption and homestead clainmants shall be permitted to perfect their proofs and en-
tries and receive patents therefor : Provided farther, That this section shall not
apply to lands settled upon subsequent to the first day of December, eighteen hun-
dred and eighty-two, by persons claiming to enter the same under the settlement
laws of the United States, as to which lands the parties claiming the same as afore-
said shall be entitled to prove up and enter as in other like cases.
It does not appear from the papers before me that any one is claim-
ing the land by virtue of a settlement existing at the date of the al-
leged purchase, but the claim of Wasley seems to be predicated upon
his contest of the entry of Nyce, and it does not appear whether he has
ever settled upon the land.
It is unnecessary at this time to pass upon the question as to the
qualification of the present applicant to take as assignee of the original
purchaser from the company. or to express any opinion as to the rights
of settlers under the second proviso to said section, inasmuch as the
party has not made any application to purchase in the manner as di-
rected by the Department in the case of Samuel L. Campbell (8 L. D.,
27), and Wasley has had no opportunity to be heard. You are there-
fore directed to notify the applicant in this case that it will be required
to make application to the proper local officers showing its right to
purchase in the manner as provided in the case of Samuel L. Campbell,
supra, and that Wm. P. Wasley shall be specially served to show cause
why said application to purchase should not be granted.
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RAILROAD GRANT-PRIVATE CLAIMST-SURVEY.
DUNCANSON V. SOUTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co.
The srvef of a private claim that is not approved by the surveyor general is not
effective as against the operation of a railroad grant.
The land reserved for the satisfaction of a private claim having specific boundaries
is that found to be within such boundaries, on the survey under which patent
issues.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, December
1, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of the Southern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany from the decision of your office of September 12, 1884, rejecting
its claim to lots 2 and 3, Sec. 27., T. 2 S., R. 7 W., S. B. M., Los Angeles,
California.
On the 12th of April, 1884, E. E. Dncanson made application for a
homestead entry of said lots 2 and 3. His application was rejected by
the local officers because the land applied for is within the primary
limits of the grant of March 3, 1871 (16 Stats., 579), to the branch line
of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, the rights of which attached
April 3, 1871, when its map of designated route was filed in the General
Land Office.
On appeal b Duncanson your office reversed the action of the local
officers and held that the land was within the claimed limits of the
Jurupa Mexican grant at the titne that the grant to the railroad com-
pany became effective, and therefore was excepted from the railroad
grant.
In its appeal from this decision the railroad company contends that
the land was never within the out-boundaries of the Jurupa grant.
The records in your office show that the Jurupa grant was one of
specific boundaries. It was duly confirmed by the board of land com-
missioners in California, and affirmed on apeal, by the district court
for the southern district of California. Several surveys of this con-
firmed grant were made. The survey by Reynolds, under which the
decision of your office in favor of Dncanson was rendered, was never
approved by the surveyor-general, and, consequently, was of no valid-
ity. Frasher v. O'Conner (115 U. S. op. p. 110).
The survey made by Minto in 1878 was duly approved by the sur-
veyor-general, and under it patent issued. This survey, as approved,
and on file in your office, shows that the land in contest was not within
the limits of the Jurupa grant, but at the time the grant to the railroad
company became effective was subject thereto.
The decision of your office rejecting the claim of the railroad com-
pany to the land in question is therefore reversed.
a
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FINAL PROOF PROCEEDINGS-EVIDENCE-P1RE-EMPTION.
LEHMAN V. SNOW.
The local officers are without authority to accept final proof for land involved in a
case pending on aDpeal.
The want of proper authority in an officer designated to take final proof, will not
affect the validity of testimony taken before him, under rule 35 of practice, at
the time such proof is submitted.
A temporary removal of the pre-emptor from land of his own, prior to the establish-
ment of residence on his pre-emption claim, will not take such claim out of the
second inhibitory clause of section 2260, R. S.
An entry may be allowed with a view to equitable action where the officer designated
to take the final proof is not qualified therefor, but the proof is otherwise regu-
lar and shows due compliance with law.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the GeiieraZ
Land Office, December 2, 1890.
Rosa A. Lehman filed her declaratory statement No. 21,231 on May
24, 1886, upon the SE. 4 SE. 1, Sec. 15; NE. NE. , See. 22, and W.i
NW. -, See. 23, T. 27 S., R. 9 E., M. D. M., San Francisco, California,
alleging settlement July 3, 1885.
On June 18, 1886, Ernest Snow filed his declaratory statement upon
the same land, alleging settlement November 21, 1885. On October 7,
1886, Snow applied to make final proof, and thereupon the register
issued his notice that the same would be taken before the " superior
judge " of San Luis Obispo county, California, on December 14, 1886, and
on the same day the regist!er and receiver issued a summons to Rosa A.
Lehman to appear at that time. and place, "and contest the claim of
Ernest Snow . . . . . and show cause, if any there be, why the
said Ernest Snow should not be allowed to make final proof and entry
for said land, he having filed due notice of his intention to do so."
On October 18, 1886, Miss Lehman gave notice of her intention to
make final proof in support of her claim before the register and receiver
on December 9th thereafter; but, on the suggestion of the register, the
date was fixed for December 14, and the officer before whom it should
betaken, the judge of the superior court of San Luis (bispo county,
California, and the notice was published accordingly-thus making the
time and place the same as in the published notice of Snow, and also
the date and place fixed by the register's summons for Lehman to con-
test Snow's claim. It does not appear that any formal protest was
made by either party.
On the day fixed, both parties with their attorneys appeared, and
offered their final proofs; the hearing was also had, in pursuance of the
summons to Lehman to contest Snow's claim, and, on June 1, 1887, the
register and receiver held that Lehman's final proof should be received,
and that Snow's declaratory statement should be canceled.
On June 23, thereafter, Snow filed his appeal from that judgment,
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the general ground of error. being that he and not Lehman, was the
first bona fide settler on the land.
On July 26, 1887, Lehman, by her attorney, filed her petition and
objection to any further action being taken in the case until such time
as she may be allowed to submit final proof in support of her claim ac-
cording to existing regulations; that she gave notice of her intention
to make final proof in support of her claim to said land, said notice re-
citing that such final proof would be made before the register and re-
eeiver at San Francisco county. California; that the local officers (lid
change said notice of intention to ake it read that said final proof
should be made before the judge of the superior court of San Luis
Obispo county, California; that the proofs taken in the contest are ir-
regular, null and void, in so far as they relate to her final entry of said
land, because not taken before the register or receiver, nor the clerk of
the county, as per circular of instructions of the Commissioner of the
General Land Office, of March 30, 1886, and approved by the Secretary
of the Interior. She again gave notice of her intention to make final
proof in support of her claim before the register and receiver, and asked
an order that all proofs and affidavits theretofore filed, which were not
before the proper officer, be set aside, and that the decision then made
be set aside, except in so far as the respective rights of contestants
may be concerned. She asked, however, that the testimony submitted
at the hearing and the decision rendered thereon should stand, as be-
tween her and Snow, showing her superior right to the land.
On July 30, thereafter, Snow filed his answer to said petition, and
objected to any action being taken thereon, on the ground that his ap-
peal from the action of the register and receiver canceling his entry
was, at the time and before said petition was filed, pending before your
office.
The register and receiver allowed Lehman to make final proof on her
petition for that purpose, but directed that the testimony, in so far as
it related to the contest with Snow, should not be disturbed or added
to, and that " no testimony of any kind shall be taken as to what Snow
has, or has not, done since the previous hearing," and the register and
receiver sent the same, together with the testimony taken at the hear-
ing, to your office to be considered with Snow's appeal. They did not
send the so-called final proof taken before the judge on December 14,
1886.
On June 12, 1889, you rendered your decision in this case and held
for cancellation Snow's declaratory statement, " leaving the final proof
of Rosa Lehman to be disposed of as the law may direct." Snow again
appealed, and assigns, substantially, the following grounds of error:
That said decision is contrary to the evidence and rules of this De-
partment;
That you erred in considering the last proof, taken by Lehman; also
in sustaining the action of the register and receiver in granting Leh-
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man's motion to "recommit"; also in considering the proof made by
Lehman before the judge of the superior court, and finally in awarding
the land to Lehman and not to Snow.
Snow's appeal, filed June 23, 1887, from the judgment of the register
and receiver, rendered June 1, 1887, removed the jurisdiction of the
case from those officers, and the register's action thereafter, permitting
Miss Lehman to make final proof anew, while Snow's appeal was pend-
ing, was irregular.and void. Saben v. Amundson, 9 L. D., 578.
No other officer than the register orreceiver or the clerk of a court of record of the
county in which the land is situated can take proofs in pre-emption cases, except
that when the land is in an unorganized county the proofs may be made before the
clerk of a court of record in an adjacent county in the sane State or Territory. Gen-
eral Circular of January 1, 1889, p. 11.
It follows from this that the final proof made by Snow and Lehman
on December 14, 18$6, before the superior judge of San Luis Obispa
county, California, is irregular because made before an officer not recog-
nized at that time as empowered to take final proofs in pre-emption
cases. See Circular, March 30, 1886, 4 L. D., 473.
But the hearing before the superior judge was specially authorized
by the register and receiver, under the power given them by rule 35 of
the Rules of Practice. The testimony taken at this hearing was very
full. The witnesses for both claimantswere examined and cross-exam-
ined, and the testimony thus taken is complete and in no wise depend-
ent upon the so-called final proofs of the two claimants. This hearing
was given specially to enable Lehman "to show cause, if any there be,
why the said Snow should not be allowed to make final proof. "
The testimony taken in pursuance of this notice relates to the good
faith of both parties, and while the formal final proofs of both claim-
ants were also taken, yet such final proofs are not necessary to the
determination of the question of the superior rights of either party, the
testimony taken at the hearing being ample and complete for that pur-
pose.
I have carefully reviewed this testimony, and find the same substan-
tially set forth in your said office decision. I think it very clear that
Miss Lehman has the superior right to the land. She was first to file
and first to settle on the land; her improvements showed good faith,.
while those of Snow were very meager, and his testimony as to his res-
idence is unsatisfactory. Independent of this, I am of the opinion that
Snow was not a qualified pre-emptor under the provisions of section
2260 of the Revised Statutes, the second subdivision of which reads as
follows: "No person who quits or abandons his residence on his own
land to reside on the public land in the same State or Territory A shall
acquire -any right of pre-emption under the provisions of the preceding
sections.
His testimony on this point is as follows:
Q. You say you have a home in Santa Barbara county (California) ?
A. Yes, sir.
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Q. Do you own any land there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How much A. One hundred and twenty acres.
Q. What kind of land?
A. It is some farming and some grazing land.
Q. Is it deeded-title land, or government land ?
A. It is deeded land.
Q. When did you leave there -
A. I left it in latter part of August, 1885.
Q. Why did you leave; for what purpose ?
A. For the purpose of moving to San Luis Obispo county.
Q. Why didn't you remain there 
A. I didn't like the country there; I like San Luis Obispo county better.
On cross-examination the following interrogatories and answers were
given:
Q. Where were your family in November, 1885, lst, the time you said you settled
on this land 
A. They were at my father-in-law's.
Q. Where was that. A. About ten miles from there.
Q. When did they go to your father-in-law's?
A. don't hardly know; we came there when we first came up from Santa Barbara
county, last September.
Q. You came frotn Santa Barbara couty for the purpose of abandoning your home
and taking up public land, did you not?
A. No, sir.
Q. You left your residence on your own land in Santa Barbara county to come to
this county?
A. Yes, sir.
From the above it will be seen that he left his farm in Santa Barbara
county, California, the latter part of August, 1885; that he left for the
purpose of moving to Obispo county, in the same State, because he
liked it better; that he went with his family to his father-in-law's from
Santa Barbara county, and his family remained there until he settled
on the land in controversy in November, 1885; that he still owned the
land in Santa Barbara county when he offered his final proof on his
pre-emption claim.
If the act of settlement be followed in proper time by actual residence,
the settler is held to have established constructive residence from the
date of settlement. (David Lee, 8 La. D., 502.) His residence on the
land, therefore, began in November, 1885, when his family was at his
father-in-law's, where they had been since he moved frot his land in
Santa Barbara county. His stay at his father-in-law's was merely tem-
porary, a visit only, so that he really " abandoned his residence on his
own land to reside on the public land in the same State or Territory."
A temporary removal of the prQ-emptor from land of his own, prior to
the establishment of residence on his pre-emption claim, will not take
such claim out of the inhibition contained insaid statute. (Ottv.Craw-
ford, 10 I,. D 1)
Snow's filing will therefore be canceled; and since his disqualifica-
tion eliminates him from the case, it is only necessary to dispose of it
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as between the government and Miss Lehman. She has fulfilled every
requirement the law imposed upon her as to residence and cultivation;
the irregularity of submitting the final proof before an officer not
authorized to take the same was caused by the register who alone was
responsible for it. And since the final proof showed she had complied
with the law, and had been taken at the time and place and before an
officer named in the advertisement, and the register and receiver having
recommended that she be permitted to enter the land, new proof will
not be required. You will direct the local officers to allow the entry
with a view of submitting the same to the board of equitable adjudica-
tion for confirmation. (Milton De Shong, 11 L. D., 299; Sylvester
Gardner, 8 L. D., 483; Pecard v. Camens, 4 L. D., 152.)
Your said office decision is modified.
HOMESTEAD CONTEST-RESIDENCE.
HOAGLAND V. FAIRFIELD.
The failure of the wife to reside on the land until after notice of contest does not im-
peach the good faith of the claimant, where it is apparent that her final removal
to the land is in compliance with a previous bonafide intention of the claimant
to make his home on the land.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land O ce, December 2, 1890.
On May 10, 1886, Joseph HI. Fairfield, the defendant herein, made
homestead entry No. 10,343 for the NE. 3 Sec. 12, T. 21, R. 54, Sidney,
Nebraska. March 5, 1887, Joseph S. Hoagland, plaintiff herein, filed
affidavit of contest against said entry, alleging abandonment, change
of residence, lack of settlement, cultivation and good faith; that the
same was made for speculative purposes, and not for the purpose of
settlement and cultivation, but for the benefit of a townsite company.
Notice was served on the defendant March 10, 1887, hearing begun
May 17, and concluded May 20, 1887. The register and receiver fotind
in favor of the defendant, and recommended the dismissal of the con-
test.
On appeal to your office, their decision was affirmed, April 17, 1889.
IHoagland now appeals to this Department, alleging, in substance, that
your said decision is contrary to law and against the evidence.
A careful examination of the evidence fully sustains the decision of
your office, wherein the facts are accurately and succinctly set forth (to
which reference is hereby made).
The good faith of the entryman is abundantly shown by the evidence,
and, although his wife did not remove to the claim until after notice of
this contest was served upon the defendant, yet it clearly appears that
such removal by her was in pursuance of and in compliance with a
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previous bonafide intent on the part of the defendant to make his home
on the claim. She had been living with her mother at Plattsmouth,
nearly five hundred miles distant, while her husband was preparing a
home for her on the claim. Under these circumstances, her failure to
reside on the claim should not prejudice the rights of the defendant.
Scott v. King, 9 L. D., 299.
The decision of your office is affirmed.
PROCEEDINGS ON FINAL PROOF-APPEAL.
CONNER V. TANGELAND.
In proceedings under a protest against final proof a decision of the local office that
the claimant is entitled to make new proof is not such an adverse judgment as
will, in the absence of appeal, defeat his right to have the judgment of the Gen-
eral Land Office on the sufficiency of the proof already submitted.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 2, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of B. S. Stangeland from the decision of
your office of March 27, 1879, holding that the rejection of his proof by
the local officers for the N. 3 of the SE. 1, the NE. 1 of the SW. 1 and
the SE. j of the NW. , Sec. 20, T. 34 N., R. 18 W., Valentine, Ne-
braska, has become final, and allowing the homestead entry of S. M.
Conner for said tract to remain intact.
It appears from the record that Stangeland offered to make final
proof under his pre-emption declaratory statement for said tract when
Conner pr/tested, and both parties offered testimony. The local offi-
cers made the following decision:
After a careful examination of the testimony taken at this hearing, we are of the
opinion that Stangeland made prior settlement on the tract, and that he has acted in
good faith. We would therefore respectfully recommend that the homestead entry
of Conner be canceled and that Stangeland be allowed to make new proof
No appeal appears to have been taken from this decision, and the
local officers transmitted the record to your office.
By decision of March 27th aforesaid, your office held that the recom-
mendation that defendant be allowed to make new proof operates as a
rejection of the proof offered, and that Stangeland having elected to
offer final proof in the presence of an adverse claim, must abide the re-
sult. It was then held:
Your decision, therefore, rejecting the final proof offered by Stangelaud in support
of his D. S. 6883 has become final, no reason to the contrary appearing under Rule 48
of Practice; but your recommendation that he be allowed to make new proof cannot
be complied with for the reason already stated.
From this decision Stangeland appealed.
It may be conceded that the recommendation of the local officers that
Stangeland be allowed to make new proof operated practically as a re-
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jection of the proof offered, but it was not such an adverse decision as
would in the absence of appeal forfeit the right to have the judgment
of the Commissioner upon the testimony submitted. In fact, the only
decision upon the facts made by the local officers was, that Stangeland
made the prior settlement, and that he acted in good faith, and it does
not appear from their decision why new proof should have been required.
The defendant had the right to have the judgment of your office upon
the question as to whether from the testimony submitted he had suffi-
ciently complied with the law, especially in view of the fact that the
local officers, in submitting it, recommended that the defendant be al-
lowed to submit new proof.
The case is therefore remanded, with direction that the testimony
submitted be examined, and a decision thereon he made by your office.
TIMBER LAND ENTRY-FINAL PROOF.
EMMA J. WOODBURY.
There is no authority for the submission of proof, under an application to purchase
timber lands, at any place except at the local land office.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 2, 1890.
I have considered the case of Emma J. Woodbury, on appeal from
your office decision, dated September 25, 1889, rejecting her applica-
tion to purchase E. J SW. 4 and W. W SE. 1-, Sec. 21, T. 16 N., R.1 B.,
El. M., Humboldt, California.
She applies to purchase under the act of June 3, 1878 (20 Stats.,
89), and the proof is rejected because not made at the place or before
the officers named in the published notice.
In compliance with the law in this case, publication was made that
applicant would offer proof in support of her claim before the register
and receiver December 20, 1888.
It appears from the record that proof was made before the superior
judge of Del Norte county, California, December 20, 1888. The evi-
dence discloses that applicant and all her witnesses lived at Crescent
City, Del Norte county, California, which is about a four days' trip
from the land office. Within a few days of December 20,1888, storms
occurred which would have rendered travel over the route difficult and
dangerous.
This Department has heretofore instructed the local officers to see
that the law is strictly complied with in reference to proof, under said
act (see instructions, 3 L. D., 84; 7 C. L. O., 52, and 6 L. D., 114), and
it does not provide for making proof at any place except at the local
-land office.
I therefore affirm your decision.
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OTOE AND MISSO-URIA INDIAN LAND-SETTLEMENT.
FLEMING v. BOWE.
The settlement required of a purchaser of Otoe and Missouria Indian lands must be
in good faith and permanent in character.
First Assistant Secretary J Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 2, 1890.
I have considered the case of Albert M. Fleming v. Frank B. Bowe
on appeal by the latter from your decision of June 26, 1889, holding for
cancellation his cash entry for the S. b NW. of Sec. 20, T. 1 N., R. 6
E., in the Otoe and Missouria Indian reservation, for sale at Beatrice,
Nebraska land district.
On December 30, 1879, Bowe appeared before Chas. L. Schell, notary
public for Gage county, Nebraska with two witnesses and made formal
settlement proof for this tract of land, alleging settlement on that day,
and said his act of settlement consisted in " quarrying stone for a foun-
dation "-for what is not stated.
On January 2, 1880, he appeared at the Beatrice land office with said
"settlement proof" and made application to purchase the tract named,
and the settlement proof was indorsed by the local officers " approved
and entry allowed" and the entryman thereupon paid one third of the
appraised value of the land, and took a receipt therefor. There is no
other application or affidavit or any record evidence of any compliance
with law than these papers.
On July 3, 1883, he paid the balance of the purchase money with in-
terest and received a final certificate.
i On June 22, 1886, Fleming filed an affidavit of contest against said
entry or purchase, alleging that Frank E. Bowe was not at the time of
said entry or purchase a settler on said land, and that be never had
made a settlement thereon, etc.
Service was made by publication and hearing was had before the
local officers on March 16, 1887, and the local officers found from the
testimony in favor of the entryman and recommended the dismissal of
the contest. From this decision the contestant appealed and your of-
fie on June 26, 1889, reversed said decision and held said entry for
cancellation, from which decision the entryman appealed.
The testimony shows that at the date of this entry, the entryman was
a lad, thirteen years of age, living with his father whose home was in
Iowa. The father and son went to Nebraska taking with them a drove
of cattle, which they herded upon this and other unfenced lands on this
reservation. The father, R. L. Bowe, furnished the money to pay for
the land. He with his son and two men went on the tract, and laid up
some loose stone in the form of a foundation for a house, on the 30th
day of December, 1887, and on the same day made what is called, " set-
tlement proof." Afterward they took these stones and walled up a
spring with them. These are all the acts of settlement on the part of
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the entryman and his father, except the grazing of cattle on the land.
Their cattle did not do well and they closed up the business and re-
turned to Iowa.
The local officers report that this purchase was made under the
act of August 15, 1876, 19 Stats 208, and so indicate upon all the papers
in the case. It will be observed that the third section of said act was
amended by the act of March 3, 1879, 20 Stat., 471, by the former act
these lands could be sold only for cash to actual settlers, but the amend-
atory act enlarged the provisions of law, and permitted sales
To actual settlers or persons who shall make oath before the register and receiver
of the land office at Beatrice, Nebraska, that they intend to occupy the land,
and who shall within three months after the date of such application make
permanent settlement upon the same.
Counsel for the entryman claim that the decision of your office is based
upon a misunderstanding of the facts proven, and that it is contrary to
the law. To my mind it is clear that the father attempted to have his
son purchase this tract as a settler, not however with any intent of his
making it a "permanent settlement" or home. The terms "isettle-
ment," and " settler," are too well understood as applied to public land
entries to require any comment at this time. I call attention to the fact,
however, that in said statute, Congress evidently to prevent purchases
of the kind at bar, qualified the term " settlement " by providing that
it should be a 1' permanent " one.
The attempt to construe the law to mean that going upon the land,
and going away again, is all that was contemplated by it, is frivolous,
and the claim of counsel that a thirteen year old child living with his
father, whose home is in Iowa, can make an entry of this tract under
said act by going with his father and two hired men upon the land, and
helping to lay a few loose rock in the form of a foundation for a house
thereon, and then going about his business, is untenable and can not be
upheld by this Department.
Your decision is affirmed and the entry held for cancellation.
ALABAMA LANDS-ACT OF MARCH 3, 1883.
WILLIE W. THORNTON.
The report of a special agent, made prior to the act of March 3, 1883, that land is val-
uable for coal, excludes such land from subsequent entry under the homestead
law until after public offering.
Land thus reported, but covered by a homestead entry at the passage of said act, be-
comes subject thereto on the cancellation of such entry.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 3,1890.
I have considered the appeal of Willie W. Thornton from your office
decision of November 8, 1888, rejecting his application to make home-
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stead entry for the N. SW. , See. 4, T. 17 S., R. 3 W., Montgomery,
Alabama.
It appears from the record that this tract was formerly covered by
the homestead entry of one Mack Holmes, which was held for cancella-
tion by your office decision of November 24, 1886, on testimony taken
in a contest. (n appeal said decision was affirmed by the Department
on August 13, 1888. Holmes filed a motion for review, which was de-
nied on November 22, 1890.
On August 20, 1888, Thornton made application to enter which was
rejected by the local officers because of the existing entry of Holmes
and because "the land had been classed as of the class reported as
valuable for coal." On appeal your office affirmed the action below on
the ground that the tract belongs to that class of lands comprehended
in the provisions of the act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 487), providing
for a public offering.
It appears from your said office decision that on February 7, 1882,
special agent Perdue reported the tract as valuable for coal.
Said act of 1883 provides that all public lands in Alabama shall be
subject to disposal only as agricultural lands, provided "that all lands
which have heretofore been reported to the General Land Office, as
containing coal and iron shall be first offered at public sale."
Appellant urges that the mere report of a special agent is not such
a one as is contemplated by said act, and that the law does not apply
to this tract, for the reason that Holmes' entry, subsisting at the date
of the act, took the tract out of the category of " public lands." Both
points must be decided against appellant on the authority of the case
of Thomas J. Jackson (2 L. D., 36). The tract therein involved had
been reported as valuable for coal by a special agent, and was covered
by an entry at the date of the act. Nevertheless, it was held that it
must be offered under said act. See also Lorenzo D. Evins (9 L. D.,
635).
Said decision is accordingly affirmed.
PRE-EMPTION CONTEST-ILLEGAL CLAIM.
SHIRLEY V. JONES.
4 pre-emption claim initiated and maintained in the interest of another is illegal,
and the filing made thereunder must be canceled.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 3, 1890.
On the 16th of September 1878, Jacob Harshberger made timber
culture entry for the N. NE. SE. i NE. and NE. SE. Sec. 12,
T. 11 S., R. 6 W., Salina, Kansas.
This entry was canceled by relinquishment September 17, 1885, and
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the same day Henry Jones, the defendant herein filed his declaratory
statement No. 20517 for said tract alleging settlement the daybefore.
May 26, 1886, William J. Shirley, plaintiff herein, made homestead
entry No. 24090 for the same land.
August 12, 1886, Shirley filed in the local office a complaint in the
nature of a contest against the filing of Jones, alleging that he was not
a citizen of the United States; that prior to his filing he had exhausted
his pre-emption rights; that his filing was not made in good faith, and
that he had not improved the land, nor resided thereon as the law
required.
August 21, 1886, both parties appeared, and by consent the case was
continued to October 12, 1886, at which time Shirley verified his com-
plaint by his corroborated affidavit. Both parties appeared attended
by counsel.
The register and receiver recommended the cancellation of Jones'
filing for lack of residence and improvement, and because the evidence
showed that he was not a citizen of the United States at the time Shir-
ley's rights attached.
On appeal by Jones, your office by its letter of February 2, 1889, re-
versed the decision of the local officers, and held that the residence and
improvements of Jones were sufficiently established; that he had not ex-
hausted his pre-emption rights, but being in doubt as to the evidence of
citizenship your predecessor directed this point to be reserved until Jones
offered his final proof when more satisfactory evidence might be intro-
duced as to the matter, and allowed Jones ninety days in which to sub-
mit the final proof and satisfactory evidence of citizenship.
From this decision Shirley appeals.
I can not concur in the decision of your office in its finding as to the
residence and improvements of Jones. The evidence shows that for
three or four years prior to the relinquishment of llarshberger and the
filing of Jones he had been in the employ of iHarshberger as a hired
hand, having " nothing except what he worked for." That Jones and
Harshberger went together to the local office when the former relin-
quished his timber culture entry, aid Jones immediately filed his de-
claratory statement for the land. They both testify that sometime after-
wards Jones executed and delivered to flarshberger his promissory
note for five hundred dollars. This note was not produced on trial and
neither Jones nor JHarshberger could remember its date.
Jones constructed a box house on the land twelve by fourteen feet,
Harshberger paying for the lumber. It had no floor, no glass in the
window, no stove, chimney, not even an aperture for a stove-pipe.
Jones claims to have slept there except in the cold weather in winter,
when he slept at Harshberger's. After his filing he continued to work
for flarshberger as a hired hand at eighteen dollars a month and his
board, and was still so employed at the time of the hearing. Prior to
the hearing Jones had raised about four acres of corn on the land, his
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cornfield being in the same inclosure with that of Hlarshberger's, all
plowed and cultivated together with no lines or boundary between
them. Harshberger used Jones' pasture in common with his own.
There was no " well. pig-pen, chicken house or coop, stable, corncrib,
granary " nor other outhouses on the land, in fact nothingbut the house
(which was not habitable) to indicate that Jones had made any calcula-
tions or preparations to occupy this land as a home, his only occupancy
of the house consisting in sleeping there when the weather would per-
mit.
I think all the evidence together shows that arshberger and not
Jones is the real party in interest. He says himself that he relinquished
his timber culture entry because he was satisfied that he could not
hold the land longer under his entry, and from the evidence I have no
doubt that he procured Jones to file on the land in order that he might
in the end procure the title himself under the filing of Jones.
From this view of the evidence it is not necessary to discuss the other
charges in the contest affidavit.
The filing of Jones will be canceled. The decision of your office is
therefore reversed.
RANCHO PUNTA DE LA LAGUNA-CIRCULAR INSTRUCTIONS.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
Washington, December 1, 1890.
To the Registers and Receivers of the U. S. Land OQJlces, California.
GENTLEMEN: Your attention is directed to the provisions of an act
of Congress approved October 1, 1890, entitled "An act relative to the
Rancho Punta de la Laguna," a copy of which is herewith enclosed;
and will be found also in the latest volume of the Statutes at large,
page 644.
It is found that the allegation in the preamble of said act is sustained
by the evidence; and the record submitted shows, rimnafacie, that the
following named persons are the beneficiaries, and entitled respectively
to select the quantities of land set opposite their names, viz:
Acres.
W. L. Adam ----------------------... .... 424.99
J. L. Shuman ----------------------------------------- 424. 99
Erminia Dargie, formerly Erminia Peralta ................................ 424. 99
Josefa P. Van Vrankin, formerly Josefa Peralta ........................... 424. 99
Isaac Goldtree ............ .-. ...... - . ------. -..- .....- 849. 99
J. B. Arellanes -----------------------------------------------------------. 849. 99
W. E. Dargie- --------------------------------------------------.------- 849. 99
J. H. Rice ............................. ................................. 212. 49
Eliza Dutard, wife of Hippolyte Dutard- --------------------------------- 212.49
L. M. Kaiser ------------------- .......... 219.49
S. I. Jamison ............................-......... ...... ...... . 173.86
Estate of A. Toguazzini ............................................... .... 38.63
Total ....................... -.... ............ ......... 5099. 89
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William E. Dargie, of Oakland, California, one of the parties in in-
terest, has been constituted attorney in fact of all the other parties
above named, except in the matter of the estate of Antonio Toguazzini,
deceased.
The right of Mr. Dargie, under his powers on file in this office, to
make all the selections, under the terms of the act, except 38.63 acres
due the Tognazzini estate, will be recognized.
There are several minor children of said Tognazzini, and an adminis-
trator of his estate has been appointed.
The said administrator, or a duly authorized guardian of said children
may make the selection for " the heirs of Antonio Tognazzini, deceased."
A full forty acre tract may be taken at whatever district land office in
California the application to select is made, and cash paid for the ex-
cess over 38.63 acres; and the usual "cash excess receipts," in dupli-
cate, will be issued.
The lands to be selected under the law, and these instructions, must
be unoccupied, unappropriated, and unreserved public lands of the
United States in the State of California, not mineral, surveyed or un-
surveyed, " and in tracts not less than the subdivisions provided for in
the United States land laws."
These selections, therefore, may be made at different land offices, for
the smallest legal subdivisions, or larger ones. Compact form, or con-
tiguity, is not required by the act.
If unsurveyed land is applied for, immediate steps will have to be
taken to ascertain the exact quantity and character of the land which
the party desires to select.
All these selections must be made within one year next after October
1, 1890.
The act is mandatory upon this point, and the land department has
no authority to extend the time so prescribed by Congress.
The enclosed forms, "A" and "' B " may be used in effecting the se-
lections. They may be used in manuscript or printed form, and adapted
to the number of legal subdivisions applied for at one time in your
offlce.
Form "A" is an application to select.
Form " B" is a certi Rcate of entry, with a register's and receiver's
number. These certificates will be issued in duplicate; one to be trans-
mitted to this office (with the application), and the other delivered to
the person making the selection.
A new series, conmmencing with No. one, will be used, at each land
office in California in this matter, and a separate docket must be kept
of all selections made nuder the aforesaid act at your office. The said
applications and certificates connected with any such selections, will be
reported. to this office, regularly, together with a separate abstract
thereof, with your monthly returns.
Care must be taken to keep the selections madelby, or for, each of
the above named beneficiaries, " entirely separate and distinct."
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A tract in part satisfaction of the amount due one party, as herein-
before indicated, cannot be coupled in an application, or certificate, with
a tract desired by another of the parties named."
In case any application to select under said law, and these instruc-
tions, is denied or rejected by you, for any cause whatever, the applica-
tion and facts will be at once reported to this office in a special letter,
for appropriate action.
Very respectfully,
LEWIS A. GROFF,
Commissioner.
Approved.
JOHN W. NOBLE,
Secretary.
RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY MAP OF LOCATION.
LONGMONT, MIDDLE PARK, & PACIFIC Y. CO.
A map filed under the right of way act within twelve months after definite location
of the line of route delineated thereon, showing a section of road over surveyed
public land, which is returned for amendment, will be held to have been filed in
time, though the statutory period may expire before the perfected map is filed
in the local office.
A map filed under said act will not be approved where the statements in the certificate.
and affidavit, accompanying the same are not in accordance with the conditions
surrounding the case.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land ffice, December
3, 1890.
With letter of July 10, last, the Department returned to you a map
theretofore submitted, and filed by the Longmont, Middle Park and
Pacific Railway Company under the right of way act (March 3, 1875,
18 Stat., 482), with a statement that approval thereof was withheld
because the map was not filed within the time required by the act, with-
out allusion to other objections. In a subsequent letter, that of Sep-
tember 6, last, you stated that two maps had been filed in 1881 by the
Longmont, Middle Park and Pacific Narrow Gauge Railway Company,
now knower by the name above mentioned, which were returned to the
company because of defects, and that no action had been taken in the
premises till the present map was filed. You submitted the matter for
directions, and, on the 1st ultimo, re-submitted the map.
In reply and for your guidance, I have to state, generally, that a
map filed under this act within twelve months after the definite location
of the line of route delineated thereon and showing a section of road
over surveyed public lands, which is returned to the company filing it
because of imperfections, will be held to have been filed within the
statutory period although the legal limit may have elapsed before the
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perfected map, or a similar one in its stead, is again filed in the local
office.
Laches as respects the re-filing of this map would not operate against
favorable action thereon, according to the above view, and in the light
of the statements in your letter of September 6, if the map were other-
wise properly executed and authenticated and accorded with the facts
as presented.
Your letter states that Longmont, the eastern terminus of the section
of road, is in section 10-2 N.-69, W., while the map shows it to be in
section 3; and that Ward, the western terminus, is in section -1, N.-
73, W., while that town is not noted on the map, but the section of road
ends at a point on the west line of section 18-1, N.-72, W. The state-
ment in the certificate attached to the map is not in accordance with
the conditions surrounding the case and such is true respecting the
affidavit which precedes the certificate.
By reason ot the foregoing objections the map is herewith returned
unapproved.
PRACTICE-EVrDENCE-PRE-EMPTION CONTEST.
CONN V. CARRIGAN.
An affidavit filed with an appeal to the Department cannot be received as evidence
in a contested case.
The temporary removal of the claimant from land of his own, prior to tA establish-
meqt of residence on his pre-emption claim in the same State will not take such
claim out of the second inhibitory clause of section 2260 R. S.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, December 4,1890.
I have considered the appeal of James Carrigan from your office de-
cision of May 17, 1889, holding for cancellation his pre-emption cash
entry, made October 19, 1886, for the SW. i Sec. 21, T. 6 N., . 34 W.,
Mcook, Nebraska.
On March 15, 1887, Leslie Conn made application for a hearing, in
which he alleged that " James Corrigan has moved his family, himself,
and dwelling-house, from deeded land of his own in this Statelto reside
on the above described pre-emption cash entry, which deeded land was
his deeded homestead, which is contrary to the ruling of the ILaud De-
partment."
The hearing was duly had by your order of June 6, 1887, and the
register and receiver, from the evidence submitted thereat, found that
the claimant had acted in bad faith and recommended the cancellation
of his entry, and on his appeal you affirm that judgment.
The entryman appeals therefrom to this Department, alleging, among
other things, as grounds of error, that your decision is contrary to law
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and unsupported by the evidence. The facts are suostantially set forth
in your opinion.
The land in controversy corners on the southwest with the NE. i of
Sec. 29, in the same township. n October 22, 1885, Mr. Corrigan made
his final homestead proof on the last described tract, and on November
12, 1885, filed his declaratory statement for the land in question, alleg-
ing settlement thereon October 28, 1885. .His witness, William Liston,
testifies that he thinks the claimant removed from his homestead to
Culbertson, Nebraska, on November 8, 1885; that about February 20,
1886, he made his first act of settlement on the land in question, and
about April 1, thereafter, he moved with his family from Culbertson to
his pre-emption claim.
ile further swears that claimant told him " inside of two or three weeks
after he made final proof " that he (claimant) " did not want any more
land," and did not want to pre-empt the land in controversy. Claim-
ant told the same in substance to his witness, Ballard. It was exactly
three weeks from the time he made his final proof on his homestead
entry until he filed his declaratory statement for the land in controversy,
so that his statement to Liston was probably not sincere. If, as Liston
says, he moved frdm his homestead to Culbertson on November 8, he
made the filing within four days after such removal.
The evidence further shows that he moved the house from his home-
stead claim to his adjoining pre-emption claim, and after he had proved
up on that (October 19, 1886,) he moved the same house to his timber
culture claim in section 31, of the same township, where he wag living at
date of hearing. He failed to testify at the hearing as to what his
intentions were when he moved from his homestead; and the statements
made in his affidavit, accompanying his appeal, as to such intentions,
can not now be considered. Rule 72 of the Rules of Practice; Crow v.
Andrus, 5 L. D., 425; Knox v. Bassett, 5 L. D., 351. It is shown that
he moved from his homestead to a house he caused to be built in Cul-
bertson, where he staid about four months; thence he removed to his
pre-emption claim; and it is insisted that these acts do not constitute
an abandonment of his residence on his own land to reside on the public
land, and therefore not inhibited by the second subdivision of section
2260 of the Revised Statutes.
I thinuk from all the facts and circumstances in this case, that claim-
ant's residence in Culbertson was intended to be only temporary, and,
if so, his temporary removal from land of his own prior to the estab-
lishment of residence on his pre-emption claim will not take such claim
out of the inhibition contained in said statute. Ott v. Crawford, 10 L.
D., 117.
I am also of the opinion that this removal to Culbertson was a mere
subterfuge to evade the provisions contained in the inhibitory clause in
said statute. I am strengthened in this opinion by the fact that his al-
leged settlement on the pre-emption claim antedated his removal from
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his homestead, and whatever the facts really are, he should not be per-
mitted to deny his own statement, which he caused to go on record, in
order to avoid the effect of the same in his efforts to secure more gov-
ernment land. It can hardly be said, when he moved from his home-
stead to Culbertson, on November 8, that he did notintend at that time
to move to the pre-emption claim, when he filed on the same four days
later. On the contrary, the facts warrant the conclusion that he did
intend such removal.
I concur in the conclusions reached in your decision that this entry
should be canceled. It is so ordered and the judgment appealed from
is affirmed.
PURCHASE UNDER THE ACT OF JUNE 15, 18SO-AFFIDAVIT.
GRAHAM V. GARLICHS.
An affidavit of identity is not required of the original entryman where he applies to
purchase under section 2, act of Jane 15, 1880, and the duplicate receipt accom-
panies the record.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Ofce, December 5, 1890.
December 8, 1879, Julius Ipsom made homestead entry for the NW.
± Sec. 15, T. 4 S., R. 22 W., Kirwin, Kansas. May 19, 1884, he exe-
cuted a power of attorney, authorizing Hugh Mc~redie, in his name
and for his use, to make final proof for the same "uder the 2d
section of the act of June 15th, 1880, 21 Stat., 237." June 21, 1884, He-
Credie, in virtue of his said power of attorney, made and subscribed
the cash proof affidavit required of the entryman, and received final
certificate in the name of Julius Ipsom.
The laud was several times transferred. and on the 21st of April,
1886, was conveyed by warranty deed to Garlichs, appellant herein.
April 18, 1885, the said cash entry was suspended by your office, be-
cause the required cash proof affidavit was made by a person other
than the entryman.
March 20, 1888, George Graham applied to contest the said cash en-
try, alleging the proof to be insufficient by reason of the affidavit afore-
said. His application was held to await the action of Garliels, in
relation to the suspension of Ipsom's cash entry.
June 14, 1888, Garlichs filed with the register and receiver an ab-
stract of the record showing his ownership of the land, and an affidavit
to the effect that he was an innocent purchaser, without notice of the
defective affidavit, or of the action of the Commissioner in suspending
the entry, and that he had made diligent inquiry to learn the where-
abouts of Ipson, with a view to procuring from him a proper affidavit,
but had been unable to find him, and asked that the personal affidavit
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of Ipsom be dispensed with, the cash proof already on file accepted,
and the land passed to patent. This application was referred to the
Commissioner, and, on October 17, 1888, the Commissioner allowed him
sixty days (additional) in which to procure and file Ipsom's affidavit.
Garlicbs failed to furnish the required affidavit, whereupon your
office, by its letter of June 1, 1889, held the said cash entry for cancel-
lation, and Garlichs now appeals.
The affidavit of identity, etc., is required only when the original
homestead party applies to enter and "has lost his duplicate receipt."
General Circular of January 1, 1889, page 19.
In the case at bar, Ipsom's duplicate receipt accompanies the record.
The affidavit was therefore unnecessary.
Graham's contest is dismissed, and you will direct a patent to issue
to Garlichs.
Your decision is reversed.
SUSPENDED ENTRY-SEGREGATION.
MELVIN P. YATES.
The suspension of an entry does not relieve the land covered thereby from reserva-
tion, hence during sch suspension the entry of another for said land cannot be
allowed.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 5, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Melvin P. Yates from your office de-
cision, dated February 16,1889, rejecting his application to make home-
stead entry on the NE. of Sec. 28 T. 7 S., R. 28 W., Oberlin, Kansas.
The record shows that on November21,1884, Horace G. Pearson filed
pre-emption declaratory statement for above described tract, and on
June 24, 1885, he made cash entry for the same. His proof shows that
he had resided on the tract since December 1, 1884, cultivating and
improving it. June 16, 1888, your office suspended said cash entry for
insufficient residence and improvements, and allowed Pearson sixty
days, without republication of notice to file additional evidence.
It also appears that notice of said suspension was sent to Pearson's
last address at oxie, Kansas, but he was then living in Pasadena,
California. September 5, 1888, a second notice was sent to Pasadena,
which he received.
September 24, 1888, Melvin P. Yates, applied to make homestead
entry upon the same tract, which was rejected same day, by the local
land office for the reason that said tract is covered by cash entry of
Horace G. Pearson.
Yates appealed from this action to your office, where, on February
16, 1889, you affirmed the decision appealed from. Thereupon he still
further prosecutes his appeal to this department.
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At the time this application was made, Horace G. Pearson's entry of
the tract was of record, uncanceled and was notice to this claimant and
all the world of his claim to this land.
His entry, though suspended temporarily, is nevertheless an entry,
and withdraws the land embraced therein frz market until such time
as the same may be finally acted upon. See Henry Cliff (3 L. D., 216).
A mere suspension of Pearson's entry until he could furnish the addi-
tional proof called for does not open this land for entry to the public.
And the allowance of sixty days' time for furnishing such proof does
not necessarily mean that at the end of that time his entry should be
canceled. Circumstances might have arisen during the allotted time
which in the discretion of the Commissioner of the Land Office, would
be sufficient cause for granting more time.
In this case it appears by reason of Pearson's change of residence the
sixty days' time was consumed before he received notice of the action
of the General Land Office. The notice was sent to him September 5th
and on October 16th, 1888, he began to take steps to comply with the
order of the Land Office, ordering him to furnish additional proof.
There could not be two entries at the same time on the same land.
Russell v. Gerold (10 L. D., 18); Geer v. Farrington (4 L. D., 410). It
therefore follows that the application of Melvin P. Yates to make home-
stead entry was rightly rejected.
Your office decision is affirmed.
ALABAMA LANDS-ABANDONMENT.
JAMES E. JOLLY.
An additional homestead entry of land reported, prior to the act of March 3, 1883, as
containing coal, can not be allowed until after public offering.
An entry of a less amount than that covered by settlement operates as abandon-
ment of the land not included within the entry.
First assistant Seoretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Offloe, December 6, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of James E. Jolly from your office de-
cision of October 14, 1889, rejecting his homestead application to enter
the SE. 1 of NW. Sec. 22, T. 14 S., R. 3 W., Huntsville, Alabama.
The record shows that applicant made entry for the S. e of NE. ;,
Sec. 22, T. 14 S., R. 3 W., in 1876; and that he has resided thereon
with his family ever since. In his present application he asks the
privilege of entering the tract above as additional to his original entry
of 1876.
July 24, 1889, the local office rejected this application for the reason
that he did not allege settlement prior to March 3, 1883, and that the
land is classed as mineral.
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Your office affirmed the decision of the local office. Whereupon ap-
plicant appealed to this Department.
According to the statements of your office the tract sought to be
entered had been reported as containing coal prior to the act of March
3, 1883 (22 Stat., 487).
It must, therefore, have been offered at public sale before it is subject
to entry. The tract in dispute had not been offered at public sale prior
to this homestead application. It follows that unless applicant's rights
attached to this land before the act of March 3, 1883, he can have no
right now.
The question therefore arises did James E. Jolly make settlement on
the tract in controversy before March 3, 1883.
His application is dated July 23, 1889, more than six years after the
passage of said act. The attorney for applicant argues that settlement
should date back to the time of the original entry in 1876 under the act
of May 14, 1880. I do not believe the argument is well taken, because
if applicant claims settlement now he must have claimed settlement of
this tract at the time of his entry of the original eighty acres in 1876.
If so, his entry of the eighty acres will operate as an abandonment of
the tract now in dispute. See Cayce v. St. Louis and Iron Mountain
Railroad company (6 L. D., 356); see also Nix v. Allen (112 U. S., 129).
Your office decision is affirmed.
PRACTICE-CERTIORAMI-APPEAL.
SMITH V. NOBLE.
An application for the writ of certiorari will be denied, if it appears that the appli.
cant has not sought relief by appeal.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the Genteral Land Office, Decem-
ber 6, 1890.
I am in receipt of your letter of September 11, 1890, transmitting an
application for certiorari filed by Robert Smith in the case of said
Smith against Spencer V. Noble.
It appears that on August 7, 1882, Noble made "mineral entry No.
116, for placer claim No. 1, above discovery and upper one hundred feet
of discovery and hill claims adjoining on southeast " Deadwood series,
now Rapid City, Dakota, and that subsequently on June 16, 1890, the
local officers forwarded a protest filed by Smith, alleging that he was
the owner of a portion of said claim by purchase, that he has resided
thereon and cultivated it for ten years, " that the part so occupied by
him is thirty feet above the remainder of the claim, and of the placer
ground on Whitewood Greek; that no placer mining had been done
thereon other than prospecting, since he has resided thereon and for
years previous; that no one has made any claim to said premises, set
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stakes, or posted notices thereon since his settlement ;" that Noble has
sold all that portion of the placer claim to a railroad company, "which
the company is now leveling for machine shops and round houses," and
that the ground claimed by him is not valuable for mining purposes.
By letter of July 1.8, 1890, your office found that the evidence showed
the claim to have been owned and worked as a placer byNoble and his
grantors, since 1876; that not less than $5000, had been expended
thereon for that purpose and that several thousand dollars worth of
gold had been taken from the claim; that Noble had given legal notice
of his application for patent, and that Smith had failed to file an ad-
verse claim under the statute; that Smith had not alleged that valu-
able mineral had not been discovered on the claim, and concluded that
your office would not be warranted in ordering a hearing.
The protest was accordingly dismissed.
Thereupon protestant instead of seeking relief by appeal, filed this
application for certiorari.
By your said letter of September 11, you call attention to the fact
that no appeal has been taken in the case, and that the right of appeal
has not been denied.
The rules of practice contemplate that any person aggrieved by a
ruling of your office shall seek relief by appeal to the Department.
This is the ordinary and orderly practice. It does not appear why the
applicant failed to pursue this course. The Department will not coun-
tenance a resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari when an ob-
servance of the usual methods of practice furnishes ample relief. Pro-
testants in mineral cases are, under certain circumstances, entitled to
appeal. Bright v. Elkhorn Mining Co. (8 L. D., 22). Inasmuch as
applicant has not sought relief by appeal, the application is denied.
HOMESTEAD SETTLEMENT-CONFLICTING CLAIMS.
BERRY V. WEBSTER.
A valid settlement claim under the homestead law, can not be made by one who is
at the same time maintaining a settlement claim for another tract under the pre-
emption law.
No rights, as against others, are acquired by the cultivation of a tract under authority
from a railroad company that has no right thereto under its grant.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 8, 1890.
The land in controversy was formerly embraced within the limits
of a withdrawal for the benefit of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad
Company, but, on May 24, 1886, it was restored to the public domain, in
accordance with the decision of the Department of March 23,1886, in the
case of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company (4 I. D., 458), hold-
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ing that the company was not entitled to a grant of lands between San
Buenaventura and San Francisco, and that the withdrawal of said lands
was therefore without authority and void.
On May 24, 1886, the said lands were opened to entry by the order of
your office.
Robert Webster filed declaratory statement for the NW. 4 of See. 25,
T. 25 S., R. 12 E., M. D. M., San Francisco, California, and o the same
day John S. Berry made homestead entry of the same tract. On Decem-
ber 16, 1886, Berry offered final proof, pursuant to notice, which was
contested by Webster, and testimony was offered by both parties upon
which testimony the local officers held that Webster was the prior set-
tler and should be allowed to make final proof, and that Berry's entry
should be canceled. Upon appeal, your office affirmed this decision,
and Berry appealed.
It appears from the testimony that Berry cultivated the land for
eight years prior to restoration, claiming the land under the athor-
ity of the railroad company. On May 8, 1886, he moved a house upon
the land, and established his residence with his family, having moved
from his adjoining pre-emption claim, upon which he offered final proof
in April preceding.
Webster first made settlement upon the claim in June 1885, by sleep-
ing on the land, and then left the claim to purchase lumber and to qual-
ify himself to enter the land by filing his declaration of intention to
become a citizen of the United States. He returned to the land the
latter part of June of that year and slept on the land in the gulches.
On July 4, Webster hauled some lumber on the land, which was re-
moved by Berry after he had ordered Webster to remove it, who refused
to do so. In November Webster built a cabin, and resided therein
until the date of the hearing, his wife having lived with him from May
22, 1886, when she came from England and joined her husband in this
country.
It will be seen from the recordthat Berry did not make final proof
upon his pre-emption claim until April, 1886, and in his testimony he
states that he first made settlement and residence upon the land on
May 8, 1886. He could not make a valid settlement until after he had
offered proof on his pre-emption claim, without abandoning that claim,
nor did his cultivation of the claim under the authority of the railroad
company give him any right over others, inasmuch as the company had
no right to the land.
I think the proof clearly shows that Webster actually settled and
resided upon the land from November, 1885, up to the time of the hear-
ing, and warrants the finding of the local office and of your office that
Webster was the first bona fide settler upon the land, and the decision
of your office holding the entry of Berry for cancellation and allowing
Webster to make final proof is affirmed.
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MINING CLAIM-MILL SITE-SECTION 2337 R.S.
SYNDICATE LODE MILL SITE.
A mill site location not made for the use or occupancy of the applicant, but for the
benefit of another, cannot be passed to patent.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, December
8, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of A. E. Wanneriaker from so much of
your office decision, dated September 3, 1.889, as holds for cancellation
the Syndicate mill-site mineral entry No. 437, made October 7, 1885, at
Durango, Colorado.
The record shows that the Syndicate lode claim was located by W.
E. Steele September 28, 1880.
January 14, 18i4, Steele conveyed to Alice F. Wanneinaker the claim.
Alice F. Wannemaker and W. E. Steele on October 8, 1884, conveyed
the same to A. E. Wannemaker.
October 11, 1884, A. E. Wannemaker located the Syndicate mill-site
known as the Syndicate lode mill-site.
October 7, 1885, A. E. Wannamaker made entry for the Syndicate
lode and mill-site.
September 3, 1889, your office held for cancellation applicant's mineral
entry to the extent of the mill-site lot No. 2185 B., embracing five acres.
Section 2337, under which applicant seeks for patent is as follows:
Where non-mineral land not contiguous to the vein or lode is used or occupied by
the proprietor of such vein or lode for mining or milling purposes, such non-adjacent
surface ground may be embraced and included in an application for a patent for such
vein or lode, and the same may be patented therewith, subject to the same prelimi-
nary requirements as to survey and notice as are applicable to veins or lodes; but no
location hereafter made of such non-adjacent land shall exceed five acres, and pay-
ment for the same must be made at the same rate as fixed by this chapter for the super-
ficies of the lode. The owner of a quartz-mill or reduction-works, not owning amine
in connection therewith, may also receive a patent for his mill-site, as provided in
this section.
The evidence, upon examination discloses that ever since the mill-site
in dispute was located by Wannemaker it has been occupied by coke
ovens for the manufacture of coke from bituminous coal for the use of
the Grand View Mining and Smelting company's smelter at Rico,
Colorado.
At the time applicant located the Syndicate mill-site he agreed to
deed the same to the above named company as soon as he could obtain
patent therefor. This arrangement seems to have been made because
the Grand View Mining and Smelting company was not at that time
the owner of any lode or mine and could not therefore obtain patent for
a mill-site while applicant, Wannetnaker, being the owner of Syndicate
lode could obtain a patent for a mill-site to be used in connection there-
with.
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It seems, therefore, that said mill-site was not located for the use and
occupancy of applicant, but was to be conveyed to the above named
company. In his location certificate applicant said that the Syndicate
Mill-site was to be used and occupied as a mill-site in connection with
the Syndicate lode. In fact,it has never been used or occupied for any
such purpose, but on the contrary, it is admitted by the evidence, that
it has been continuously used by the Grand View Mining and Smelting
company. These facts show conclusively that the land is not used or
occupied for the purpose for which it was located or for any purpose in
connection with the Syndicate lode.
Whatever improvements are upon the mill-site were not placed there
by Wannemaker.
The claimant has not shown such use and occupation of the land in
question as is contemplated by Sec. 2337, R. S. See Charles Lennig
(5 L. D., 190); Le Neve Mill-site (9 L. D., 460).
Your office decision is affirmed.
PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHT-SECOND FILING-MINOR.
JOHNSON V. ROUNTREE.
A minor who files a declaratory statement with full knowledge of his disqualifica-
tion under the law, and subsequently sells his relinquishment of the claim, ex-
hausts thereby his pre-emptive right, and can not be allowed to make a second
filing.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 8, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Lourain Johnson from the decision
of your office of May 11, 1889, allowing the final proof of Charles J.
Rountree upon his pre-emption claim for the E. i of the NW. 1 and the
W. 4 of the NE. J of Sec. 25, T. 3 S., R. 24 W., Kirwin, Kansas.
It appears from the record that on August 5, 1885, Rountree offered
proof upon said claim, when Johnson protested, alleging an adverse
and superior claim to the land by virtue of his declaratory statement,
filed July 13, 1885. Upon this protest a hearing was had, and the
local officers found in favor of defendant, from which decision the prot-
estant appealed, alleging error in said decision in holding: (1) that the
defendant did not exhaust his pre-emption right by his filing made
April8,1880; and(2)inholdinigthathehadcomplied withthelaw as to
residence and cultivation. Your office affirmed said decision, and held:
As to the 1st error assigned, the testimony shows that when he was eighteen years
of age, defendant made or procured another man to make for him a D. S. filing on a
certain tract of land, that he only held said filing a few weeks, and then sold it and
relinquished all his right to it for $10. 1-is filing at that time was of no legal effect,
as he was not a qualified pre-emptor, and is consequently not a bar to his exercise of
his right under the pre-emption law after he had become qualified to do so.
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Your office further held that, as to residence and improvements on
the tract, he had complied with the law.
The controlling question in this case is, whether the defendant, with
a fall knowledge of the fact that he was a minor and not qualified to
make a pre-emption filing, did, notwithstanding such knowledge, make
a filing and sell the relinquishment of his claim. If he did, he has ex-
hausted his right, and it is unnecessary to consider the question as to
whether he has complied with the law.
In his testimony, he says that he did make a filing in 1880 for another
tract of land, when he was eighteen years old, and that it was made for
him by a man named Barman. He says:
I paid him $3.00 for making said filing. I asked him to do it. I broke five acres of
-prairie on this land, is all I done. I done nothing with the land afterward. Mrs.
Right has that land now. She paid me $10.00 for my paper on that land. I signed
my name on back of papers.
This case is controlled by the decision of the Department in the case
of Allen v. Baird, 6 L. D., 298. In that case the Secretary said "In
the first filing Allen stated that he was over twenty-one years' of age,
when he knew that statement was untrue." "The land was subject to
settlement and entry, and Allen can not now be heard to say that his
first filing was illegal."
In the case at bar, it does not appear that Rountree was prevented
from perfecting his entry, and, although he was disqualified from mak-
ing filing or eiitry, yet he might have perfected his claim upon attain-
ing majority. His attempt to acquire title, knowing that he was under
age, and his speculation on the land by the sale of his relinquishment,
has exhausted has right, and his filing should be canceled.
Your decision is reversed.
MINING CLAIM-CHARACTER OF LAND.
MORRILL V. MARGARET MINING CO.
A mineral application will not be allowed if the mineral character of the land does
not satisfactorily appear.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 8, 1890.
I have considered the case of Benjamin G. Morrill'v. The Margaret
Mining company on appeal by both parties from your office decision of
May 20, 1889, finding that the land in controversy, being unsurveyed
public lands in Seattle land district, King (Jo., Washington, has no value
for either mining or agricultural purposes.
The record shows that on the 26th day of August, 1886, the Margaret
Mining company filed in the local office its application to purchase the
Gray Eagle Mining claim being survey No. 52, situated in King county,
Washington Territory, on unsurveyed public land.
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On May 14, 1886, and afterwards on June 25, 1886, Benjamin G. Mor-
rill filed in the local office his protest against the allowance of a min-
eral entry for said land by the Margaret Mining company or any one
else alleging his settlement upon and improvement of a claim on un-
surveyed lands in March, 1885. That subsequently a mining company
located a mineral claim embracing the same lands, called the Gray
Eagle. That the object and purpose of said mining company is to ob-
tain title to some hot springs. That there is no valuable mine on the
claim, and they make no pretensions to one outside of obtaining a
patent to Sulphar Springs." He further alleges that he was an occu-
pant of the land in question before any parties interested in the said
mining company. That he had erected buildings on the claim and that
it had been his home for the past eighteen months.
On the 12th day of November, 1886, a hearing was ordered by the
local officers to determine the character of the said "Gray Eagle min-
ing claim." In pursuance thereof the testimony was in part taken
before a notary public in King county, Washington Territory, partly in
the form of depositions, and the remainder before the local officers.
From the evidence introduced in the case the local officers, on the 7th
day of November, 1887, refused the application of said Margaret Mining
company, from which said company appealed to your office, which on
the 20th day of May, 1889, found " that said claim has not been proven
to be of any value for mining purposes, neither is it of any value for
agricultural purposes. Hence it must be held to be most valnable for
its hot springs thereon and therefore subject to sale under the general
laws, and not under the acts relating to the sale of mineral lands."
From your said decision both parties appeal.
It appears from the evidence that prior to the organization of said
Margaret Mining company, said Benjamin G. Morrill made a settlement
upon, and was improving a claim upon unsurveyed public land. That
after the organization of the mining company it located the Gray Eagle
Lode mining claim upon land embraced in Morrill's claim. In the
boundaries of said mining claim there is what the witnesses denominate
as the "Hot Springs of Green River," the waters of said springs are
supposed to contain valuable medicinal qualities. The value of said
springs is not shown by the evidence in this case but Morrill and said
mining company seem to value them highly. In fact the acquisition of
said springs seems to have been the object of Morrill's settlement, and
of the organization of said mining company. After the organization of
said company and the location of said mining claim, Morrill wag ejected
from the land by an officer under some sort of proceedings had before
a court at the trial before which he swears he made no appearance, since
which time he has been out of the possession. Morrill's improvements
consisted chiefly in buildings near said hot springs erected for the ac-
commodation of guests and people visiting said springs for their health,
and the breaking and clearing of about an acre of ground which he
planted to garden egetalble~s and potatoes.
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The claim crosses Green River and is shown to be generally covered
with timber and brush. It is shown to be broken and rocky generally
yet there is a portion of it that can be cultivated successfully and has
some value as agricultural lands. Morrill's improvements are shown to
have been worth from $800 to $1000.
As to the mineral character of the land embraced in the Gray Eagle
claim, the evidence fails to satisfactorily show that mineral in paying
quantities exists, or has been found on said claim.
It appears that very little effort has been made by the mining com-
pany t develop the mineral resources of the claim, the mineral claim-
ants having turned their attention to the mineral springs, which appear
to be their sole incentive for acquiring title to the land. The sole issue
presented for determination was the right of the mineral applicants to
purchase the land and inasmuch as the land is not shown to be mineral
in character, your office decision in rejecting their application to pur-
chase was right and to that extent is hereby affirmed.
The rights of Morrill in the tract can properly be determined when
he makes application therefor under the law.
Your said office decision is accordingly modified.
PRACTICE-REVIEW-REHEARING.
CLINE v. DAUL.
An allegation of additional evidence, not newly discovered, if made for the first time
on review comes too late to justify a rehearing.
8ecretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Ofce, Decem-
ber 8, 1890.
Frederick Daul has filed a motion for review and reconsideration of
departmental decision of June 28, 1890, in the case of Mary Cline v.
Frederick Daul, involving a part of Sec. 2, T. 8 N., R. 19 W., Grand
Island land district, Nebraska.
The ground of said motion is "that said decision of the Honorable
Secretary in canceling the entry was contrary to law and contrary to
evidence;"1 that " the evidence oi se eral witnesses introduced by said
contestant . . . . . . was false and untrue; " that " the said con-
testee was taken by surprise at the said trial by the evidence of said
contestant and contestant's witnesses."
No attempt is made to show wherein said decision was " contrary to
law and contrary to evidence." It is not stated whose testimony was
false, nor wherein it was false. No explanation is made of the manner
in which the entryman was "taken by surprise." The affidavit of the
entryinan, and two other persons, Levi P. Wells and his wife Jennie M.
Wells, are given, to the effect that the entryman has resided on the
tract in question continuously since April 1, 1884. It is not necessary
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to analyze the statements contained in these affidavits, and compare
them with the testimony taken at the hearing. At best they are but
cumulative, and insufficient, when taken in connection with the evi-
dence adduced at the hearing, to authorize a reversal of the former de-
cision. But "affidavits filed after judgment, as a basis for or accom-
panying applications for review, are to be received with great caution "
(Thorp v. McWilliams, 3 IL. D., 344). The entryman made no applica-
tion for a continuance of the hearing on the ground of the absence of
the witnesses; no application before your office for a rehearing for that
cause; and as this evidence-being in no sense newly discovered evi-
dence-has never been offered before, it comes too late when produced
for the first time on motion for review. Should this motion be granted
on the grounds here presented, it would encourage the trial of cases
piecemeal, and allow a party to keep back a portion of his evidence
for an emergency-a course which would be unjust to the opposing
party, and a practice not tolerated in courts of law. The motion is
without merit, and must be dismissed.
TIMBER CULTURE CONTEST-DESTRUCTION OF TREES AFTER FINAL
PROOF.
BROWNING v. FRY.
A timber culture entryman who has complied with the law, submitted proof, and re-
ceived final certificate thereon, Is not required by law or any regulation of the
Department to replant the tract where the trees are subsequently destroyed by
fire.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 10, 1890.
I have considered the case of William F. Browning v. Stephen J.
Fry, upon appeal by the latter from the decision of your office ated
May 25, 1889, holding for cancellation his timber culture entry for the
SE. Sec. 23, T. 5 S., R. 16 W., Kirwin land district, Kansas.
May 26, 1876, Fry made timber culture entry for said tract under the
provisions of the act of March 13, 1874.
June 2, 1884, in accordance with published notice he offered final
proof before the register and receiver (under the provisions of the act
of June 14, 1878), which was approved, and final certificate issued for
the land February 14, 1887, Browning initiated contest against Fry's
entry, alleging substantially as follows:-That the final proof was
fraudulently made; that at the date thereof there was not the required
amount of thrifty growing timber on said tract, and that the timber
had not been cultivated and protected as contemplated by the timber
culture act.
Hearing was ordered and had, the local officers found in favor of
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contestant and recommended the entry for cancellation, whereupon
claimant appealed.
May 25, 1889, your office affirmed the action of the local office, and
claimant again appealed alleging the following grounds of error, viz:-
1. In concluding that the lack of fire-breaks evidenced bad faith.
2. In treating the breaking of the tract denuded of its timber by fire after proof as
evidencing bad faith.
3. In concluding that the planting of about two thousand additional trees before
proof on an addition to the timbered tract evidenced an intention to prepare for proof
in evasion of law.
4. In not considering the equities of Fry.
5. In not concluding that there were a sufficient number of thrifty trees on the land
at date of proof to entitle Fry to a patent.
6. In not applying the well known departmental rule that the matterof the accept-
ance of the proof after entry is governed by the rules in force when the proof was
made.
On the trial both parties were personally present, attended by their
respective attorneys. A large amount of testimony was offered by
them, and therefrom it appears that at the time claimant offered final
proof he had about thirty acres under cultivation, and about twelve
acres planted to timber ranging from six inches to twelve feet in height,
and numbering about thirteen thousand trees.
Several of contestant's witnesses did not know claimant and had not
seen the tract in dispute until several years after he had made his entry.
Contestant admitted that he first saw section 31, October 13, 1886, and
that he had no personal knowledge regarding claimant's efforts to com-
ply with the requirements of law before he proved up on his claim.
Joseph Edwards, one of contestant's witnesses testified that he resided
for over ten years within forty rods of the tract in dispute; that claim-
ant had about twelve acres planted to timber; that the trees growing
thereon June 2, 1884, would average from six inches to twelve feet in
height consisting of cottonwood, box elder and walnut; they were
planted four feet apart each way; he believed fifteen hundred of them
were over nine feet high; that one third or more of all the timber was
from five to six years old; the larger trees were growing all over the
plat. Witness had personal knowledge that the timber was cultivated
both in 1883 and 1884 and that it was in a thrifty condition and com-
pared favorably with other tree claims in that neighborhood, and that
at the time of final proof there were at least six thousand seven hun-
dred and fifty trees from six inches to twelve feet in height growing on
this claim: and that the laud was in a good state of cultivation. The
undisputed evilenee also shows that claimanthad repeatedly replanted
or refilled his tree plat with either tree seeds or cuttings whenever he
discovered that the seeds or cuttings previously planted had failed to
germinate or grow.
The weight of affirmative evidence shows thatclaimant had broken a
fire guard around three sides of his tree plat prior to 1888, but that no
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ordinary fire guard could have stopped the ravages of the fire which
destroyed his timber in the fall of the year 1884.
It is shown by uncontradicted evidence that the fire which destroyed
claimant's timber started on land owned by one C. B. Nichols about
three miles northwest from the tract in dispute. There was a strong
wind blowing at the time which carried the burning tumble weeds and
grass along, destroying everything combustible in its track.
In the case of Reynolds v. Sampson (2 L. D.. 305) it was held that
the entryman should not be held responsible for the results of in-
cendiarism nor for the destruction caused by floods; and in the case of
Hupp v. Overall (7 IL. D., 11) it was held that if a claimant was in good
faith attempting to comply with the law, under which his entry was
made, and that a devastating fire had swept over the land destroying
the major portion of his trees, it appearing that no ordinary precaution
could have prevented such destruction, that his entry should not be
cancelled.
Upon review of the record in the case at bar, I am convinced that
claimant's final proof was honestly made; and as it was accepted by
the local officers, and final certificate had issued thereon, he was not
required by law nor by any rule of this Department to replant the tree
plat destroyed by fire, and as it appears that final certificate was issued
to claimant in accordance with the rules then in force (Jacob E. English,
10 L. D., 409), I must reverse the decision appealed from and direct that
the entry pass to patent.
RAILROAD GRANT-WITHDRAWAI-ENTRY-SETTLEMENT CLAIM.
STEWART . NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co.
The withdrawal on general route does not take effect upon land covered by a home-
stead entry, even though the statutory life of such entry may have expired prior
to said withdrawal.
When occupancy alone is relied upon to except land from a railroad grant it must
be affirmatively shown that the person in possession could have asserted a claim
to such land under the settlement laws.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land (qffice, December
11, 1890.
This is an appeal by the Northern Pacific Railroad Company from
your office decision of November 18, 1887, wherein you affirm the local
office and reject the company's claim to the E. NW. and E. SW.4
Sec. 21, T. 18 N., R. 1 W., W. M., Olympia, now Seattle, land district,
Washington Territory, " with a view to allowing " the application of
William A. Stewart to file a pre-emption declaratory statement for the
tracts named.
The land involved is within the limits of the withdrawal upon the
map of general route of the company's road filed August 13, 1870, and
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also within the limits of the grant as desi-nated by the map showing
the definite location of said road tiled May 14, 1874. Said land was also
embraced in homestead entry No. 330 made by John C. Wood, July 11,
1863. This entry as sown by the records of your office was canceled
December 21, 1871, for abandonment.
On May 3, 1886, the applicant Stewart, presented at the local office
his pre emption declaratory statement alleging settlement the same day
and the same was, on August 26th following refused for conflict with
the company's grant.
By letter of August 13, 1886, your office directed the local officers
" that if Stewart can allege that the land was claimed or occupied May
14, 1874 " i. e., the date of definite location, to order a hearing to deter-
mine the fact.
On October 4, 1886, the applicant Stewart filed in the local office his
affidavit (not corroborated) wherein he averred upon information and
belief " that said land was cultivated during the years 1874, 1875, and
1876, and that it was claimed during said period by settlers thereon."
A hearing against which the company protested alleging inter alia
that it was based upon an insufficient showing, was had (after continu-
ance) in pursuance of your said office letter at the local office on Janu-
ary 8, 1887, when both the applicant Stewart and the company
appeared.
The testimony submitted was that of two witnesses for the applicant
who resided in the neighborhood and who had been familiar with the
land for a number of years.
One witness stated that in June 1874 the homesteader, Wood, had
asked him (witness) to help him repair fences on the land, and also that
he (Wood) had continued to claim the land al} to the time last men-
tioned. The other witness, who lived about a mile and a half from the
tract, stated that he knew Wood claimed the land from 1871 to 1874
"' by talking with him." This witness also stated that "there was a
man that farmed the place claiming that, he had rented the place of Mr.
Wood in 1874. In 1875 there was a man by the name of Charles Zell
who rented the place in the same way." Witness however supposed
that Wood only rented " what was under fence." He (witness) also
stated that from 1871 to 1874, Wood lived a portion of the time in
Olympia and a portion of the time in the country," and also that Wood
died about three years before the hearing.
The land involved was, on August 13, 1870-the (late of said with-
drawal-embraced in the homestead entry of Wood. This entry was
made on July 11, 1863, and consequently the statutory period of seven
years during which Wood should have made proof in support of his
claim had elapsed prior to the withdrawal mentioned. This, however,
so far as it might affect this case is not material.
When the said entry was made the land became thereby segregated
from the public domain, and so remained until such entry was canceled
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of record. It therefore follows that the said withdrawal could not affect
the land during the record existence of the entry referred to.
The tract in question being excepted from said withdrawal, it only
remains for me to consider the status of the land on May 14, 1874, the
date of definite location. If at that time the land was free from a pre-
emption or other claim or right it passed by the grant, and if not it was
excepted therefrom.
While the evidence shows that Wood was "claiming" the land in
question at the date of the definite location of the road, yet it is not
shown that he had not at that time exhausted his rights under the set-
tlement laws of the United States. When occupation alone is relied on
to except lands from the grant, it must be shown that the person in
possession could have asserted a claim to the land under the settle-
ment laws.
The decision of your office is accordingly modified. The case will be
remanded for further proceedings, and the applicant will be required to
affirmatively show, at a hearing before the local office, after due notice
to the company, that said Wood was qualified to claim said land under
the settlement laws of the United States, at the date of the definite
location of the company's road. Northern Pacific Railroad Company v.
Potter (11 L. D., 531). pon the receipt of the evidence taken thereat,
and the report of the local officers thereon, your office will re-adjudicate
the case.
PRACTICE-APPEAL-ACT OF JUNE 15, 180.
PARKER v. GRAY.
An applicant under section 2, act of June 15, 1880, who fails to appeal in time from
the rejection of his application, is concluded thereby, in the presence of an in-
tervening adverse right.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 11, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Isadore a. Parker from the decision
of your office of June 18, 1889, holding for cancellation her homestead
entry for the NW. Sec. 34, T. 8 S., R. 23 W., Kirwin, Kansas and
allowing the application of Wm. R. Gray to purchase said tract under
the act of June 15, 1880.
Gray made entry of the tract December 23, 1879, which was canceled
for abandonment October 25, 1885. November 16, 1885, Francis Metz
filed for said land, and on May 15, 1888, transmuted said filing to home-
stead entry which was canceled June 30, 1886, and Isadore Parker on
the same day made homestead entry of the tract.
On April 24, 1886, while the filing of Metz remained intact, Gray ap-
plied to purchase the land, and said application was rejected for the
reason that the original entry of Gray had been canceled for abandon-
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ment and the tract was then covered by the filing of Metz. From this
decision Gray on July 26, 1886-more than three months after his ap-
plication had been rejected-filed an appeal to your office from the re-
fusal of the register and receiver. Upon this appeal your office reversed
the action of the local officers, holding that they erred in not allowing
the application to be placed of record subject to the filing of Metz.
Your office therefore directed that Gray be allowed to perfect entry
within thirty days from notice of this decision, from which action Mrs.
Parker appealed.
While the local officers erred in not allowing the application of Gray
to be placed of record, yet he is concluded thereby, not having appealed
therefrom within the time required by the rules, and not until after the
entry of Mrs. Parker had been allowed.
Your decision is reversed and the homestead entry of Mrs. Parker
will remain intact.
RAILROAD GRANT-SETTLEMENT RIGHTS-HOMESTEAD OCCUPANCY.
Boss v. CENTRAL PACIFIC R. R. CO.
The failure of a settler to place his claim of record will not defeat it as against the-
United States, and the land covered thereby, at the date when a railroad grant
becomes effective is excepted therefrom.
The claim of a qualified settler, who has for a long period maintained a residence on,
nnsurveyed land, and is, at the date of withdrawal on designated route, in the
actual occupation and possession of such land, though not then residing thereon,
is sufficient to except it from the operation of a grant that protects the occupancy
of a homestead settler.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office December
11, 1890.
I have considered the case of E. D. Boss v. Central Pacific Railroad
Company, on appeal by the former from the decision of your office of
December 23, 1886, involving the S NW , SW i NE , and the
NW I SE of Sec. 33, T. 15 N., It. 6 E., M. D. M., Marysville district,
California.
It appears from said office decision that "said land is within the liml-
its of the grant of July 1, 1862 (12 Stats., 489) as enlarged by the act
of July 2,1864 (13 Stats., 356), to the Central Pacific Railroad Company,
and of the withdrawal ordered for the benefit of said grant, August 2,
1862. The map of definite location of the line of said company's road,
opposite the land in question, was-filed March 26, 1864."
The said "1 S. of the NW. i" of said Sec. 33, was listed by the
company October 23, 1883, but at the date of the filing of the map of
definite location (March 26, 1864) it was part of a tract upon which one
Richard Hamilton had settled in 1862, having previously bought the
improvements and p)ossessory interest of a prior settler, and which said
Hamilton had cultivated and improved and had claimed and lived upon
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as a home from the time of his said settlement in 1862 to the summer
of 1866.
The township plat of survey was not filed until February 3, 1871, and
Hamilton could not place his claim upon record until that time, and it
appears that he has never done so; but
It is well seti led by departmental rulings, that the omission to put a claim of record,
while it might defeat such claim as against a subsequent settler who duly files, will
not defeat it as against the United States, and the land covered thereby will be ex-
cepted from the operation of any withdrawal for the benefit of a railroad, subsequent
to the inception of the settlement right. (Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Evans, 7 L.
D., 131 and cases therein cited.)
Lands " to which a pre-emption or homestead claim may have at-
tached at the time the line of the road is definitely fixed" are excepted
from said grants to the Central Pacific Railroad Company. (12 Stat.,
356; 13 Stat., 489). Your office properly held, therefore, hat said land
being embraced in said claim at the time the company's right vested
under the grant, was excepted therefrom. The subsequent listing of
the land by the company, October 23, 1883, did not affect the status of
the land. (Roeschlaub v. Railroad Company, 6 L. D., 750).
But it is further stated in said decision, that said S. of the NW. i
is also within the limits of the grant of July 25, 1866, to the California and Oregon
Railroad Company (now a branch of the Central Pacific Railroad), as shown by said
company's map of designated route filed September 13, 1867, in accordance with
which there was an order of withdrawal October 29, 1867, received at the local
office, November 25, 1867.
Your office holds, that while said tract was excepted from the grant
to the Central Pacific Railroad Company, by the settlement or pre-emp-
tion claim of said Richard Hamilton, yet, that said HamiltoA had
abandoned said claim at the date September 13, 1867, when the right of
the California and Oregon Railroad Company vested under its grant,
and that therefore it was subject to the latter grant.
Said Ha milton, as stated above, bought the improvements of a prior
settler on the tract embracing said S. i of the NW. 1 in 1862, and lived
upon and claimed said tract as a home from 1862 to the summer of 1866.
His improvements were valued at $300, and were of such a character as
to indicate a settlement for the purpose of establishing a home on said
tract to the exclusion of any other. In the summer of 1866, his father
(A. Hamilton) died, and Richard Hamilton moved to his father's resi-
dence, about a mile distant on an adjoining tract in the same section,
";to take care of the family," but he still claimed the said tract from
which he had moved, kept it under fence, and used it for stock, and
such was the status of the said S. j of the NW. i as a part of said claim
at the time when the California and Oregon Railroad Company's rights
vested under its said grant.
The said act of July 25, 1866 (14 Stat., 239) excepts from the grant
lands which "shall be found to have been granted, sold, reserved,
occupied by homestead ettlers, pre-empted or otherwise disposed of."
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Your office holds that "his claim had terminated" at the date the
company's right vested under its grant, namely, September 13, 1867,
because of his removal in the summer of 1866 to his father's residence
on an adjoining tract in the same section. With this conclusion I can
not concur.
The record shows that Richard Hamilton had actually resided on
the land nearly five years, occupying it as a home to the exclusion of any
other, and was both a qualified pre-enltor and bomestea(ler, having
exhausted neither his pre-emption nor homestead right, and the land
had not been surveyed so as to be oen to entry or filing of record.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that Hamilton's claim excepted the
said S J of the NW. I from the grant to the California and Oregon Rail-
road Company as well as that of the Central Pacific Railroad Company.
As to the remainder of said land involved in this case, namely, the
SW. of the NE. and the NW. of the SE. I of said Sec. 33, it ap.
pears, that it also was embraced within the limits of said grants to both
said railroad companies, but at the said dates when their rights vested
under their respective grants, was covered by the pre-emption claim of
A. Hamilton and was therefore excepted from the operation of said
grants. This does not seem to be disputed by the railroad company.
(Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Potter et al., 11 L. D., 531.)
All said lands being, according to the views above expressed, ex-
cepted from the grants to both said railroad companies, it follows, that
said Richard and A. Hamilton having respectively abandoned their
claims thereto, they became public land subject to appropriation by
the first legal applicant. Talbert v. Northern Pacific R. t. Co., 2 L. D.,
536; Northern Pacific R. R. Co., v. Burt, 3 L. D., 490; Holmes v. North-
ern Pacific R. t. Co., 5 L. D., 333; Roeschlaub v. Union Pacific Ry.
Co., 6 L. D., 750.
While such was the status of said lands, December 3, 1885, E. D.
Boss, the appellant, filed an application to make homestead entry
thereon, together with an affidavit that "at the date the grant to the
railroad company took effect, valid pre-emption claims" (those of said
Richard and A. Hamilton) "had attached to said land." A hearing
was had, on which the facts above set forth as to the claims of said
Richard and A. Hamilton were established and thereon the local officers
denied the application of Boss. On appeal, your office held I hat said
S. i of the NW. I was subject to the grant to the California and Oregon
Railroad Company as above stated, and that the said SW. 4 of the NE.
4 and the NW. of the SE. 1, were excepted from the grants to both
said companies, and subject to disposal as public land. From this de-
cision Boss now appeals to this Department.
The application of said Boss being in all respects in conformity to
law and the land embraced therein being subject to entry, said ppli-
cation should be allowed and I so direct.
The decision of your office is accordingly so modified.
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PRACTICE-NOTICE BY REGISTERED LETTER.
JOHN P. DRAKE.
Notice of a decision by mail, whether by registered or unregistered letter, will not
bind the party to be served if such notice fails to reach him; but the failure to
thus receive notice can not be set up by one whose own laches has prevented serv-
ice in the manner prescribed.
This rule is specially applicable as against a successful contestant, where the land has
been entered by another after the expiration of the thirty days, and without
notice of any defect in the service.
Secretary Noble to the Gommirssioner of the General Land Office, Decem-
ber 11, 1890.
This is an application filed by John P. Drake for an order directing
your office to certify to the Department the record in the matter of his
application to enter the NE. i of Sec. 34, T. 17 S., R. 31 W., Wa-Keeney,
Kansas, as successful contestant of the timber-culture entry of Virgil
N. Howe, making the following case.
The tract for which he applied to enter was embraced in the timber-
culture entry of Virgil N. Howe, which was canceled August 25, 1887,
upon the contest of the applicant. On September 1, 1887, the local
officers at Wa-Keeney, Kansas, sent notice of the cancellation of said
entry to Drake, by registered letter, addressed Dighton, Kansas, which
not be.ng called for, was returned to the land office at Wa-Keeney. He
alleges that his post office address at the time of the initiation of the
contest was and has been ever since at Fellsburg, Edward county, Kan-
sas, and the first knowledge he had of the cancellation of the entry
was by letter received from the register, dated November 17, 1888, in
reply to a letter of inquiry made by applicant, and on December 18,
thereafter, he made formal application to enter the land, which was
rejected because of the entry of Samuel S. Kelly for said land, which
had been allowed November 12, 1887. Notice of his rejected applica-
tion was mailed to him December 18, by unregistered letter, but which
he received, and on January 26, 1889, his attorney mailed to the local
office an appeal to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, which
was dismissed by your office on January 9, 1890. From this action he
appealed in due time, but your office declined to transmit said appeal,
for the reason that the appeal from the local offlcers rejecting the appli-
cation was not filed within the time prescribed by the rules.
With said application is filed a copy of the letter of your office of
January 9, 1890, dismissing the appeal of Drake, and also a copy of the
letter of your office of August 6, 1890, declining to transmit his appeal
from your said decision of Janary 9, 1890.
By reference to the decision of your office dismissing his appeal, it
appears that in his affidavit of contest he gave his post office address as
" Dighton, Lane County, Kansas," and which was his last known ad-
dress at the local land office.
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In his application he states that his address at the date of the initia-
tion of the contest, and at the date when notice was mailed to Dighton,
was at Fellsburg, Edwards county, Kansas, but he does not deny that
the address he gave the local officers in his affidavit of contest was
Dighton, Lane county, Kansas, and that no other address was given to
them by him.
Service by mail, whether by a registered or unregistered letter, will
not bind the party to be served, if it be shown that such service failed
to reach him, but if by his own laches he has put it out of the power of
the officials charged with such duty to serve him in the manner pre-
scribed by the rules, he will be charged with such notice if it be sent in
that manner, whether he received it or not, and will not be permitted to
plead failure of notice which is due solely to his own laches. Especially
will this rule be enforced where the land has been entered after the ex-
piration of the thirty days allowed the successful contestant to enter
without notice of any defect of service.
The application is denied.
TIMBER CULTURE CONTEST-PRACTICE-EVIDENCE.
BEATLEY V. RUBERSON.
A charge that an entryman " has failed to comply with the law " is a statement of the
contestant's opinion, and not of any fact to be proved, and where objection is made
thereto before trial, an amendment of such charge should be required.
A citizen may contest an entry regardless of his own right to enter the land.
Motions to dismiss, and applications to take depositions on interrogatories, should not
be filed with an officer designated to take testimony, but when so filed, and for-
warded with the testimony to the local office, should be considered on the day of
hearing.
Where a new hearing is ordered the failure of a witness at the former hearing to sign
his testimony may be cured by his signing the same, after due examination thereof,
and making oath thereto.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 11, 1890.
I have examined the record and proceedings in the case of George C.
ileartley v. James B. Ruberson, on the appeal of the latter from your
decision of April 10, 1889, holding for cancellation his timber culture
entry for the E. SE. and E. i NE. Sec. 12, T. 6 R. 38 W., Oberlin,
Kansas land district.
On April 20, 1880, Ruberson made timber culture entry for said land
and on November 26, 1886, Heartley filed affidavit of contest against
the same alleging that " James B. Ruberson has wholly failed to comply
with law as to timber culture, and that there is no timber growing on
said land at the present time."
Thereupon the entryman was served personally with notice of said
contest, the hearing being set for February 3,1887, and L. M. arwood
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notary public of Sherman county, Kansas, was appointed to take testi-
monly on January 22, 1887, at his office in Voltaire. Kansas.
On the day fixed for taking testimony, the parties appeared before
the notary public, and the attorney for contestee filed a motion to dis-
miss the contest.
The notary public having no authority to pass upon the motion, sent
it with the papers to the local office. The contestant introduced his
witnesses and at the close of his testimony the contestee by his attor-
ney filed an affidavit substantially in compliance with rules 23 and 24
of Rules of Practice, and accompanied it with interrogatories, a copy
of which was served on the adverse party, as appears by indorsement
on the papers, setting forth that three witnesses whose names and resi-
dences were given were material to him, etc., and that they would not
attend before the notary to give their testimony; a fourth was named
who lived more than fifty miles distant, and upon this showing he
asked an order that depositions be taken in the case, but the notary
having no authority to make an order in the case, transmitted the ap-
plication, with the testimony, to the local office. The contestee was
sworn in his own behalf, and some other witnesses, and the taking of
depositions closed on January 25, 1887.
On February 3, the day set for hearing, nothing was done in the case,
nor was any action taken until June 22, following, when the local offi-
cers passed upon the case and recommended the entry for cancellation,
from which the entryman appealed, and on April 10, 1889, your office
affirmed said decision and held the entry for cancellation; he thereupon
appealed to this Department.
Appellant, by his attorneys, assigns the following errors which are
material:
First. The register and reeiver erred in overruling the motion asking
that the case be dismissed, etc.
Second. In deciding the case in the absence of defendant's evidence,
when hp had applied to have depositions taken, etc.
Third. That the record shows that the notary omitted ten pages of
the testimony from the files.
Fourth: That one McUlusky did not sign his testimony after it was
written out.
Other assignments are made which in my view of the case are not
material.
The motion to dismiss is based upon two grounds: First that the
affidavit does not allege in what particular defendant had failed to com-
ply with the timber culture law; and Second: That contestant was
plaintiff in another contest pending before the United States land of-
fice.
In referring to this motion, your office letter says it is " frivolous and
not entitled to consideration," yet the first ground of the motion was
well taken.
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The charge that an entryman " has failed to comply with law," is
simply a statement of the contestant's opinion, and does not state any
fact to be proven, and where objection is made before trial the contest
affidavit should be amended.
The second ground of the motion was not well taken because a citizen
may contest an entry regardless of his own right to make entry for the
land.
The local officers should have sustained the motion, unless an amend
ment had been made to the affidavit, but nothing appears of record to
show that it was ever considered by the local officers, although trans-
mitted to them by the notary with the testimony.
Each of these papers, the motion and application was improperly
filed with the notary who had no jurisdiction over the case, but only a
clerical duty to perform; but when forwarded to the local office they
should have been considered on the day of bearing, and while there is
nothing to show that the motion was ever called up" for hearing, the
attorney states that the application to take depositions was "d called up "
and that "on two different occasions lie was informed that the order
would be issued as soon as the office could find time to do it, and he
supposed the order had been issued and the depositions taken and on
file in the case."
There is nothing in the record to show that the application was
ever considerd by the local officers; certain it is, they issued no order
to take the depositions as they should have done, and it is quite appar-
ent that they misled the entryman and his attorney in regard to the
matter.
I have examined the testimony on file and am satisfied by inspection
of the testimony of the witness, frnm whose testimony the ten pages
appear to have been omitted, that the mistake is a mere clerical error
in numbering the pages, and that none were oitted.
In the matter of lc~lusky's testimony, which he neglected to sign,
it is sufficient to say that the statute provides that the deposition shall
be subscribed by the deponent.
I have not considered the case upon the testimony transmitted with
the papers. I feel that justice and good practice require that the find-
ing and judgment of your office should be set aside, the action of the
local officers reversed and the case returned for a full and fair hearing.
The case will therefore be returned to the local office, and noticewill
be given the parties of the action of the Department. A day will be
set for hearing, and upon the contestant amending his affidavit as
herein indicated, setting forth the facts as of the date of his original
charge, the contestee will be permitted to take depositions under the
rules of practice, and the case will be re-adjudicated in accordance with
law and departmental regulations. The testimony being regularly
taken except the Mc~lusky unsigned testimony, will be considered as
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on file, and the testimony of Mc~lusky may be cured, if upon reading
it or having it read to him he is willing to say upon his oath that it is.
his testimony and he shall then sign it.
NATURALIZATION-FINAL PROOF-EQUITABLE ADJUDICATION.
JOHN B. BURNS.
Naturalization of the father during the minority of the son inures to the benefit of
the latter and makes him a citizen.
In the absence of protest, final proof taken at the time and place designated, but not
before the officer named in the notice, may be referred to the board of equitable
adjudication.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General'
Land Offce, December 11, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of John B. Burns from your office de-
cision dated July 26th, 1888, rejecting his pre-emption proof for the SE.
i of Sec. 15, T. 114 N., R. 65 W., Huron, Dakota.
The record shows that about May 20, 1883, he settled upon said tract
and built a frame house thereon eight by ten feet, with board roof floor9
door and window, and broke about six acres, backset a part of it, and
raised three acres of corn, one acre of potatoes and made hay on about
nine acres.
About July 15, 1883, while he was absent from his claim for a few
days his house and all his furniture were stolen and taken away.
He then built a sod house eight by nine feet inside, in which be con-
tinuously lived until February 16, 1884, the date of entry. Hie was
born in Ireland but came to the United States with his father, when
quite young.
His father, James Burns, became a citizen of the United States by
naturalization at a time when claimant was a minor living in the United
States.
Applicant published notice that on February 5th, 1884, he would
make final proof before the clerk of the district court at Old Ashton,
D. T., and that to prove his continuous residence upon and cultivation of
said land he would, the same day before D. N. Hunt, a notary public in
and for Spink county, D. T., at Redfield, examine James Gage, George
Beaty, Duncan McMillan of Redfield. and Edward Hyde of Altoona,
D. T.
February 5th, D. N. Hunt was absent from the county and the testi-
mony was taken at the time and place published, but before Z. W.
Craig, notary public.
The proof was accepted by the local office as sufficient.
Your office decision of July 26, 1888, rejected said proof and allowed.
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entryman ninety days within which to furnish new proof. From this
order he appeals to this department and assigns errors.
1st, In rejecting the proof because of meagre improvements, short
periods of residence and small area broken and cultivated.
2d, Decision is against the law and evidence.
From an examination of the questions involved I think that claim-
ant's proof of the citizenship of his father, by naturalization, during
claimant's minority, is sufficient proof of his naturalization, and that
he was a qualified person to make entry under the law. See James H.
Robertson et al. (9 L. D., 297); Bartl v. West (8 L. )., 289).
It is shown by the testimony that his means are limited yet he built
a house of lumber on this tract, and when it was removed by a tres-
passer during his temporary absence, he at once erected a sod house.
It is true that the improvements upon the land are not extensive. It
is also true that the claimant is a man of limited means. He persis-
tentlv combatted with adverse, circumstances, which, with his continu-
ons residence for nearly eight months, before offering proof, is, it seems
to me, evidence of good faith.
The final proof was taken at the time and place mentioned in the no-
tice of the offering of final proof but not before the officer named in the
notice. Upon the day set for taking the same, no one appeared to ob-
ject to his evidence, and in my judgment, it should stand. The proof
not having been taken before the officer named in the notice, the case
will be referred to the Board of Equitable Adjudication. Eden Mer-
ryman (8 L. D., 406).
I therefore, direct its reference to that tribunal for its action.
Your decision is accordingly modified.
PROCEEDINGS ON TILE REPORT OF SPECIAL AGENT.
UNITED STATES V. SAWBRIDGE.
In proceedings against an entry by the government where the proof leaves it doubt-
ful whether the claimant in good faith complied with the law, his refusal to tes-
tify justifies an adverse conclusion.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 11, 1890.
John Sawbridge made pre-emption cash entry of the SW. of the
NW. 1 of Sec. 9, the S.J of the NE. and the SE. 1 of the NW. of
Sec. 8, T. 61 N., R. 51 W., Duluth, Minnesota, November 5, 1885. His
entry was held for cancellation upon the report of a special agent, A pril
8, 1886, and a hearing was had thereon.
At said hearing Special Agent Naff was the only witness exatuined
for the government. He testified that he examined the land in A ugust,
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1887, and found an unoccupied log house, which bore evidence ot hav-
ing once been occupied. There were about four and a half acres of
land broken that had been cultivated, two of which appeared to
have been cultivated in 188f6. About thirty acres of timber had been
cut and removed from the land, and the land was rough, rocky and
coutained a number of holes as if it had been prospected for ore. There
was no well or fence on the premises.
The only witness offered by claimant was Patrick Roche, who testi-
fied that he assisted in clearing the land; that they cut the trees from
twelve or fifteen acres, and burnt the brush off six or seven acres, which
they sowed to timothy; that he helped to clear the two acres near the
house. and planted it in potatoes. As to residence, he testifies that he
first saw Sawbridge on the land in February, 1885, and last saw him
there in October, 1885, and saw Sawbridge and his family living on the
land during the months of June, July, October and November. Dur-
ing this time Sawbridge was carrying on business in Tower, a few miles
from the claim.
The claimant also offered in evidence the special agent's report, and he
was then called upon by the government to testify, but declined to testify,
either for the government or in his own behalf. The counsel for the gov-
ernment in offering him as a witness stated that he expected to prove by
him that he did not establish an actual residence on the premises on Jan-
uary 10, 1885, or at any time prior to making final proof, and that be-
fore making final proof he had not used the land for a home, or for cul-
tivation, and at the time of his entry he was a resident of and engaged
in the hardware business in the village of Tower, and has been ever
since a resident of that place.
The local officers found from the testimony that he had not complied
with the law, and your office affirmed that decision, from which the
alaimant appealed, alleging the following grounds of error:
First. The honorable Commissioner erred in concurring with the honorable register
and receiver in their coDclusions.
Second. The honorable Commissioner erred in holding the entry for cancellation.
This appeal might be dismissed, for the reason that no specific error
is alleged, but from the record before me I find no error in the decision.
It may be conceded that claimant occupied the premises from the
time covered by his entry, but it was at least questionable from the
testimony submitted, whether that occupancy was for the purpose of
taking the tract for a home, and when he declined to be sworn to testify
upon the question as to whether he actually made a home upon the
tract, after it had been charged that his home was elsewhere, instead
of removing the doubt, he solved it against himself. It is true, that if
the testimony showed conclusively that he had complied with the law,
the fact that he declined to testify would not affect the case. But there
was a grave doubt as to the bona fides of his residence, and no one
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 581
better than himself could have settled this question. is refusal to do
so justified the holding of the local office and of your office, that the
entry was made for speculative and fraudulent purposes,and it is hereby
affirned.
PROCEEDINGS ON FINAL PROOF-MORTGAGEE.
WILLIAM SPRIGGS.
A mortgagee may cure a defect in inal proof, caused by the sbstitution of a wit-
ness, by due advertisement of the names of the witnesses who testified, and such
proof may then be accepted in the absence of protest.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 10, 1890.
On. December 8, 1884, William Spriggs filed his declaratory statement
for the E. J of the SE. 1 of Sec. 32, T. 114 N., R. 80 W., fluron, Dakota,
alleging settlement thereon the 4th of that month. He made final proof
thereon June 4, 1885, payment was accepted and final certificate duly
issued.
On May 31, 18i8, you required claimant to make new advertisement
and new proof, because the improveients " are insufficient to show the
good faith of the pre-emptor; " also because one of the witnesses who.
testified in the final proof was not mentioned in the published notice.
Notice of this requirement was sent to claimaint by registered letter at
Okohojo, Dakota Territory, and was returned unclaimed. The same
was again sent to him at Pierre, D. T., and again returned unclaimed.
Diligent inquiry failed to disclose his whereabouts, and on June 29,
1889, the Western Loan and Trust Company appealed from your said
office decision. It appears that said company took a mortgage on the
land for a loan of money after the issuance of the final certificate.
This appeal presents the question of the sufficiency of claimant's im-
provements, as shown by the final proof.
There were no improvements on the land at date of filing. Claimant
built a house, ten by twelve feet, broke three acres of land, and culti-
vated the same to corn and potatoes. The improvements are valued at
$75. His residence was continuous, at least from December 4, 1884,
until June 4, 1885, and his house was necessarily acomfortable one for his
existence in the same during the winter months in Dakota. In theab-
sence of any showing as to claimant's ability to place greater improve-
ments on the land than those herein described, I do not feel justified in
holding his cash entry for cancellation.
Two witnesses testified in the final proof-one of them was not adver-
tised.
Under Rule 4, of the rules to be observed in passing on final proofs
(9 L. D., 123), the company will be required to make new advertisement
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of the names of the witnesses who do testify, and, if no protest or ob-
jection is then filed, the proof theretofore submitted mar be accepted.
Allow sixty days from notice of this decision for compliance with this
order.
Your said office decision is modified.
RAILROAD GRANT-MAP OF DEFINITE LOCATION.
MORGAN V. SOTTHERN PACIFIC R. B. Co.
The grant of March 3, 1871, not only contemplates a preliminary designation of the
general route, but also a map of definite location, nd by such map the primary
limits of the grant are determined.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land 0ifice, Decem-
ber 12, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of William C. Morgan from the decis-
ion of your office of January 2, 1889, rejecting his application to make
homestead entry of the E of the NW 1 and W of the NE of
Sec. 9, T. 6 S., R. 2 W., S. B. M., Los Angeles, California.
Morgan's application to make entry of this land bears date November
20, 1888, and was rejected by the local officers "as being in conflict
with the grant to Southern Pacific Railroad Company March 3, 1871 "
(16 Stats., 579).
On appeal, your office affirmed their decision, and Morgan now ap-
peals to this Department, alleging the following errors: 1. In refusing
to allow said entry; 2. In rejecting said application, and 3. In holding
that said land was reserved by reason of the application of the South-
ern Pacific Railroad Company to select said land as a part of its pri-
mary grant, when it appears that/the land is outside of the primary
limits.
The map of designated route was filed in your office April 3, 1871, in
accordance with which lands were withdrawn, by letter of April 21,
1871, which was received at the local office on the 10th of the following
May.
On the 24th of July, 1876, a duly certified map was filed in the Gen-
eral Land Office showing the definite location and construction of that
part of the road opposite the land in contest, and the lands ere again
withdrawn for the benefit of said grant. According to the first map,
this land is within the indemnity limits of the grant; but, according to
the second map, it is within the granted limits. Both maps show it to
be either within the primary or the indemnity limits, and it was "selected
by the Southern Pacific Railroad Company May 25, 1883, per list 11."
Morgan was advised that the said land was within this list and
claimed by the railroad company at the time he made his application
for a homestead entry of the same tract. His application was rejected
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on the ground of the railroad company's claim. But he contends,
through counsel, that the map of definite location filed July 24, 1876,
is of no validity, and that the land he claims is not within the primary
limits of the grant.,
The supreme court, in the case of Buttz v. Northern Pacific Railroad
Company (119 U. S., 55-71), says, in effect, that the granting act not
only contemplates a preliminary designation of the general route of the
road, and the exclusion from sale, entry or pre-emption of the adjoining
odd sections within forty miles on each side until the definite location
is mnade, but it contemplates the filing by the company in the office of
the Commissioner of the General Land Office of a map showing the
definite location of the line of its road, and limits the grant to such
alternate odd sections as have not at that time been reserved, sold,
granted, or otherwise appropriated, and are free from pre-emption,
grant or other claims or rights.
The grants to the Northern Pacific and Southern Pacific are almost
identical. Under the decision of the supreme court in the case above,
the map of July 24, 1876, showing the definite location of the line on
which the Southern Pacific Railroad opposite the land in contest was
constructed, is fully authorized, and according to this map the land is
within the primary limits of the grant to the said company.
The decision of your office is therefore affirmed.
MOTION FOR REVIEW.
RENRY W. LORD.
Motion for review of the departmental decision rendered July 7, 1890,
11 L. D., 18, in the case above entitled denied by Secretary Noble, De-
cember 12, 1890.
RAILROAD GRANT-HOMESTEAD CLAIMS.
NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. CO. V. SALES.
Land nuder cultivation by a qualified homesteader at date of definite location is ex-
cepted from the grant to this company even though the claimant did not at such
time reside on the laud.
Secretary Soble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, December
12, 1890.
This appeal involves the right to the NE. i of the SW. 1, the SE. i of
the NW. i, the SW. i of the NE. 1 and the NW. 4 of the SE. 1, Sec. 23,
T. 2 S., R. 4 E., Bozeman, Montana, lying within the primary limits of
the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company.
At the date of withdrawal, February 21, 1872, the tract was covered
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by the homestead entry of James Hildebrand, which was canceled
December 11, 1879.
The line of the road opposite the tract in question was definitely lo-
cated July 6,1882.
On January 12, 1886, Charles A. Sales applied to make homestead
entry for said tract, alleging that it had been continuously occupied and
claimed by a qualified settler from 1871 to the date of his application,
which was rejected by the local office, for the reason that the tract was
within the limits of the grant to said road, and had been listed by the
road June 27, 1885, as part of its grant. From this action Sales ap-
pealed, and your office, holding that the entry of ildebrand having
excepted the tract from the operation of the withdrawal, ordered a
hearing to ascertain the status of the tract July 6, 1882, the date of
definite location. Upon the testimony taken on this hearing the local
officers found in favor of the applicant, which was affirmed by your
office, and from said decision the railroad company appealed, alleging
the following grounds of error:-
1. Error to find that John Nye had such a claim to the land at date of definite lo-
cation of the road as excepted it from the grant.
2. Error in awarding the land to Sales and in not awarding it to the company.
The testimony shows that at the date of definite location the tract
was being cultivated by John Nye, who was qualified to make home-
stead entry, and, although he did not reside on the land, he, had then
such a claim to it as would except it from the operation of the grant,
Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Potter et al., 11 L. D., 531.
The decision of your office is affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT-OCCUPANCY CLAIM.
NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co. v. BECi.
Occupancy of a tract within the limits of the grant prior to, and at date of definite,
location, by a person qualified to enter it under the settlement laws excepts the
tract from the operation of the grant, but such qualification must affirumatively
appear, as well as occupancy at the date when the grant attached.
Secretary Noble to the Conmissioner of the General Land Offiee, December
12, 1890.
This appeal involves the right to the NE. of the SE. of Sec. 157
T. 1 S., R. 5 E., Bozeman, Montana, which lies within the primary limits
of the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, as shown by
map of general route filed February 21, 1872, and as definitely located
July 6, 1882.
Herman Kohle filed declaratory statement for said tract August 10,.
1871, alleging settlement August 7, and was in possession of said tract
at the date of filing of map of general route, which excepted said land
from the operation of the withdrawal.
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John B. Beck made timber culture entry of said tract March 15, 1883,
and filed with his application the affidavit of John Volkers, alleging
that the land was settled upon and claimed by Kohle prior to and at
date of filing of map of general route, and that Beck had been in pos-
session of said land since 1875, and was then in possession of it.
Your office, on July 23, 1889, held that the timber culture entry Of
Beck should remain intact, subject to appeal by the railroad company,
From this decision the company appealed, alleging the following
grounds of error:
I. Error to rule that Beck's timber culture entry should remain intact because he
had been in possession of the land since 1875.
II. Error to have found that Beck was so in possession in the ex-parte statement of
Volker.
III. Error not to have ruled that Luere occupancy of the land does not, of itself,
except the tract from the grant. Starkey v. Boruham, 21 Pac. Rept., 624; Buxton v-
Traver, 130 U. S., 412.
IV. If mere occupancy does so except, then it was error to decide the case on ex-
parte evidence and not to have accorded the company a hearing in the case.
Although the tract was excepted from the withdrawal, it was error
to have allowed the entry of Beck after the definite location of the road
upon a mere affidavit that it was occupied by him, but a hearing should
have been ordered to determine the truth of the allegations, and the
company should have been cited to appear to show cause why the entry
should not be allowed, especially since it does not appear from the
record before me whether Beck was qualified to enter the tract under
the settlement laws.
Occupancy of a tract within the limits of the grant prior o and at
date of definite location by a person qualified to enter it under the set-
tlement laws excepts the tract from the operation of the grant, but such
qualifications must affirmatively appear, as well as occupancy at date
when the right under the grant attached.
You will therefore order a hearing, of which all parties will be noti-
fied.
PRItE-EMPTION PROOF-OTJLTIVATION.
FRED NICKERSON.
Proof of breaking, and the use of the land for grazing purposes, is satisfactory proof
of cultivation where it is shown that the land is suitable only for pasturage.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the Generat
Land Office, December 12, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Fred Nickerson from your office de-
cision of June 26, 1889, holding for cancellation his pre-emption cash
entry for the SW. j of Sec. 24, T. 3 S., R. 29 W., Oberlin, Kansas.
He filed his declaratory statement March 1, 1884, alleging settlement
February 1, of that year. He made his final proof before the register
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and receiver November 21, 1884, and on the same day paid for the land
and obtained the final certificate.
On May 26, 1887, your office directed that claimant be notified to
furnisli an affidavit, duly corroborated, showing "whether he continued
to reside upon the tract after making final proof and payment, and the
-extent of the improvements and cultivation made after that date."
In your said office decision, holding said entry for cancellation, I finid
the following statement: d
"February 20, 1889, you transmit evidence of service of notice, and
report no action."
On examination of the letter, from which the above quotation is
made, I find you are in error. The register in his letter of February
20, 1889, advised vour office that a registered letter, containing notice
-of your requirement of May 26, 1887 (above set out), was sent to claim-
ant at the post-office nearest the land, " but the letter was returned un-
-claimed." In addition to this, claimant testifles that he never received
such notice.
Accompanying the appeal is an affidavit of claimant, duly corrobo-
rated, stating that the land in question is fit only for grazing, and that
he had used it solely for that purpose. In the final proof claimant
swears that he used the land " principally for grazing about one thou-
-sand head of sheep."
The improvements are shown to consist of a house, twelve by four-
teen feet, stable, a well of good water, and five acres broken. The im-
provements are variously estimated at $25, $30, $50, and $75.
Sinee the land is shown to be suitable only for grazing purposes, and
was so used by claimant in raising sheep which is an agricultural pur-
suit, further evidence of cultivation is not required. Mary A. Taylor,
7 L. D., 200. I am therefore of the opinion that his improvements are
sufficient, as shown by the proof and-supplemental affidavits.
But there is filed in this casean affidavit, duly corroborated, by Daniel
H. Smith, sworn to before the register, on November 2, 1889, stating
that affiant knew the present condition of the land, and that claimant
"made fraudulent proof upon the land in this, that he never resided
upon said land the six months prior to making proof thereon, nor at
-any other time; that he did not have to exceed three and three-quarters
acres broken and cultivated upon said tract at the time of making
said proof, viz: November 21, 1884, nor did he have a habitable house
thereon at any time . . . . . and he has made no improvements
thereon since date of proof." He asks for a hearing to enable him to
prove the above charge.
The question of the entryman's residence is raised for the first time
by this affidavit, and since the case instituted by the government against
the entry has failed, and the allegations in the affidavit attacks directly
the good aith of the entryman in a matter not hitherto raised by the
government, I direct that a hearing be ordered on the matters alleged
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in said affidavit, and that all parties be duly notified of the time and
place of such heari lig. United States v. Scott Ihea, 8 L. )., 578.
Your said office decision is modified.
HOMESTEAD-ACT OF JUNE 15. 1SS0-PERSONAL AFFIDAVIT.
MACFARLAND v. ELLIOTT.
A cash entry under section 2, act of June 15, 1880, allowed on the affidavit of the
entrymau's attorney, will not be disturbed, where after transfer of the land, the
eutryman refuses to make the affidavit required by the regulations.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of te General
Land Office, Decetber 12, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of J. D. Macfarland. transferee, from
your decision requiring Ezra Elliott to make a personal affidavit in
support of his cash entry for NW. J of Sec. 5, T. 4 S., It. 24 W., Kir-
win, Kansas.
The facts in this case are as follows:-
Elliott made homestead entry for said tract June 2, 1879.
On May 15, 1884, he executed a power of attorney appointing J. L.
Miller his attorney in fact, and in his name and to his use, to deed and
convey the land above described, and giving him full power to do any
thing necessary to be done in order to obtain a title to said land under
the second section of the act of June 15. 1880, 21 Stat., 237.
On June 4, 1884, Miller made affidavit in which he stated that he
was well acquainted with the facts concerning the homestead entry of
Elliott, that he was qualified to make the same, and had never trans-
ferred the land, and that he made application for the same under the
second section of the act of June 15, 1880. The cash entry was allowed
by the local officers on the affidavit and final certificate issued June 5,
8884.
Said entry was suspended by your office on April 18, 1885, and Elliott
was called upon to make a personal affidavit in support of the same.
In response to your letter of February 7, 1889, allowing him sixty days
in which to furnish said affidavit, he, by written statement before the
register on May 8, 1889, refused to furnish the same.
The record shows that Elliott on June 6, 1884, by deed executed by
his attorney James L. Miller, transferred said land to Wm. E. Crutcher;
and Crutcher, on July 7, 1884, transferred the same to Frank L. Shel-
don, who, on November 12, 1885, transferred it to J. D. Macfarland,
who makes affidavit that he paid the sun of $625, for the land and
purchased the same in good faith, without any knowledge, direct or
imlirect, of any fraud, irregularity or omission on the part of the entry-
man or his agent, and without any knowledge that the entry had been
suspended by your office.
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In various letters written by Elliott, he alleges that he was induced
to execute the power of attorney to Miller by false representations by
one ILoomis, who assured him that he had no right to the land as he
bad abandoned it for so long a time, and that he would give him $50@
for the power of attorney. This offer appears to have been accepted
by Elliott who does not assert that the statements made by Miller in
support of the cash entry were false.
In the case of George T. Jones (9 L. D., 97), it was held that "a cash
entry under the act of June 15, 1880, allowed on the affidavit of the
entryman's attorney, will not be disturbed, where, after transfer of the
land, the entryman refuses to make the personal affidavit required by the
regulations." In said case it was stated that " Such cases as those of
Falconer v. Hunt (6 L. D., 512): Addison W. Hastie (8 L. D., 618), and
Daniel R. McIntosh (8 L. D., 641), show it to be an already established
rule, that the seller of a final certificate will not be allowed to take ad-
vantage of an irregularity in his proof, to ignore rights wich he him-
self has conferred, and dispose again of propertyalreadyonce assigned."'
The case at bar comes under these rules. Your decision is, tere-
fore, reversed.
RAILROAD LANDS-ACT OF1 MARCH 3, 1587.
CENTRAL PACIFIC . R. CO.
The act of March :3, 1887, is mandatory in character, and calls for jdicial proceed-
ings for the recovery of title, where the record shows that land has been pat
ented to a railroad that was in fact excepted from the grant.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, December
12, 1890.
By your office letter, dated June 24 last, were transmitted certain
papers relative to the action taken by your office looking to the insti-
tution of proceedings under the act of Congress, approved March 3,
1887 (24 Stat., 556), to set aside the patent issued to the Central Pa-
cific Railroad Company, on June 23, 1883, for N. of the SW. of Sec.
15, T. 12 N., R. 8 E., M. D. M.. California.
It appears that the Department, on September 17, 1888 (Lands and
Railroads, vol. 83, p. 132), in the case of Jefferson T. Thatcher v. Ben-
jamin Bernhard, involving the SW. of the SW. 4 of said section, found
that the land was within the limits of the grant to said company by the
act of Congress approved July 1, 1862 (12 Stat., 489); that on May 28,
1883, said Bernhard offered to file his pre-emption declaratory state-
ment for the N. of the SW. 4and the SW. of the SW. -. of said sec-
tion 15; that at the same time he filed affidavits, alleging that said
tracts were settled upon and improved "' at the late of the grant to the
railroad company; that a hearing was duly had, and upon the evi-
dence submitted the local officers decided in favor of Bernhard, from
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whose decision the company did not appeal; that the company selected
said N. i of the SW. 4s on July 26, 12, upon which patent issued on
June 23, 1883; that your office, upon consideration of Bernhard's said
app]ication, allowed him to file for said SW. of the SW. + of said see-
tion, but held that " the record being clear of conflicting claims, at the
date of the examination of the railroad selections, this office could know
nothing of the application of Bernhard and the hearing at the local of:
fie. The appellant having slept upon his rights, the land was properly
patented to the railroad company," and that " the attention of your
office is called to the allegation in the record that the N. i of said SW.
1 of See. 15, was settled upon and improved prior to the date of the
grant to the railroad company, with the suggestion that an investiga-
tion be made with a view to recommending suit to set aside the patent
to the company for said tract, if the facts justify such recommendation."
Acting upon said suggestion, your office, on May 6th last, issued a
rule to said company to show cause why said proceedings to recover
title of said tract should not be duly instituted.
The company, on June 4th following, through its resident attorney,
filed its answer, in which it alleged, in brief, that the Department has
no jurisdiction to institute proceedings under said act, for the reason
that at the date of its selection and at the date of the issuance of said
patent, there was no claim of record for said land, and said Bernhard,
if he made any settlement in 1865, as alleged, " was under legal obliga-
tion to present his claim at the local land office, in accordance with
law, within three months after settlement
This contention can not be maintained. The record shows that said
N. J of said SW. i was settled upon and occupied by a bona fide settler,
both at the date of the grant and also continuously to the date of the
definite location of its road, when its right attached, as well as when
said " selection " was made and patent issued. It was therefore ex-
cepted from the operation of said grant and was improperly patented
to the company. Emmerson v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 3 L. D., 271;
Pointard v. Central Pacific E. R. Co 4 L. D., 353; Ranmage v. Central
Pacific R. R. Co. 5 L. 1)., 274; Central Pacific R. R. Co. v. Shepherd, 9
L. D., 213; Icard v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 10 L. D., 464.
Since said act of March 3, 1887, is considered to be mandatory (9 L.
D., 649), the recommendations of the present claimants of the land that
the patent to the company should not be disturbed can not prevail, and
the recommendation of your office, " that a demand he made on the
company to reconvey said land to the United States," is concurred in
by the Department; and you are hereby directed to demand from said
company a reconveyance to the United States of said N. 0 of the SW.
1 of said section 15, and at the expiration of ninety days from date of
such demand, you will make due report to this Department of the ac-
tion of the company in the premises.
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RAILROAD LANDS-ACT OF MARCH 3, 1887.
WELLS V. SOUTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co.
An application under section 5, act of March 3, 1887, to purchase lands erroneously
patented to a railroad company can not be entertained until the government has
secured a reconveyauce of the title.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Off ce, December
12, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of C. M. Wells from the decision of your
office dated November 19, 1888, rejecting his application to purchase all
of See. 21, T. 7. N., R. 14 W., S. B. M., Los Angeles, California, under
the provisions of the act of Congress approved March 3, 1887 (24 Stats.,
556); for the reason that the land applied for was patented to the South-
ern Pacific Railroad Company o January 9, 1885, per list No. 9, as be-
ing within the primary limits of the grant to said company (branch line)
by act of Congress approved March 3, 1871 (16 Stats., 573). Your office
decision also states that the land in question is within " the primary
limits of the forfeited grant to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Com-
pany; " that, although said patent was erroneously issued, yet, pending
the result of the proceedings intended to secure a reconvcyance of said
land to the United States, the land can not be disposed of under the
fifth section of said act of 1887.
The appellant asks that, in the event that it shall be decided that said
application is premature, the rejection of the same " shall he held in
abeyance until the proper time for presenting the same shall have ar-
rived, and that it then be allowed."
The application is clearly prematurely made, but this will not pre-
vent the stpplicant from renewing the same when the land shall be sub-
ject to disposal by the United States. Said appeal is accordingly dis-
missed without prejudice to the appellant's right to renew his applica-
tion at the proper time
V' X
RAILROAD GRANT-MINERAL LANDS-SUIT TO VACATE PATENT.
BULLOCK ET AL. V. CENTRAL PACIFIC R. R. Co. ET AL.
On the allegation duly corroborated that certain land patented to a railroad cotn-
'. pany was in fact excepted from the grant, by reason of its known mineral char-
-acter, a hearing may be directed to ascertain whether the facts justify jdicial
Gl jproceedings for the recovery of title.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner f the General Land Office, December
12, 1890.
By your office letter dated August 20, 1890, was transmitted the peti-
tion of W. H. Bullock, D. W. Spear, R. Greenwood, and J. S. Rees, filed
in the Sacramento, California, land office and forwarded to your office
on August 5th, last, asking that proceedings be instituted by the. United
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States to set aside a patent issued to the Central Pacific Railroad Com-
pany on April 30, 1885, for lot No. 12 of the SE of See. 23, T. 14 N.,
R lo E., M. D. M., on the ground that said tract was known to be-
mineral long prior to and at the (late of the grant to said company, and
also at the date when the rights of said company attached to its granted
lands, and was therefore excepted from its grant.
Your office letter states that sid lot 12 contains an area of 22.75
acres and covers te SE. corner of the SE. 1 of said section; that it is
within the primary limits of the grant to said coMpany under the acts
of Congress approved July 1, 1862 (12 Stats., 489), and July 2, 1861 (13
Stats., 356); that the township plat of survey was duly approved on
June 9, 1870, and said section was returned as agricultural land; that
said lot 12 was listed by said company on July 29, 1884, per list 6, and
patented to said company on April 30, 185, per list 43; that there was.
nothing upon the records of your office to show that said laud was mni-
eral, and in the absence of any objection said patent was regularly
issued.
Your office further finds that " the petitioners allege possession and'
ownership of said lot through succession to the title thereto from the-
original locators, whom they allege located the same as a placer in the-
year 1885: " that said patent issued on April 30, 1885; it does not ap-
pear that any mineral claim was initiated prior thereto, or tat, at the|
date of said patent, there was any adverse right thereto; that it is not
alleged that the Mayflower Gravel Mining Company pureh used sail lot
from said railroad company with a knowledge of any fraud laving been
perpetrated on the part of said railroad company in procuring title-
thereto, and the presumption must be that it " is a bona fide purchaser
without notice, in which event proof of the fraud must be clear and
convincing to justify the cancellation of the patent."
Your office, therefore, in view of the insufficiency of the petition and
upon the principles enunciated by the United States supreme court in
San Jacinto Company (125 U. S., 273), and United States v. Beebe (127
U. S., 338), declines to recommend the institution of suit to set aside
said patent.
The affidavits filed in support of the petition allege that
said lot 12 now is and for said (the last) twenty-eight years has been well known
valuable mineral land bearing gold, that the same was held, claimed and pos-essed
under the mining laws and customs at the time of the passage of the act ganting
lands to the Central Pacific Railroad Company of California, and that the same has
yielded a larger amount of gold than almost any other tract of like area in the.
State of California, reaching probably from $5,000 to $0,l00 per acre, and that the
same is yet very highly valuable mineral land. That the same at the time of the attach-
ment of the grant to the railroad company, and of the survey thereof and of the issue
of the patent thereto in 1885 to said company was actually claimed and worked as-
mining land and was notoriously known to be valuable as such.
The affiants, twelve in number, swear that they have resided in the
vicinity of said tract for the last twenty-eight years and know each part
thereof.
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If said allegations as to the known mineral character of said lot be
true, then the land was expressly excepted from the grant to said coin-
pany, and the United States has an interest in the land which would
fully warrant the institution of proceedings to set aside said patent
under the mandatory act of Congress approved March 3, 1887 (24 Stats.,
556). McLaughlin v. United States, 107 U. ., 526; Western Pacific
R. R. Co. v. United States, 108 U. S., 510; Mullan et al. v. United States,
118 U. S., 271; Winona & St. Peter B. R. Co., 9 L. D., 649; Central
Pacific R. R. Co. et al. v. Valentine, 11 L. D., 238.
The petitioners offer to bear the necessary expenses, and, in my judg-
iment, they should have an opportunity of establishing the truth of said
allegations at a hearing to be duly had before the local office in order
that the Department may have the requisite evidence to warrant the
institution of proceedings to set aside said patent. (Alexander Moore
et al., 2 L. D., 761).
You are therefore directed to cause a hearing to be had before the
local land officers, after due notice to all parties in interest, and upon
receipt of the testimony taken thereat, together with the report of the
local officers thereon, you will consider the same and make due report
to the Department.
TIMBER CULTURE CONTEST-RELIN QUISHMEN T.
ROBERTS v. GASTON ET AL.
A contest against an entry that appears of record through the failure of he local
office to act upon the previous relinquishment thereof, must fail where the party
filing such relinquishment has thereafter proceeded in compliance with the timi-
her culture law in the honest belief that his application to enter thereunder has
been allowed, and the contestant begins proceedings with fall knowledge of the
facts.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 13, 1890.
I have considered the case of James Roberts v. Thaddeus B. Gaston
and Washington I. Anderson, upon appeal by Roberts from the decis-
ion of your office dated June 10, 1889, dismissing his contest against
Gaston's timber culture entry for the NE. Sec. 33, T. 24 S., R. 10 W.,
Wichita, land district, Kansas.
January 23, 1879, Gaston made timber culture entry for said tract and
on February 5, 1887, Roberts initiated contest against said entry, alleg-
ing as follows:
That he was well acquainted with the tract of land embraced in said timber cul-
ture entry and knows the present condition of the same; also that said Thaddeus B.
Gaston failed to do any breaking in the years of 1879, 1880, 1881, and 1882, and that
he sold his claim to Thos. Anderson who has done or caused to be done all the work
that has been done on said claim, and that there has never been ten acres broken on
said claim to this date.
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Hearing was ordered and set for March 15, 1887, and Gaston was
notified of the same.
On the day appointed for the hearing, Gaston failed to appear either
in person or by attorney, but Washington I. Anderson appeared in
person and by attorney and having first disclosed on oath the nature
of his interest in the tract as required by rule 102 of the Rules of Prac-
tice, he was made a party defendant, and on motion of contestant the
case was continued to A pril 14, 1885, at which time both the contestant
and intervenor appeared and submitted testimony, and on April 22,
1887, the local office found in favor of contestant.
The intervenor appeale , and your office dismissed the contest and
decide d that Anderson was entitled to make entry for the land, where-
upon contestant appealed.
The record of the hearing hows that contestant testified he resided
at Sylvia, Reno County, Kan as, and had known the tract in dispute
since September 1886; that before he initiated this contest he had
heard that Washington I. A derson was the owner of this tree claim,
but that the record of the cal office showed Gaston's entry to be still
uncanceled.
On his cross examination he admitted that on the day he went to
serve Gaston with notice of this contest, Gaston informed him that he
had sold his improvements to Anderson, and had executed and deliv-
ered to Anderson a relinquishment of his interest in the land years be-
fore, receiving from Anderson two cows as payment therefor. He
further admitted that he induced Gaston (by paying him twenty-five
dollars) to execute and deliver to him (contestant) February 5, 1887, a
secon(l relinquishment of his timber culture entry, and that Gaston at
the same ime had promised to testify at the hearing that lie had not
done any work on the claim since he sol(l it in 1881; that Gaston after-
wards declined to do so.
Only one other person was sworn and examined on the part of con-
testant, and the most material part of his testimony was to the effect
that there were not more than about three thousand trees growing on
this claim at the time of the hearing.
The intervenor and several other persons were sworn and testified on
his behalf, and their testimony shows that about October 18, 1881, the
intervenor purchased of Gaston his improvements on the tract in dis-
pute consisting of five acres of plowed land, paying therefore the value
of about one hundred dollars, viz: two cows and two calves. At the
same time Gaston executed a relinquishment of his said entry before a
justice of the peace in and for Stafford county, Kansas, which re-
linquishment was written on a portion of the back of the duplicate
receiver's receipt.
October 26, 1881, Anderson went to Hutchinson, Kansas, and there
employed a firm of reputable lawyers to prepare the usual application
to. make entry for said tract under the act of June 14, 18'18 (20 Stat.,
2497-VOL 11-X8
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113). After executing his application he gave his attorneys Gaston's
relinquishment and eighteen dollars to pay the fees and commissions
at the land office, as well as other expenses incurred. About five days
thereafter the intervenor's attorneys transmitted to the local office a
letter purporting to contain his application, the relinquishment, and
legal fees.
November 4, 1881, the register wrote to the intervenor's attorneys as
follows:
Gents -
The enclosed relinquishment will not answer. Mr. Gaston must acknowledge the
relinquishment before some court of record, a J. P. will not answer. You state that
you eclose application and fees of Anderson, the fees came through all right, but
there was no application enclosed.
A clerk in the attorney's office says he notified Anderson by mail of
the requirements of the local office, but Anderson testified thathe never
received any such notice, and had always supposed his attorneys had
duly entered the tract for him until after the initiation of this contest;
that as soon as he heard of the contest he went to his attorney's office
and informed them of what he had heard, and upon inquiry made by
them, they iscovered that the application and relinquishment had re-
mained in the law office since the fall of 1881. February 15, 1887, An-
derson got Gaston to acknowledge his former relinquishment before a
notary public and to certify as follows:
This relinquishment is made to cure an alleged defect in relinquishment of said
entry dated October 18, 1881, made before S. H. Tedforl, a justice of the peace of
Stafford county, Kansas, and delivered to Washington I. Anderson.
The evidence shows that in the fall of 1881, the intervenor took actual
possession of the tract in dispute, and in the spring of 1882, he broke
ten acres, and during that season he planted ten acres to thirteen thou-
sand five hundred cottonwood trees from one to two years old and from
eighteen inches to two feet high. During 1883, the weeds were pulled
and the trees were hoed. In the spring of 1884, the ground between
the tree rows was listed and the ten acre tree plat was refilled with cut-
tings wherever needed and so as to have the trees four feet apart each
way.
The intervenor continued to cultivate and protect the timber and at
the time of the hearing he had about six thousand one hundred trees
growing upon the tract in an apparently thrifty condition.
April 16, 1887, at 9.30 a. in., the intervenor offered to file Gaston's
original relinquishment and at the same time applied in proper form to
enter the tract, and ten minutes thereafter contestant applied to make
entry for the tract, the register refused both applications, but held them
to await the final result of this contest.
Gaston's original relinquishment transferred unconditionally to the
United States all of his right, title and interest in and to said tract,
and was acknowledged before a person having authority to take ac-
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knowledgements under the provisions of section 1118 of the Statutes at
Large of the State of Kansas. (Vol. 1-p. 357).
The local officers should have received said relinquishment when pre-
sented in 1881, as it was executed in accordance with the requirements
of circular of May 25, 1880, relating to relinquishments and contests
of pre-emption, homestead and timber culture claims under the act of
May 14, 1880, wherein the local officers were instructed-
Not to accept or act upon any relinquishment unless made before you, which has
not been duly subscribed by the claimant on the back of his duplicate receipt, and
acknowledged, witnessed, and executed in a manner which under the laws of the
State or Territory in which the land is situated, would be sufficient as a valid trans-
fer of real estate.
Upon review of the record herein while I find that the intervenor or
his attorneys were negligent, yet there is not the least indication of
bad faith on his part, and as it sufficiently appears that Gaston's
relinquishment was not the result of Roberts' contest, he can not prop-
erly claim anything thereunder; and as it further appears that Roberts
was fully aware of the intervenor's occupancy of the land and of the
facts in the case when he began his contest, and simply sought to take
advantage of the condition of affairs and as this Department will not
knowingly be made a party to the accomplishment of an act of injustice
whereby a citizen would be deprived of the fruits of his honest labor,
the decision appealed from is accordingly affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT-INDEMfITY SELECTIONS-EXPIRED FILINGS.
LITTLE ROCK AND MEMPHIS R. R. Co.
'No action should be taken on indemnity selections for land covered by expired filings
until after notice to the claimants to assert any rights they may possess.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, August
28, 1890.
I am in receipt of your letter of the 15th instant, transmitting for my
approval list No. 8, containing one thousand four hundred acres of lands
selected by the Little Rock and Memphis Railroad Company, as in-
demnity.
Yea state that the lands are within the State of Arkansas and are of
the same character as those embraced in list No. 7, approved by the
Department on August 2, 1890 (11 , D., 168), and were selected at the
same time, but were excluded from said list 7 because in conflict with
certain pre-emption filings of record.
You further state that said filings have now all been cleared from the
record, except certain ones which have expired by limitation of law. It
appears you have taken no steps to clear the record of these latter
filings, and in this particular you State you were guided by the rule
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announced in Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Stovenour (10 L.
D., 645), to the effect that the presumption is such claims have been
abandoned.
The lands in this list were selected by the Little Rock and Memphis
company within the indemnity limits of the Little Rock and Fort Smith
road, both being branches of the road provided for in the grant of Feb-
ruary 9, 1853 (10 Stat., 155). The odd sections within the indemnity
limits of said latter branch had been withdrawn for the benefit of the
grant, for many years, but on March 21, 1883, the withdrawal was re-
voked. From that time these lands have been open to settlement. It
appears it has been the practice of your office to exclude from such lists
submitted for approval all tracts covered by expired filings. In view
of these facts the proper practice in this case. before you approve of
this list, would be to notify these claimants to assert their rights, if any
they have. There is nothing in the Stovenour case to prevent this.
While the rights under the filings have ceased, settlement, if continued,
would defeat the right of selection. Northern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany v. Anrys (8 L. D., 362).
The list is accordingly returned for such action.
RAILROAD GRANT-HOMESTEAD-ACT OF JUNE 15, 1880.
NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. CO. v. KILLIAN.
The right of purchase under section 2, act of June 15, 1880, existing at the date when
a railroad grant becomes effective, excepts the land covered thereby from the opera-
tion of the grant.
Acting Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
December 15, 1890.
I have considered the appeal from the decision of your office of June
24, 1889, approving for patent the cash entry of Henry Killian for the
NW. SW. 4 S. S.' and SW. - SE. 4 Sec. 11, T. 5 N., R. 4 W., He-
lena, Montana, made under the act of June 15, 1880.
This land is within the primary limits of the grant of the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company as definitely located July 6, 1882, and is also
within the limits of withdrawal from the benefit of said road, which
became effective February 21, 1872.
From the facts as recited in your letter and which are not controverted
by the company, it appears that at the date of withdrawal on general
route the tract was covered by the homestead entry of Peter Riley
made November 13, 1871, which was canceled February 21, 1879.
On June 18, 1876, Henry Killian purchased Riley's interest in the
tract, and on December 19, 1883, he purchased the tract under the act
of June 15, 880, which was approved by your office.
From this decision the company appealed, assigning error in not hold-
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ing that Killian having failed to avail himself of the benefit of the act
prior to the vesting of the right of the company July 6, 1882. could not
thereafter make entry of the tract.
The facts in this case are in all essential respects the same as those
in the cases of Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Burt (3 L. D. 490); H6lmes
e. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. (5 IL. D. 333) and Northern Pacific R. R.
Co. v. McLean (b., 529) and must be ruled thereby.
Your decision is affirmed.
TIMBER CULTURE CONTEST-RELINQUIS11MENT.
BLANE V. CENTER.
A charge of relinquishment is not established by evidence showing that an informal
relinquishment of the entry has been placed in the hands of auother,bnt not filed,
nor executed for such purpose, but as security for the payment of note.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 17, 890.
I have considered the case of David D. Blank v. Gibson S. Center,
upon the appeal of the former from your office decision of May 22, 1888,
dismissing his contest against the timber culture entry of Center for
the SW of Sec. 24, T. 110 N., R. 65 W., Huron, South Dakota.
The record shows that Center made timber culture entry for the
above described land January 26, 1885. January 5, 1886, David D.
Blank applied to enter the same tract and under oath alleged that " said
tract has been relinquished, and said relinquishment is in the posses-
sion of one M. W. Coykendall, and by him held in violation of the tim-
ber culture laws, said relinquishment being made and executed by said
Gibson S. Center."
March 30, 1886, a hearing was had before the register and receiver,
who, on May 28, 1886, decided against contestant, dismissing his con-
test.
Thereupon he appealed to your office, where, on May 22, 1888, you
affirmed the judgment of the register and receiver. Blank appealed to
this Department.
I have examined all of the questions involved in this case, and all of
the evidence in the record. From this examination I find that the find-
ings in your said office decision are correct. It is clear that the proof
does not show a relinquishment by the contestee. le merely placed
his informal relinquishment in the hands of a triend to be held by him
as a pledge that he would pay off a note or arrange security for it at a
eertain time, at which time this paper, purporting to be a relinquish-
ment, was to be returned to him. It is not shown that Center ever in-
tended to have this relinquishment filed in the land office, and it never
has been filed there.
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A paper purporting to be a relinquishment is of no legal value until
it is filed in the land office. (Vandivert v. Johns, 9 L. D., 609).
Said decision is accordingly affirmed.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-ACT OF JUNE 15, 1880.
EDWARD H. BURFORD.
The erroneous allowance of a cash entry under section 2, act of June 15, 1880, dur-
ing the pendency of a contest, is an error that can only be taken advantage of by
the sccessful contestant.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 15, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Edward I. Burford from the decision,
of your office refusing to order a hearing to determine the right to the
S. of the NW. and Lots 3 and 4 of Sec. 4, T. 31 S., R. 27 W., Garden
City, Kansas.
From the record before me it appears that this tract was embraced in
the homestead- entry of William Y. Buchanan, and made May 1, 1879,
and was held for cancellation by decision of your office February 6,
1886, upon the contest initiated against said entry by Columbus Brund-
age, from which decision Buchanan appealed.
Prior to the decision of your office, to wit: on January 26, 1885,
Buchanan made cash entry of the tract under the act of June 15, 1880.
On March 24, 1888, the Department considered the appeal of Bu-
chanan, and held that the local officers had no authority to allow said
cash entry, for the reason that Brundage having proved the allegations
of his contest was entitled to the preference right of entry, but directed
that since the local officers had allowed said cash entry, it should be
suspended and held subject to the right of Brundage to make entry of
the land, and if he failed to make entry within thirty days from notice
of said decision, the cash entry of Buchanan will be relieved from sus-
pension.
After the cash entry of Buchanan had been allowed, and while the
case of Buchanan . Brandage was pending before the Department on
appeal, Edward M. Burford made homestead entry of the tract.
Brundage having failed to avail himself of his preference right to
make entry of the tract, your office, on October 12, 1888, reliesved the
cash entry of Buchanan from suspension and held the homestead entry
of Burford for cancellation, because of conflict with said cash entry.
From this action the applicant appealed, alleging, substantially, the fol-
lowing grounds of error:
(1) Because an entry under the act of June 15, 18SO, can only be allowed in the-
absence of an adverse right.
(2) Because Burford's entry was a valid adverse right that attached before the ex-
piration of the thirty days' preference right of entry of Brundage, the sccessfnli
contestant, and should take precedence of all other applications.
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(3) Because it was error to allow the cash entry of Buchanan under the act of
June 15, 1880, until after the expiration of the thirty days allowed to the successful
contestant to make entry.
Although the cash entry was erroneously allowed, yet it was an error
that could only be taken advantage of by the successful contestant.
His right of purchase was good against every one bat the successful
contestant, or an adverse claim initiated prior to his cash entry. At the
date Burford's entry was allowed, the land was not subject to entry,
because of the cash entry of Buchanan that segregated the land, and
which could only be annulled by the successful contestant.
The decision of your office is affirmed.
TIMBER LAND APPLICATION-PRELIMINARY AFFIDAVIT.
L. W. WALKER.
The departmental regulation requiring a purchaser under the act of June 3, 1878, to
personally examine the land prior to application is within the intendment of
said act.
Where the applicant in his preliminary affidavit falsely states that he has person-
ally examined the land, and knows from his personal knowledge that it is of the
character contemplated by said act, the right of purchase should be denied.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 18, 1890.
I have considered the case of L. W. Walker on appeal from your de-
cision of July 3, 1884, affirming the action of the local officers in re-
jecting his proof on timber lanl application tinder act of June 3, 1878,
20 Stat., 89, for the purchase of the SE. 1 Sec. 12, T. 20 N. R. 10 W.,
Seattle, Washington land district.
On November 10. 1888, he made said application and made his affi-
davit upon the usual form for the purchase of timber and stone lands,
and stated therein that:
I have personally examined said lands and from my personal knowledge state that
said land is unfit for cultivation, and valuable chiefly for its timber; that it is unin-
habited; that it contains no mining or other improvements; nor as I verily believe
any valuable deposit of gold, silver, cinnabar, copper or coal, etc.
On July it, 1889, he, having given the notice by publication required
by law, appeared at the local office to make proof and pay for the land.
On being sworn and examined he stated that he had never been on the
land at the time he made his application; that a man named Wing had
made an inspection of the land for him, but he had been upon it after
his application was made.
The local officers rejected his proof because by his testimony he had
not examined the land prior to making his application. From this de-
cision he appealed, and your office on July 3, 1889, affirmed said action
and held his filing for cancellation, because the same was fraudulent in
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its inception. He again appealed and brought the case before the De-
partment.
The appeal assigns error as follows:
1st. It was error forsaid Commissioner to find that the application of said claimant
was fraudulent because of the fact that he did not examine the land applied for prior
to filing his application therefor.
2d. It was error to conclude from facts appearing in the record that " the attempted
entry of claimant was fraudulent in its inception " or at any time since its inception.
The third and fourth assignments amount to one and say it was error
to reject the application.
Counsel for appellant contend that the law does not require the ap-
pellant to examine the land, or testify from personal knowledge that it
is of the character contemplated by the act of June 3, 1878, and he cites
the letter of Secretary Vilas to Commissioner Stockslager, dated Janu-
ary 5, 1889 (8 L. D., 20), which says-
In the timber culture circular approved July 12,1887 (6 L. D., 20), the preliminary
affidavit therein required contains a phrase which does not appear in the form pre-
scribed by the statute. The words referred to are as follows:-
'1 That I have made personal examination of said land and from my personal knowl-
edge of the same state."
While it is true that the statutory affidavit can not be made in good faith except
on knowledge derived from a personal examination of the laud, yet as the statute
(20 Stat., 113), has prescribed the-exact words of the oath required of the applicant,
the Department has no athority to add thereto.
The said phrase should therefore be stricken out of said affidavit.
The act referred to in the above letter is unlike the act providing for
"timber ant stone entries "' (approved June 3, 1878, inasmuch as it pre-
scribes the form of the preliminary affidavit while the latter does not.
Were the acts identical the letter would apply to the case at bar, al-
though subsequent to it, for if the phrase was inserted without warrant
of law, it would be impertinent to the issue and immaterial and could
be disregarded by the deponent, but this is not the case.
The statute under which claimant seeks to acquire title to this tract,
requires the applicant to file with the register a statement in relation
to the land which he desires to purchase, and it will be observed that
this is divided into two clauses: First he must state that the land is
unfit for cultivation, uninhabited and unimproved. This statement he
makes upon his corporal oath and this necessarily implies personal
knowledge. Secondly: He must on like oath state, as he verily believes,
that it contains no valuable deposits of gold, etc. This part of the oath
may of course by the law be made on information. It is quite clear that
Congress intended to distinguish between those conditions affecting
the character of the land, which could be certainly known by ordinary
diligence and observation, and those that could not be so known or
determined and as to the latter, the applicant was permitted to base
his oath upon his belief.
In thus stating the matter, in the act, Congress took care to include
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that which could be taken on information and belief, and by the well
known naxim, inclusio unius est exelusio alterius, the statements in re-
gard to cultivation, inhabitancy and improvements are excluded from
that part of the affidavit based on mere belief. In these he must know
whereof he affirms.
The third section of the act provides that the applicant after giving
notice, etc., shall " furnish to the register of the land office satisfactory
evidence . . . . that the land is of the character contemplated in this
act." The local officers can therefore examine the applicant and wit-
nesses as to their means of knowing the character of the land; thus to
ask if the applicant had examined the land or been upon it, would be
pertinent to the issue, and a relevant and competent inquiry, and the
statement in this affidavit I have personally examined this land," is
simply the equivalent of such an examination at the hearing. It is con-
templated by the statute that the applicant would know whereof he
affirmed, and it is certainly within the province of the Department to
ascertain whether the oath is made upon the applicant's knowledge,
or on his belief, or rashly " with no probable cause for believing," and
it is not an unreasonable requirement on the part of the Department,
that whoever offers to purchase this class of land, must show that he
has had an opportunity of knowing that the statements that he was by
law required to make concerning its character, are true in fact when so
made. The phrase in the affidavit adds iro condition or limitation to
the character of the land, as defined by the statute, nor does it conflict
with the statute in any of its forms. The statute prescribes certain
facts to be sworn to, but it does not give any form of oath, and the only
limitation that it fixes is that as to valuable minerals.
Besides these considerations there is nothing in the act in question,
which removes this class of land from under the general supervisory
control of the land department, or exempts purchasers of the same from
the general rules and regulations thereof.
I am of opinion that the Department had full authority to insert the
phrase in question in the preliminary oath, that when so inserted it
was pertinent, material and binding upon the applicant who should
subscribe to the oath, and with this view of the law I concur in your
conclusions.
Your decision is affirmed.
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HOMESTEAD CONTEST-RESIDENCE.
FARRELL V. LINDE.
The establishment of residence on a homestead claim within six months after entry
is required by departmental regulation, and, in the face of a contest, no amount of
improvements will excuse a failure to comply therewith, or cure default therein.
Residence under the homestead law can not be established through the acts of
another.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 18, 1890.
May 26, 1886, Frederick Linde made homestead entry, No. 2754, for
lots 2 and 6i, and the SW. t of the NE. i and the NW. 1 of the SE. of
Sec. 2, T. 4 N., R. 16 W., Los Angeles, California.
January 12, 1887, Robert Farrell instituted a contest against the
same, alleging that defendant had never established residence thereon.
Hearing was had March 15, 1887, and on July 12, 1887, the register
and receiver found in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, your office, by
letter of January 19, 1889, affirmed the action of the local officers, and
held the entry for cancellation.
Linde appeals from your judgment. I have examined the evidence
and it shows that defendant had not resided on the claim up to the
time of the contest, more than seven months after he made his entry,
but had all the time resided with his family at Los Angeles, where he
was in business as a jeweler. le had hired one Lowe to improve the
claim. Lowe had built a house and improved and cultivated the land.
Claimant would occasionally visit him to give directions about the im-
provements but maintained his residence at Los Angeles.
The establishment of residence on a homestead within six months
after entry is required by the regulations, and no amount of improve-
ments will excuse a compliance therewith or cure the default in the face
of a contest.
Such residence must be personal. Renting the land to a tenant, or
having some one else to reside on it, will not satisfy the law.
The decision of your office is affirmed and you will cancel said entry.
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SURVEY SUB-DIVISION OF SECTIONS.
CIRCULAR.
The circular instructions of June 2, 1887, 5 L. D., 699, re-issued by
Commissioner Groff, December 9, 1890.
RAILROAD LANDS-ACT OF MARCE 3, 187.
E. D. RAND.
An application to purchase under the act of March 3, 1887, can not be allowed for
lands embraced within an outstanding patent to a railroad company.
In such a case a statement and applicatidn, duly corroborated, as required by de-
partmental regulations, may be presented for consideration with a view to the
institution of judicial proceedings to set aside the patent.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, December
19, 1890.
I have considered the ease arising upon the appeal of E. D. Rand
from your office decision of August 3, 1889, rejecting his application,
made June 8, 1889, to purchase, under the act of March 3, 1887 (24
Stat., 556), Sec. 17, T. 7 N., R. 13 W., S. B. M., Los Angeles land dis-
trict, California.
The tract described lies within the primary limits of the grant, by act
of March 3, 1871 (16 Stat., 579, See. 23), to the Southern Pacific Rail-
road Company; and the ground of the rejection of the application was,
that said tract had previously (to wit, on January 9, 1885,) been pat-
ented to said company.
The applicant alleges, as ground of appeal, that your office decision-
does not in any way settle the matter. Either the land in question belongs to the
railroad company or to the United States. If it belongs to the United States then
the right of the undersigned to purchase under said act of Congress is perfect, and
the application should be allowed. The CommissioLer does not enter into the merits
of the case, in that he does not decide whether the land belongs to the railroad com-
pany under its grant, or to the appellant herein under the act of March 3, 1887.
The sole question presented to your office, upon the presentation of
Rand's application to enter, was whether said application could prop-
erly be accepted and filed. Your office very properly decided that, as
the title to the tract applied for had passed, by paten t, to the railroad
company, the government was no longer owner thereof, and that you
had no alternative except to reject the application. (See United States
v. Schurz, 102 U. S., 378; see also Horace B. Rogers et al., 10 L. D.,.
29). Your office also, very properly, did " not enter into the merits of
the case,"1 and did " not decide whether the land belongs to the railroad
company under its grant, or to the appellant," for the very obvious rea-
son that these questions were beyond your jurisdiction, and must be-
decided by an entirely different tribunal.
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Before any one can purchase from the United States the tract de-
scribed, the title thereto must be restored to the United States.
You will inform the applicant that if he will prepare a statement and
application, supported by corroboratory affilavits, as required by de-
partmental circular instructions of February 13, 1889 8 I.. D., 318), and
supplemental instructions of August 30, 1890 (11 I. D., 229), and trans-
mit the same to the Department, through the proper channel, such
statement and application will be duly considered, with a view to rec-
ommending to the Honorable Attorney General the institution of suit
to cancel and set aside said patent, as provided for in Sec. 2 of the act
of March 3, 1887 (supra).
PRACTICE-DEATH OF DEFENDANT NOTICE-ATTORNEY.
DRISCOLL V. JOHNSON.
Where a party dies prior to hearing his attorney is without authority to enter appear-
ance, or thereafter prosecute a appeal i the name of the decedent.
The rules of practice do not authorize the service of notice of contest on a resident
defendant by registered letter.
Where the entryman dies prior to the service of notice, his heirs and successors in
interest should be made parties to the action, and duly served with notice thereof.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to te Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 19, 1890.
May 5, 1886, Edmund P. Johnson made homestead entry for the NE.
4Se. 17, T. 27 ., R. 46 W., Chadron, Nebraslka.
December 31, 1887, Edward Driscoll filed an affidavit of contest
against the same. Notice of contest was served upon Johnson by regis.
tered letter, in which the hearing was set for February 15, 1888, testi-
mony to be taken before a notary public at Box Butte, Nebraska, on
February 10.
On said last (late, at 8 o'clock A. M., the defendant was killed by the
accidental discharge of a gun, but the contestant proceeded with his
testimony before the notary. On the return day (February 15) John-
son's attorney appeared before the register and receiver and moved to
dismiss, because of defective service of notice. The motion was over-
ruled, and the contestant allowed to " file supplemental affidavit and
proceed against the heirs." From this action Johnson's attorney ap-
pealed.
Your office decision of June 30, 1888, affirmed the action of the reg-
ister and receiver, and Johnson's attorney again appealed.
Johnson having died prior to the hearing, his attorney had no author-
ity to appear for him. The relation of attorney and client ceased on
the death of the client. Nor can a dead man appeal by attorney. Con-
sequently, there is no appeal pending here.
Johnson was never propel served with noti3e. The rules of practice
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provide for but two methods of service of notice of contest: 1st, Per-
sonal service, which is made by delivering a copy of the notice to the
defendant. 2d, When the defendant is a non-resident of the State or,
Territory. or can not be served personally, notice may be served by
publication, as provided in Practice Rules 11, 13, and 14.
There is no provision for service by registered letter.
As this is the first time within my observation that service of notice
of contest on a resident defendant has been attempted by registered
letter, and as the language of some of the decisions of this Department
may seem to authorize such manner of service, I deem it advisable to
refer to these decisions, with a view to reconcile them, if possible, to the
rules and regulations governing practice before the district and General
Land Offices.
In the case of Anderson v. Tannellill et al., 10 L. D. 388, an order of
publication was made against the claimant; whereupon Stenson, his
transferee, appeared and disclosed, under oath, his ownership of the
land in controversy; he was allowed to intervene, and moved to dismiss
the contest because no publication had been made against Tannehill,
the original claimant. New notice was then issued, and publication
made, fixing a later date for the hearing, at which date Stenson again
appeared and moved to dismiss all proceedings, because the record
failed to show that the notice was posted upon the land. This motion
was sustained, and a new order of publication made, November 27,
1887, fixing January 11, 1888, as the day of hearing, when Sttson ap-
peared for the third time and moved to dismiss the contest, because no
personal service had been made upon him (Stenson), although he was
a resident of the State. Upon a showing that notice had been given
Stenson by registered letter, which had been received by him more than
thirty days before the (lay set for hearing, his motion was overruled,
and the Secretary in affirming the action of the Commissioner says:
" In the first place, this objection is purely technical; as a matter of
fact transferee was notified by registered letter, and upon said notice
appeared to move a dismissal," etc.
This holding was undoubtedly correct, for Stenson, not having dis-
closed his ownership of the land prior to the commencement of proceed-
ings against the entry, was not entitled to be served with notice as an
original defendant, and when he afterwards appeared and made oath to
his ownership, he thereby was in court, asking to be allowed to defend
against the contest. This was an appearance to the merits, so far as
he was concerned, as transferee of the claimant. e found " no fault
with notice to the entryman, but only contended that he was entitled
to the same kind of personal service as the entryman would be if liv-
ing within the Stdte.
The last clause of said decision, that "1 Service by registered letter is
personal service, as required by Rule 15 of Practice," being unnecessary,
may be regarded as obiter dictum.
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Rule 15, referred to, has no reference to the mode or manner of per-
sonal service, but relates exclusively to the manner of proving such
service, and says that it- " shall be (that is, proof of service, as pre-
scribed in Rule 9, shall be) the written acknowledgment of the person
served, or the affidavit of the person who served the notice attached
thereto, stating the time, place, and manner of service."
The manner of making personal service, as prescribed in Rule 9, con-
sists "in the delivery of a copy of the notice to each person to be
served." That this service has been so made an be proven by the
written acknowledgment of the defendant or by the affidavit of the
person serving him, as per Rule 15. This acknowledgment by the de-
fendant, under the practice that obtains in nearly all courts of law, is
endorsed on the back of the notice, or a copy thereof, and dispenses
with the return of the officer serving the same. This is the kind of
written acknowledgment contemplated by Rule 15, and it was never
contemplated that service by registered letter is equivalent to personal
service.
The distinction is clearly recognized in Rule 17, which provides that
"Notice of interlocutory motions, etc., may be served personally or by
registered letter through the mail."
By Rule 18 proof of service by mail is not shown by the receipt
alone. but such receipt must be accompanied by "the affidavit of the
person who mailed the notice."
In the case of William W. Waterhouse, 9 L. D., 131, the defendant
was a non-resident, and an attempt was made to notify him by publica-
tion. The notice was not published for the proper length of time, but
it having been shown by the "return card " that he had received notice
of the hearing by registered letter-received by him at Oshkosh, Wis-
consin, the land being in Dakota-the notice was held sufficient.
The sending of notice by registered letter is provided for where notice
is given by publication (see Rule 14), whereas no such provision is
made when personal service is required.
This case is not parallel with the one at bar, nor is it authority for
serving a resident defendant by registered letter; neither are the cases
therein cited.
In Crowston v. Seal, 5 L. D., 213, the defendant was a non-resident.
In the case of the New Orleans anal and Banking Company v. State
of Louisiana, cited in support of Waterhouse, supra, the notice under
discussion was a notice of appeal and not of contest, and the Rules of
Practie provide for serving notice of appeal by registered letter, and
in that case it was merely held that notice sent by unregistered letter
was sufficient, when receipt of such unregistered letter was admitted
by the party to whom it was sent and who was the party entitled to
notice.
The other case of Ida May Taylor, 6 L. D., 107, there cited, has refer-
ence to notice of the decision of the Commissioner canceling an entry,
notice of which mav also bh made through the mail.
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While notice of interlocutory motions, orders, and nearly all proceed-
iDgS occurring after jurisdiction is once obtained, may be made through
the mail, there is no provision in the Rules -of Practice for acquiring
jurisdiction over resident defendants through such service. Nor in my
judgment should there be.
The notice of contest takes the place of a writ of summons in common
law courts, which is a " due process of law," without which no man may
be deprived of his property. This writ of summons, in all the States
to which my research has extended, is required to be served by a sworn
officer of the law.
This Department has so far departed from this general rule of prac-
tice. as to allow notice of contest to be served by persons other than
officers of the law, but it has not authorized ervice by mail of a writ
which confers jurisdiction to deprive a defendant of all his property.
Johnson having died before he was served with notice, the local
officers obtained no jurisdiction of his person. There being no action
pending at his death, it could not be revived against his heirs.
It follows that the action of the local officers was right in allowing a
new affidavit to be filed, making his heirs and successors in interest
parties defendant, and directing notice to be issued against them, in
compliance with the Rules of Practice, above noted.
The decision of your office is affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT-CONFLICTING LIMITS-ADJUSTMENT.
CHICAGO, ST. PAUL, MINNEAPOLIS AND OMAHA RY. Co.
The definite location of the Northern Pacific road did not take effect upon lands
within the previous indemnity withdrawal made under the act of May 5, 1864.
Where the primary limits of one company conflict with the indemnity limits of an-
other, and both derive their grants from the same act, the former is entitled to
the lands in question, without regard to priority of location or construction.
The second proviso in section 5, act of March 3, 1887, applies only to the case of
lands, which at the date of the passage of the act had been settled upon after
December 1, 1882, by parties claiming in good faith a right to enter the same
under the settlement laws, in ignorance of the rights or equities of others in the
premises.
In the final adjustuent of a grant the Department must be controlled by statutory
authority, and can not depart therefrom to protect parties claiming rights under
an alleged purchase from the company.
Previous instructions for the restoration of indemnity lands modified, and directions
given for the disposition of applications to purchase under the act of March 3,
1887.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, December
19, 1890.
On February 12, [11] 1890, 1 approved for patent lists 13, 14 and 15
of lands for the benefit of the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and
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Omaha Railway Company, and sent them to you, with a letter of instruc-
tions bearing even date, 10 L. D., 147. Before any action was taken
by your office in the premises, you were verbally directed to return said
lists and letter of instructions to me: which was accordingly done. The
reasons which actuated me in thus suspending action as above stated,
no longer existing I herewith forward to you said lists and letter, with
directions o carry out the instructions in said letter, as modified herein.
You were informed that this action closed the adjustment of the con-
gressional land grants for the benefit of said road, and you were di-
rected to restore to the public domain aud throw open to settlement the
surplus lands theretofore withdrawn for indemnity purposes, under the
grants for said road. It was provided, however, that-
the order of restoration shall not affect rigbtsacqnired within the primary or granted
units of any other congressional grant;" nor "take effect or be s5) construed as
to authorize the acquisition or recognition of any rights to said lands or any portion
thereof until thirty days after notice thereof, through advertisement, hall have een
previously given by the officers of the district land office.
Afterwards two letters were received from you, dated respectively
the 10th and lAth of February last, in relation to the revocation of said
withdrawal. In the letter of the 10th, which was received after mine of
the 12th was sent, you call attention to the fact that of the surplus
lands to be restored a portion lie within the fifteen mile or indemnity
limits of the Omaha grant, uder the act of June 3 1856 (11 Stat., 20),
and a portion within the twenty miles or indemnity limits of the grant
to said company under the act of Mtay 5, 1864 (13 Stat., 66); and that
the primary limits of the Wisconsin Central Railroad, under the same
grant of May 5, 18634, supra, and the primary limits of the Northern Pa-
cific Railroad under its grant of July 2, 1864 (13 Stat., 365), in regard
to portion of said lands, overlap the aforesaid limits of the Omaha road;
and you desire a determination of the respective rights of the different
roads wi'hin these conflicting or overlapping limits.
Upon particular inquiry at, and a more careful examination into the
matter by, the Railroad Division of your office, it is learned that there
will be no surplus lands within the fifteen miles limit of the Omaha road,
which are covered by the primary limits of the Northern Pacific Rail-
road-such lands having been dealt with in the adjustment heretofore
made. Bat there are lands within the twenty mile limits which are
covered by the primary limits of the Northern Pacific road, as stated
by you.
As before said, the Omaha grant was made May 5, 1864; that of the
Northern Pacific.July 2, 1864; and the indemnity withdrawal of the
Omaha Company was made February 28, 1866, and the definite location
of the Northern Pacific on July 2, 1882. Consequently, at the date of
the definite locatiou, the lands in question were-set apart by executive
order for the indemnity purposes of the Omaha grant. And the ques-
tion is, did this condition except them from the operation of the North-
ern Pacific grant ?
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The third section of Northern Pacific act grants the designated sec-
tion, on each side of the railroad-
whenever, on the line thereof, the United States have fll title, not reserved, sold,
granted, or otherwise appropriated, and free from pre-emption or other caims or
rights, at the time the line of said road is definitely fixed and a plat thereof tiled in
the office of the Commissioner of the General Land Office; and whenever, prior to
said time, any of said sections shall have been granted, sold, reserved, occupied by
homestead settlers, or pre-empted, or otherwise disposed of, other lands sall be
selected by said company in lien thereof, etc.
The force and effect of an executive withdrawal, for indemnity pur-
poses under one grant,in excepting lands from the subsequent attach-
ment of rights under another grant, have been fully and exhaustively
discussed by this Department in several cases arising under this Omaha
grant. See cases of Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha iRy. Co.,
6 L. D., 195; Wisconsin Central R. R. Co., 10 L. D., 63; which cases are
quoted and the rulings therein concurred in b:y Mr. Justice Harlan in the
opinion of the court in the unreported case of the Wisconsin Central
R. R. v. Forsythe, decided last September in the U. S. circuit court for
the western district of Wisconsin.
In pursuance of those decisions, I must hold that the lands in ques-
tion were at the date of the definite location of the Northern Pacific
"reserved" and " otherwise appropriated," and consequently excepted
from said grant. Therefore, there is no proper conflict with rights of
the Northern Pacific in the described limits.
With regard to the overlapping limits of the Wisconsin Central Rail-
road within the fifteen miles indemnity limits of the Omaha road, that
question was definitely decided adversely to the Central Company in
the cases before quoted, and it is not necessary to say anything more
on the point.
But as to the conflict between the primary limits of the Wisconsin
Central and the twenty miles indemnity limits of the Omaha Company
the rule is different. Both companies deriving their grant from the
same act, the Wisconsin Central is clearly entitled to the land in ques-
tion, without regard to either priority of location or construction. This
rule is well seet!ed. See St. Paul v. Winona R. R. Co. 112 U. S., 720-
727; Sioux City R. R. Co. v. Chicago Ry. Co., 117 U. S., 406-8.
This disposes of the questions in relation to the conflicts described
in your letter of the 10th of February.
But in that letter and the one four days later, it is stated that a large
portion, if not all, of the surplus land within the indemnity limits of
the Omaha grant, about to be restored to the public domain, is " cov-
ered by claims based upon settlements made during the last year or
two, growing out of applications to enter, presented and rejected dur-
ing that period ;" and that, it has also come to your knowledge " the
company had, years ago, disposed of a large amount of these lands,"
the transferees of some of which have been permitted by the local
officers to make proof, and to purchase the same, under the provisions
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of section five o the adjustment act of larch 3, 18S7 (24 Stat., 557);
against some of which purchases protests have been filed by parties
claiming to be settlers.
In your letter of February 14th, you also call attention to the fact
that the departmental instructions, approving the final adjustment of
the Omaha grant and directing te restoration of the surplus land to
the public domain, made no provision for the protection of purchasers
from the company under said section and act; and y ou invite attention
to the conflicts likely to arise between the claims of such purchasers
and those of parties claiming as settlers, subsequent to December 1,
1882, under the second proviso of said section. And in this connection
the question is asked, " does the last proviso of the section include set-
tlements made after the passage of the act, and, if so, might it not
defeat the object of the section entirely ? "
The section and proviso referred to are as follows:
That where any said company shall have sold to citizens of the United States, or to
persons who have declared their intention to become such citizens, as a part of its
grant, lands not conveyed to or for the use of such company, said lands being the
numbered sections prescribed in the grant, and being cotetminous with the con-
structed parts of said road, and where the lands so sold are for any reason excepted
from the operation of the grant to said company, it shall be lawful for the bona fide
purchaser thereof from said company to make payment to the United States for said
lands at the ordinary government price for like lands, and thereupon patents shall
issue therefor to the said bona fide purchaser, his heirs or assigns: Provided, That
all lands shall be excepted from the provisions of this section which at the date of
such sales were in the bona fide occupation of adverse claimants under the pre-eiip-
tion or homestead laws of the United States, and whose clai tis and occupation have
not since been voluntarily abandoned, as to which excepted lands the said pre-emp-
tion and homestead claimants shall be permitted to perfect their proofs and entries
and receive patents therefor: Provided farther, That this section shall not apply to
lands settled upon subsequent to the first day of December, eighteen hundred and
eighty two, by persons claiming to enter the same under the settlement laws of the
United States, as to which lands the parties claiming the same as aforesaid shall be
entitled to prove up and enter as in other like cases.
If the language of this proviso is to be taken literally it would dom-
inate the whole section, and being repugnant to the other provisions
would make the section inconsistent with and destructive of itself. The
purview and scope of the section is, (1) to protect such as were in the
bonafide occupation, under the settlement laws, of lands of the charac-
ter described, at the time the same were sold by the company, and
which occupants, if they have not voluntarily abandoned their claims,
it is expressly declared are to be allowed to perfect proofs and re-
ceive patents; and (2) if there are no such settlers or claimants, then
bona fide purchasers from the company on paying the price to the
government are to receive patents. But the second proviso, if literally
accepted, changes all this, and declares that said section shall not
apply to lands " settled upon " subsequent to December 1, 1882. So
that if, after adjustment of a railroad grant it is found that surplus
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lands are in the occupation of claimants who were there prior to De-
cember, 1882, and had remained continually in possession, their claims
could be defeated by other settlers who might go upon the land after
1882. And the same would be true as to parties who purchase from
the company at a time when there was no other claimant to the land in
question, and who might have extensive improvements thereon. In.
4eed, that proviso, literally taken, would be an invitation to parties
t' settle upon such lands at any time in the future, and thereby defeat
the equities of prior claimants.
I can not bring myself to believe that Congress intended to legislate
to such an end. The proviso here should be treated as in the nature
of a saving clause, restricting in certain cases only the operation of the
more general language of the preceding clauses of the section. In
such a ease "' The true principle undoubtedly is, that the sound inter-
pretation and meaning of the statute, on a view of the enacting clause
and proviso, taken and construed together, is to prevail." 1 Kent Com.
463, note "a." And in the case of the United States v. Dickson, 15
Peters, 141-165, the supreme court say:
We are led to the general rle of law which has always prevailed, and become on-
secraterl almost as a maxim in the interpretation of statutes, that where the enact-
ing clause is general in its laugnage and objects, and a proviso is afterwards intro-
duced, that proviso is construed strictly, and takes no ease oat of the enacting clause
which does not fall fairly within its terms. In short, a proviso carves special ex-
eeptions only out of the enacting clanse, and those who set up any such exception
must establish it as being within the words as well as within the reason thereof.
The whole scope of the act in question is undoubtedly remedial.
" Its intent is to relieve from loss settlers and bona. fide purchasers,
who, through the erroneous or wrongful disposition of the lands in the
grants, by the officers of the government or by the railroads, have lost
their rights or acquired equities which-in justice should be recognized."
-Opinion of Attorney General, 6 L. D., 272.
Applying these rules of construction and keeping in view the scope
of the act, as above stated by the Attorney General, it is my opinion
that said proviso applies only to the case of lands, which at the date
of the passage of the act had been " settled upon " subsequent to De-
cember 1, 1882, by parties claiming in good faith a right to enter the
same under the settlement laws, in ignorance of the rights or equities
of others in the premises. Such parties the law was, in my opinion,
intended to protect: not those who may endeavor at any time after
December 1, 1882, to "jump" the claim of another under pretense of
an intention to enter the same; or who, in violation of the law which
authorizes the placing of lands in railroad limits under reservation, for
the purpose of effectuating the grant, invade the reservation in an effort
to obtain precedence over other and law-abiding citizens. Such in-
vaders can not be regarded as acting in good faith.
In your letter of February 14th it is suggested that a time be fixed
within which purchasers under said act should be required to come for-
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ward, make proof and otherwise comply with the requirements thereof.
I have no doubt of my authority, in the administration of the law,
to make such a requirement, and approve of your suggestion to that
effect.
Accordingly the order heretofore issued on February 12, 1890, di-
recting the restoration of the surplus lands heretofore withdrawn for
indemnity purposes of the Omaha grant, is modified so as to extend the
time when said restoration is to take effect until after ninety days
notice thereof, through advertisement, shall have been previously given
by the district land officers, which advertisement shall also contain a
notice to parties claiming as purchasers under said act, requiring them
to come forward during said period of ninety days, submit their proof,
and make paynent, in pursuance of the requirements of the official cir-
cular of February 13, 1889 (8 L. D., 348-351); and that a failure to sub-
mit proof and payment within the time named would be treated as a,
waiver of claim; all land not so claimed to be subject to entry under
the settlement laws by the first legal applicant at the expiration of the
aforesaid period of ninety days.
In the case of those parties who, you say, have been. allowed by the
local officers to make proof and purchase improvidently, that is, prior
to the "final" adjustment of this grant, they should be notified that
they will be required to give a new notice, under the circular, within
the prescribed period, and if, at the proper time, no adverse claimant
appears, then the proof heretofore submitted, if otherwise correct, may
be accepted. Notice should also be given to those parties who have
made applications to enter any portions of said lands that such appli-
cations, whilst the lands were in a state of reservation, conferred upon
them no right to the lands applied for; that all such applications have
been rejected, and that upon the date mentioned in the notice all the
restored lands will be thrown open to entry without regard to said
applications.
On November 22, 1890, Messrs. E. A. Shores, H. C. Henry and H..
F. Balch filed here a petition, with a number of exhibits, seeking the
interposition of this Department to protect them in certain asserted
rights and protesting against the roposed action of the Department
in throwing open to settlemlent and entry certain lands to which the
petitioners claim a right.
From said petition and papers it appears that an agreement was
made in February, 1884, between the Omaha and the Wisconsin Cen-
tral railroad companies in relation to the overlapping limits of their
respective grants, wherein it was stipulated that "the Central Company
shall have " certain lands, among which are described, in item 2: "' all
that part of the four mile strip outside of the six mile of Omaha, and
within the ten mile limit of the Central Company' grant, and within
township 45, 46 and 47 ranges 4 and 5 west."
It was further stipulated that the Omaha Company was to apply
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to the State for patents to the described lands, and, on obtaining the
same, was to execute and deliver a quit claim deed therefor to Henry
F. Spencer. It is not alleged, nor does it appear that said patents were
issued; but what purports to'be a deed from said company to Spencer
is filed, dated April 15, 1881, and conveying to him the land in question
" in consideration of the sum of one dollar and other valuable considera-
tions." Copies of other deeds are produced conveying said lands from
,Spencer to the petitioners. It is further stated that the Omaha Com-
pany, having constructed its road, earned the lands in question, in-
eluded the same in lists filed in the General Land Office as of its
granted lands; but for some unknown reason said lists were subse-
quently canceled, so that no patent will be issued by the United States
to the Omaha company for said lands, but it is proposed to throw the
same open for settlement and entry. All of which, it is alleged, will
do the petitioners great wrong and injustice; and it is asked that a
patent, in due form of law, may be issued for said lands to the Oinaha
company, or the State of Wisconsin, for its use and benefit, in order to
perfect the record evidence of petitioners' title to the described tracts
sof land.
The "strip" of land above described and claimed to have been par-
ehased, is situated east 6f the branch line of the Omaha company out-
side of the six miles limits of its grant under the act of 1856 but within
the additional four miles limit under the grant of 1864, and is also
within the ten miles limit of the Central company under the last act.
Being thus within the lapping limits of two grants made by the same
act, at the time of the alleged contract between the two companies, it
was evidently supposed that each was entitled to one undivided moiety
-of said lands, and that, as usual, a patent for the whole would be issued
to the State which would make division between the companies. The
contract, then, seems to have been made with a view to promote the
amicable and just division of said lands between the parties entitled;
and in listing the lands within tLhe granted limits, it was proper that
the Omaha company should claim each of the designated sections, of
which it supposed it was entitled to the undivided half, being then
without authority of law to pick, out particular tracts as its one half
of the grant. But when afterwards that grant came before this De-
partment for adjustment, and it was held in effect, as shown in the
eases heretofore cited, that the Wisconsin Central could not go within
fifteen miles of the Omaha road for any lands whatever, because the
lands within those limits were reserved from the Central grant, a diffor.
*ent condition from the ordinary lapping of the granted limits of two
roads under the same grant was presented; and it was held, under
these circumstances, that the Omaha company was only entitled to the
one undivided half of the lands within said granted limits, and that the
other half belonged to the government. Therefore it being impossible
to issue for the benefit of said company a patent for au undivided
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moiety of said lands, or patent to the State for the whole for the joint
benefit of said company and the United States, it became necessary to
reject the former lists, presented by the company, and to require it to
specify particular tracts, which in the aggregate would amount to one
half of the lands within its granted limits so that patents conveying
full title to the same might be issued therefor.
The adjustment has been made on these principles; lists have been
prepared and approved for patent, and the adjustment is practically
closed. It is not perceived there is anything improper in the mode
,adopted, or that any wrong has been done to the petitioners for which,
the government is in any way responsible. If they have thought proper
to purchase lands to which they supposed the company was entitled,
and now find themselves mistaken, the United States is not to blame.
It has administered and adjusted said land grant in accordance with
the law and contract under which it was made, and can not undertake
now to open the same to gratify the views or protect the rights of per-
sons who may see therein a remote or resulting injury to themselves.
However much it might be desired that all parties shtould be protected
and exact justice done, those charged with the adjustment of the grant
are officers of the law, who can not deviate from its rule because obe-
dience thereto may seemingly inflict individual hardships.
Had the Department been aware of the truth of the matters stated
in the petition before the adjustment of the grant, it is hardly probable
that it would have required the Omaha company to list and take patents
for the described land, in order to force it to comply with the spirit of
its contract with the Central company. For the officers of the govern-
ment thus to go outside of their legitimate duties to settle disputes and
enforce contracts between parties to which the United States is in no
way privy, would be'entering upon an undertaking of more vast pro-
portions tan the business of the government itself. The questions and
complications of law and facts incident to such an inquiry would be
endless, ad, as probably the railroad onpany has sold, or contracted
to sell, other lands, more perhaps than it will receive patents for, it the
door is thrown open under the present application doubtless other peti-
tioners would set up like claims with equal or even greater quities,
and the executive department, organized for the administration of the
public laws, would be converted into a tribunal for passing upon, deter-
mining and enforcing private rights.
It may be that these parties are amply protected in their purchases-
by the provisions of the acts of January 13,1881 (21 Stat., 315), or of
March 3, 1887 (24 Stat., 556), if they choose to take the necessary steps
to that end.
But, without expressing an opinion on that subject, which I am not
now called upon to do, I am clear in my convictions that the prayer of
the petitioners should he rejected, which is accordingly done, and of
which you will notify then, and file the )etition which is seat to you
for that purpose.
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RAILROAD GRANT-INDEMNITY-WITEIDRAWAL-SUSPENSION OF PRO-
CEEDINGS.
WISCONSIN CENTRAL R. R. CO. (ON REVIEW).
The lands reserved by executive order for indemnity purposes under the grant of
June 3, 1836, are excluded by express terms from the grant made by section 3, of
the act of May 5, 1864; and the lands so withdrawn and reserved, but not re-
quired as indemnity, do not become subject to the latter grant on the final ad-
j ustment of the former.
Application for suspension of action under the departmental decision of January 24,
1890, pending jadicial proceedings denied.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, December
19, 1890.
On October 15, 1883, your office held for cancellation certain lists of
land presented by the Wisconsin Central Railroad Company and claimed
as part of its granted lands under the act of May 5,186-4 (13 Stat., 66).
From said cancellation the company appealed; and, on January 24,
1890, the action of your office was approved by this Department (10 L.
D., 63). On May 17. 1890, the said company filed here a petition setting
forth that the lands listed as above are valuable for the timber thereon,
are adjacent to, and one tract within the limits of the city of Ashland,
in the State of Wisconsin; that petitioner, relying upon its supposed
title thereto, has sold and conveyed divers portions of said lands; that
petitioner has instituited cases in the United States circuit court for the
western division of Wisconsin aga nst William 0. Forsythe and others,
for the purpose of obtaining a judicial determination of its rights to
the lands in question; that a decision is expected at the June term,
1890, of said court, when it is expected that Mr. Justice Harlan, of the
United States supreme court, will be present and preside. Wherefore,
in view of the complications which may arise, if the lands In question
are thrown open to the public before title to the same shall be settled
and adjudicate(l in the court, the great embarrassment, confusion and
ultimate loss which will occur to parties settling thereon under the land
laws, should the right and title thereto be determined to he in the com-
pany under its grant, it is asked that no action be taken by the Depart-
ment looking o the restoration of said lands to the public domain, and
making them subject to settlement and entry, until said cases or some
of them may be determined, and rights definitely ascertained in respect
to the same.
The lands here referred to are those within the overlapping limits of
the Omaha Railway grant and that of the said Wisconsin Central Com-
pany.
On June 2, 1890, the attorney for the Wisconsin Central filed here a
supplemental petition, setting forth reasons why in its judgment the
lands in question should be awar(le(l to it, and why no action should be
taken under the departmental decision, until the courts shall have
passed upon the issues involved.
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Inasmuch as this last paper sets forth reasons why the lands in ques-
tion should be awarded to the Central Company, after the Department
had decided in 10th L. D., that said lands should not be awarded to
that company, the application, to that extent, is a motion for review;
and not having been filed within the time required by the rules might
be properly disregarded.
One of the reasons urged in favor of the review is, that it having
been announced in 10 L. D., 147, that the Omaha grant had been
fitially adjusted and fully satisfied, and that surplus lands were left
after said adjustment and satisfaction, the grant of 1864 in favor of the
Central Company is now clearly operative upon said surplus lands, and
in fact has been all the time, to the extent that they might not be
required to satisfy the claims of the Omaha Company.
The case of the Wisconsin Central Railroad Company v. Forsythe,
before referred to, was tried at the June term of the United States cir-
cuit court for the western district of Wisconsin, but has not yet
been reported. On September 15, 1890, Mr. Justice Harlan delivered
the opinion in that case, which was, in effect, an appeal to the court
from the previous decisions of this Department in respect to the Omaha
grants and the grant to this company and their relations to each other.
In an exhaustive opinion, the whole subject, in all its aspects, was dis-
cussed, the departmental decisions quoted. and the views therein ex-
pressed were concurred in. The point here presented, as to the right
of the Central Company to the surplus lands, after the satisfaction of
the Omaha grant, was pressed in that case and was fully answered by
Justice Harlan, in his opinion, a copy of which is now before me, as
follows:
Another contention upon the part of the plaintiff is that, even conceding that the
lands in dispute were reserved by virtue of their being withdrawn prior to 1864 for
indemnity purposes, yet as the object for which the withdrawal was made, namely,
to supply deficiencies in the place limits of the Bayfield road, were fully satisfied
(before the defendant made his entry), by the final adjustment of the land grant for
the Omaha road, the lands, so withdrawn, would be affected by the granting clause
in the third section of the act, and so become and be the property of the Central
Company under that section. This view is in opposition to many adjudged case>.
Whatever force it might have in the case of two contemporaneous grants to different
companies, covering the same land, in neither of which an exception was made of
lands " reserved to the United States," it can have no application where, as in the
present case, the statute expressly reserves and excludes from its operation any and
all lands so reserved. If these lands were reserved when the act of 1864 was passed,
they certainly were not granted by the third section of that act to the Central road
and could not get inio the grant to, and become the property of the Central Com-
pany, by reason simply of their not being required for the adjustment of a different
grant made for another road. This view is illustrated by several cases.
And the cases of Kansas Pacific Railroad v. Dunmeyer 113 U. S., t629,
Bullard v. Des Hoines R. R., 122 U. S., 167-176, and Hastings, and I)a-
kota Ry. v. Whitney, 132 U. S., 357, were quoted in support.
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After discussing another question, the opinion continues:
It was stated at the bar that the decision of this case and two other cases in eject-
ment, tried at the same time and depending upon the same facts, would indirectly
affect the title to large tracts of land, i the same situation as the particular lands
here in dispute, d which have been heretofore sold in good faith, by the Central
Company, to bona fide purchasers in the belief that they were embraced in the grant
in the third section of the act of May 5, 1864, and not excluded from the operation of
that act by the sixth section relating tolands reserved to the United States; and that
a decision in favor of the defendant in the present case would produce great con-
fusion and trouble among such purchasers. In view of this statement the court has
felt it to be its duty to embody in this opinion all the material facts shown in evi-
dence, and to state fully the grounds upon which its conclusion rests. That con-
elusion is:
That the lands in dispute were not granted by the United States for the benefit of
the road mentioned in the third section of the act of May 5, 1864, and that the grant
for the benefit of the railroad beginning at a point on the line from the St. Croix
River or Lake to the west end of Lake Superior, and extending to Bayfield, de-
scribed in the first section of that act, having been fully adjusted by the United
States with the only company that was entitled to the benefit of such last named
grant, the lands in dispute became part of the public domain, in virtue of the orders
bubsequently made by the Secretary of the Interior, and were thereafter opened to
entry under the homestead and pre-emption laws of the United States.
In view of this clear exposition of the law by so eminent a jurist,
and my own convictions, I am not persuaded by the theory of counsel
to reverse the former decisions of the Department in this case.
That portion of the application which asks that the lands in question
be retained in reservation until the final adjudication, by the courts,
of the claims and pretensions of the Central Company, raises a ques-
tioI of administrative policy; upon the full coisideration whereof, I
am not disposed to accede to the request made.
The matter of the rights of the (maha and Central Companies under
their respective grants, ant their relations to each other, has been the
sub~ject of consideration and reconsideration by this Department for a
number of years. My predecessor, Secretary, now Mr. Justice, Lamar
gave theta a most careful examination, as will be seen by his opinions
in 6 L. D., 190, and 195. My own decision in 10 L. D., 63, was made
after a careful review of the whole subject, and I have no doubt about
its correctness; and it is now re-inforced by that of so eminent a jurist
as Mr. Justice Harlan. Under these circumstances, I am impressed
with the belief that it would be unwise, if not a grave dereliction of
duty, to interfere with the regular course of administratimin by retain-
ing in reservation, for an indefinite period, some 200,000 acres of land,
which my predecessor, myself, and Mr. Justice Harlan have held to be
public lands, and ought to be thrown open to settlement and entry; If
such action should be taken in the present instance, it is not seen how
it could well be refused, where any claim is set up to a tract of land.
Any one, claiming rights as a settler or entryman, which have been
passed upon adversely by this Department, would have a right to ex-
pect that the particular tract claimed by him should be held in reser-
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vation until he had his rights finally adjudicated by the supreme court
of the United States.
The application of the Central Company is denied, of which you will
inform it; anl the papers relating thereto are herewith sent you.
PRACTICE-REaEARING-NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.
MCKINNIS V. STATE OF OREGON.
An application for rehearing on the ground of newly discovered evidence shotil be
supported by the affidavits of the persons by whom the applicant expects to
prove the alleged additional facts.
A rehearing will not be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence where
due diligence is not shown in aking known the alleged discovery and taking
action thereon.
The failure of the applicant's attorney to properly conduct the case does not furnish
ground for a rehearing.
Where the local office, the General Land Office, and the Department, concnr in a find-
ing of fact, and that fact is the only issue in the case, a very strong and clear
showing is required to justify a reversal of said decisions on review.
- I
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Oce, December
20, 1820.
Charles McKinnis has filed a motion for review of departmental de-
cision of March 31, 1890, in the case of said McKinuis v. The State of
Oregon, involving the E. of the SW. of Sec. 8, and the F. of the
NW. of Sec. 17, T. 41 S., R. 25 E. Willamnette Meridian, Lakeview
land district, Oregon.
The sole question in issue is whether the tract in question is swamp-
land within the meaning and intent of the acts of September 28, 1850 (9
Stat., 519) and March 12, 1860 (12 Stat., 3).
McKinnis offered his declaratory statement June 23, 1885, but it was
refused by the local officers because the tract therein described had pre-
viously (January 6, 1-883,) been included in a list of selections of swamp
lands filed by said State. McKinnis thereupon filed affidavit of contest;
a hearing was had; and on the evidence adduced the local officers
decided (August 13, 1886,) that the tract was swamp-land. McKinnis.
appealed to your office, which (January 2, 1889,) affirmed the decision
of the local officers. He then appealed to the Department, which, after
a careful examination of the voluminous testimony taken atthe hearing,
on March 31, 1890 (supra), affirmed the decision of your office.
The sole ground of review is that of newly discovered evidence.
Accompanying the application are a number of affidavits embodying
said evidence-sworn to by Woodson Garrard, Thomas Wheeler, David
Lodge, Peter Peterson, R. C. Clark, and Filander Bonnom.
Besides those above named, the applicant refers to P. . Dolan and
Henry Coleman, as persons whose residence he has but recently dis-
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covered, and who would, if a re-hearing were allowed, testify to the
effect that the land is not swamp in character.
An affidavit of an applicant as to what some witness would testify if
called upon, does not furnish sufficient ground for review. In view of'
the rule that "such affidavits after judgment, are to be received with
great caution, for the reason that they are apt to encourage fraud 2
(Caledonia Mining Company v. Rowen, 2 L. D., 720; Thorpe v. McWil-
liams, 3 L. D., 344), far less weight should be given where no affidavits are
filed trom the parties whose testimony is relied upon to reverse the (ecis-
ion, the only affidavit being that of the applicant, alleging what they
would testify if called upon. The motion and affidavit of an applicant
must be " supported by the affidavits of the persons by whom he expects
to prove the same " (Swanson v. Anderson, on review, December27. 1889-
not reported). "A statement of what an applicant expects to be able
to prove is no ground for review " (Cobby v. Fox, 10 L. D., 483). This
disposes of so much of applicant's motion as refers to said Dolan and
Coleman.
The applicant in his affidavit states:
That 'he had no knowledge that he could prove the facts he now expects to prove
by said Thomas Wheeler until on or about the 23d of Septemtber, IS,6; that he had
no knowledge that lie could prove the facts he now expects to prove by P. H. DolaD
until on or about the first day of October, 1856; that he had no knovledge that he
could prove the facts that he now expects to prove bv Henry Coleman until ol or-
about the 10th day of May, 1887; that he had no knowledge that he could prove the-
facts he now expects to prove by R. C. Clark until Septemlber 2S, 1890; that he had
no knowledge that he could prove the facts he how expects to prove by Filandler
Bonnorn until the first day of October, 1890.
ff The above showing does not indicate "due diligence" in miaking-
known to your office or to the Department the facts which he now
acknowledges he knew on or before the first day of October, 1887. Be-
tween that date and March 31, 1890-the date of the departmental
decision complained of-he allowed two and a half years to elapse, and
not until after said decision against him was rendered did he give any
intimation that he had in reserve valuable evidence having a bearing
on his case. Such evidence can not now be considered as " newly dis-
covered evidence." To grant a rehearing upon the basis of such evi-
dence would encourage the trial of cases by piecemeal, and allow a
party to keep back his most conclusive proof for an emergency-a course
which would be unjust to the opposing party, and a practice not toler-
ated in courts of law.
McKinnis alleges that at least a portion of the evidence herein re-
ferred to would have been offered at the hearing, or placed before the
Department at an earlier date, but for the failure of his counsel to per-
form his duty; *' that his counsel in Oregon has seemingly retarded his.
case, and obstructed rather than aided and assisted him in getting the
case before the Department in due time and proper form." But the fact
" that applicant's attorney did not conduct the case as skilfully as it.
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might have been conlucted affords no ground for review or rehearing"
(Cobby v. Fox, 10 L. D., 483).
There remain, as proper to be considered by the Department in con.
nection with the motion for review in the case at bar, only the affida-
vits of R. C. Clark and Filander Bonnom.
X. C. Clark in his affidavit states:
That I am acquainted with Coleman Valley, Oregon; that I was there in 1863;
..... that the country through which I passed at that time was as dry then as it
has been the past seven or eight years; and that the vegetation growing upon Cole-
man Valley in 1863 was mech larger than at the present time, said vegetation at that
time being rabbit-brush, grease-wood, rye-grass, and some native grasses suitable for
pasture or hay; that from my knowledge and observation of Coleman Valley, and of
lands in general in its vicinity, I am able to judge with reasonable certainty that
the lands in contest were no more swampy on March 12, 1860, than in 1863, when I
saw them first.
Filander Bonnom in his affidavit states:
That he knew the land in Sees. 8 and 17. T. 41 S., R. 25 E., W. H., Oregon (more
.commonly known as Coleman Valley, Oregonrj,)in the month of Jne, lSd3; at that
time the vegetation growing on a greater portion of the land was rye-grass, sage-
brush, and grease-wood; that willows were growing in benches along the creek; also
a strip of meadow-land from one to two hundred yards in width adjoined the creek;
that the land looked as if it needed irrigation rather than reclamation; that he saw
nothing to indicate that the land was swamp or overflowed; that ithad more the ap-
pearance of being of a desert character than that of a swamp; that from his personal
knowledge and observation of the land in 1663, it could not have been swamp on
March 12, 1860. He further states that he has recently seen the said land, and that
it is of the character above described.
Counsel for McKinnis contend that the foregoing is newly discovered
evidence, and that it is not cumulative evidence, because it reaches
back to an earlier date than that of any witness examined at the hear-
ing; and that "if proof is made at a rehearing, as stated in said affi-
davitsit willconclusively overcome all testimony heretofore offered tend-
ing to prove the contrary. The condition of the land at a date
nearest to the date of the grant is presumed to be its condition at the
date of the grant." In support of this position they quote from the de-
partmental decision of April 9, 1885, in the case of the State of Oregon
(3 L. D., 476, last paragraph), and that of Millard v. State of Oregon (5
-C. L. 0., 179). In view of said decisions it is contended that, in the case
at bar, the testimony of Clark and Bonnom ought to be held as over-
-coming that of the witnesses for the State introduced at the hearing
already had; hence, that a new hearing should be had, at which said
'Clark and Bonnom should be afforded an opportunity to testify.
A careful perusal of the affidavits hereinbefore quoted shows that,
so far as appears, the said Bonnom was on the land but once until ' re-
cently," to wit, " in the month of June, 1863; " and that the said Clarke
was on the land but once, to wit, as he passed through the country "in
1863," not specifying the month.
The field-notes of survey shed no light on the character of the land,
'further than that the land is "subject to annual inundation."1
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Where the local officers, your office, and the Department, have all
concurred in a finding as to a given fact, and that fact the only issue
in the case from the beginning, a very strong and clear showing is in-
dispensable before such a uniform line of decisions will be reversed-
the more so when such reversal would involve a violation of established
precedents in similar cases which have previously, after full and care-
ful consideration, been decided by the Department (Boyd v. Oregon, 10
L. D., 315).
Even conceding that, in case another hearing were had, said Clark
and Bonnom were to testify as set forth in their affidavits, in my opin-
ion it would not, in connection with the testimony adduced at the hear-
ing already had, be sufficient to warrant a reversal of the departmental
decision a review of which is now sought.
The application for a rehearing is therefore denied.
PR1ACTICE-APPEAL-NOTICE.
HORACE H. BARNES.
An appeal from the rejection of an aiiplication to enter will not be entertained, in-
the absence of notice to an adverse claimant of record.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the Generd
Land Office, December 20, 1890.
Your letter of November 8, 1889, transmitted to this Department
the appeal of Horace H. Barnes from your ruling of August 17, 1889,
affirming the action of the local officers in rejecting his application to
make timber culture entry (not homestead entry as stated in your de-
cision) for the NE. 1 Sec. 7, T. 1 N., R. 48 W., Denver, Colorado land
district.
On June 8, 1889, Barnes made application to make timber culture
entry for this land and the same was rejected by the local officers " for-
the reason that said tract is covered by the timber culture entry of
John A. Burrows No. 2808 made July 21, 1885," from which ruling
Barnes appealed to your office and on August 17, 1889, you sustained
said action and from this ruling of your office he appealed to this De-
partment.
It appears that on July 21, 1885, one John A. Burrows made timber
culture entry for this tract, the affidavits, including the non-mineral,
being insufficient, his entry was held for cancellation, and on August
25, 1887, he filed supplemental timber culture and non-mineral affida-
vits, also an explanatory sworn statement in which he sets forth among
other matters that when he made the entry he was ignorant of the law;.
that he had not seen the land, but had been advised that the non-
mineral affidavit could be based on information and belief, etc., and he
asked to substitute the said affidavits for the original, and that his.
entry be allowed to stand, as a valid entry.
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On April 28, 1888, your office passed upon the case thus presented
and said: "After a careful consideration of all the papers presented I
can not think that Burrows made this entry in good faith and the entry
is therefore held for cancellation, subject to appeal within the usual
time."
No appeal was taken from this decision and on Jne 17, 1889, in re-
ply to your office inquiry the local officers informed your office that
"the party was duly notified, bat has failed to appeal from said de-
cision."
On June 8, 1889, the appellant Barnes, made application to make
timber culture entry for said laud and the same was rejected as herein
before stated, from which he appealed to your office, on July 12, 1889.
On July 6, 1889, your office sent to the register and receiver at Den-
ver land office a letter in which you refer to their letter of August 25,
1887, transmitting Burrows' supplemental affidavits, also to your office
letter of April 28, 1888, in which you held his entry for cancellation,
also to their letter of June 17, 1889, notifying your office that he had
not appealed, and proceeding, you refer to the decision of the Depart-
ment in the case of Griffith W. McMillan (8 L. D. 478) and conclude by
saying: " In view of this decision I have decided to change the former
action of this office and allow the entry of Burrows to remain intact on
the record."
On August 17, 1889, your letter to the local officers at Denver land
office, acknowledged the receipt of their letter transmitting the appeal
of Barnes from their rejection of his application to make timber culture
entry for the land, and you affirmed their action because the records of
your office showed the entry of Barrows to be intact, from which Barnes
appealed to this Department. This is the case as it appears of record.
This statement of facts shows that Burrows is, by reason of his sub-
sisting entry, a claimant of record for the land involved and as such is
entitled to notice of the appeal herein. Such notice not having been
served on him, this Department will not, under the circumstances, con-
sider the appeal. If Burrows' entry ought to be canceled that end may
be attained by a proper procedure on the part of Barnes or any other
interested party.
The appeal of Barnes, for the reasons set forth, is dismissed.
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PRACTICE TRANSFEREE-REVIEW.
.JAMES ROSS.
If the showing made by the transferee would not entitle the entry man to be heard on
review, the application therefor, o behalf of the transferee, must be denied.
Motions for review must be accompanied by a affidavit of the party, or his attorney,
that the motion is made in good faith, and not for the purpose of delay.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner qf the General Land Office, December
201, 1890.
I have before me a motion for review of te departmental decision
dated May 19, 1890. in the case of Janmes Ross, involving the commuted
homestead entry of said Ross for the NE. I of Sec. 12, T. 135 N., R. 51
W., Fargo, Dakota.
On the 2nd day of August, 1886, your office rejected loss' commutation
final proof for the tract and held his homestead entry for cancellation
from which he appealed, and on the 4th day of August, 1888, the De-
partment found, that " the facts presented by the final proof not only
fail to show that the claimant ever in good faith established a residence
on this land, but when taken in connection with his total abandonment
of the land on the same day he received final certificate therefor, con-
vince me that he was acting in bad faith in this matter, and was en-
deavoring to obtain title to this tract of land without complying with
the requirements of law," and thereupon affirmed said decision of your
office.
A motion for review and reconsideration of said departmental decis-
ion was filed by Ross and on the 12th day of February, 1890, upon full
consideration was denied.
Upon receipt of said decision by Ross' attorneys they, as the attor-
neys for "The Colonial and United States Mortgage Company, Limited,"
of London, England, transferee of said James Ross, applied to your office
for the issuance of an order for new publication and submission of new
proof by said transferee. This application your office refused on the
ground that as a final decision had been rendered by the Department,
and the case closed, your office had no jurisdiction in the premises.
Thereupon said attorneys applied for a writ of certiorari on the
ground that the several decisions hereinbefore referred to against the.
entryman have " no bearing whatever as to the rights of the transferee,
who has never been heard nor had his day in court," which application
was upon full consideration denied on the 19th day of February, 1890.
October 2, 1890, the same attorneys filed the motion for review of said
decision of February 19, 1890.
There is but a single question presented by the motion under consid-
eration which is stated by the attorneys representing the motion, to
be: "Did not the company by virtue of the mortgage given by Ross
to them, acquire some interest in the premises ?" This question was
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passed upon in the opinion sought to be reviewed, at least so far as the
same is material. That a transferee or mortgagee is injured by the de-
cision is no ground for review, as his rights are in no sense other or
different from those of the entryman. A. A. Joline (5 L. D., 589); Chas,
W. McKallor (9 L. D., 580).
If the showing made by the transferee would not entitle the entry-
man to be heard on review, the application [Hust be denied. The entry-
man appeared and hotly contested every point therein, and nothing
could be gained by going over the same ground at the instance of the
transferee.
The motion under consideration does not conform to the Rules of
Practice. Rule 78, requires that: Motions for rehearing and review
must be accompanied by an affidavit of the party, or his attorney, that
the motion is made in good faith and not for the purpose of delay."
While there is such a statement as Rule 78 requires attached to the
motion, there is no evidence of it having been sworn to. In view of
the foregoing the motion is denied.
APPLICATION FOR REPAYMENT-WAIVER OF APPEAL.
UNICORN PLACER.
An appeal from a decision holding an entry for cancellation is waived by a subse-
quent application for the repayment of the parchase money.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Comnissioner of the General
Land Office, December 23, 1890.
Your letter of December 2, 1889, transmitted the appeal of Theodore
F. Van Wagenen, trustee, etc., in the matter of the Unicorn placer
claim (mineral entry No. 2881), from your decision holding for cancel-
lation said mineral entry for the Unicorn placer claim, embracing the
S.ofS.hofNE.ofSE. theN. I of S. j of SE.J, the N.4S. SW.j
of SE. the S. W of NW. i of SE. 4t, the NE. 1 of SW. the S. of
SW. of NW. , and the N. of NW. j of SW. i of Sec. 35, T. 11 S.,
R. 80 W., 6th P. M., Leadville, Colorado land district.
Your letter of August 11, 1890, transmitted an application by the
Twin Lakes Hydraulic Gold Mining Syndicate, for repayment of the
purchase money paid on this entry, and on entry No. 2802, the Capri-
corn placer claim, decided by this Department June 7, 1890 (10 L. D.,
611), and on entry No. 2883, the Ritchie Patch placer claim. The latter
two, like this, having been made by said Van Wagenen.
It is claimed by Van Wagenen that he is the trustee for the Twin
Lakes Hydraulic Gold Mining Sydicate. a corporation, but it was held
in the case of Capricorn placer claim supra, that " The trustee in this
case as disclosed by the record is merely the agent, for a special pur-
pose, of an alien corporation." The same is true of the trusteeship in
the case at bar, and the action of the principal (the corporation) in ap-
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plying for a repayment of the purchase money is in effect an abandon-
ment or waiver of the appeal of the agent (trustee) it being really the
appeal of the corporation, and the appeal herein is therefore dismissed.
See Michael Shannon (9 IL. D., 643).
The application for repayment not having been considered by your
office, because of the pendency of two of the cases in this Department,
is returned to your office for your consideration.
RAILROAD LANDS-FORFEITURE ACT OF SEPTEMBER 29, 1890.
INSTRUCTIONS.
The language in section 2 of said act authorizing " a second homestead entry " refers
only to those persons who had theretofore made a homestead entry but failed
from any cause to perfect the same. The object of such provision being to allow
any one qualified, who had not theretofore secured a piece of land under the
homestead law, to obtain a tract of the forfeited land under said law, and at the
same time to take said land out of the operation of the pre-emption law.
In establishing the terminals separating the graDted lands from those forfeited on the
main line of the Northern Pacific between Wallula and Portland the lines should
be run at right angles to the general course of the last twenty-five miles of the
toad.
Under the provisions of section , of said act the Northern Pacific Company should
be called upon to elect as to the alternate odd numbered sections it will take in
satisfaction of the moiety for its constructed branch line where the limits of such
line overlap the limits of the forfeited main line, and thb remaining odd sections
be restored to the public domain.
The Gulf and Ship Island road should be called upon to indicate the exact point
where its line will cross the New Orleans and Northeastern road.
Directions given for a rule on certain companies to show cause why the indemnity
withdrawals made for their benefit should not be revoked.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, December
24, 1890.
By letter of October 28, 1890, you submitted for my approval a draft
of a circular letter of instructions under the forfeiture act of September
29, 1890 (26 Stat., 496).
Section 1 declares a general forfeiture of granted lands opposite the
unconstructed portions of land-grant railroads.
Section 2, of said act provides:
That all persons who, at the date of the passage of this act, are actual settlers in
good faith on any of the lands hereby forfeited and are otherwise qualified, on mak-
ing due claim on said lands under the homestead law within six months after the
passage of this act, shall be entitled to a preference right to enter the same under the
provisions of the homestead law and this act, and shall be regarded as such actual
settlers from the date of actual settlement or occupation; and any person who has
not heretofore had the benefit of the homestead or pre-emption law, or who has failed
from any cause to perfect the title to a tract of land heretofore entered by him under
either of said laws, may make a second homestead entry under the provisions of this
act.
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You state that a strict construction of this language would exclude
from the privilege of a, second homestead entry granted by this section,
any person who had perfected title to land under either the homestead
or pre-emption law, and would confer the privilege only upon those who
had made an entry under either law, and failed from any cause to per-
fect title to the same, but that this construction is repugnant to the idea
of a second homestead entry, "' for unless the settler had heretofore
made a homestead entry, the necessity for the privilege of a second
homestead entry does not arise." You then express the belief that
" the intention of this act is to permit a second entry where the party
has not heretofore perfected title under both homestead and pre-emp-
tion laws, thus to permit him to acquire, in the aggregate three hun.
dred and twenty acres under both of said laws."
It is clear that the first clause of the section allows the actual settler,
if qualified, to make a homestead entry of the tract upon which he has
made settlement, and this as a preference right to be exercised within
six months after the passage of the act, While the language of the
second clause is somewhat ambiguous, I have concluded that the lan-
guage authorizing "4 a second homestead entry " refers only to those per-
sons who had theretofore made a homestead entry but failed from any
cause to perfect the same. The object is to allow any one qualified who
had not theretofore secured a piece of land under the homestead law to
obtain a tract of these forfeited lands under that law, and at the same
time to take these lands out of the operation of the pre-emption law.
I suggest that the circular instructions under the third section of the
act be in the words of the act itself, with the addition of the instruc-
tions now in the circular as to the provisos to said section.
By the first section of the act the grant to the Northern Pacific rail-
road company appertaining to the main line between Wallula, Wash-
ington, and Portland, Oregon, is forfeited.
This renders it necessary to establish terminals separating the granted
lands from those forfeited, at these points.
On Augnst 13, 1885, the question of fixing the terminal limit at Wal-
lula was considered by the Department (5 L. D., 459), and it was held
that the line should be run at right angles to the general course of the
last section (of twenty-five miles) of the road.
By the fourth section of the grant for said company it is enacted:
That whenever said Northern Pacific Railroad Company shall have twenty-five
consecutive miles of any portion of said railroad and telegraph line ready for the serv-
ice contemplated, the President of the United States shall appoint three commissioners
to examine the same, and if it shall appear that twenty-five consecutive miles of said
road and telegraph line have been completed, in a good, substantial and workmanlike
manner, as in all other respects required by this act, the Commissioners shall so re-
port to the President of the United States; and patents of land as aforesaid shall b
issued to said company, confirming to said company the right and title to said lands,
situated opposite and coterminous with said completed, section of said road. .
And so, from time to time, whenever twenty-five additional consecutive miles
shall have been constructed. (13 Stat., 367).
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Referring to these provisions the Secretary in his decision of 1885
said:
From these provisions as the railroad company completed each consecutive twenty -
five miles of road, upon report of the commissioners, the grant must be confirmed by
patents for the land on each side of the road corresponding with the section of the
road completed. If it is to be confirmed by patent, as each twenty-five miles is con-
structed, a determination of boundary must precede the patent, the presumption
would arise that either at or before the time the inspection was made, the law con-
templated that the terminal limit of the twenty-five miles inspected was to be fixed.
By the provisions of the grant, such inspection would fix the terminal limit of land
to be patented and thus, for purposes of patenting, the road as constructed, would
be divided in patenting sections of twenty-five miles each, the boundary of each of
such sections fixed at or before the time of inspection.
The grant then having divided the road into sections of twenty-five miles for put-
poses of boundary and patenting, in fixing the boundary of this last section by the
provisions of the grant alone, (excluding all extraneous facts,) as the courses of the
road are various, some general course must be adopted from which to fix the terminal
line.
The subject of the course to be fixed was considered in a decision rendered by Sec-
retary Thompson, on the 23d of February, 1858, reported in 1st Lester, page 527, also
in the case of the Flint and Pere Marquette Railroad, by Secretary Kirkwood, on
September 1, 1881 (1 L. D., 394); and also was incidentally discussed by the supreme
court of the United States in the case of the United States v. Burlington and Mis-
souri River Railroad, ( Otto, 334). The substance of the rulings in the several cases
is: " The land is taken along such line in the sense of the statute, when taken along
the general direction or course of the said road within lines perpendicular to it at
each end."
Then if this rule is to be applied (as it has been already shown, only the last twenty-
five miles of the road under the terms of the present grant can be considered) the
terminal line should be run at right angles to the general coarse of the last twenty-
five miles of the road.
Under this decision it is clear that the Department held the company
to be entitled to patents for the road then constructed, down to the
line so established and no farther. Assuming this conclusion to be cor-
rect, (and the forfeiture act in no way interferes with it) there is no
reason now presented for changing the same. On the contrary the
terms of the forfeiture act are in line with that decision. Said section
four of the granting act, supra, directed patents to issue for lands
4 opposite to and coterminous with said completed section of said road;
. . . . and so on as fast as every twenty-five miles Of said
road is completed as aforesaid:" the first section of the forfeiture act
restores to the United States the title to " all lands heretofore granted
to any State or to any corporation to aid in the construction of a rail-
road opposite to and coternsinous with the portion of any such railroad
not now completed." If the line fixed in 1885 separated the lands then
earned by the company, by the construction of the road, from those not
so earned, it does so now, as no more road has since been built. In
other words that line divides the lands ", opposite to and coterminous
with" the portion not constructed, from those earned by the constructed
road. The line of 1885, will, therefore, be adhered to.
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The same principles apply to the line at Portland.
Section 6 of the act provides:
Nor shall the moiety of the lands granted to any railroad company on account of a
main and a branch line appertaining to uncompleted road, and hereby forfeited,
within the conflicting limits of the grants for such main and branch lines, when but
one of such lines has been completed, inure by virture of the forfeiture hereby de-
clared to the benefit of the completed line.
You state that " the grant appertaining to the main line of the North-
ern Pacific Railroad, forfeited by this act, is overlapped by the limits
adjusted upon the constructed branch line of said road, and as to such
overlap the grant is of a moiety on account of each line; that the map
of general route of the main line opposite said conflict was filed and a
legislative withdrawal made thereon prior to the location of the branch
line and that the withdrawal continued in force at the date of the pas-
sage of the forfeiture act. You conclude that within the conflict "every
alternate odd-numbered section" should be reserved for the branch
line, and the remaining odd sections restored to the public domain under
said section 6, and suggest that the company be called upon to elect
which of such alternate odd-numbered sections it will take in satisfaction
of the moiety for its branch line. All of this meets with my approval.
The company urges that as the main line had not been definitely
located, between Wallula and Portland, the lands within the with-
drawal on general route for that distance cannot be treated as granted
lands, and are therefore not subject to said provisions as to moiety
lands within the overlapping limits.
This contention cannot be sustained. In the first place there was a
grant along said route, which lacked only action on the part of the com-
pany to consummate. Furthermore, a reading of the entire act leaves
no room to doubt that a forfeiture along said stretch of the main line
was contemplated, and the lands so forfeited are described in the first
section of the act as " granted " lands. If this be not true, there has
been no forfeiture at all on that part of the line, a conclusion which
even the company does not maintain. It is equally apparent that the
word " granted" in said section 6, is used in the same sense as in sec-
tion 1, and, therefore, refers to the lands upon which the forfeiture oper-
ates. These are the lands withdrawn along said line.
You will, accordingly, notify the company to indicate within thirty
days from notice what alternate odd-numbered sections it will elect to
take. If the company elect to take sections 1, 5, 9, 13, etc., of the
Various townships then sections 3, 7, 11, 15, etc., will remain to the
government and be restored to the public domain or vice versa. Should
the company fail to make its election within said time then your office
will act in that capacity in its stead.
Section 7, provides that upon certain conditions the forfeiture shall
Dot operate for one year as to so much of the grant for the Gulf and
Ship Island Railroad as lies south of a line drawn east and west through
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the point where said road may cross the New Orleans and Northeastern
Railroad in the State of Mississippi. It appears from inquiries made
by your office that the former road will not cross the latter at the point
indicated by the map of definite location. You accordingly request in-
structions " as to where the terminal shall be established in order to
separate the lands upon which the act operates immediately from those
saved from forfeiture for one year." I suggest that you direct said coin -
pany to notify you, within thirty days, of the exact point at which the
line will cross the New Orleans road.
After the submission of said circular, by letter of November 7,1890,
you submitted an opinion in reference to the operation of section 8, of
said act upon the grant for the Mobile and Girard railroad in Alabama.
Inasmuch as the questions therein involved are peculiar, I suggest that
the instructions under said section be omitted from the circular and I
will communicate with you later on the subject.
You state that section 4, of the act repeals certain sections in acts
making grants to aid in the constriction of certain railroads, in so far
as said sections require the Secretary of the Interior to reserve lands
within the indemnity limits of such grants, and recommend the formal
restoration of any such lands now remaining withdrawn.
On August 13, and 15, 1887, the lands within indemnity limits of
most of the land grant roads wqre restored to the public domain. (6
L. D., 84 and 92). Certain exceptions, however, were made of roads to
which you now refer. See 6 L. D., 328, and 456. To the end sug-
gested by you, you will notify each of said companies to show cause
within thirty days why the withdrawal of indemnity lands made for its
benefit, should not now be revoked and the lands therein embraced re-
stored to settlement. This practice is in accord with that in the former
restoration.
Otherwise than as herein indicated the proposed circular will meet
my approval. Herewith are returned the papers.
RAILROAD LANDE-ACT OF MARCH 3. 1887.
NICHOLAS COCHEMS.
An application to parchase under section 5, act of March 3, 1887, made by one claim-
ing under a grantee of a railroad company, can not be entertained until it has
been finally determined that the land in question is in fact excepted from the
grant.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, December
27, 1890.
I have considered the appeal of Nicholas Cochems from the decisions
of your office of March 1, 1889, and June 24, 1889, refusing his applica-
tion to purchase under the act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat., 556), Sec. 33,
T. 8 N., R. 14 W., S. B. M. Los Angeles California land district.
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The second decision was made solely because of an error in the first
in the description of the land.
Cochems as the purchaser from the grantee of the Southern Pacific
Railroad Company of this land, which it is stated by you falls within
the granted limits of the grant to said company by act of March 3, 1871
(16 Stat., 573), and is also within the indemnity limits of the grant to
the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company by act of July 27, 1866 (14
Stat., 292), asks to be allowed to purchase this land from the United
States under the provisions of the fifth section of said act of March 3,
1887. This application was refused by your office on the grounds that
it has not yet been finally determined that lands situated as this tract
is, were excepted from the grant to the company under which Cochems
claims. By decision of this Department of June 23, 1888, (6 L. D., 816)
lands of this class were continued in reservation " pending adjudication
by the courts, or until such time as the Department may deem it proper
to remove the reservation." No further action has been taken by this
Department nor has the question involved been finally determined by
the courts. Under these circumstances the application to purchase can
not be allowed and the decision refusing the same is affirmed.
This action will not prevent the favorable consideration hereafter of
an application, if it shall be determined that said land was excepted
from the said grant and a proper showing to bring the applicant within
the provisions of said act of March 3, 1887, shall be made.
PRACTICE-APPE AL-JTURISDICTION.
VANN V. WOOD.
The validity of the appeal from the local office will not be considered by the Depart-
ment, where the case is submitted on its merits to the General Land Office, and
without objection to its jurisdiction.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 27, 1890.
I have considered the case of Perry C. Vann v. Robert Wood on ap.
peal by the former from your decision of June 1, 1889, dismissing his
contest against the homestead entry of the latter for the N. t of SE. i
and SE. I of NE. i Sec. 1A, T. 16 S., R. 2 W., Montgomery, Alabama.
The first error assigned by appellant is that the appeal to your office
from the decision of the local officers, was made by one Samuel Thomp-
son, attorney, who being a United States commissioner, was debarred
from practicing before the Land Department. This objection, however
valid when properly taken, was not made before your office when the
case was there pending, but the attorneys appeared of record and filed
an argument on the merits of their case and closed by saying: " Where-
fore . . . . appellee prays the Hon. Commissioner of the General
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Land Office to affirm the decision of the register and receiver and that
said entry of Robert Wood be held for cancellation."
There was no motion filed to dismiss the appeal, nor question made
as to your jurisdiction, and counsel having taken their chances and in-
voked your judgment on the merits of the case, will not be heard to
complain, now that they have lost, that there was no proper or valid
appeal. Your jurisdiction did not depend upon the validity of the ap-
peal, as the manifest error of law by the local officers, would have given
your office authority under the 2d paragraph of Rule No. 48 Rules of
Practice, to consider and determine the case, in regular course of busi-
ness, even if no appeal had been taken.
Your decision states the record and testimony fairly and substantially,
and having carefully reviewed the record, I do not find any reason for
disturbing your decision, and the same is accordingly affirmed.
RESIDENCE-LEAVE OF ABSENCE-ACT OF MARCH 2, 1889.
HARRY C. SEWARD.
The leave of absence accorded to settlers under section 3 of the act of March 2, 1889,
can only be allowed on a duly corroborated showing that such absence is made
necessary by sickness, failure of crops, or other unavoidable casualty.
First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, December 29, 1890.
On April 29, 1889, Harry C. Seward filed an application for leave of
absence under the provisions of the act of March 2, 1889.
May 2, 1889, the local office rejected his application for the reason
that he failed to show that by reason of unavoidable casualty he had
been unable to secure a support upon his claim, and also that the cor-
roborating affidavits were not shown to have been made by disinterested
witnesses as required by circular of March 8, 1889.
Claimant appealed.
June 26, 1889, your office affirmed the action of the local officers and
directed them to notify claimant of his right of appeal, and the same
time to advise him-
That while the extraordinary relief provided by the act (March 2, 1889) is afforded
only in the particular class of cases therein specified, yet in cases generally, the tem-
porary absence of a settler from the land for the purpose of obtaining employment,
will not invalidate his claim when good reason therefor appears and he is found to be
seeking in good faith to make his. home on the land.
Claimant again appealed in which he merely alleges that " said find-
ing and decision are contrary to law and contrary to the facts set forth
in my application."
While I am of the opinion that these allegations are insufficient and
do not comply with the requirements of rule 88 of the Rules of Practice,
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yet as the question to be decided is one between the applicant and the
government, I will waive the informality of the appeal and consider the
case on its merits.
Section 3 of the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 854), provides:-
That whenever it shall be made to appear to the register and receiver of any public
land office, under such regulations as the Secretary of the Interior may prescribe,
that any settler upon the public domain under existing law is unable by reason of a
total or partial destruction or failure of crops, sickness, or other unavoidable casual-
ty to secure a support for himself, herself, or those dependent upon him or her upon
the lands settled upon, then such register and receiver may grant to such settler a
leave of bsence from the claim upon which he or she has filed for a period not ex-
ceeding one year at any one time, and such settler so granted leave of absence shall
forfeit no rights by reason of such absence: Provided, That the time of such actual
absence shall not be deducted from the actual residence required by law.
In pursuance of the foregoing act this Department on March 8, 1889,
8 L. D., 314 issued its circular of instructions to registers receivers of
the United States land offices, directing them that:
The applicant for such permission will be required to submit testi-
mony to consist of his own affidavit, corroborated by the affidavits of dis-
interested witnesses, .... setting forth in detail the facts on
which he relies to support his application, ad which must be sufficient
to satisfy the register and receiver, who are enjoined to exercise their
best and most careful judgment in the matter, that he is unable by rea-
son of a total or partial destruction or failure of crops, sickness, or other
unavoidable casualty to secure a support for himself or those depend-
ent upon him upon the land settled upon. In case a leave of absence is
granted the register ad receiver will enter such action on their records,
indicating the period for which granted, and promptly report the fact
transmitting the testimony o which their action is based.
In case of refusal the applicant will be allowed the right of appeal on
the usual conditions.
Following is a copy of claimant's application, viz:-
Territory of Wyoming)
County of Converse) SS.
Harry C. Seward of said county and Territory, being first duly sworn according to,
law, on his oath deposes and says: That he is the identical Harry C. Seward who
made (filed) pre-emption entry (declaratory statement) No. 5091, on the 7th day of
April A. D., 1888, for the southwest quarter of section number twenty-one township.
number thirty-two north, of range numbersixty-five west of the sixth principal me-
ridian. Affiant settled on said land March 31, 1888, he built a house thereon, moved
there with his family, has resided there during the last year and resides there now.
He dug a well on said land to a depth of thirty-six (36) feet, the last three feet of
which was through rockthat required blasting; he did not obtain water, and is with-
out the necessary means to purchase blasting powder to complete said well. As a
result he has been compelled to have water hauled from the nearest well a distance
of five and a half miles; affiant has no team or farm implements, and has been com-
pelled to hire water hauled and other farm work done that required a team. He has
been unable to obtain work, and finds it impossible to continue his residence on said
land and spport himself and family. He therefore requests the honorable register
and receiver of said land office that he be granted a leave of absence of one year from
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said land, that he may go where he can obtain employment to support himself and
family, and earn the necessary means with which to return to said land and complete
his residence and settlement thereon.
HARRY SEWARD.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29th day of April, A. D., 1889.
HARRY L. HIGBY,
Notary Public.
Also appeared at the same time and place John H. Foster and William R. Dryer,
who being duly sworn depose and say that they reside in the vicinity of the land
herein described; that they have known Harry C. Seward, applicant, since he set-
tled on said land, and that the statements made in the foregoing affidavit are true,
of their personal knowledge.
JOHN H. FOSTER,
WILLIAM R. DRYER,
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29th day of April A. D., 1889.
HARRY L. HIGBY,
Notary Pubeio.
As it clearly appears from the record herein that the applicant failed
to showby his affidavit corroborated by the affidavit of two disinterested
witnesses that he was suffering by reason of a total or partial destruc-
tion or failure of crops, or sickness, and as I think that the mere failure
to find water at the depth of tbirty-six feet was not of itself such a cas-
ualty as is contemplated by statute, so as to entitle him to a leave of
absence, therefore and in view of the additional circular issued S-eptem-
ber 19, 1889 (9 L. D., 433), explanatory of the circular of March 8, 1889,
the decision appealed from is accordingly affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT-PROCEEDINGS ON FINAL PROOF.
NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co. v. HARENDRUP.
The failure of a railroad company to respond to a settler's notice of intention to sub-
mit final proof for land within its primary limits, is a waiver of said company's
right to deny the facts as set up in said proof; but if the record does not affirm-
atively show that such land is excepted from the grant the entry can not be ap-
proved.
Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Ofce, Decem-
ber 29, 1890.
I have considered the case of the Northern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany v. Peter L. Harrendrup, as presented by the appeal of the com-
pany from the decision of your office, dated March 13, 1889, rejecting
the claim of the company for the SW. i of Sec. 29, T. 9 N., R. 9 W.,
Helena, Montana.
The record shows that your office, on July 26, 1888, examined pre-
emption cash entry No. 1656, made July 11, 1884, by said Harrendrup
of said tract at Helena, Montana, and found that the land was within
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the statutory withdrawal on filing map of general route, of February
21, 1872, and also within the primary limits of the grant to said com-
pany by act of Congress, approved July 2, 1864 (13 Stat., 365); that
one George L. ilarrendrup filed pre-emption declaratory statement No.
2563 for said land on April 24, 1872, alleging settlement November 15,
1871; that said Peter L. larrendrup filed re-emption declaratory
statement No. 5287 for said land on May 21, 1883, alleging settlement
on the same land April 6, 1883, and after due notice made final proof
and received final certificate No. 1656 for said tract; that said final
proof shows that the entryman purchased the possessory right and im-
provements of his brother, said . L. larrendrup, valued at $1 ,000;
that there was nothing before your office showing the status of said
land, or the qualifications of said G. L. Harrendrup at the date of said
withdrawal on general route, or July 6, 1882, the date of the definite
location of the road, and the local officers were directed to order a
hearing, giving all parties in interest due notice thereof.
The entryman filed inthe local office an appeal from said decision of
your office, and with his said appeal filed affidavits, alleging that said
G. L. Harrendrup was a qualified settler and in the possession of said'
land at the date of withdrawal on general route, and also at the date of
definite location of the road. But your office, on January 22, 1889, re-
fused to accept said appeal, and directed the local officers to proceed
with said hearing.
On March 13, 1889, your office examined said cash entry, and finding
the facts as above stated held that the failure of the railroad company
to appear at the time the cash entryman offered his final proof and pro-
test against the same, was conclusive against its claim,'citing as au-
thority the case of Brady v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company (5 L.
D., 407). But this land, being within the granted limits, is differently
situated from that in the Brady case (supra). Besides, in the case of
Randolph (9 L. D., 416), the Department held that "1 By the failure of
the company to respond to notice of intention to ubmit final proof, it
waives all right to deny the facts set up in said proof'; " but the record
must affirmatively show that the land was excepted from the grant, or
the entry would not be approved.
In the case at bar, the final proof does not affirmatively show that the
land was occupied at the date of the withdrawal on general route by a
,qualified pre-emptor, and the company has had no opportunity to con-
test the truth of the allegations made in the subsequent affidavits filed
in the case. A hearing will accordingly be ordered, after due notice to
the parties, and the affidavits filed with the appeal from the decision of
your office ordering said hearing should be returned to the local office as
a basis for said hearing. Upon receipt of the testimony taken at said
hearing and the report of the local officers thereon, your office will re-
adjudicate the case.
The decision of your office is modified.
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prevent the government from considering after initiation of, will not relieve the entry-
the evidence, and passing upon the rights man from the effect of a default existing at
of the entryman ......... .................. 166 date of contest- - ...- 423
HOMESTEAD. j If good faith is apparent, failure to fully
Wherethe ntryan des pior o sevice comply with the law may be excused, whereWhere the entryman dies prior to service such failure is the result of mistake, and an
of notice, his heirs and successors in inter- effort is made to aro the default prior to
est should be made parties to the action and the initiation of ............................ 252
duly served with notice ............. ...... 604 Against an entry that appears of record
On the ground that the entryman is not a through the failure of the local office to act I
citizen must fail if declaration of intention upon the relinquishment thereof, must fail
is filed prior to the initiation of suit ----- 71 where the party filing such relinquishment
Must fail if, prior to the initiation thereof, has thereafter complied with the law in the
the entryman, without actual or construct- belief that his entry of the land has been
ive notice thereof, cures the default in allowed, and the contestant begins proceed-
good faith ------------------------- 400 ings with full knowledge of the facts ...... 592
A charge of abandonment is supported Not a good defense that the default oc-
by evidence showing failure to establish res- curred through the negligence of the entry-
idence within six months after entry .... 418, 602 man's agent ..... t.. 161
Failure of the wife to reside on the land Must fail where the non-compliance
until after notice of, does not impeach the charged is the fault of the contestant ..... 177
638 INDEX.
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Contestant. Land bordering on a streamof water, and
Will not be permitted to take advantage that produces a natural growth of grass in
of his own wrong and ths secure a prefer- paying quantities, is not ................... 206
ence right of entry ......................... 177 Entry.
No preference right acquired by, if the See Alienatian, Application, Final Proof.
contest is not begun and prosecuted in good ALLYr
i aith to acquire title to the land ....... ..... 5 GENERALLY.
Who fails to appeal from a decision of the Of publio land can not be made by an em-
local office dismissing his contest, loses ploys of surveyor-general's office (General
thereby the preference right ............... 328 Land Office) ............................ 96,848
Who fails to appeal from an adverse de- Made by one who has accepted an appoint-
cision of the local office is barred thereby ment in the local office, but has not yet en-
from asserting any further claim or right.- 416 tered upon his duties, is in violation of the
A successful, is entitled to thirty days spirit of the law, which prohibits employes
from the receipt of notice of cancellation of the land office from becoming interested
within which to exercise the preference in the purchase of public land - 280
right ....................................... 474 May be canceled by the Department,
Failure to exercise preference light prior to issuance of patent, on sufficient
within the statutory period after notice of proof that the land is not subject to such
cancellation defeats such right 202 appropriation, or that the entry is in fraud
No preference right can be asserted, in the of the law ........-.-..... 484, 507
presence of an adverse claim, by a contest- Of intervening claimant must be canceled,
ant who fails to make entrywithin the stat- if, after duenotice, he fails to show sufficient
utory period after notice of cancellationl175, 208 cause why the ad verse right of a successful
Who doesnot exercise his preference right contestant should not be recognized - 474
within the statutory period, can not assert Suspension o, does not relieve the land
the same thereafter in the presence of ad- from reservation; and during such suspen-
verse claims, even though he ray have be- sion the entry of another can not be al-
lieved that his entry was in fact of record, lowed ............ - ......... 556
and under such belief had proceeded to DESERT LAND.
comply with the law...................... 208 That embraces some land not subject
Preference right of, not defeated by a re- thereto, is not necessarily fraudulent ..... 206
linquishmeut, accompanied with anapplica- Will not be disturbed on the ground that
tion to enter, filed after initiation of con- the larger portion of each smallest legal sub-
test .............. -5 ................ 65, 525 division is nnirrigable, if the reclamation
Who fails to give his proper post-office shown is otherwise satisfactory. and the
address can not set up want of notice of the desert character of the land is apparent - -... 277
order of cancellation, as against an inter- Will not be canceled for failure to show
vening entryman who has no notice of any personal knowledge of the laud, if the entry
defect in such service-.. -------------------- 574 was allowed under an existing practice
which did not require such showing ....... 155
Continuance. HOMESTEAD.
See Practice. Validity of, is determined bythe facts ex-
Costs. isting at the date it is made ................ 314
See Practice. Of a less amount than that covered by set-
tlement operates as an abandonment of the
Cultivation, land not entered-.............557
See Final Proof sub-title, Pre-emption). Tracts of land cornering on each other are
Of a tract under authority of a railroad not within the rule of contiguity required
company, that has no right thereto, confers under the homestead law .................. 367
no right as against others .................. 559 Second will not be allowed to one who has
perfected title uinder the first; and such an
Decision. enitrymanwill notbe heard to allege that the
See Judgment. first entry was in fact illegal and fraudulent,
Declaratory Statement. and hence no bar to the second . .......... 507
See Filing. May be made under the act of March 2,
1889, section 2, though the claimant mayDeposition. have previously filed a soldier's declaratory
See Evidence. statement for another tract- ................ 384
Desert Land. Amendment of, allowed as against an ad-
See A lienalion, Entry, Final Proof. vet-se occupant who takes forcible posses-
The nature and location of, the means and sion with full knowledge of the claimant's
facilities for irrigation, and the rights of ad- right ......... . 394
jacent entrymen, maybeproperly considered Of land covered by the prior timber cul-
in determining questions of compactness .. 27 turo entry of another not of record, without
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actual notice of any claim thereunder, is a Failure to inlorse the title of the cause on
valid claim that will attach on relinquish- the envelope inclosing depositions does not
ment of the prior entry, and exclude the necessarily exclude them from considera-
right of a contestant against said entry . . 36 tion, in the absence if apparent prejudice to
Erroneously allowed for land within an the interest of the parties ................ 183
Indian reservation may remain intact on A technical objectien to the regularity of
the release of the land, and take effect as depositions call not be raised on trial by one
of date when the land is opened to settle- who participates in the examination of the
ment 231 [ witnesses, and at such times raises no ob-
PRItMPTION. jectios to the proceedings .............. ... 183
Madewithout the prerequisite compliance Application to take depositions on inter-
with law is illegal, and the entryman ex- rogatories should not be filed with an officer
hausts his right thereby, and can not make designated to take testimony, but when so
a second .- ........ 290 filed, and sent up with th e record, should be
Acts performed after, only considered for considered on the day of hearing ........... 575
the purpose of determining the claimant's The affidavit of contest need not accom-
good faith during the period covered by the pany an order designating aii officer to take
final proof ......-.. -............ . 290 testimony, nor is it necessary that such affi-
Married woman may make, with a view davit shonlcd be in his possession ........... A18
to equitable adjudication, where the proof An officer designated to take testimony,
shows that she duly complied with the law under role 35 of practice, may authorize
in the matter of filing, residence, and im- any other qualified officer to act in his place. 415
provement prior to marriage .............. 366 Want of authority in an officer designated
TIMBER C LTUIRE. to take final proof will not affect the validity
Mfay embrace a technical quarter section of testimony taken before him under rule
without reference to its relation to the e 35 of practice, at the time such proof is sub-
t ire sec tion . . . .mitted ...-.-......... 53D
Within a section containing a natural Testimony offered on final proof is not
growth of valuable timber is invalid, and admissible in proceedings ordered to test
will be canceled -...................... 500, 525 the validity of an entry, but due weight
Made in good faith, of land not strictly should be given to the legal presumption
'devoid of timber " will not be disturbed that the entry is valid . -.- . 175,
if allowed in accordance with the depart- Affidavit filed with an appeal to the De-
mental construction of the statute then in partinent not received as, in a contested
force .-.. . 426 case .- ....... 55
Not barred by the occupancy and posses- Admission that the facts stated in a spe-
sion of one who asserts no record claim to cial agent's report are true does not extend
the land within the statutory period 300 to a conclusion of said agent contained
Allowance of, segregates the land, even therein .................................. 468
though the entry may not be made of re- Taken at the instance of an attorney, who,
cord, and the failure of the local officers to under section 190, R. S., was not authorized
place th entry of record will not affect the to act as such, will not be considered 25
rights of the entryman ................ 356 Stipulation of attorneys as to matters of,
is binding upon the parties in the absence
Equity. of misconduct on the part of the prevailing
Principles of, will protect one holding party ----..........----------.----- 7£
under all entry, where by mistake the pat- Not "obviously irrelevant " should not be
ent failed to describe the land purchased, excluded by the local office ................ 461
as against another claiming under a subse- It is not error that a party is not informed
quent location of the land made with a of his right to cross-examine witnesses
knowledge of the facts-. 1 ............... 123, 389 where due opportunity for cross-examina.
tion isallowed ......... ......... 419
Equitable Adjudication. Failure of a witness to sign his testimony
See Final Proof, Roesteac (sub-title Gen- maybe cured, where a-sebearing is ordered,
erally), Mining Claim, Private Entry. by his signing the same, after due exanmina-
The intervention of an adverse claim pre- tion thereof and making oath thereto .-. 575
cludes action under rule 30 ................. 59 Refusal of the entryinan to testify, justi-
fies an adverse conclusion where his god
Evidence. faith is in doubt ............-...... .. 579-
In a case should be limited to the charge
as laid in the affidavit of contest 75 Filing.
Au irregularity in the transmission of For unoffered land under the act Or 1843
depositions may be waived by agreement of protected the settler until the commence-
counsel .................... ................. 183 ment of public sale, and this protection was
640 INDEX.
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not modified until the passage of the acts of
July 14,1870, and March 3,1871 ..... 195 Final Proof.July 14,1870. and March 3,1871 .......... See Practice (Sub-title, Hearing),LTibner and
The statutory life of, having expired with- Stone act.
out proof and payment, the presumption
arises that all claims thereunder are aban- GENE RALLY.
doned----------------------------------- 138 Circular of October 21, 1890, under the
Defective for want of previous settle- act of October 1, 1890, for the relief of cer-
ment is made good by settlement thereaf- tain settlers on the public lands ............ 402
ter in the absence of an intervening adverse The act of May 26, 1880, authorizing proof
claim - 208 before "any commissioner of the United
By one foreign born, who has not declared States circuit court, " does not change exist-
his intentionof becoming a citizen, becomes ing provisions defining the place for taking
valid, if such declaration is made prior to such proof ....... 8........... ............. 361
the intervention of an adverse right ....... 121 The circular of June 25, 1890 (10 L.D., 687),
For land covered by the prior homestead issued under the act of May 26, 1890, must
entry of another should not be allowed, n- be construed to mean that said act does not
less the superior right of the pre-emptor is authorize the making of the proofs and affi-
shown on a hearing had for that purpose.. 452 davit mentioned therein before a commis-
Transmuted to a homestead entry, under sioner outside the county and State or dis-
which title is perfected, exhausts the pre- trict and territory in which the lands are
emptive right, though such filing is made situated, except where the lands are within
prior to the adoption of the Revised Stat- an unorganized county .................. 361
ut-- .-------.- 322 Should not be submitted for land involved
By a minor, with full knowledge of his in a pending contest ........ ....... 449
disqualification, who subsequently sells his The local office is without authority to
relinquishment, exhausts his pre-emptive accept, for land involved in a case pending
right .5......................8. 562 on appeal ......-. 539
Made in the interest of another is illegal. Should not be submitted during the pend-
and must be canceled ...................... 548 ency of adverse proceedings instituted by
A pre-emptor is not estopped from prov- another to secure title to the land in-
ing that his settlement was in fact made volved ... .. ............... 256, 452
at a different and earlier date than that al- On a protest against, it is a matter of dis-
leged in his declaratory statement --------- 143 cretion with the commissioner whether a
The right to amend, can not be exercised hearing shall be ordered .................. 273
in the presenee of a valid intervening ad- In proceedings under protest against, the
verse claim ....... - ...... 477 commissioner should pass on the whole case
Second, will only be allowed where the as presented by the record, including the
claimant, by reason of a prior or adverse sufficiency of the proof .................... 409
right, is unable to perfect title under the In proceedings under protest of a railroad
first- -------------------------------------- 121 company against, the qualifications of the
Second, will not be allowed on the ground settler at date of settlement will be pre-
that the land included in the first is not sumed on appeal in the absence of any alle-
habitable, unless it is clearly shown that the gation to the contrary in the protest ....... 437
settler in exercise of ordinary diligence was If the protest by a railroad company
unable to discover the true character of the against, does not raise any question as to
laud ..---..- .. 45 the settler's citizenship at the date of set-
Made in good faith by a minor, but aban- tlement, the company will not be allowed
doned when the fact of minority is discov- to do so on appeal ............. 437
ered, is no bar to a second ................ 317 Special notice of intention to submit,
should be given adverse claimants of rec-
OSAGE. ord, and proof submitted without such
notice requires republication with special
Failure of settler on Osage land to make, citation to the adverse claimant ........ ... 172
within hree months after settlement sub- A transferee may be accorded an oppor-
jects his claim to any other valid interven- tunity to show the qualifications of the
ing right ..... 396 entryman ......-......... ....... 3
Time within which Osage, is required to Mortgagee may cure defect in, caused by
be made will not run where the local office the substitution of a witness by due adver-
is closed, and the Commissioner so directs 256 tisement of the names of the witnesses who
Where two claimants for Osage land are testified, and such proof may then be ac-
each in defaultin the matter of, the one who cepted in the absence of protest ......... 581
makes the first has the better right, subject When not taken before the officer desig-
only to defeat in case of failure to submit nated, and the eutryman refuses to respond
lproof within six months ................ 62,275 to further requirements, the transferee may
INDEX. 641
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file the certificates of the officer designated, right is in the one who first submits final
and the one officiating, that no protest was proof ....................................... 275
filed against the entry; or, in the absence of That the receiver's receipt is dated one
such certificates, readvertise ............... 266 day beyond six months from date of filing
Where no cause is shown for failure to will not defeat the entry, where the proof
submit on the day fixed therefor. bat the was made within said period and good faith
local office accepts the same, the entry may is apparent ....... 116
be equitably confirmed .................... 3 It may be presumed that the first payment
Where the testimony of the witnesses is was properly tendered where the proof is
taken before an officer not authorized by rejected for reasons not involving payment,
statute to take such proof, the entry may be and the record shows full compliance with
equitably coufirmedif otherwise regular and law in other respects, but is silent as to such
in compliance with law .................... 299 tender ...................................... 390
Where the officer designated is not quali-
fied to take, an entry may be allowed with a PRERIMPTION.
view to equitable action, if the proof is One who has submitted, under his filing,
otherwise regular and shows due oompli- is under no obligation to protest against the
ance with law .........-......... ...... 539 proof of another who subsequently initiates
Where taken at the time and place desig- a claim for the land ........................ 449
nated, but not before the officer named in New, can not be made by one who has made
the notice, the entry may be equitably con- entry without prerequisite compliance with
firmed, in the absence of protest ........... 578 law -290
Supplemental proof of residence may be Preimptor who elects to make, in thepres-
submitted where no adverse claims exist. 312 once of an adverse claim, must abide there-
In proceedings under protest against, a suit thereof, and submit to an order of can-
decision of the local office that the claimant cellation if compliance with law is not
is entitled to make new proof is not suchan shown ..........-..... .............. 338
adverse judgment as will, in the absence of Delay in making payment will not defeat
appeal, defeat his right to have thejudg- an entry allowed prior to the regulations re-
nient of the commissioner on the sufficiency quiring proo ad payment to be made at
of the proof already submitted ............ 544 the same time .......... -... 66
Where not made before the local office,DESERT LAND. and the delay in payment is explained, ad-
Should be made within three years from ditional proof of non-alienation is not re-
date of initial entry, even though the official quired, if it appears that the law had been
surveys have not been extended over the complied with up to the date of proof and
land .................-.......... ...... 414 the entryman had not then sold or agreed
Where made prior to survey, supplemen- to sell the land .......... ... 66
tal,withontrepublication should be required Showing as to improvements not gov-
after survey showing adjustment to the lines erned by specific statutory requirements,
of survey ..... 414 but must be such as to indicate good faith . 172
Where not submitted within the statu That shows breaking and use of the land
tory period, and the delay is satisfactorily for grazing purposes, is sufficient as to Col-
explained, the entry maybe equitably con- tivation, where the land is suitable only for
firmed ------------------------- 27 pasturage ................................. 585
If proofof reclamation is not made within
the statutory period, the intervention of an Hearing.
adverse claim defeats the right to perfect See Practce.
the entry- .. ... 58
Should definitely show what proportion of Homestead.
each legal subdivision has been irrigated 58, 246 See Entry, Final Proof, Mineral Land,
Should show what proportion of ehch legal GENERALLY.
subdivision has been irrigated ............. 58 Rights acquired by settlement, not de-
HOMESTEAD. feated by subseqncnt town site settlement. 910Where the etryman in good faith ulti-
In case of discrepancy between proof of vates and improves the land, but dies with-
military service submitted and the records out having established residence thereon,
of the War Department, the claimant, if un- the widow may show her residence on the
able to explain the discrepaney, must show land and connection with the claim with the
sufficient actual residence on the land to view to equitable action -------------------- 235
complete the requisite period .............. 368 Right not impaired by the fact that it was
initiated pending the issuance of final cer-OSAGE. tificate n preemption proof previously
Wheretwo claimants are both in default submitted by the claimant in due com-
either as to filing or final proof, the superior pliance with law ........................... 182
2497-VOL II-41
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Right not vitiated by the fact that the tional entry under section 6, act of March
land entered contains a stone quarry, and 2,1889 .............. 3
that the entryman was aware of such fact SOLDIERS.
at date of application, if good faith is other- Declaratory statement can not be filed for
wise apparent --------- --------------- 140 unsurveyed land-. .------------- --------- 88
Asettleringoodfaithwhois subsequently Filing a declaratory statement does not
appointed register before the land is exhaust the right of entry under the act of
opened to entry is entitled to perfect his Iarch, 1889 ....-............. .......... 384
claim under section 2287, R. S., the same as If a declaratory statement is illegal be-
though it had been initiated by an applica- cause filed while the claimant is residing on
tion to enter ------ . .. ------------- - .IS a premption claim, such illegality may be
Section 2287, R. S., authorizes the perfec- cured by subsequent entry under the filing,
tion of apending claim through payment for after submission of preemption proof, and
the land, and not through a constructive in the absence of any intervening right. . . 28$
residence thereon ------------ 18
Right can not be acquired by an Indian Illinois.
who maintains the tribal relation - 57--- 57 See Swamp Land.
The language in section 2, act of Septem-
ber 29, 1890, authorizing a "second home- lproveintiots.
stead entry" refers only to those who had See Preinptien.
theretofore madesoch entry but failed from Indeninity.
any cause to perfect the eaine - 625 See Railroad Grant, School Laud.
ACT OF JUNE 15, 1880.
Right of purchase suspended by the ini- India Lands.
tiation of a contest ......................... 261 Members of the citizen band of Pottawat-
Allowance of cash entry during the Dend- omies may elect whether they will take allot-
ency of a contest is an error that can only be ments under the act of May 23, 1872, or Feb-
raised on behalf of the successful contest- i-nary 8, 1887 ............................. 103
ant-.. ..................................... 598 New selections may be allowed under the
Right of purchase defeated by interven- act of May 23, 1872, in lieu of allotments
ing claim where the applicant fails to ap- pending thereunder and unpertected at the
peal in time from the rejection of his appli- passage of the acts of March l and 2, 1889,
cation --------------------------------------. 570 and certificates therefor may issue on the
Failureof the homesteaderto complywith payment of the sum per acre originally
the law in the matters of settlement and given by the United States ................ 103
residence does not affect his right of par- Allotments provided for prior to the act
chase ---------------------------------- 462 of 1887 not necessarily confined to the terms
Cancellation of the original entry no bar of the prior act ---........ 107
to purchase under the act - 416 Agricultural lands formerly within Sioux
Personal affidavitnotrequired of the orig- Reservation must be disposed of under the
inal entryman where he applies to pur- homestead law .......... 231
chase and the duplicate receipt is with the OSAGE.
record --------------------------------- 555 See Filing, Final Proof.
Cash entry allowed on the affidavit of the Purchaser of, must be an actual settler- . 259,
entryman's attorney will not be disturbed 319, 27$
where, after transfer of the land, the entry- Where two claimants for, are both in
man refuses to make the affidavit required default, either as to filing or final proof
by the regulations 587 and payment, the superior right must be
accorded to the one who first submits final
ADDITIONAL proof. 275
Under the act of March 3, 1879, an entry A single woman who has the qualifica-
can not be maintained by acts of entryman's tions of a preomptor, and after due compli-
tenantin the matterof residence, occupancy, ance with law and submission of final proof
and cultivation 412 marries, is not by such marriage deprived of
Application to make, under section 6, act the right to have her entry allowed ........ 396
of March 2, 1889, may be presented by one The purchaser of, must show that he is an
who has commuted for part of the land cov- actual settler by residence following the al-
ered by a former entry ................. 364 leged act of settlement, and the proof re-
quired of such fact is no less in degree than
COMMUTATION. that required under the preemption law --- 216
Rightof, dependentupon prior compliance The provisions of section 2285, R. S., do
with the homestead law ................ 235, 812 not exempt the settlers named therein from
One who submits proof for part of the land the spetified restrictions of the preemption
covered by his original entry exhausts his law, except as to lands held by settlement
right thereunder, but may apply for addi- on May 9, 1872, and the purchase of such
INDEX. 643
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landdixbansts the preemptive right, either Mineral Land.
as to Osage or other land .................. 372 A segregation survey at the expense of the
Settlement on, subsequent to the act of agricultural claimant may be directed, where
May 9, 1872, does not authorize the purchase his claim includes land of mineral character,
thereof, if prior thereto the settler had per- covered by a previous mineral location- 409
fected an entry of such land ............... 372 The Department retains jurisdiction to
One who quits or abandons residence on consider and determine the character of land
his own land to reside on Osage land in the claimed under the mineral I aws until the is-
same State is disqualified to purchase said suance of patent ..................... - 246,441
land ......-............. .................. 164 Proximity of land to coal veins will not
Requirement a to six months' residence alone warrant the conclusion that it is loin-
prior to final proof not applied with the oral in charatte- ............................. 462
same rigor to settler on Osage land as to a Mineral character of land as a present fact
preemptor of other land, but the acts of must be shown to support the conclusion
such settler must show clearly an intention that the land is such, when not so returned. 462
of making the land his home ............... 302 Report of a special agent, made prior to the
Settlement and occupancy of, do not se- act of March 3, 1883, that land is valuable for
cure the right of purchase if such acts were coal, excludes such land from subsequent
not with the intention of taking the land homestead entry until after public offering
for a home ...... ... 268, 319 (Ala.) - - ..-.........------ 547
OTOE AND MISSOURIA. Land reported valuable for coal prior to
The settlement required of a purchaser the act of 1883, but covered by a homestead
mustbein good faithand permanentin char- entry at date of the act, becomes subject
acter ..-. 546 thereto on the cancellation of the entry
(Ala.) .. ............... .. ...... 547
Instructions and circulars. Additional homestead entry of land re-
See tables of, and cirocla s cited and con- ported valuable for coal prior to the act of
strued, page xvii. March 3,1883, can not be allowed until after
public offering (Ala.)-....................... 557
Judgment.
An order of cancellation based o the re- Mining Claim.
port of a special agent can not be treated
as final if the record does not show notice Application will not be allowed if the
of such action duly served upon the entry- mineral character of the land does not sati5-
man-............ ....... 278 factorily appear-...... ....... 561
Placer application will not be allowed if
Jurisdiction. the evidence does not show as a present factthe placer character of the land-......441See es Judicata. A citizen of the United States, acting in
Of the commissioner to render a decision the interest of a foreign corporation. can
on the whole record, where he has ordered a not make a mineral entry for the benefit of
rehearing, not affected by the action of the such corporation ............-.. 425
local office on the evidence submitted at such Application to make entry, held without
rehearing . .........................-.. 199 action during the absence of the register,
Commissioner has no authority to enter- reserves the land covered thereby until final
tain an appeal from the action of the local action thereon-212
officee on claims presented under th'e Vigil Enty made during the existence of an-
and St. Vrain grant, as the statute in such other entry for the same tract is irregular,
Case directs that said claims shall be estab- but may be allowed to stand on the caneel-
lished to the satisfaction of said office, and lation of the previous entry ................ 120
does not provide for an appeal therefrom 226 A decision cancelling an entry "without
prejudice to the claimant's proceeding deLand Department none, in a regular manner," is in effect only
Employ6s of, may not enter public lands. a permit to the claimant to renew his ap-
Circular of September 15, 1890 .............. 348 plication, subject to adverse rights . -........ 120
Clerks in the office of the surveyor-general The publication of an application in a
are clerks or employ6s in the general land weekly paper requires ten insertions 417
office within the meaning of section 452 R. S., Where the publication is made under a
and therefore disqualified to enter public former practice that recognized nine inser.
land9 s......................................... go t  in a weekly paper as sufficient, the en-
try may be equitably confirmed in the ab-
LOCAL OFFICE. sence of an adverse claim .............. 457
While closed, time will not run as against In case of protest against an application,
applicants forpublic laud if the Commissioner the localoffice is authorized to order a hear-
so directs ..... 256 ing to determine the character of the land,
,644 INDEX.
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and whether there has been due compliance Naturalization.
with law .... 214 Of the father, daring the minority of the
The failure of an agent, who files an ad- son, inures to the benefit of the latter and
verse claim, to furnish therewith proof i makes him a citizen .............. ......... 578
corroboration of his sworn statement of
authority, will not defeat the right of the Notice.
adverse claimant to have the controversy See Practice (sub-title Notice).
settled in the courts 150
An adverse claim will be recognized as Obiter dicta.
filed within time, if such filing is in accord- Department not bound by the expression
ance with the regulations then in force --_. 391 of an opinion in a matter not needful to the
Failure to prosecute an adverse claim, or determination of the question actually in-
in other manner assert a right against a volved .. . 244
known pending application, is conclusive as Oceupancy.
against the existence of such right --------- 8 See Possession.
The local office has no authority to allow
an entry during the pendency of adverse Officer.
judicial proceedings ...................... 150 Mistake of, sh 'uld not prejudice the rights
Judicial proceedings instituted outside of of an applicant for public land ............. 91
the authority of section 2326 R. S., can not Failure or refusal of the local officers to
affect departmental action on all application properly discharge a duty-will not defeat a
for patent ---------------------------------- 8 right ................................... 218,316
No action can be taken in the Land De-
partment on an application for patent dur- Oklahiomia.
ing the pendency of adverse judicial pro- Townsite circular of July 10, 1890 ........ 24
ceedings-.. -....... ----- 391 Townsite circular ofJuly 18, 1890, commu-
The relinquishment by te applicant of ted homestead ..........-....... 8... . 6
the land originally in conflict, does not Public lands in, general circular of July
authorize the Land Department in reas- 21, 1890 ................ .........-........ 79
sumingjurisdiction, during the pendency of The act of March 2, 1889, opening to set-
judicialproceedings by an adverse claimant, tlement and entry the Territory, as limited
who has been permitted in such proceedings by the third proviso of section 13, of said
to amend so as to embraces largerquantity act, prohibits any one from entering said
of land than was included in the original Territory, prior to the hour fixed by proc-
adverse claim-. - 391 lamation, with the intention of settlement
Individual rights of an applicant are not on any part thereof ............... 330
waived by his executing, as president of a No permission to be within the Territory
company, an agreement recognizing inter- byvirtueof special employment therein can
eats adverse to said company -8 be granted, as against the express terms of
Entry may be referred to the board of the act of 1889 ............................. 330
equitable adjudication where the published One who is permissibly within the Terri-
notice of application is not as explicit in the torfrprior to the opening thereof, and seeks
matterofdescriptioe (connectingline)asthe to take advantage of his presence therein,
notice posted on the claim -................. 234 has "entered and occupied" the same in
The surface right is an adjunct of the lode violation of the statute, and is disqualified
claim, and can not extend beyond the point to enter any of said lands, or acquire any
where the lode intersects the exterior line right thereto .................. ..... 330
of a senior location .................... 236, 250 Osage Land.
Where several claims are embraced within See a m
one application, the annual work required See Indian Leeds, Fitiug, fleet Proof
by statute may he done on one of such claims Otoe and HIissouria Indian
for the common benefit of the claims covered Land.
by the application-............ 8 ha gby te aplicaion-------------------- 8 See Settlement, Indian Latndo.
The use and occupancy of land for the
maintenance of pumping works, necessary Patent.
to the operation of a lode mine, is such a use Suit to set aside, will not be advised in
as will authorize entry of the land as a mill- the absence of a specific showing sufficient
site .-.-.................................... 338 to justify such action ................. 32
Mill-site location not made for the use or May issue to correct a mistake in the
occupancy of the applicant, but for the description of the land ................... 123
benefit of another can not be passed to pat- Misdesciption in finalcertificate and, will
ent ............................ ............ 561 not defeat the right of the purchaser to the
land actually covered by the sale and pur-
Misdescription. chase, or render such land subject to the en-
See Patent, Equity, try of another . .......... 123. 389
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Certification equivalent to, where patent An attorney who advances money for the
is not required by statute, and the validity prosecution of a contest is not entitled to the
thereof can only be questioned in the courts 475 right of, if the suit is dismissed ..-........... 65
Hearing may be ordered to determine By attorney on behalf of deceased client
whether suit to vacate, should be advised - 590 without effect ............................ 604
When filed from a decision of the GeneralPayment. Land Office, removes the ease from the ju-
Time extended for, in case of failure of 17 risdiction of that office 140, 409
crops, circular of October 27, 1890 - 417 ........................ Rights lost by failure tofail-re to .............. 416, 570
Possession. If not taken from the rejection of an ap-
And occupancy of public lands for the plication to contest an entry, all rights are
purpose of working a stone quarry thereon, lost thereunder - ------------- 179
confers no right as against the United In the absence of, and no reason shown
States, or others having a valid claim under therefor, the Department will notundertake
its laws ................................... 140 to review a decision of the General Land Of-
flee.... .. 101
Practice. Failure to appeal from the rejection of an
See Contest, Evidence, Judgment, Juriedietion, application does not impair the claim of the
Res Judicata. applicant if he is not informed of the right
of appeal ..... ................. 191
GE5NERALLY. , By one not a party to the record will not
The General Land Office should fellow the be entertained in the absence of due show-
rulings of the Department in the disposition lng as to the nature of the interest claimed
of cases that fall within such rulings ...... 174 by the interveninga ppellant --------------- 499
When witnesses are examined by the lo- Validity of, from the local office will not be
cal officers their finding of facts where the considered by the Department where the
testimony is conflicting is entitled to spe- case is submitted on its merits to the G(en-
ial consideration ................... 409,442,490 oral Land Office, and without objection to
Concurring decisions of thelocal, and gen- itsjurisidiction- ------------.. -..... - 630
eral land offices, as to questions of fact, are Time for filing from decision of Commis-
generally accepted as conclusive by the De- sioner begins to run from the date that
partment where the evidence is conflicting 321, service is first made, whether it be upon
344, 409, 426, 413, 490 the party himself or upon his attorney,
The rule as to the effect of concurring de- either local or resident in Washington .. .4139
cisions below is not followed by the DepArt- In all cases where held defective by the
ment in questions of law ................... 426 General Land Office the case should be
The Department will not render an opin- transmitted to the Department and the let-
ion in a hypothetical case .................. 511 ter of transmittal should specifically desig-
Record of proceedings in the local office nate wherein the appeal is defective ....... 48
should show with exactness the dates when Failure of the Commissioner to return un-
papers are filed or action taken 117 der rule 82 an appeal defective for want of
Sworn statement of attorney, disclosing notice, does not relieve the Department
the interests of an intervener, must contain from the necessity of dismissing the same
a fullsbowingof his meansof his knowledge, on account of said defect, if the time allowed
and suchfactsas willaffirmatively show that for appeal and notice has expired ....... 375
the party seeking to intervene has a present In the absence of, a decision of the local
interest in the matter involved -..-....... 305 office contrary to existing laws and regn.
Motion to dismiss should not be fled with lations may be corrected by the Commis-
an officer designated to take testimony, but sioner ................................... 396, 407
when so filed and sent up with the record In the absence of, the decision of the local
should be considered on the day of hearing. 575 office is final as to the facts, and will not be
Proceedings on the report of special agent 176, disturbed by the Comnuissionerexcept under
278,311,369,462,507,579 Rule 48 ....- .. ........... 300
AMENDMENT. Specifications of error should clearly and
Of an application for certiorari, denied for concisely designate the errors alleged .-.. 214
want of formality, can not be allowed ...... 36 Will be dismissed if there is no proof that
a copy of the appeal and specifications of er-
APPEAL. ror was served on the opposite party ....... 48
See Jsurisdictionw. Will not be considered in the absence of
Will not lie from an interlocutory order of proper service of notice thereof on the oppo-
the local office .............................. 84 site party-2, ........... .9,385
Should betaken from the original decision There is no prescribed form of words to
and not from the refusal to grant a rehear- be used in giving notice of, and to serve the
ing . 260 appellee with a true copy thereof is suffi-
Regularly taken should not be dimissed.. 235 coient notice - ......................... 406
\.
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The words "service accepted" indorsed Objection to the sufficiency of, waived by
on the, by the attorney of appellee, imply general appearance ...................... 198
service of notice accepted, and the acknowl- One who admits the service of, and ap-
edgment of the receipt of " copy " thus in- pears generally without allegation of preju-
dorsed implies that such copy is of the pa dice, can not plead a defect therein .. . 269
per so indorsed ................. 406 Of a contest should recite the charges
Will not be entertained if a copy thereof contained in the affidavit of contest, but
is not served upon the opposite party within will not be regarded as defective if it shows
the prescribed period ..................... . 385 a sufficient allegation to support a judg-
Taken from a decision holding an entry meut of cancellation ....... -.-...... 418
for cancellation, on account of the adverse Of contest may be signed by one or both
claim of another, will not be entertained in of the local officers .......-... ............. 418
the absence of due notice to such adverse Of contest not invalidated b the omis-
claimant ...................... . ..  * 375 sion of the register to affix to his signature
FHom the rejection of an application to thereto his official designation ------------- 269
enter will not be entertained, in the absence Of contest on resident defendant by reg-
of notice to an adverse claimant of record -- 621 istered letter, not authorized ............... 60£
Will not be dismissed on the ground that Publication of, without an affidavit as the
a copy thereof was not served in time on basis therefor, confers no jurisdiction upon
the opposite party, if the record does not the local office ..........-.. ..... .. ..... 315
show when notice of the decision was served By publication defective for want of copy
on the appellant ............ 49 by registered letter is not made good by
From a decision holding an entry for can- subsequently mailing such notice, without
cellation wahed by a subsequent applies- now posting and publication ............... 433
tien for repayment of the purchase money- 624 In an affidavit, filed as the basis for an or-
CONTINUANCE. der of publication, which sets forth thatthe defendant is bot a resident of the State,Of a case, from day to day, with the knowl- and personal service can not be made, it is
edge and consent of the parties, preclades not necessaryto showwhat eflorts have been
subsequent objection to such action ....... 346 made to secure personal service -......... 261
Costs. Of a decision by mail, whether by regis-
Under rule 55 each party must pay the tered or unregistered letter, will not bind
cost of taking the testimony of his own wit- the party to be served, if such notice fails
nesses, both on direct and cross-examina- to reach him ........ - ..... 574
tion ........................................ 388 Of a decision by unregistered letter is not
sullicient evidence of service .... .... 261
HEARING. Of a decision can not be given verbally 261
Discretionary with the Commissioner Of a decision to an attorney of record is
whether he will order a, on protest filed notice to the party he represents ......... . 394
against final proof .......................... 273 Failure to receive, of a decision can not
Refusal of the Commissioner to order, on be set up by one whose own laches has pre-
protest against dual proof, will not be dis- vented service in the manner prescribed.. 574
turbed if such action dols not amount to Of cancellation to the atorney of a suc-
the denial of a right ------ ........... 307 cessful contestant is notice to the contestant 202
Application for, addressed to the Secre- REIEARING.
tary, calls for the exercise of his discretion- Commissioners discretion in ordering,
ary authority, and he should therefore be will not be controlled by the Department,
fully informed as to all facts connected in the absence ot an apparent abuse of dis-
with the subject-matter .................... 349 cretionary authority .... . . 260
Ordered by the Department, is not af- Required, where the record is indefinite
fected by the circular instructions of May and it can not be determined therefrom
15,1889, issued to special agents by the Gen- whether the defendant had due notice of
oral Land Office, directing the suspension of the day set for the hearing - . 117
proceedings wherein it is believed that the An allegation of additional evidence, not
government will not be able to sustain the newly discovered, made for the first time on
charge against the entry-.................3.. review comes too late to justify 565
Will not begrantedon theground of newly
NoTICE, discovered evidence where due diligence is
See Appeal (opra). not shown in making known the alleged
Questions affecting the slufficienOy of, can discovery, and taking action thereon . 618
only be raised by the defendant, or one Application for, on the ground of newly
claiming under him - ................ 1 99 discovered evidence, should be supported by
A defendant who appearagenerally, with- the affidavits of the persons by whom the
out objection to the sufficiency of, can not applicant expects to prove the alleged addi-
raise snob question after judgment 418 tional facts ....... 618
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Failure of the applicant's attorney to covery of the error is subsequently with-
properly conduct the ease does not furnish held from sale ... -...... 445
ground for ...........-..... ........... 618 No right of, is acquired by settlement on
Wher granted, the case is generally tried reserved land, and if the settler dies while
d novo, and the petitioner in such case will the land is under reservation his heirs have
not be heard to complain of former proceed- no right thereto that can be perfected under
ings therein however defective they may be. 319 section 2269 R. S. after the land is restored
In proceedings by the government to the public domain ............. ......... 477
against an entry held by a transferee the Lands chiefly valuable for timber may be
entryman is not entitled to, on the ground taken under the preemption law if the
that he was not served with notice of such claimant's good faith is clearly manifest. 7
proceedings, and the orders made there. In determining the good faith of a claim
under, where he appears as a witness forthe asserted for lands subject to entry under
government and sets up no rights under the the timber and stone act of 1878 the charac-
entry . . . ....... ... .. 311 ter of the land maybe properly considered- 145
REVIEW. Requirements with respect to settlement,
Motion for, must be accompanied by affi- residence, and improvement applicable to
davit that the request is in good faith and lands formerly embraced n the Fort Larned
not for the purpose of delay ................ 623 Military Reservation ............ 290
On motion for, the specifications of error Improvements required of the settler are
must be definite, and clearly set forth the i not specified by statute, but must be such
facts or issues on which a ruling is desired. 8 .as to indicate good faith . -.- . 172
In the absence of sufficient reason shown Temporary removal of the preemptor
a motion for, will not be considered if not from land of his own will not take the claim
filed in time ....... 5....... ...... ..... 611 out of the second inhibitory clause of sec-
Reversal of concurring decisions of the tion 2260 R. ...................... .... 539, 553
local office, General Land Office, and the
Department, on a finding of fact, not justi- Price of Land.
fied except on a strong and clear showing.. 618 See Publis Land.
Will not be granted on the application of
a transferee unless it is made to appear Private Claim.
that the entryman is entitled to be heard.. 623
Motion for, filed by a transferee must set The right to indemnity under section 3,
up facts sufficient to show that he is enti- act of June 2, 1858, does not exist if the
tled to such hearing ........................ 194 clain under which such right is asserted
Petition for re-review will not be enter- was satisfied by location prior to the pas-
tained unless it sets up new matter for con- sage of said act ...................... .. 147
sideration ...... -1... 314,349,480 "Patent" certificates for claims con-
Application for, which calls for the exer- firmed by the act of 1828 were transmitted
ciss of the supervisory authority of the Sec- to the General Land Office to show the ac-
retary on behalf of a stranger to the record, tion of the Land Office in the premises . 149
will not be entertained where such appli-O The land embraced within the Sangre de
cant can assert his rights through regular Christo grant at the date of the confirma-
proceedings, instituted for that purpose.... 403 tory act belonged to the United States if
not to the grantees, and it was therefore
Prelilption. competent for Congress to confirm the title
See Entry, Filing, Final Proof, Indian Lands. in the grantees either by a grant de noro
Right and extent of, determined by set- or by confirming the Mexican grant .... 203
tlement - ................... 72 Duty of the Commissioner to direct the
Law in the States admitted into the Union survey of, and to issue patents thereon, not
by the act of February 22,1890, not repealed limited to grants covered by the treaty of
by section 17 of said act . 307 Guadalupe Hidalgo ........................ 203
Right of, exhausted by transmutation - . 322 Section 1, act of February 25, 1869, does
Right of, exhausted by an entry made not authorize an appeal from the decision
without requisite compliance with law 290 of the local office on claims presented under
Default in compliance with the require- the Vigil and St. Vrain grant .............. 226
ments of the law can not be cured after en- Mexicangrantof quantity within a tract of
try ......................................... 290 larger area is a float, and the lands reserved
Claim initiated and maintained in the in- within such area are those that may be a-
terest of another is illegal, and the filing tually required to satisfy the float .......... 463
thereunder must be canceled ............... 548 For a specific place or rancho reserves
Right of, not defeated by failure to make the land included within the boundaries as
proof and payment prior to a day erro- finally ascertained3.................... .. 491,538
neously appointed for the public offering Nolan grant No. 39; statement of action
of the land, where such tract on the dis- made to the Secretary of State ............. 518
648 INDEX.
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Selections under the act of October 1, 1890, ing selection of the land so far as the rights
in lieu of lands belonging to the Ranoho of the settler are concerned ................ 271
Punta de la Laguna must be made within The act of July 28, 1866, reviving the
one year from date of said act, and may be grant of February 9, 1853. was not a new
by agent or attorney under appropriate in- donation of lands included within the limits
structions .............................. 512,550 of the original grant, but a waiver of the
Private Entry. terms of reversion contained in said grant.
Non-mineral affidavit properly required (St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern R.
with application, to make -....... .... 216 R. Co.) ................. .......... ......... . 17
Made in good faith, of the land covered Settlement and residence on an odd-num-
by the previous timber culture entry of the bered section, partly within the former
purchaser, may be referred to the board of boundaries of the "Indian country " claimed
equitable adjudication in the absence of by the Wahpetou and Sisseton Sioux, and
an adverse claim ........................... 395 wholly within the grant to the Northern
Pacific, does not, on the extinction of the
Public Land. Indian title, confer any right as against the
Within the limits of a railroad grant and grant, if on that part of the land within the
reduced in price by the act of June 15, 1880, Indian country . -.................... 502
is again raised to double minimum if it sub- The grant of March 3, 1871, not only con-
sequently falls within the limits of another templates a preliminary designation of the
grant ............. --- - --- 99 general route, but also a map of definite lo-
Section 4, act of March 2, 1889, does not cation, and bv such map the limits of the
reduce the priceof land within the limits of grant are determined. (Southern Pae) .- 582
a railroad grant if the portion of railroad Where the primarylimits of one company
opposite thereto was completed prior to the confict with the indemnity limits of an-
passage of said act ....-....... ......... 99 other, and both derive their grants from the
Purchaser. same act, the former is entitled to the lands
See Alienation, Homestead (sub-title, act in question, without regard to priority of
June 15, 1880). location or construction .................... 607
Raitroad Land. On a corroborated allegation that certain
Railroad Grant. land patented to the company is excepted
See nal Proof, Railroad Lands, Rht of' from its grant by reason of its known min-
ay, eral character, a hearing may be ordered to
ascertain whether the facts jstify jdicial
GEiNERALLY. proceedings for the recovery of title ....... 590
Takes effect on lands free at definite loca- The grant of July 1, 1862, and July 2, 1861,
tion- .............. ........ 91 is not controlled by the designation of the
Status of land at definite location deter- general route, bat by the definite location
mines whether it is subject to the grant of the road, and the departure of the corn
irrespective of any subsequent order of pany, in its location and construction of the
withdrawal .-. 186 road from the general route as designated
Inthe adjustmentof, the Department can b the map of 1866, does not abridge the
not depart from stat6tory authority to pro- grant ........-.-........ . 108
tect the rights of parties claiming under the Failure of the Leavenworth, Pawnee and
company -----------........... .... 607 Western Company to signify under seal its
Failure of the company to appear in re- acceptance of the provisions of the act of
spouse to final-proof notice precludes its July 1, 1862, does not defeat the right to
denial of the correctness of the case as patents thereunder ...... ........ ........ 108
made by the record, but forfeits no right The President's acceptance of the Union
shown thereby-......... ....... 91,633 Pacific road as constructed on its line of
Selection of land within granted limits definite location west of Fort Riley to the
confers no right ........... ............... 482 onehluudredth meridian, meets thestatutory
Right of selection under the act of June requirement that such route shall -be sub-
2, 1864, can not be exercised if the land is ject to the approval of the President, as the
covered by homestead settlement . 271 map of said route was accepted by the Sec-
Right to even sections under the act of rotary of the Interior, and the road con-
June 2,1864, within the six-mile limits of the structed on the faith of said acceptance. .. 108
grant of 1856 does not attach until selec- Directions given for the issuance of pat-
tion, and the right of selection can not be ents tothe Union Pacific company for lands
exercised until definite location of the modi- in the State of Kansas .................... 108
fled line-.-........... 271 The lateral limits of the grant as fixed by
Consent of the company to a judicial the original withdrawals, should not be read-
decree recognizing the validity of an entry justed with the view to recovering title to
under which settlement rights are alleged lands patented to the Missouri, Kansas and
is an abandonment of the company's pend- Texas Co. that may thus be shown to lie,
INDEX. 649
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outside of its grant, as () the title to said No action should be taken on selections
lands has passed out of the company (2), for lands covered by expired filings until
the original withdrawals must be presumed after notice to the claimants to assert 
any
to have been made after due consideration, rights they may possess ................... 
595
and (3) said withdrawals have stood unques- The right of selection is not defeated by
tioned for many years and titles vested the fact that the land selected is within 
the
thereunder -------------------- 130 primary limits of another grant, if such
Departmental action for the recovery of land at date of selection is vacant public
lands within the New York Indian Reserva- land . 135
tion patented to the Missouri, Kansas and The grant of February 9, 1853, as revived
Texas Co. under the grant of 1863, and acts and extended by the act of 1866, was in-
amendatory thereof, precluded by executive tended equally for every part of the road
and Congressional action based on the opin- and its branches, and deficiencies on one
ion (acquiesced in by-the Indians) that said branch may be made rip by selections from
reservation had ceased to exist ------------- 130 lands within the indemnity limits of the
In establishing the terminals separating other. (Little Rock and Memphis Co) --. 168
the granted lands from those forfeited, the A settlement claim acquired and main-
lines should be run at right angles to the tained in good faith after the revocation of
general course of the last twenty-five miles an indemnity withdrawal is good as against
of the road. (Northern Pac.) .............. 625 a subsequent selection ................. .. 49&
Under section 6 of the act of September A company claiming under a selection
29, 1890, the Northern Pacific should be re- within a revoked indemnity withdrawal
quired to elect as to the alternate odd- can not plead insufficient notice of an ad-
numbered sections it will take in satisfac- verse settlement claim where it appears in
tion of the moiety for its constructed branch response to final proof notice, files protest
line, where the limits of such line overlap and is heard thereon ... - ..... 494-
the limits of the forfeited mainline, and the Principles announced in the case of the
remaining odd sections be restored to the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha
public domain . -.-................... 625 Railway Company, 6 L. D., 193, followed in
The Gulf and Ship Island road required the adjustment of the grant to the Missouri,
to indicate the exact point where itslinewill Kansas and Texas Company . - '. 130
cross the New Orleans and Northeastern LANDS EXCEPTED.
road .-.-.....-... ........... 625 Does not take effect upon land covered by
Application for suspension of proceedings - an entry at date of definitelocation; and the
under the decision of January 24, 1890, in
the Wisconsin Central case denied ..- 61 subsequent cancellation of the entry 
does
Action suspended on the location, under not affect the status of the land under 
the
the forfeiture act, of the western terminal grant ------------ -------- ----- 
.. 157
line of the grant in aid of the Marquette, A homestead entry of record at date of
loughton rad Ontonago Rt M Co .. t....... 466 definite location excepts the land coveredHoughtonand Ontoagon N.E Co - 460 thereby from toe grant; and the entrymnan's
ACT OF JUNE 22, 1874. subsequent compliance with law is immate-
Amended by act of Congress August 29, Tial - ..............-------------.-..- 535.
1890, and circular issued thereunder, No- The company will not be heard to ques-
vember 1, 1890 .............................. 434 tion the validity of an entry or filing except
ACT OF APRIL 21, 1876. under allegation that the claim is void ab
Au entry mlade in good faith by an actual iine because the alleged settler was nut in
settler, before notice of withdrawal is re- existence at the date of the record ......... 53
ceived at the local office, and under which Erroneous allowance of an entry can not
compliance with law is shown, is confirmed divest the company of its right under the
by section 1, and the cancellation of such grant .............. ......... -- 430
entry prior to the passage of said act will A prima facie valid preemption filing of
not defeat the confirmatory operation there- record, when the grant takes effect, excludes
of -. .......... ................. 85 the land therefrom ........... 1,143,163,195,224
INDEMNITY. A prima facie valid preemption filing ex-
The right to select a particular tract not isting at date of definite location excepts
recognized if the basis is not specifically the land covered thereby from the opera-
designated ........... 1,428 tion of the grant; and the fact that 
the pre-
The order of May 28, 1883, permitting emptor did not reside upon, or improve the
selections without designating the basis, land does not relieve the gr ant from the 
ef-
did not extend to lands subject to settle- fect of the filing ............ 163,225-
ment, but only applied to lands protected A prima facie valid preemption filing of
by withdrawal (Nor. Pac) .................. 428 record at the date when the grant becomes
An expired preemption filing no bar to effective raises a presumption of settlement
selection ................................... 138 as alleged, and of the actualexistence of the
50 INDEX.
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claim, which is conclusive as against the date of definite location, will not except thegrant in the absence of an allegation that land covered thereby from the operation of
said filing was void eb inito ............... 224 the grant .................................. s
- A prima facie valid school selection of Occupancy of public land by an Indian
record when the grant becomes effective ex- who has not abandoned the tribal relation
cepts the land therefrom; the subsequent confers no homestead right under the act of
cancellation of the selection does not affect Ju ly 4, 1884. as against a grant that becomesthe status of the land --------------- 49 effective prior to the passage of said act..- 304Under the provisions of the grant of Feb- An allegation that land is excepted from,
rary 9,1853, lands covered by prima facie by a settlement claim, is not established by
validswampselections,whenitbecame effec- showing that the tract is included within ative, were excepted therefrom. St. Louis, large body of land improved and occupied,Iron Mountain and Southern R. R. Co.) ..- 157 as a whole, for a cattle ranch ............... 463A claim based on settlementresidence,and An allegation that land is excepted from,
-cultivation, existing at the date the grant by reason of a settlement claim, will be in-becomes effective, excepts the land covered vestigated even though such action may notthereby- 
........... 443, 589 inure to the benefit of the applicant 
- 444Failure of homestead settler to make entry Survey of a private claim, under the act
within the statutory period, will not relieve of July 1, 1864, not approved by the sur-the grant from the effect of the settlement veyor-general, the commissioner, or the
claim ------- 
---- 
-271 Secretary, is not effective as against the op-A valid settlement claim existing when eration of a ----------....---...-. 491the grant becomes effective excepts the The survey of a private claim that is notland therefrom, and the failure of the settler approved by the surveyor-general is not of-to place his claim of record can not be called fective as against a grant 538in question by the company 
- 482, 571 Lands within the larger outboundaries ofSettlement and residence of an alien does an unlocated private claim of quantity are
not except the land covered thereby from not excepted from, except as to the quan-the grant .-....... 
- . . 89, 354 tity required to satisfy the float ........... 463Settlement of an alien, is not effective as Lands not finally required to satisfy a pri-against the operation of the grant, and the vate claim for a specific place are not ex-
subsequent qualification of the settler will - cepted from ............................ 491, 538
not relate back to defeat the grant ........ 354 The case of Childs v. Southern Pacific R.When possession and occupancy alone R. Co. cited and followed ................ 49,465
are relied upon to except land, it must af- The right of purchase under section 2, actfirmatively appear that the party in such of June 15,1880, existing when the grant be-possession had the right to assert a claim comes effective, excepts the land therefrom. 596
under the settlement laws ... 531, 568, 584 The discovery of the mineral character ofOccupancy and possession of one who has land, at any time prior to the issuance of pat-
exhausted his rights under the homestead ent therefor, or certification where patent
and preemption laws do not constitute a is not required, effectually excludes such
'claim" that will defeat the operation of the land from a grant which contains a provisiongrant. (Northern Pacific) ----------------- 531 excepting all mineral lands therefrom ...... 238Occupancy of a tract by a qualified set- Lands within the grant to the Atlantictler at the date when the grant becomes ef- and Pacific are expressly excepted from thefeetiveexceptsthe land therefrom. North- later grant to the Southern Pacific; and theern Pacific) .......-....-... 
........ 584 forfeiture of certain lands granted to theLand under cultivation at date of definite former company confers no rights upon thelocation is excepted from the grant to the latter to select lands never embraced in itsNorthern Pacific, even though the claim- grant............... 
.. 534
ant did not at such time reside on the land 583 Definite location of the Northern PacificThe claim of a qualified settler who has did not take effect upon lands within thefor a long period maintained residence on previous indemnity withdrawal made under
unsurveyed land, and is in occupation there- the act of May 5, 186 ....... 7.. ............. 607of at date of withdrawal on designated The lands reserved for indemnity pr-
route, though not then residing thereon, is poses under the grant of June 3, 1856, are
sufficient to except it from a grant that pro- excluded by express terms from the granttects the occupancy of a homestead settler, made by section 3, act of May 5, 1864; and(Act of July 25, 1866) ..........- 5 ....... .. 571 the lands so reserved but not required asOccupancy, at definite location, by one indemnity do not become subject to the lat-
who holds under the company, and asserts ter grant on the final adjustment of the
no right under the settlement laws, will not former -----.........------- 615defeat the grant ---------------.. 471 WITHDRAWAL.
The occupancy of an Indian, who has not Takes effect upon usurveyed as well asabandoned the tribal relation, existing at surveyed land .. ........ 186
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On general routereserves the land until where the record shows that lands 
have
definite location, and the status of such land been patented to a railroad that 
were in fact
meanwhile is not affected by the fact that excepted from the grant -
588, 592
it subsequently falls within the limits of an The Department hasjurisdiction to enter-
order purporting to withdraw it for indem- tain an application for the re-instatement 
of
nity purposes ------------------------------ 92 an entry under said act if there has 
been no
Does not take effect upon land covered by formal adjustment of the grant ............ 358
a valid settlement claim ................... 437 An applicant for the right of 
re-instate-
On general route (Northern Pacific) does ment under said act will not be heard to
not take effect upon land covered by prima deny that he voluntarily abandoned 
his en-
facie valid preemption filing - 443, 471 try where he has sold and transferred 
for a
On general route does not take effect upon valuable consideration 'all his estatetitle,
land covered by a valid settlement right, and interest " to the land covered 
thereby. 358
and the land is thereafter open to settlement An application to purchase under 
section
and entry by the first legal applicant - 482 5 lands erroneously patented to a 
railroad
On general route does not take effect on company can not be entertained 
until a re-
land covered by a homestead entry even conveyance of title has been secured 
.... 590, 603
though the statutory life of such entry may Right of purchase under section 
5, not
have expired ------------------------------- 568 limited to immediate purchaser from the
Plea that a withdrawal can not take effect company, but extends to any bona fide pur-
before the company accepts the conditions chaser of the land who is qualified 
in the
imposed by the State, if effective for any I matter of citizenship; the qualificatious of
purpose, can only be set up by one who has his grantor or intervening purchasers 
are
been induced by such condition of affairs to not material -.----------- 
229
go upon land otherwise subject to the with- The second ploviso in section 5 applies
drawal - - ..--...-----..---.- 186 only to lands which, at the pissage of the
Order of Febrtiary 12 (11),1890, revoking act, had been settled upon after December
withdrawal for the Chicago, Minneapolis 1, 1882, by parties claiming in good faith 
a
and Omaha Railway Company modified . 607 right to enter the same under the 
settle-
Directions givenfora rule on certain com- ment laws in ignorance of the rights 
or
panies to show cause why the indemnity equitiesofothers -....................... 
607
withdrawals made for their benefit should Application to purchase under section 
5,
not be revoked .......... 8.................. 625 made by one claiming undera railroad com-
pany, can not be entertained until it has
Railroad Lands. been fin illy determined that the land is in
See Homestead (sub-title Generally.) fact excepted from the grant - --- 629
Circular of November 1, 1800, under the
the act of Auilit 2i, 189J, for the relief of Receiver and1 Register.
settlers on ------- . ... --- 43 l See Land Department.
Circalar of Norembi.r 7, 1890, under the Record.
act of October 1. 191, fir the relief of set- Circular with respet to exemplification
tlerson Northern Pacific indemnity 
8.... 
.. 435 o respect -- -xemplification
Instructioni ol lar the forfeiture act of
September 28,1890 ------------..-.-.-. 625 Rehearing.
ACT OF MARCH 3, 1887. See Practice.
Proceedings to recover title unler the act Reinstatement.
of 1887 taken on due application ........... 603 See Application, Jailroad ands.
Application to purchase under. section 5
must be presented in accordance with de- elinqimisliment
partmental regulations ...-........... .. . 536 Filed after initiation of contest 
does not
Application under the aot for reinstate- defeat the right of the contestant 
--------- 
65
ment will not be refused because not in a Filed during the pendency of 
a contest is
cordance with the regulations of February presumptively the result thereof, 
but such
13, 1889, where made prior to the formula- presumption is not conclusive -
210
tion of said regulations ....-..... ......... 359 Is not in aid of a pending contest 
unless
Directions given for the disposition of ap- filed as the result thereof ................... 
210
plications to purchase lands formerly with- Filed by the entryman terminates 
his
drawn for the Chicago, Minneapolis and rights in a pending contest with 
an adverse
OmahaRailway Company ................. 607 claimant ...... -.... 
.. 251
Decision of the General Land Office on Framed in terms of absolute and 
uncon-
ex parte proceedings, holding that the land ditional surrender of all rights 
claimed
is subject to the grantdoes not preclude de- thereunder, is not limited in its operation
partmental action under said act .......... 226 by a statement therein that it 
is made for
The act is mandatory, and calls for judi- the purpose of making a new entry in lien
cial proceedings for the recovery of title of the one relinquished .................... 
341
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Page. Page.Of homestead entry not defeated by the of inhabitancy, and the claimant's relationprotest of the entryman's wife ............. 352 to the land after final proof may be con-Failure of the local office to act upon will sidered-450
not defeat equities arising thereunder 592 One who purchases land from a State, byIs not effected by an informal paper exe- virtue of his residence thereon, is precluded
cuted and held for the purpose of securing thereby from claiming residence on publicthe payment of a note ... 597 land during the period covered by his proof
Repayment. under the State law ........... .. ... 161-A mortgagee, whose claim is merely lien Official employment can not be accepted
on the land is not entitled to ......-...-... 283 as an excuse for the want of, where the entryCan not be allowed in the case of a desert is made with a full knowledge that such em-
entry canceled because made for speculative ploymeut will prevent inhabitancy of thepurposes and for land not desert in charac- land -
---------- 
- 280ter ................ .... ..... Leave of absence accorded under sectionApplication for, waives pending appeal 3, act of March 3, 1883, can oulv be allowedfrom an order of cancellation . - .624 on due showinX that such absence is made
necessary by sickness, failure of crops, orReservation. other unavoidable casualty ...... 6......... 631
For a proper purpose (preservation of HO-mESTcAD.
"mammoth trees") made bythe localoffice, Failure to establish within six months
on the request of the surveyor-general, if from entry not cured by the value of the
unrevoked, may be considered as approved improvements, where a contest is broughtby the Department, and the land included on the gi-onud of such default ........ 602
therein reserved from disposal ............. 60 Must be shown to cover period not in-Entry erroneously allowed for laud cov- eluded within military service ...... 6...... 36
ered by Indian, mat be held intact on the The plea of sickness and poverty can not
release of the land .................... 231 be received as an excuse for failure to estab-Agricultural lands formerly within the lish, unless good faith is shown, and it isSioux Indian, and opened to settlement un- apparent the failure is d n to the causes al-der the act of March 2, 1889, subject to dis- leged ................. 
............. 497position only under the homestead law.... 231 Temporary absences on account of ex.
Residence. ceptional cireumstances may be excused,See Settlement. but such absences should be the exceptionTo establish, there must be, concurrent and not the rule .. ......... 422
with the act of settlement, an intent to. make PREEMPTION.
the land a holue, tothe exclusion of one else- Absence occurring after settlement does
where ..- 41.. 450 not affect the rightof thesettler if he returnsWhen once established to the exclusion to the land prior to the intervention of any
of a home elsewhere, and the improvements adverse claim, and thereafter resides there-indicate good faith, temporary absences on on in due compliance with law ------------- 307
business may be excused .......-........... 505 Res JuTdicata.
Can not be established through the acts An expression of opinion by the Commis-
of another ........... ..................... 2 sioner as to the validity of an entry pendingNotacquirednorinaintainedby occasional before the local office, will not preclude said
visits to the land .................... 
... 284, 469 Commissioner, or his successor, from a fullOf husband and wife, while they liveito- examination of the case when reached ingether as such, is the same; and the home regular order-....... ..-. . -
of the wife is presumptively with her hus- A decision losg acquiesced in will not beband .-. . ... . 22 reconsidered on the mere allegation of errorFailure of the wife to reside on the land in construing the law - ------ . 232
until after notice of contest does not im- A departmental decision that land is min-peach the good faith of the claimant where oral in character does not preclude subse-it is apparent that her final removal to the quent investigation on the part of the De-land is in compliance with a previous bona partment as to the character of such nd- 441fide intention of the claimant to make his Final adverse decision of the Department
home on the land ............ ........ 543 precludes favorable consideration of a sub-Separate, can not attlie sametime he main- sequent application of the same party rais-
tained by husband and wife, in a housebuilt ing the same question .................. 46&
across te line between two settlement Final decision of the Secretary is not sub
claims. In such a case the claimants may ject to review by his successor in office .- . 504
elect which tract they will retain - 1 207 The issuance of a final certificate by theIn determining whether the claim of, is local office can not be set up by te entry-
made in good faith, the fitness of the land man as an adjudication that precludes such
as a place of permanent abode, the period office from rendering a decision on a hearing
INDEX. 653
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subsequently ordered by the General Land Settlement.
Office ...................................... 473 See Indian Lands, Oklaomrea, Settlers.
Rights of, not acquired without personal
Review. acts on the part of the settler ............. 175
See Prfactie. Actual notice of the extent of a claim
Revised Statutes. made by, will protect such claim as against
See Revised Statutes cited and construed, the entry of another -------------- 404
page xIx. And residence of one who fails through
mistake to include the land within his entry,
Right of Way. will be protected as against the subsequent
Maps showing a continuous line of road occupetion of another who takes forcible
may be submitted for approval, though ox- possession with fall knowledge of the facts. 394
hibiting sections of road in excess of 20 And residence of an alien confers no
miles ----------------------- 384 rights ..-- .---..... .... ... ......----89,354
Application for, will not be approved in Of an alien is ineffectual, and his ight
the absence of due proof showing the organ- will not relate back on subsequent qualifi-
ization of the company under its incorpora- cation, to defeat the intervening claim of
tion ........... -............ ..... 432 another -.... 354
A map filed within twelve months after On land covered by the open and notorious
definite location, which is returned for occupancyand possession of another, is with
amendment, will be held to have been filed notice of any rights that may exist in the
in time, thongh the statutory period may I prior occupant .---- --- -- 191
expire before the perfected map is filed --- 52 Rights acquired by, are abandoned as to
A map will not be approved if the state- the land not included within the entry-.557
ments ir the certificateand affldavit accom- Made with the intention to secure title
panyingthe sameare not in accordance with under section 2287, R. S., and without resi-
the facts as otherwise shown .............. 552 deuce on the land, is not in good faith, and
Reservoir Lands. does not authorize a purchase under said
section ....................... .
Circular of July 22,1890, issued under the Right not established on a showing that
act of June 20, 1890, authorizing the resto the tract is included within a large body of
rationof certain lands withdrawn for reser- t ae is and oddepied s a whole for
voir purposes21 land.. improve an occupie as. a2hoe2oa cattle ranch .............................. 463
School Land. One who is occupying land as the tenant
Indemnity selection made by the Terri- of an entryman. acquires no right as a set-
tory of Washington, under section 2275, R. tier, on the relinquishment of the entry,
S., reserves the laud covered thereby; and that can be set up to defeat the intervening
lands thus selected are not released from entry of another-178
such reservation by the act admitting said One who, residing on land as the tenant of
Territory into the Union - ............. 381, 382 lanother, may, on the termination of suchTerritory into the Union reltion,.acqure.a.vali settlemet right by
The authority to make indemnity selec- relation, acquire a valid settlementh s
tions rests with the county commissioners, remaining thereon and improving the same
who derive their authority from the act of with the intent to make it a permanent
March 2,1853. (Washington) .............. 382 home-7. ..... - 72, 284
If the State takes indemnity for land re- One who enters upon land as the repre-
turned as mineral, it is estopped from assert- sentative of another, and remains thereon
ing a further claim to the basis, even though in such capacity, is not a settler within the
it is in fact agricultural land. (Colorado).. 50 meaning of the preemption law ........... 63
Settlement on, prior to survey, by one who On land withdrawn from entry confers
has exhausted his preo-mptive right, and no right as against the government, bat as
claims as a homesteader, does not defeat the between claimants for such land priority of
reservation, if the survey is made prior to settlement may be considered 197
the act of May 14, 1880 ................ 527 On laud covered by the entry of anotheris at once effective on the cancellation of
Scrip. such entry-............ .-197
Where an application to locate covers non- On land covered by anentry confers no
contiguous ttacts, and is allowed for one, right as against the record entryman, but as
and rejected as to the other, on account of between subsequent claimants the settle-
non contiguity, the entry allowed may be ment first in time is entitled to the highest
canceled on request and the scrip returned, consideration on cancellation of the exist-
if the government, by such action, sustains ing entry - - - - - 284
no loss ............................. .... 328 Acts of, on land held in reservation con-
Issued under the act of June 2, 1858, in fer no right against the government, but
satisfaction of a private claim, may only be may be considered in determining the prior-
located on land subject to private entry.... 378 ities of subsequent claimants 452
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On lands subject to the operation of a Stare Decisis.
railroad grant confers no rights .. . 91 The General Land Office in the disposi-
HOMESTEAD. tion of cases that fall within well-settled
Followed by residence and improvement, rulings of the Department must be gov-
confers a right of homestead that attaches erned by such rulings until they are re-
from date of settlement, and such right is versed by departmental authority . 174
not impaired by the subsequent occupation Survey
of the land by cowneite settlers on the day Should not be approved if the corners are
of such settlement 
- 330 not marked on the ground as indicated
Not made in good faith, but with a view therein and as required by the regulatious 93
tospeculatiou, does not confer any right - e0 Oirular of uine 2,1887, 5 L. D., G99, with
Can not be made by one who is at the same respect to the subdivision of sections, c-
time maintaining a settlement chain for an- issued- to . : o . r 03
other tract under the preemption law 559
Not affected by the fact that it is made Swamp Land.
pending the issuance of final certificate on In the investigation of claims the proceed.
preemption proof, previously submitted in ings of a special agent should be in accord-
due compliance with law . . . 182 ance with departmental regulations . 222
PRERMPTION. The claim of the State, while pending on
May be shown to have been made at a dif. adjustment, should not be considered as
ferent and earlier date than allegedin the "walved in the abene 228
declaratory statement --------------------- 143 
..
On reserved land confers no right of pro- Timber Culture.
6mption . . 477 See Contest, ntry.
Of the preemptor defines the extent of Entryman may take advantage of break-
the claims - - - - - 72 ing done by a previous occupant of the
land -.. 43,469Settlers. Entryinan who entrusts the care of his
Act of August 29, 1890, for the relief of, claim to an agent is responsible for the fail-
on railroad lands; circular of November 1, ure of such agent to perform the requisite
1890 - --.... - ----- ,-,-,, 414 acts in compliance with law . 161,289
Act of October 1, 1890, for the relief of, Where the failure to secure a growth of
on Northern Pacific indemnity lands; cir- timber results from the want of ordinary
eular of November 7, 1890 . -.. .. 435 diligence the entry must be canceled 183
Failure to break the full acreage does notSioux Indian Lands. call for cancellation, where good faith is
See Indian Lands. manifest and the default is cured when dis-Soldier's ho niestead. ~~covered-..................189S o die r' s l1o 01 e ste ad. Sowing tree seeds on frozen ground partly
See Homestcad. covered with snow can not be accepted as
Special Agent. compliance with law, especially where it
See Practice. appears that the work might have been done
seasonably and in good order ............... 289
States amid Territories. Planting before the tine fixed by the law
The title to land sold and segregated by is compliance with its requirements, if the
the State as swamp, prior to the act of July land has been properly prepared . 460
23, 1866, is confirmed in the State by the Failure to secure the requisite growth of
second clause of section 4 of said act if the trees does not call for cancellation where
segregation conforms to the "system of such result is not due to negligence in plant-
surveys " adopted by the United States. ing and cultivation, but to the character of(Cal)- ....... the season, and seed that proved defective. 468
The supervision of the Commissioner of One who has complied with the law, sub-
the General Land Office in approving town- mitted proof and received final certificate,
ship plate showing segregation surveys is not required to replant where the trees
made by the State ?rior to the act of 1866 is are subsequently destroyed . - . 56
limited to determiningwhethersaidsurveys Timber and Stone Act.
conform to the system of surveys " Recognizes the right of preemption on
adopted by the United States. oSetable, if lands chiefly valuable for timber .......... 7,145
fraud is alleged the Commissioner may re- Entry made by an employd of surveyor-
fuse his approval. (Cal.) - . ..- .37 general's office is invalid and must be can-
celed .- . 96Statutes. Does not authorize entry of land included
See ets of Congress, and Revised Statutes, within a bona fide preemption claim, and
cited and construed, pages xviII and xIx. the right of the preomptor is not limitedAN-
